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A c K n o W L E d G m E n T S

i.
“Learning to unlearn” grew out of ten years of conversations and collabora-
tions on issues of common interest. As an Uzbek-Cherkess living in Moscow 
and of an ethnically Muslim family, Madina was concerned with colonial 
questions in Central Asia and the Caucasus. As a son of Italian immigrants 
to Argentina and living in the U.S., Walter was concerned with the colonial 
question in the Americas. It was clear to us that the Russian/Soviet colonies 
and colonies in South and Central America and the Caribbean have paral-
lel histories vis-à-vis colonial relations and with regards to imperial control 
and domination. At the same time, in South America, the history of imperial 
control is tied to the history of capitalism, in the West, while Central Asia 
and the Caucasus have a different pedigree, due to the subaltern and non-
Western or not-quite-Western nature of the empires that controlled them in 
the past (the Ottoman Sultanate, Russia, the Soviet Union). From the six-
teenth century to today, South America and the Caribbean and the Russian 
colonies (first, the Volga region, Siberia, the Baltic region, the Crimea; and 
from the late eighteenth to the nineteenth century on, the Caucasus and Cen-
tral Asia), followed parallel histories vis-à-vis the Western imperial designs 
(Spain, Holland, France, England, the U.S.) and vis-à-vis the Russian Czar-
dom, the Russian Empire (from Peter the Great onward), the Soviet Union 
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and the Russian Federation today. The U.S. started its advances toward South 
America at the beginning of the nineteenth century and has continued to 
advance until today, while the Russian Federation, its current remaining col-
onies and newly independent post-Soviet states, also have to confront the 
interests of the U.S. in Eurasia.
 As the conversation and collaboration progressed, it began to turn around 
two key concepts: imperial and colonial differences and their modulations in 
the modern/colonial world order from 1500 to 2000. The first modulation 
was the external imperial difference between the Russian Czardom, and later 
Russian Empire, in relation to Western empires. Consequently, we asked 
ourselves, what would be the difference between imperial/colonial con-
figurations in the West framed by Western Christianity, secular Liberalism 
and Marxism and imperial/colonial configurations in Russia and Eastern 
Christianity, and later on, in the Soviet Union. More concretely, the ques-
tion turned to the colonial configurations of Central Asia and the Caucasus 
under the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and South 
America and the Caribbean first under the direct Spanish and Portuguese 
colonization and, after the formation of the “independent” republics, the 
indirect colonization by Britain and France in collaboration with the local 
Creole elites, on the other. Once we reached this point, we moved to the 
internal imperial difference among Western capitalist empires. For example, 
the so-called Black Legend that England launched against Spain in the sec-
ond half of the seventeenth century and the making of the South of Europe 
through which Latin and Catholic countries leading during the Renaissance 
were demoted to a secondary role in the second modernity (i.e., the Enlight-
enment). We arrived at a conclusion that had been expressed historically 
before: the fact that Russia and Spain became two countries at the margins 
of enlightened modernity. The core of our argument evolves around this set 
of concepts. We are not “comparing” Central Asia and the Caucasus, on the 
one hand, with South America and the Caribbean, on the other, but rather 
analyzing the underlying colonial matrix of power maintaining the illusion 
that these “areas” are far apart from each other (and they are, as far as local 
histories are concerned), while in fact they are linked to Western hegemony 
by the logic of coloniality.
 We are not comparing them, because Central Asia and the Caucasus, on 
the one hand, and South America and the Caribbean, on the other, are two 
complex “regions” located in the colonial matrix of power. They belong to 
the same universe. It is only from a modern and imperial epistemological 
assumption that they are seen as “two distinct areas to be compared.” They 
have local histories for sure. But their local histories are interconnected with 
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the local Western imperial history. This point is crucial in our argument. 
As both are regions within the colonial matrix, they are entangled with the 
West. The Central Asia and southern Caucasus entanglement is part of the 
history of Russia/Soviet Union up to the recent formation of the independent 
states after the collapse of the Soviet Union. South American and the Carib-
bean went through a similar process: Spain and Portugal were the impe-
rial countries from which South America and the Caribbean first gained 
their independence; and later on, the processes continued in the British, 
Dutch, and French Caribbean. So, what we are looking at here is a complex 
network of imperial and colonial differences: external imperial differences 
between the Western empires and the Russian Empire/Soviet Union and 
internal imperial differences between the South of Europe and the Western 
post-Enlightenment empires (France, England, Germany), whose intellec-
tuals were responsible for making the European Catholic South an inferior 
sector of Europe. Furthermore, we take into account the external colonial 
difference that Europe created in relation to the Indians and Africans. This 
relation was reproduced by the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. We are 
not dealing in this book with the internal colonial difference, which worked 
in the classification of the European internal “others”: Jews and Romany, 
mainly.
 It is necessary to make it clear from the start that, although the point of 
origination of the particular conceptual structure (modernity/coloniality/
(de)coloniality) was located in South America, its scope is not limited to 
South America and the Caribbean. To think that way would be similar to 
believing that, if the concept of “biopolitics” originated in Europe, it is valid 
only for Europe. It is important to make this clarification, because there is 
an unconscious tendency to think that theories that originate in the Third 
World (or among Black or gay intellectuals) are valid only for the Third 
World (or Black and gay people), while theories that originate in the First 
World (and created by White and heterosexual people) have a global if not 
universal validity. This modern and imperial way of thinking is coming to 
its end. But we know that the belief that the Whites have knowledge and 
the Indians have Wisdom; the Blacks have experience and the Whites have 
philosophy; the Third World has culture and the First World has science 
unfortunately is still well and alive. And what we say is that it is time to start 
learning to unlearn this assumption among others in order to relearn.
 The somewhat coeval imperial beginnings of Russia and Spain in the 
sixteenth century1 were followed up by Spain’s demise in the eighteenth cen-
tury and the beginning of Russia’s doomed catching up race with the great 
empires of modernity. Russia and Spain “at the margin of the West” (the first 
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because it never got to the center no matter how much it yearned to, and 
the second because it lost its place there) was a metaphor shared by Spanish, 
Latin American, and Russian historians and philosophers alike (Ana María 
Schop Soler (1971), Leopoldo Zea (1958), or Vassily Klyuchevsky (2009)). 
Paradoxically, when Peter changed his title of the Czar to that of the Emperor 
(early eighteenth century), the “external imperial difference” between West-
ern and non-Western civilizations was consolidated. Simultaneously, in the 
eighteenth century, Spain lost its former imperial clout, became the South of 
Europe, and originated the “internal imperial difference.” Both Russia and 
Spain lost the train of the second modernity, that of the Enlightenment, the 
Industrial Revolution, and the birth of the secular nation-states.
 Consequently, the Russian colonies, on the one hand, and South America 
and the Caribbean, on the other, were recast according to the new world 
order dictated by the leadership of England, France, and Germany—the 
“heart or Europe” in Hegel’s metaphor, in politics, economy, philosophy, and 
sciences. As Russia was getting more and more tightly entangled in the net 
of intellectual and cultural dependency on Europe, bordering on self-colo-
nization, its methods of conquering the new territories were becoming more 
and more similar to European ones, and the previous relative tolerance of 
other religions and ethnicities gave place to open genocide and racism. Ivan 
the Terrible, three hundred years earlier, was able to have as his second wife a 
daughter of Cherkess prince Temryuk or a Tatar deputy on the throne, but in 
the nineteenth century discourses, the inhabitants of the Caucasus or Central 
Asia were already unequivocally coded as inferior beings. The final conquer-
ing of these territories in the middle and the second half of the nineteenth 
century took place in the context of discourses on racism, Orientalism, and 
Eurocentrism, which were borrowed from Europe and subsequently dis-
torted by the Russians—due to their own dubious status. The main rival 
of the Russian Empire then was the Ottoman Sultanate, which shared with 
Russia its second-rate status, while the Russian inferiority complex with 
respect to the unattainable Western empires of modernity was compensated 
in the conquering of the Caucasus and Central Asia, which were racialized in 
accordance with the notions of the post-Enlightenment Europe in this new 
colonial period of imperial management.
 Meanwhile, in South America and the Caribbean, many countries gained 
independence from Spain and Portugal in the nineteenth century, just to 
enter in the first period of imperialism without colonies. England controlled 
the economy while France had strong political investments (e.g., the name 
of “Latin” America was a geopolitical move of French imperial expansion; it 
dominated the intellectual life as well as shaped the state universities). Like 
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Africa and Asia in the second half of the twentieth century, South American 
countries gained independence from the former empires, in order to remain 
dependent on new imperialism.
 Thus, while Russia remained and Spain became a marginal empire in the 
eighteenth century and they were located in the external and internal impe-
rial differences, respectively, the colonies of Central Asia and the Caucasus 
that were acquired by Russia in the post-Enlightenment phase of modernity 
were regarded differently from the colonies gained in the sixteenth–eigh-
teenth centuries. The previously existing relations and ways of interpreting 
the indigenous populations of Central Asia and the Caucasus were com-
pletely erased from the Russian memories and replaced with the borrowed 
Western discourses. This was particularly clear in case of the Circassian 
genocide and Circassians’ subsequent exile to the Ottoman Sultanate in the 
mid-nineteenth century (Circassian Genocide 2008, Shenfield 2008). As for 
South America, these ex-colonies were relocated by updating the external 
colonial difference put in place in the sixteenth century. The colonial differ-
ence came into being in the process of debating the humanity of the inhab-
itants of Anahuac and Tawantinsuyu, renamed “Indias Occidentales” by 
Spaniards and “America” by a group of intellectuals in northern France and 
southern Germany, at the suggestion of Martin Waldseemüller. “Indian” as 
the name of the people and “Indias Occidentales,” as that of the place, are two 
anchors of the colonial difference. Not only was a name that was not theirs 
imposed onto the people, they were also cast as inferior to Christians and 
Spaniards. Enslaved Africans transported to the New World were the second 
group of renamed people: all enslaved Africans became “Black” disregarding 
their original kingdom of origin in Africa, respective languages, and sacred 
beliefs.
 People of the Caucasus and later Central Asia were also reclassified by 
the Russian Empire within the frame of the racist logic imported from the 
West and superimposed onto the existing religious frame. From the “Busur-
man” of the first modernity (a term originating arguably in the word “Musul-
man”—Muslim), coming to gradually embrace all non–Orthodox Christian 
people, the Russian construction of otherness came to the concept of “inoro-
dets” (usually translated as “alien” but literally meaning the one who was 
born an other), in the early nineteenth century, when the religious difference 
was replaced with a racial, ethnic, and civilizational one to be essentialized. 
Thus, in the second modernity, the Muslim confession of Central Asia and 
partly the Caucasus was turned into the color of skin. So that, on top of the 
legal term “inorodets” (which included the Pagan nomads, the Muslims, and 
the Jews alike), there was also the term “Tatar” in use to define all Muslims, 
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similarly to the West, where the Muslims were called Arabs or Turks regard-
less of their ethnicity. The topographic and ethnic renamings intensified 
and acquired a more planned strategic element in Soviet nation building in 
the remapped borders, invented ethnicities and languages, and erased his-
tories. As a result of the Soviet modernization, the religious difference was 
completely translated into race and the Caucasus and Central Asian people 
acquired the common name of “Blacks” that they still carry. The Orthodox 
Christian commonality of Russians with Osetians (until the war with Geor-
gia over South Osetia), Georgians, or Armenians has been systematically 
downplayed and replaced with racism and Orientalism from the nineteenth 
century until now.
 All of this was taking place at the time when the European philolo-
gists and intellectuals were rebuilding and enacting the colonial difference 
in their definition of the Orientals and the creation of Orientalism. In this 
move, Muslims became Arabs and Turks and the original imperial difference 
between the Spanish Empire and the Ottoman Sultanate lost the religious 
underpinning, while secular ethnicity entered in the Western redrawing of 
the external colonial difference. It is precisely at this point that the Cauca-
sus and Central Asia entered the imperial imaginary of Russia in the role of 
Russia’s own secondhand Orient. The internal colonial difference was also 
remapped during the same period: Jews, as a religious group, became secu-
larized as ethnic Jews, a transformation that had its dramatic consequences 
in the holocaust.
 We do not present a new version of historical grand narrative but rather 
revisit the local histories of different geopolitical spaces, and always within 
the colonial matrix of power. We do this not with the simple goal of adding 
certain crucial facts and notions to the existing historical interpretations, 
although in many cases this is in itself an important and still unaddressed 
task. Our goal instead is to look at these seemingly familiar historical events 
from the position of border thinking and border consciousness, sensitive 
to the colonial and imperial difference, and to do so necessarily in the con-
text of the rhetoric of modernity based on the logic of global coloniality 
in its various manifestations (Western capitalism and liberalism, socialism, 
the discourses of subaltern empires, etc.). Border thinking is theorized in 
more detail later. Since there is no outside position from which the colonial 
matrix can be observed and described (we are all within it), border thinking 
emerges in the process of delinking from the colonial matrix and escaping 
from its control. Suffice it to say here that, by border thinking, we mean a 
specific epistemic response from the exteriority of Western modernity, a 
response from the outside created from the perspective of the inside (that is, 
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the exteriority in building its own identity as humanitas). This means that 
while we are all in the colonial matrix, not everyone belongs to its memories, 
feelings, and ways of sensing. Many of us have been “trapped” in the colonial 
matrix but do not “belong” to it. Therefore it becomes essential to delink, and 
border epistemology-cum-decolonial thinking is one way of doing it. Border 
thinking is the epistemology enacted in the variegated responses, around 
the globe, to the violence of the imperial territorial epistemology and the 
rhetoric of modernity with its familiar defects, from forced universal salva-
tion to taking difference to sameness, from subject-object split to naturaliza-
tion of Western epistemic privilege. Thus, we perform an act of demarcation 
or delimiting with the previous principles of interpretation of history and 
modernity, without which it is not possible to enact the decolonization of 
being, thinking, and knowledge—another crucial notion and goal that runs 
throughout the book and connects our otherwise divergent local histories, 
working for the open utopia of the global decolonial move. We, therefore, 
enact border thinking in building our argument, which means that we do 
not place ourselves as detached observers (the myth of modern epistemol-
ogy) but as involved and embodied in the process we describe. We have 
this particular step in mind when we speak of the necessity of “learning to 
unlearn”—to forget what we have been taught, to break free from the think-
ing programs imposed on us by education, culture, and social environment, 
always marked by the Western imperial reason.
 Therefore, when we say that we became interested in the colonial ques-
tion, we do not mean that we became immersed in the meticulous diachronic 
study and detached detailed comparison of the conquest of the New World 
and the imperial march of Russia taking over Eurasia. Rather we felt that, 
under all their differences and incommensurability, these local histories that 
we have just sketchily presented, share some kind of common logic in the 
way coloniality (the logic under all forms of colonialism since 1500) affected 
the consciousness, subjectivity, economy, gender and sexual relations, think-
ing, social and political processes of peripheral Eurasia and South/Central 
America and the Caribbean. This commonality, as we discovered later and 
try to demonstrate in what follows, was not connected with the histories of 
concrete empires and their colonies regarded as isolated and well-formed 
entities to be compared within the Western comparative studies approach, 
but rather was a result of what can be called “global coloniality” and defined 
as a model of power relations that came into existence as a consequence of 
the Western imperial expansion but did not end with the official end of colo-
nialism and colonial administrations. It survives in culture, labor, intersub-
jective relations, knowledge production, books, cultural patterns, and other 
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aspects of modern existence (Maldonado-Torres 2007: 243). The word “colo-
niality” has a specific theoretical and historical meaning for us as members 
of modernity/coloniality international collective (Escobar 2007, Yehia 2006). 
Historically, coloniality names the darker side of modernity. Conceptually, 
coloniality is the hidden side of modernity. By writing modernity/coloniality, 
we mean that coloniality is constitutive of modernity and there is no moder-
nity without coloniality.
 By using the concept of “global coloniality,” we want to avoid such terms 
as “alternative” or “peripheral modernities,” at the same time underlying the 
hidden agenda of modernity, alternative or peripheral. We also intent to go 
beyond the British colonial history on which postcolonial studies were largely 
built and attempt to reinscribe the forgotten colonial history of the Spanish 
empire and take into account the enormous significance of the surfacing of 
the Atlantic economy (the western coasts of Africa, the western coasts of 
Europe and the eastern coasts of the Americas), displacing the weight that 
the Mediterranean had for the Western confines of the world until 1500. Fur-
thermore, we take into account the Russian colonial history, and the split of 
the Enlightenment project into two modernities (the liberal and the social-
ist) after 1917. Subsequently, with the fall of the Soviet Union, today’s neo-
liberalism is running wild, creating the conditions for the emergence of what 
we describe here as polycentric capitalism.
 Whether the historical foundation of modernity is located in the six-
teenth century, the “discovery” of America, and the European Renaissance or 
in the European Enlightenment and the French Revolution, modernity has 
been explicitly and implicitly linked with Western Christendom, seculariza-
tion, Western types of imperialism (i.e., Spain, Portugal, Holland, France, 
England, the U.S.), and capitalist economy. In that Eurocentric version of 
modernity, fashioned from the very imperial history of Europe, coloniality 
had to remain silenced. But the triumphal march of modernity cannot be 
celebrated from the imperial perspective without bringing to the foreground 
that religious salvation implied the extirpation of idolatry; civilization meant 
the eradication of non-European modes of life, economy, and political orga-
nization; and a development within capitalist economy and market democ-
racy in Western political theory. In that version of history, two major issues 
are left in the background that helps in enhancing the idea of modernity and 
hiding the logic of coloniality.
 The first was the triumphal conceptualization of modernity and its hid-
den complicity with the spatial and temporal “differences” and with coloni-
ality. Modernity, to be conceived as such, needed (and still needs) a break 
with the past within internal European history. Therefore, it colonized time 
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and invented the idea of the Middle Ages thus putting in place the histori-
cal foundation of modern time. Almost simultaneously, the very concept of 
“discovery of America” contributed to the historical foundation of modern 
space. It was a discovery of a continent that did not yet exist, as there was no 
such a thing as America when Columbus landed in the Caribbean islands. 
Furthermore, the Christian conceptualization of the “discovery” of a conti-
nent that has been inhabited for about thirty thousands years, according to 
current estimates, was marked by the efforts of Christian intellectuals in the 
sixteenth century to make the “new” continent and people fit biblical history 
and the Christian Tripartite geopolitical order. It was from and in Europe 
that the classification of the world emerged and not from Asia, Africa, or 
America. The Middle Ages were integrated into the history of Europe, while 
the histories of Asia, Africa, and America were denied as history. By the 
eighteenth century, when the “barbarians” in space where transformed (e.g., 
Lafitau 1724) into the “primitives” in time, the colonization of the world by 
the European Empire brought together and distinguished the time/space of 
modernity from the time/space of non-modern Europe and non-modern 
America, Asia, and Africa.2 “Modern” imperialism and, therefore, colonial-
ism (as distinct from Roman, Islamic, and Ottoman) rests on two basic and 
interrelated pillars: the internal colonization of time in the internal history 
of Europe (i.e., the Middle Ages) and the external colonization of space in 
the external history of Europe (of the Americas first, by Spain and Portugal; 
of Africa and Asia since the nineteenth century by England and France; and 
of strategic places of the globe, mainly since the second half of the twentieth 
century by the U.S.).
 Thus, we make the distinction here between imperialism/colonialism as 
singular, historical processes, on the one hand, and the rhetoric of moder-
nity/the logic of coloniality, on the other. From the biblical macro-narrative, 
we inherited the idea that there is a linear history from the creation of the 
first man and the first woman by God until the final judgment. From Georg 
W. F. Hegel, we inherited the secular version of the sacred narrative: the idea 
that History is a linear process that began in the East many centuries ago, 
then moved West and, at the time Hegel was writing, History was dwell-
ing in Germany, although its future was already destined to move further 
West to the United States of America (Hegel [1822] 1991). From Frances 
Fukuyama (1992), we inherited the idea that History has arrived at its end. 
Although these macro-narratives are Christian and Western, the expansion 
of the West all over the globe has made these narratives the points of refer-
ence (not necessarily of conviction) for the entire world—similar to the way 
Hollywood and Wall Street are also global reference points. The concepts of 
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colonial and imperial differences alter significantly the calm waters of a lin-
ear history that has arrived at its end with the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
as Fukuyama has it. The rhetoric of modernity (i.e., the Renaissance idea of 
“les ancients et les modernes”) was founded and expanded, in the internal 
history of Europe and the U.S., in the language of progress and newness. To 
be modern, people or countries had to be at the tip and the top of history, 
at the tip and the top of “human” evolution. With regards to the Muslims in 
the North of Africa, the Indians in America, the Africans in Africa and in 
the Americas, and the Ottomans, to be “modern” meant to be civilized and 
distinct from the barbarians (and after the Enlightenment, distinct from the 
primitives). Thus, the foundation of the rhetoric of modernity consisted of 
affirming the point of arrival of the societies in which the men who were tell-
ing the story and conceiving modernity were residing; it provided and still 
provides the justification for the continuing colonization of time and space: 
“bringing” modernity to the world (in terms of conversion to Christianity, to 
civilization, to market democracy), became a “mission” that, in the name of 
progress and development, has justified colonization, from the conquest of 
Mexico to the conquest of Iraq.
ii.
Why did we decide to write this book? Several reasons motivated our deci-
sion. First and foremost, we did it as a contribution to shifting the geog-
raphy of reasoning, in Lewis Gordon’s formulation (Gordon 2006) and to 
disengage from the assumption that certain “areas” (Central Asia and the 
Caucasus; South/Central America, the Caribbean), or certain “minorities” 
in a developed country (e.g., Latinos and Latinas in the U.S.) are “objects” 
to be studied. We ask first not what has to be studied but who is doing the 
study and for what? In other words, why has the world been divided into 
areas of investigation? Who benefits from such investigations? Argentinean 
philosopher Rodolfo Kusch devoted all his “thinking life” (as a thinker and a 
philosopher within and outside of the academy) to arguing that we can make 
no form of affirmation without being involved and transformed in our act of 
affirming (Kusch 1978).
 The argument of our book consists in a sustained effort to shift the geog-
raphy of reasoning from the enunciated (or object/area to be described and 
explained) to the enunciator (the subject doing the description and expla-
nation). This is of fundamental importance because there is an ideological 
assumption in mainstream epistemology according to which subjects who 
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are not Euro-Americans are mere tokens of their own culture. This presup-
position implies that knowledge is located in a given “area” (Western Europe 
and the U.S.) and controlled by certain people (the secular White quantita-
tive minority). The second reason for writing this book is to disobey such 
taken-for-granted assumptions. We posit ourselves as epistemic subjects who 
take on the world from our own lived experiences and education. And rather 
than being tokens of our culture, we take “as our object of study” the West-
ern imperial formations and the Western Christian and secular elites who 
created institutions of knowledge that became, imperially, the measure of all 
possible knowledges.
 We just wrote “knowledge’s” in plural but it came out automatically 
(Microsoft Word did it) as a possessive case. Word’s thesaurus does not 
accept it. It does not admit the plural of “knowledge,” because knowledge 
is supposed to be singular: It is the singularity of agents and institutions 
who control and dictate what is acceptable and what is unacceptable. We 
disobey; we delink from all totalitarian epistemology and claim epistemic 
equity. Therefore, this book should not be read as a ¨comparative study¨ of 
Central Asia and the Caucasus, on the one hand, and South/Central America 
and the Caribbean, on the other, because both are located within the colo-
nial matrix of power. How can one compare entities that belong to the same 
system? Comparing would mean to assume that the two regions are delim-
ited by their local histories and ignore that they are interconnected by global 
designs: the very constitution of the modern/colonial world and the forma-
tion and transformation of the colonial matrix of power.
 As we stated, we do not offer a comparative study of Central Asia, the 
Caucasus, South/Central America, and the Caribbean or Latinos as in the 
U.S.: We take our experience (not the disciplines) as an epistemic guide. Dis-
ciplinary apparati (concepts, narratives, debates, etc.) are tools to build our 
arguments, addressing problems and issues not framed in the disciplines. 
This does not mean that we want to represent (describe or speak for) the 
regions or the people. We just claim that we (Madina and Walter) belong 
to those regions and not to South Asia, France, or the U.S. Thus, our think-
ing is in-formed geo- and body politically. No essences are invoked. What 
is invoked is how we inhabit the colonial matrix and respond to it. There-
fore we claim epistemic rights grounded in local histories and in the bod-
ies instead of being grounded in disciplinary principles established in local 
histories and by body agents with whom we do not identify. A common dic-
tum says that Native Americans have wisdom and Whites have science, that 
Blacks have experience and Whites have knowledge. We do not recognize 
such common assumptions. We disobey and delink from them. And we are 
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not claiming for recognition of the right to exist. Our claim is stronger: We 
claim that future epistemologies are being and will be constructed with their 
“back” toward the West, not competing with the West but delinking from it. 
For, if decolonial epistemology engages in competition with Western epis-
temology, the war is lost before the first battle: “Competing” means playing 
by the same rules of the epistemic game. We instead conceive the decolo-
nial as an option. By so doing, all “competing” alternatives become merely 
options. Those options could be at the level of system of ideas (Christianity, 
Islamism, Judaism, Liberalism, Marxism) or disciplinary formations (Social 
Sciences and the Humanities, Professional Schools, Natural Sciences). When 
one looks at a system of ideas or disciplinary formations as options, one real-
izes that there is no single truth to be defended or imposed. There are only 
options to be engaged with. The road to pluriversality begins when we accept 
that there are options to be engaged and no universal truth to defend. The 
rules of the epistemic game are precisely what we are contesting and disen-
gaging from. At the same time, we look for networking and building solidar-
ity with projects moving in the same direction around the world. “Solidarity” 
should not be confused with “charity.” You can be “in solidarity” with people 
struggling for food in the world, meaning that you are sympathetic and jus-
tify their fight. But they would not care much about your “solidarity,” which 
is indeed a “paternalistic charity.” “Solidarity” in decolonial terms is recipro-
cal: If you are in solidarity, you have to be a partner and be considered as a 
partner by the institutions and agencies with which you are in solidarity. In 
sum, we are not claiming recognition, inclusion, or the right to exist—we 
know that we belong to global trajectories that do not pretend to compete 
with modern Western epistemology—rather we intend to move in a different 
direction, to delink, to shift the geography of reasoning.
 The third reason for writing this book is in revolt against the organiza-
tion of the world in boxes, in areas to be studied or their natural resources to 
be exploited. In such an obviously imperial order of knowledge, what has the 
Caucasus and Central Asia to do with South America and the Caribbean and 
with Latino/as in the U.S.? A lot, we sustain, because they all are connected 
through the logic of coloniality (or the colonial matrix of power) that has 
guided the world order and Euro-American leadership. What we are saying 
is that the mentioned areas and people are not linked as objects but through 
the logic of imperial enunciation.
 “Learning to unlearn in order to relearn” is a crucial principle in the cur-
riculum of Amawtay Wasi [The Intercultural University of the People and 
Nations of Ecuador],3 aimed at the development of reflective and intuitive 
practices of wise people rather than Western style professionals, by orga-
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nizing various “learning environments where the building of knowledge is 
interrelated with research, dialogue and projects and services” (García 2004: 
329). We need to make several clarifying points to explain why our book is 
titled after the Amawtay Wasi project of higher education and not after some 
model that Harvard, Cambridge, Le College the France, or Heidelberg (to 
mention just a few possibilities), may offer.4
 Amawtay Wasi is a project lead by indigenous intellectuals and activ-
ists in collaboration with non-Indians (Ecuadorians of European descent of 
mixed blood and mind). The project emerges after a long series of claims, 
from land claims in the 1970s, to bicultural education, from the right of 
political interventions argued through the concept of “interculturality” 
(which we explain later), to the right to create institutions of higher edu-
cation under indigenous leadership. This leadership does not mean that it 
is an Indigenous university exclusively for indigenous people, as was the 
case with the national Ecuadorian university created by creoles of European 
descent and mestizos, which indeed, at the beginning, was meant only for 
high-class mestizos and European descent students. In 1987, the Consti-
tution of Ecuador was reformed and one of the changes allowed Indians 
to register at national universities. It should be added that the creation of 
Amawtay Wasi is part of the political processes led by Indigenous Nations 
that forced numerous claims into the new Constitution of Ecuador, includ-
ing reconceptualizing “nature” as life to which we, as humans, also belong, 
and having done with the four hundred years of Baconian principles accord-
ing to which “nature” is outside of us to be exploited and dominated. How-
ever, Indigenous actors (epistemic and political) soon realized, on the one 
hand, the disadvantages they had in competing with students who were born 
and raised in the same spirit that the national university was reproducing. 
On the other hand, they realized that, whatever effort they make to fulfill 
the university requirements, they will be learning “how to be according to 
national expectations regarding the indigenous population” but not learning 
to “be themselves.” For this reason, Amawtay Wasi is open to all Ecuador-
ians, and not only to indigenous people. The concept of “interculturalidad” 
was created to highlight the emergence of political and epistemic rights that 
both the colonial and nation-state administration had denied to indigenous 
nations.
 In addition to that, the institution was conceived as a pluriversity although 
the Minister of Education did not accept such a denomination. The concept 
of inter-culturalidad was connected with the indigenous project, working 
toward the constitution of a pluri-national state; a claim that is also made in 
Bolivia and has been reinforced by the government of Evo Morales. Clearly 
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then, an institution such as Amawtay Wasi has significant implications in 
higher education, public policy, and international relations.5
 The philosophy and conceptual curricular structure is clearly delinking 
from the history of Western university as an institution, from its origins in 
the Middle Ages to the corporate university that dominates today in the U.S. 
and is gaining ground in Europe and other parts of the world (Tlostanova 
2004b, Mignolo 2003). “Delinking” does not mean that the university will 
be driven by “Indian cosmology” or that its curriculum will be structured 
and based on some ideal perennial “Indian” knowledge modeled before the 
conquest and colonization, when there was no “Indian” as a concept and the 
territory of today’s Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia were a part of Tawantinsuyu 
[the world in four parts] and the major languages there were Aymara (mainly 
in what is today Bolivia), Quechua (mainly in what is today Peru), and Qui-
chua (mainly in what is today Ecuador). “Delinking” means basically shift-
ing the geography of reason6 and planning and organizing knowledge from 
the “Indigenous” American point of view instead of having only one option, 
that is, the university organized from the point of view of “Creoles and Mes-
tizos,” who adopted the model created by the “Indigenous” Europeans of the 
Renaissance and the Enlightenment. Amawtay Wasi does not reject the exist-
ing knowledge (in science, technology, medicine, social sciences, etc.), but 
it subsumes it within the vision, needs, and life style of Indigenous nations. 
Amawtay Wasi is founded and grounded not in an authentic or essentialist 
concept of knowledge, but in border thinking or border gnosis. “Intercultur-
ality” is precisely an expression of that epistemic and hermeneutic founda-
tion based on cross-cultural dialogue, a transdisciplinary approach, and an 
imparative philosophy (from the Latin imparare—to learn in a pluralistic 
environment) (Panikkar 2000).
 In the center of the cognitive and educational matrix of Amawtay Wasi 
stands a deeper fundamental principle (Kawsay) shared by the Indigenous 
people—the inextricable link between the “being,” the “existence,” and the 
“doing” (the human agency), or the principle of relational-experiential ratio-
nality and building knowledge not outside the essence and existence of 
being, not by presenting a problem outside of its context, but by practicing 
community learning as an ongoing and never-ending open process, based 
on complexity and relationism, complementarity and reciprocity, the shift 
from the subject-object relations to the subject-subject model instead of the 
dominant fragmentation, to the learning-unlearning-relearning path, and 
from accumulating knowledge to its critical and creative understanding and 
integration in wisdom.
L E A R n I n G  To  u n L E A R n  •  15
 The curriculum, very complex indeed, is basically structured—spa-
tially—in the four spheres or spaces of learning and—chronologically—in 
five years of schooling. Spatially, it is framed in four corners or houses of 
learning and modeled on the Southern Cross, which in its turn was the spa-
tial model for the territory of Tawantinsuyu (the “map” of the Incanate). At 
the center stands the house of Wisdom, wisdom being the ultimate goal of 
the university. In each corner, Western knowledge is detached from West-
ern cosmology and “incorporated” and subsumed in Indigenous cosmology. 
Obviously, we cannot expect to find here genomic or nanotechnology insti-
tutes, not just at Amawtay Wasi but not even in South/Central America and 
in the Caribbean in general.7 What we should expect from a project such as 
Amawtay Wasi is to shift the geography of reasoning and the very goals of 
knowledge and understanding. Learning is related to doing and experience. 
From the viewpoint of Indigenous leaders, Western knowledge, both in the 
colonial and the national period, was an instrument of (epistemic) coloniza-
tion. As a result, the aim of such a shift is not destruction but rather creation 
of another model of knowledge and understanding of the world and human 
beings.
 If the spatial structure is organized in four corners or houses of knowl-
edge and a center, the chronological process of learning has five levels. The 
center of space coincides with the present in time. The first level is devoted 
to “learning to think doing things as a community.” The second level aims 
at “learning to learn,” the third strives for “learning to unlearn and relearn,” 
and the fourth- for “learning to undertake.” The last, fifth level, which is also 
at the center (similarly to Cuzco, the capital of the Incanate, which was at 
the center of the world but also the present of four previous eras, or “Suns” 
as the Incas counted each era), is devoted to “Learning throughout life.” The 
university aims at decolonizing knowledge and being and promoting com-
munities of “buen vivir,” or “the fullness of life.” “Sumak” is better translated 
into Spanish as “plenitude” or “fullness” in English. “Sumak Kawsay” would 
be better understood as precisely living the fullness of life rather than “buen 
vivir” or “living well,” where “buen” and “well” are too attached to the materi-
ality of life, to living as possessing things, to surrounding oneself with objects 
transformed into commodities, and feeling “happy” when life allows us to 
buy. Living well rather than living better than the other or better than my 
neighbor means a life in fullness that cannot be achieved within a capitalist 
economy. This concept necessarily presupposes the assumption that humans, 
nature, and the entire cosmos are alive to the extent that they are fully related 
and ontologically existing in this relational dynamic. According to Amawtay 
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Wasi vision, “education is viewed as learning to achieve relationalism, sym-
bolized experience, symbolic language as a way to advance towards wisdom 
and to approach an understanding of living well” (García 2004: 288–89).
 Such a model of education and cognition is possible to imagine in other 
locales of the world that have retained the indigenous knowledges (be it 
India, China, or Central Asia). However, the question is not only to reorga-
nize universities according to the principles similar to Ecuador University 
and based on local histories and cosmologies but also to go beyond the uni-
versity and shift the geography of reasoning and the approach to the inter-
pretation of reality, history, philosophy, or politics of intellectuals worldwide. 
The basic questions are these: What kind of knowledges are produced and 
transformed? Who produces and transforms them, why, and for whom? 
What knowledge contributes to management for the benefit of the few, and 
what knowledges contribute to the liberation of the many from the manage-
ment of the few? We are not always capable of changing the dominant power 
machines that run the systems of education or disciplines, in the same way 
we do not always have simple access to and the invigorating link with the 
communities and their knowledge and learning practices as with Amawtay 
Wasi. However, this does not mean that we cannot create the volatile com-
munities of critical decolonial thought, the global coalitions of thinkers who 
chose as their main principle the Abya Yala’s “learning to unlearn in order to 
relearn.”
 We take “learning to unlearn in order to relearn” as a guiding principle of 
this book and assume the goals and consequences of the radical proposal of 
Amawtay Wasi. We are not Indigenous Americans, but that does not mean 
that we cannot learn from them in order to unlearn what we have learned 
through our education or cultural environment and to relearn from the point 
of view of knowledge and understanding generated by the people and com-
munities that have been disavowed in their participation in education, in 
the state and public policy, and in international relations and whose view of 
economic administration has been cast as “traditional” and troublesome for 
“development” proper. We are not appropriating Indigenous categories to 
the benefit of non-Indigenous intellectuals and scholars employed by public 
or private universities. This caveat would have not been necessary, if instead 
of Indigenous thinkers, we relied on the Frankfurt School or French post-
modernism. Would a trans-diasporic multiethnic scholar living in Moscow 
and an Argentinean living in the U.S. be accused of appropriating Adorno 
or Baudrillard? If that were the path we had followed, it would have seemed 
“natural” that a Caucasus-Central Asian scholar in Moscow and an Argen-
tine in the U.S., who became a Hispanic or Latino, learned from critical 
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imperial scholarship. But, to learn from Indigenous thinkers could be ren-
dered as “appropriation.” Such biased interpretations are a result of remain-
ing within the limits and blindness of modern epistemology.
iii.
What do we mean by “thinking decolonially”? And, how does it relate to 
the title, Learning to Unlearn? Is it an expression parallel to many already 
existing ones: thinking philosophically, thinking economically, or thinking 
politically, where invariably, an action is invoked (“thinking”) and a field 
in which the act of thinking is performed (economy, philosophy, politics)? 
There is a clear difference in the fields invoked here and in the way they can 
be used: economics, philosophy, politics can refer to academic disciplines; 
but they can also refer to a wider range of activities, not necessarily aca-
demic. The CEO of a corporation thinks economically and politically, too. 
The next presidential candidate thinks politically and economically as well, 
albeit not within the disciplines but within a larger field of social actions and 
discourses, the political field, and so forth.
 “Decolonial thinking” is formulating the epistemic, political, and ethi-
cal basis for global decolonial options in the existing world order, which 
we all witness or take part in today. Where do “we” (scholars, intellectuals, 
journalists, activists) operate? Not in the sphere of the state or the market 
but in the public sphere, in the domain and terrain of the civil and political 
society, which we explain here. What is the “decolonial field” in relation to 
which “thinking decolonially” can have a meaning then? “Decolonial” pre-
supposes first that there is another field, the field of coloniality (that is, the 
colonial matrix of power), from which it is assumed one should delink or 
disengage: This is the first meaning of decolonial, not anticolonial, but mov-
ing away from the colonial. The term “colonial” has a specific meaning in 
decolonial thinking. It refers not to the Roman Empire’s understanding of a 
colony as a polity built or ruled by imperial order but to the modern meaning 
of “colonial” as a “conquered and managed territory” linked to the process 
of European “colonization,” grounded in destroying the existing social order 
and imposing one responding to the needs and habitus of the conquerors. 
By “colonies,” we refer in this book to the type of imperial-colonial intercon-
nections between the imperial core countries of Europe (Spain, Portugal, 
France, England, Holland, and to a lesser extent Italy and Germany) from 
approximately 1500 onward. This is a particular type of imperial-colonial 
relations, classified mainly by the emergence of “capitalism” (as defined by 
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Max Weber (1904/05) and “imperialism” (as defined by J. A. Hobson ([1902] 
2002), later appropriated and altered by Marxist popularizes such as V. Lenin 
([1917] 1963), R. Luxembourg (1913), and others). Hence, by the early twen-
tieth century, the legacy of the term “imperium” was translated into modern 
English as “imperialism” and connected to the already flourishing new type 
of economy, “capitalism.” We ask, at the same time, what kind of imperial-
colonial relations characterized the Russian Czardom/Empire and the Soviet 
Union? How did the colonial matrix “translate” from the Atlantic to Eurasia?
 Decoloniality means projecting decolonial thinking over the colonial 
matrix of power. The latter is an analytic concept, but its very creation already 
implies decolonial thinking. Liberal and Marxist thinkers, political theorists, 
and economic experts all accept that the current global economy is capital-
ist. The only difference is that some of them are happy and want to maintain 
it (even during and after the crisis and legal corruption of Wall Street in 
2007–2008) and others are unhappy and want to dismantle it. A decolonial 
thinker is with neither of them, and the reason is that “capitalist economy” 
is not the core analytic concept of decolonial thinking, whereas the “colonial 
matrix of power” is.
 Polycentric capitalism made the modern idea of “revolution” obsolete for 
two reasons. One is that, in polycentric capitalism, in spite of the competi-
tion for control of authority (current conflicts between capital and state and 
between non-Western states embracing a capitalist economy, like China and 
Russia), there is no more room for an idea of revolution that consists in tak-
ing control of the state (like the bourgeoisie did in Europe over the monarchy; 
the Bolsheviks over the Russian Czars; like the Creole of European descent 
(except in Haiti) did in the Americas since the end of the eighteenth century; 
or the natives did in Asia and Africa, during the era of decolonization, after 
World War II). The second reason is that all the revolutions we have men-
tioned were revolutions within the same cosmology, within the same rules of 
the game. And the word “revolution” itself is meaningful only in the ideology 
of progress and development within the realm of sameness. At the moment 
when the colonial matrix of power reached a global scope, from the U.S. and 
European Union to China, India, and Brazil, one can argue that the very idea 
of revolution (a keyword in the vocabulary of modernity) lost its historical 
possibilities. Decolonial thinking offers an essentially different approach—
the decolonial option. What is the grammar of decoloniality that could help 
advance transformative projects beyond the “revolutionary” language and 
expectations of modernity? Instead of digging into Western archives to find 
a Saint Paul or a Spinoza who would get us out of the impasse, we would 
like to dig into derogated archives, abased authors, concepts, and dissenting 
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initiatives, which grew out of dissenting energies and minds that thought the 
world otherwise, that is, on the basis of a non-Western or not-quite-Western 
genealogy of knowledge. However, since the West is all over and in all of us, 
non-Western does not mean outside. It means residing in exteriority, that is, 
the outside created by the inside, by the imperial reason of Western control 
of knowledge (i.e., coloniality of knowledge and of being). The historical and 
logical foundation of exteriority is a Western epistemic construction of rac-
ism and the patriarchal control of knowledge and understanding.
 Decolonial thinking and decolonial options are projects led and created 
by the people whom Frantz Fanon called “les damnés de la terre” (1967): all 
those humiliated, devalued, disregarded, disavowed, and confronting the 
trauma of the “colonial wound,”8 a trauma that no modern psychoanalyst can 
cure, as Fanon himself experienced in Algeria (1967, Chapter V). “Damnés,” 
in the colonial matrix, is a scalar category pervading all spheres of the social 
and not only the dispossessed. We believe that Fanon (a professional edu-
cated in France) placed himself among the damnés. The damnés should not 
be understood in economic terms (poverty) but mainly in racial terms (infe-
rior human beings). Living experience generates knowledge to deal with the 
very foundation of a system of knowledge and subjectivity that constructed 
the damnés. Decolonizing knowledge and being means to generate knowl-
edge to solve the problems in which the damnés have been placed as damnés. 
“Ending poverty” means maintaining the colonial matrix of power that pro-
duced and reproduced the dispossessed damnés. The decolonial intellectual 
and the decolonial political society link epistemology, politics, and ethics 
in the process of decolonizing knowledge and being. Radical “social move-
ments” like La Via Campesina and Food Sovereignty are good examples of 
transnational projects decolonizing knowledge and being (La Via Campesina 
2008, Abergel 2005, Desmarias 2007). Still another case is the Indigenous 
projects across the Americas, which have lately congregated in the annual 
Americas Social Forum. The project of Evo Morales’s government has gener-
ated a significant and clear discourse about what it means to decolonize the 
state and the economy.
 These are, in a nutshell, some of the questions that decolonial think-
ers ask. By asking these kinds of questions, we start thinking decolonially 
and engage ourselves in a transdisciplinary analytic in which the problems 
precede the method. Our approach departs from the canonical scholarly 
assumptions in the humanities and social sciences and has implications 
for other areas of knowledge, in natural sciences as well as in professional 
schools.9 By switching the emphasis from method to problems, a scholar, 
intellectual, or researcher is thrown into the world rather than remaining 
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within the discipline. Instead of the study or analysis of the existing post-
colonial and neocolonialist phenomena and processes, be it diaspora, exile, 
nationalism, biopolitics, etc., and maintaining the divide between the known 
object and the knowing subject, for the decolonial approach to study a phe-
nomenon (idea, social event, art work) is only the first step toward a proj-
ect, toward solving a problem, toward answering a question. The decolonial 
approach departs from the canonical distinction, in the humanities and 
social sciences, between explanation and understanding; between nomo-
thetic and idiographic sciences. Studying and investigating are only prelimi-
nary steps in formulating decolonial arguments in public policy or education. 
The problems the decolonial thinkers explore are problems emerging from 
the modern-colonial matrix of power, that is, from the modern rhetoric of 
salvation hiding the colonial logic (coloniality) of oppression, control, and 
domination. Knowledge and understanding for decolonial thinkers overrule 
and overcome expert knowledge. While expertise is necessary, it is, at the 
same time, dangerous, for it forecloses dialogue, as the expert is the Deus 
absconditius, the observer who cannot be observed because, precisely, he or 
she is An Expert! While disciplinary knowledge in the social sciences and the 
humanities focuses on objects (culture, society, economy, politics), decolo-
nial thinking shifts the politics of knowledge toward problems and questions 
that are hidden by the rhetoric of modernity.
 To what problems do we refer and explore further later? They are prob-
lems emerging from the modern-colonial matrix of power, that is, from the 
modern rhetoric of salvation hiding the colonial logic (coloniality) of oppres-
sion, control, and domination. Thus, the analytic of coloniality is the neces-
sary condition for prospective decolonial arguments—the decolonial option 
presupposes the analytic of the colonial matrix, in the same way as psycho-
analysis presupposes the analytic of the unconscious or the international 
proletariat revolution presupposes the analytic of the logic of capital. There-
fore, while disciplinary knowledge in the social sciences and the humanities 
focuses on objects (culture, society, economy, politics), decolonial thinking 
shifts the politics of knowledge toward problems and questions that are hid-
den by the rhetoric of modernity. For example, the general concern to fight 
poverty demands from the social sciences to study the conditions under 
which poverty could be eliminated, while decolonial thinking focuses on 
the hidden reasons that created and naturalized poverty. Decolonial public 
policy and education start from this premise.
 Decolonial thinking can and should work effectively at any level and 
sphere of education (schools, colleges, higher education), as is manifested in 
case of Amawtay Wasi; and it can be very effective in another area of educa-
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tion: the media (particularly independent media, because mainstream media 
reproduces and perpetuates—in different scale and to a different degree—
the coloniality of knowledge and of being) (Decolonizing the Digital 2009). 
Decolonial thinkers will not be listened to in Davos or among the G8; they 
will not be invited to a dialogue in the UN (and a wide range of similar sub-
ordinate institutions). But decolonial thinking works within the global politi-
cal society, confronting the consequences of the colonial differences because 
“imperial international law and corporations are there” and “immigration is 
here.”
 “Political society” is a concept introduced by Indian historian Partha 
Chatterjee (Chatterjee 2004). He refers to a wide range of collective activities 
that no longer belong to the sphere of the civil society that expresses itself 
mainly through voting every two, four, or six years. The liberal model of 
society then begins to crack and distinct spheres emerge between the civil 
society and the state and between the civil society and the market. Further-
more, the political society no longer keeps the relative homogeneity of the 
Europe-American civil society, but it is emerging in the non-West and trans-
forming the West through massive migrations from the non-West. Briefly, 
political society is not a modern concept but a decolonial one. If, within 
the liberal model of social organization, we can imagine a triangle with “the 
state,” “the economy,” and the “civil society” as its angles, in the colonial 
matrix of power, we have to imagine a tetragon, consisting of the modern/
colonial state, the imperial/colonial market, the civil colonial society formed 
by European migrants, and the political society emerging out of the impe-
rial/colonial history in which these four domains are the sites of struggle for 
control, domination, and liberation. One of the basic components of the civil 
society, in the liberal model (modern and Euro-American), which feeds the 
state and the market, is “education.” Education, from a decolonial perspec-
tive, is located in the domain of “knowledge and subjectivity” and can be 
divided between “instruction” (skill, knowledge for practical purposes, as is 
clear today in the “universities” created in the corporate world) and “nurtur-
ing” (knowledge and understanding for personal and collective well-being).
 In the liberal model, education and instruction communicate with “the 
state” and “the market” and are geared toward the instruction of experts, on 
the one hand, and the education of citizens (in which experts are included), 
on the other. Consumption is part of the educational process at the moment 
in which education itself becomes a commodity and sustains the corporate 
university (see Chapter 7). So we can imagine double arrows connecting 
the citizens in the civil society with the state and the market. However, the 
arrows connecting “the state” and “the market” confirm the domain of “the 
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untouchable,” to which members of the civil society have little access. The 
media plays precisely, the role of a “mediator”; in fact, more than a medi-
ator, it is an agent of economic and authority control by the market and 
the state. In the colonial matrix of power, the liberal model is contested by 
the emergence of national and global political societies (often referred to 
as “social movements”). The coming into being of indymedia, filling the 
gaps and uncovering the silences of official TV channels and newspapers, 
becomes part of the political society. The role of the decolonial intellectual, 
in the academia and in the media, is then defined by his or her task in the 
process of decolonizing knowledge and being. Although the entire sphere of 
the political society could not be described as decolonial (e.g., the sphere of 
the political society that makes claims to improve living conditions without 
questioning the colonial matrix of power is not), we can define a growing 
sector of the political society as decolonial—the decolonial political society. 
“Learning to unlearn” describes the future of decolonial education and the 
problems it has to face. “Education” is not one and universal. It is always 
entangled with projects of regulation, assimilation, transformation, conser-
vation. Learning to unlearn the imperial education is the starting point of 
decolonial education (Candau 2009).
 Instruction and education, which went hand in hand in both the liberal 
model and the socialist version of modernity, have as their goal the training 
of the skillful professionals and the nurturing of either liberal or socialist 
subjects. In the corporate university, the role of education is the formation of 
“experts.” “Scientific communism” in the Soviet Union was no less compul-
sive than the presumable liberties in Western liberal societies. After the fall 
of the Soviet Union, neo-liberalism strengthened its philosophy of education 
by making the central role of education that of an “expert.” In so doing, neo-
liberalism merged in the figure of the “expert,” both in instruction and in 
nurturing. Decolonial thinking, instead, follows the philosophical principle 
set by the planners of Amawtay Wasi described previously, where decoloni-
zation of knowledge and being, from an Amerindian perspective, does not 
mean inclusion in the existing social system, governed by the colonial matrix 
of power, but instead unlearning what imperial/colonial designs have natu-
ralized as the only way to know and the only way to be. Decolonial thinking 
and decolonial option are akin and conversant with these transforming pro-
cesses taking place in the sphere of the “civil society.” And, partly, they are 
an attempt to contribute to both—the conceptual formations for instruction 
and the transforming of subjectivities in nurturing. But the decolonial option 
projects itself as an intervention in the sphere of “political society” as well.
 As the examples of Fanon and Amawtay Wasi suggest, there is a corridor 
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between the profession, the academy, and the decolonial political society. 
Decolonial thinking is then transdisciplinary (not interdisciplinary), in the 
sense of going beyond the existing disciplines, of rejecting the “disciplinary 
decadence” and aiming at undisciplining knowledge. Thinking decolonially 
in the academy means to assume the same or similar problems articulated 
in and by decolonial political society. This is a change of terrain, a shift in 
the geography of reason: Instead of an object of study determined by disci-
plinary and academic demands, we face problems identified by les damnés 
acting in the decolonial political society. Living experiences (which I. Kant 
identified as preconditions of abstract knowledge) cannot be universalized. 
The type of living experience that Kant underwent is not the same as those 
experienced by Fanon. That is why geo- and body politics of knowledge is 
of the essence in decolonial thinking. And this knowledge is generated in 
the process of transformation enacted in decolonial political society. Hence, 
decolonial thinking in the academy has a double role:
a.  Its contribution to decolonize knowledge and being.
b.  Its joining the processes initiated in and by the actors of the political 
society.
Decolonial projects in the mid-twentieth century were at first built into 
the existing system of two modernities. What we encounter in postcolonial 
countries, after the second wave of decolonization, is mostly neocolonial-
ism. The collapse of the Soviet system, even if incomplete (as Russia retains 
several of its colonies and clings to the symbolic tokens of its former impe-
rial grandeur), was the next act in this global show of the imposing of the 
new form of coloniality onto the world. In today’s conditions of the tectonic 
change from one power system, linked to the U.S. as its center, to a new poly-
centric one, it is crucial that the colonized or better, the damnés, the nodes of 
border thinking in the world, could establish a dialogue and create networks 
globally. What is crucial here is not to try to find a better place in the existing 
global coloniality but to destroy this coloniality and create an other world. 
It is an unavoidable process because coloniality carries in it the seeds of the 
decolonial agency.
 Decolonial options orient the acts of delinking (at the same time being 
constituted by them) from the rhetoric of modernity and the logic of colo-
niality. Today’s global coloniality has slipped out of Western imperial hands. 
As a consequence, it becomes a terrain of disputes between Western and 
non-Western countries (and unions, such as the eu and unasur), disputes 
already at work between the g8 and the g5 (China, India, Brazil, Mexico, 
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and South Africa). The emerging decolonial political society, therefore, faces 
a situation that goes beyond each nation-state. In this regard, La Via Campe-
sina and Indigenous projects across the Americas, associated with New 
Zealand and Australian aboriginals, as well as the World Social Forum, are 
creating conditions for delinking from the colonial matrix of power, at the 
moment when the colonial matrix of power is “uniting in conflict” the g8, 
g5, and bric countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China). If, then, these countries 
and unions are operating within the rhetoric of modernity and the logic of 
coloniality, the decolonial political society is working toward the mutation 
of the colonial matrix of power into different forms of communal (not com-
munist) social organization, in which the role of the economy will not be that 
of accumulation and the economy will not be the site of competitiveness and 
exploitation but the site in which human beings work to live rather than live 
to work for others who accumulate.
 The control of the economic sphere in the colonial matrix of power 
(referred to as “capitalism” in liberal and Marxist terminology), is now dis-
puted by several countries (U.S., China, Japan, the formation of oil-based 
Middle East countries, etc.). As the control of the economy (and therefore 
the control of labor and natural resources) is disputed by several countries, 
the spheres of the control of authority (political and military) become con-
tested and off-centered as well. Instead of liberalism versus socialism, the 
rivalry over the control of authority in a polycentric capitalism has mul-
tiple orientations and leads to the re-inscription in the political arena of the 
conceptions of society and life that have been pushed aside, disavowed, or 
marginalized by imperial expansion of Western Christianity and liberalism 
(South America, India, North and Sub-Saharan Africa) and by Orthodox 
Christianity and socialism (Central Asia, the Caucasus). The dispute for the 
control of knowledge is also at work: The geopolitics and body politics of 
knowledge are the emerging sites contesting the Western imperial hegemony 
of theo- and ego-politics of knowledge (we come back to these categories).
 Networking across the globe, across languages and religions, and across 
institutions is one of the major tasks of decolonial thinkers and doers work-
ing toward global futures no longer controlled by the colonial matrix of 
power, once in the hands of Western empires but today being disputed by 
different centers grounded in a capitalist economy. Even though the gov-
ernment of Evo Morales, in Bolivia, introduced decolonial thinking in the 
sphere of the state and the economy, a series of events around the highway 
across the Amazon prompted a protest by the Indigenous communities liv-
ing in the area. Such a heatedly debated march against Evo Morales as the 
“tipnis case” demonstrated the limits of decolonization in the sphere of the 
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State (Friedman-Rudovsky 2011). For the time being decoloniaity remains 
exclusively a project of the political society. Recently, it authorized the cre-
ation of three universities led by indigenous leaders and geared toward an 
education that brings the needs and interests of indigenous people to the cur-
riculum. These kinds of experience, added to Amawtay Wasi, are the prime 
examples of thinking decolonially, that is, delinking from the liberal model 
of education and the growing corporative values invading higher education.
 We take the lead from these experiences and link “learning to unlearn” to 
“thinking decolonially.” Thinking decolonially means to feel and live beyond 
competition and hatred, which nourish each other. However, moving beyond 
both means delinking from the hegemonic vision of society grounded in cor-
porate values with the support of state regulations. Competition and hatred 
prevents caring for each other. The Christian ideal of love (love yourself 
as you love your neighbor) and national state ideal of love (monolingual 
and monocultural) work in tandem with competition and its consequence, 
hatred (Mignolo 2000, Chapter 6). Learning to unlearn is basically pedagogi-
cal. And although learning to unlearn could be thought out and practiced in 
a non-decolonial project, there is already a genealogy of thought in which 
both are closely connected. It is in this genealogy of thought that we place 
our argument in the following chapters.10
iv.
The first part of the book opens with two jointly authored chapters. In the 
first chapter, “The Logic of Coloniality and the Limits of Postcoloniality: 
Colonial Studies, Postcoloniality, and Decoloniality,” we aim at demarcating 
decolonial thinking from postcolonial studies and theory. Acknowledging 
the contributions made by postcolonial studies and theories in bringing the 
“colonial” into critical debates, we depart from it in two points. We start 
from the modern/colonial formation, in the sixteenth century, of the colonial 
matrix of power (Quijano 1992, 2000). The experience of British India and 
Orientalism, in which postcolonial studies and theories are grounded, is only 
part of the picture, imbedded in the already existing colonial matrix. Occi-
dentalism, which is the necessary condition for the emergence of Oriental-
ism, is left out in postcolonial studies. And the Russian/Soviet Union history 
and their respective colonies are also not accounted for. 
 In the second chapter, “Theorizing from the Borders; Shifting to the 
Geo- and Body Politics of Knowledge,” we attempt to conceptualize border 
thinking as a manifestation of today’s epistemic shift from the theo- and 
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egopolitics of knowledge to the geo- and body politics of knowledge. The 
basic idea is that the gradual expansion of Western (Euro-American) con-
cepts of knowledge and life has created borders with the so-called non-West-
ern world at all levels of the colonial matrix. “Theorizing from the borders” 
is, in our view, a way of dwelling, being, and thinking in the borders. While it 
is not possible to do away with Western conceptual apparatus and its imple-
mentation, it is far from obvious that it should be adopted and adapted by 
the rest of the world. Hence comes the “double consciousness,” as the famous 
African-American sociologist W. E. B. Du Bois described his experience of 
being Black and American, a condition under which lives the majority of the 
world population.
 Parts II and III are devoted to exploring these issues in further detail. In 
other words, our respective histories, languages, memories, sensibilities, aca-
demic training, and the like do not correspond to the imperial/colonial lega-
cies of the British Empire and French colonialism in Asia and Africa. Russia 
and the Soviet Union, and the imperial Iberian histories in South America 
and the Caribbean (topped at a later date by British and French imperialism 
without colonies), depart from both European Marxism and postmoder-
nity and the corresponding postcoloniality. In a nutshell, if postmodernity 
is the internal and imperial overcoming of modernity, postcoloniality is the 
corresponding version of overcoming modernity/coloniality translated into 
postmodernity/postcoloniality.
 Part II opens with Madina’s chapter entitled “Transcultural Tricksters 
in between Empires: ‘Suspended’ Indigenous Agency in the Non-European 
Russian/Soviet (Ex-)Colonies and the Decolonial Option.” It starts with a 
brief critical assessment of the existing area studies research on Central Asia 
and the Caucasus, taking into account the coloniality of knowledge, with 
its persistent Orientalism and progressivism and the geo- and body politics 
of knowledge as the most important yet often neglected defining factors of 
delinking from Orientalism and progressivism. The chapter argues that a 
more promising positioning is to be found in research produced by the local 
scholars themselves, provided they delink from the rhetoric of modernity 
with its underlying logic of coloniality. One of the basic elements of this sen-
sibility in the making is the vital link with the specific negotiating subjectiv-
ity of a trickster that is to be found in such border locales as the Caucasus and 
Central Asia—the cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and religious crossroads. Being 
multiply colonized in an epistemic as well as economic and political sense, 
these regions have developed their strategies of survival, resistance to various 
regimes, and re-existence through border, transcultural, and transmodern 
models, which can constitute a way out of the contemporary opposition of 
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the post-Christian West and Islam and find parallels in other instances of 
border epistemology unfolding in the world.
 This chapter briefly traces the complex history of both locales in moder-
nity, trying to understand, under the influence of which factors they turned 
into, the threatening images of paradigmatic antispaces, fallen out of time, 
for the West, and how the distorting influence of modernization and moder-
nity endangers the transcultural continuum of Central Asia and the Cauca-
sus. Further on, the chapter focuses on the specific position of Indigenous 
epistemic and political protest in the Caucasus and Central Asia, contemplat-
ing why such movements often remain unheard. It juxtaposes Indigenous 
movements and epistemologies in the Caucasus and Central Asia with those 
in South America, striving to understand the internal and global reasons for 
their failure in Eurasia. This failure is connected with the ways modernity 
has been manifested in these locales, with the specific influence of the subal-
tern empires and the imperial difference, with the multiple colonization, and 
with the brutal experience of the Soviet modernity.
 Chapter 3 also touches on the nation-building processes in contemporary 
Central Asia and the Caucasus and the specific internal neocolonialism as an 
important agent of indigenous movements’ stagnation, repression, or com-
modification. A crucial complicating factor here is Islam, which has gradu-
ally moved into the center of indigenous movements, contrary to the South 
American indigenous agency. The complex relation of Islam and indigenous 
decolonial epistemologies is also touched on, as well as the importance of 
deconstructing developmentalist logic to make the renaissance of indige-
nous movements possible in the newly independent Eurasian states. Specific 
attention is paid to the aesthetic and creative ways of resistance and re-exis-
tence in various art forms in Central Asia and the Caucasus today as possible 
preliminary venues for the future political agency.
 Chapter 4, “Non-European Soviet Ex-Colonies and the Coloniality of 
Gender, or How to Unlearn Western Feminism in Eurasian Borderlands” 
continues to elaborate on the same problematic and epistemic locale but 
with yet another additional dimension—that of coloniality of gender. It starts 
and departs from the concept of the modern colonial gender system intro-
duced by María Lugones and interprets racialization/genderization in the 
non-European former and present colonies of Russia based on the mutant 
forms of gender discourses. In the Caucasus and Central Asia a success-
ful Soviet zombification of the political and social imaginary has continued 
until now and has been accompanied by the influence of neoliberal ide-
ologies of globalization. In the focus of the chapter stand the contemporary 
gender discourses of the Caucasus and particularly Central Asia that have 
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been developing within the well-known frame of coloniality of knowledge 
and being and within the simplified opposition of modernity vs. tradition, 
which results in the tripartite scheme or vector of gender development pre-
sented in the majority of feminist works written in and about the Caucasus 
and Central Asia. This scheme moves from local traditionalism through the 
Soviet half-tradition and half-modernity to today’s ideal of Western gender 
emancipation as an epitome of modernity. Here, we can clearly see how the 
Eurocentric discourses of Western feminism and its Russian clones dominate 
in the gender studies of Eurasian borderlands. At the same time, the chapter 
concentrates on several examples of successful alternative gender discourses 
coming from China, South America, Africa, and so on. A dialogue with 
them could be fruitful for the Eurasian gender studies in the future.
 Part III is composed of three chapters written by Walter. The first, “Who 
Speaks for the ‘Human’ in Human Rights? Dispensable and Bare Lives,” takes 
the questions of subalternity and humanity to the limits. In the last analysis, 
subalternity, knowledge, and humanity are connected by racial and class 
hierarchies in the modern world. And, both are hierarchically connected 
with values placed on knowledge and the question of who can produce legiti-
mate and sustainable knowledge. “Learning to unlearn” is tantamount to 
thinking decolonially about these commonly held assumptions.
 Chapter 6, “Thinking Decolonially: Citizenship, Knowledge, and the 
Limits of Humanity,” brings the question of subalternity to a more basic 
level: the concept of Human and Humanity in the modern/colonial world. 
Human and Humanity are linked to knowledge in very complex and ambig-
uous ways. In fact, there is a direct connection between racism and legitimate 
knowledge, and between citizenship and education, which, in their turn, 
impinge on the concept of Human and Rights. This is the topic of Chapter 7, 
“Globalization and the Geopolitics of Knowledge: The Role of the Humani-
ties in the Corporate University.” This chapter connects with the previous 
two through the concepts of Human and Humanity and comes back to the 
main thesis of the book, i.e., learning to unlearn, as a basic process of delink-
ing from imperial education and building decolonial knowledges. “Learning 
to unlearn” means here a double movement: decolonizing the Humanities as 
inherited from the Renaissance and the Enlightenment and delinking and 
shifting toward the making of decolonial Humanities the overarching hori-
zon of knowledge under which science, technology, and professional schools 
should be conceived and enacted. Amawtay Wasi [the House of Wisdom], is 
the model that provides us with the need of learning to unlearn in order to 
relearn and to conceive of and enact the decolonial humanities.
P a r t  I

In JUly 2001, we were teaching a summer seminar, sponsored by Open Society Institute at the European Humanities University, in Minsk, Belarus. 
During a lunch conversation in which we were talking about “postcolonial-
ity,” one of the participants in the seminar asked: “What exactly is colonial-
ity? When you talk about postmodernity,” she said, “I know what modernity 
is (at least I am familiar with the idea and the term), but when you talk about 
postcoloniality and decoloniality, I haven’t the slightest idea what coloniality 
is or may be.”11 This is a belated response to that question.12 Explaining to 
our student what coloniality means, we also lay out the difference between 
post- and de-coloniality, clarify why we opted for decoloniality over postco-
loniality, and outline what are for us the contributions as well as the limits 
of postcoloniality.
 By addressing the limits of postcoloniality, we are not placing ourselves 
“against” it; on the contrary, we are bringing forward another option—the 
decolonial option. The term “decolonization” became common currency 
during the Cold War and was connected to the Third World, particularly 
to the process of liberation in Asia and Africa. The decolonial option that 
rejects both capitalist and communist alternatives was introduced in the 
Bandung Conference, in 1955 (Ampiah 2007). However, decolonial thinking 
and decoloniality go back to the sixteenth century and cut across the eigh-
teenth to the twentieth centuries. A non-Spanish or, later on, non-British or 
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non-French ruling was one of the first responses given by activists and intel-
lectuals in Tawantinsuyu and the Caribbean to global linear thinking sup-
ported by the invention of international law (Francisco de Vitoria and Hugo 
Grotius) and the jus publicum Europaeum described by Carl Schmitt in the 
early 1950s.13 Postcoloniality and decoloniality are two different responses 
to the five hundred years of Western consolidation and imperial expansion. 
These responses were built on different historical experiences, languages, 
memories, and genealogies of thought. Our take on decoloniality is built on 
the historical foundation of the modern/colonial world in the Atlantic (six-
teenth to eighteenth centuries) and the history of the Russian Czardom and 
Empire; its translation into the Soviet Union and the changing roles of the 
Russian Federation and its ex-colonies in the past two decades.
 In building on decolonial thinking and outlining decolonial options, our 
aim is to delink from the principles and structures supporting the existing 
system of knowledge in the humanities; we question the rhetoric justifying 
the role of the social sciences and the humanities as well as their methodol-
ogy. Drawing on experiences and arguments such as the ones suggested by 
Maori anthropologist Linda Tuhiwai Smith, we call into question the dis-
ciplinary legitimacy of knowledge and the disqualification of knowledge 
that does not obey the existing disciplinary rules. That is one of the starting 
points of learning to unlearn in order to relearn—the disciplinary disobedi-
ence (Smith 1999). This is a qualitative not a quantitative shift, as is often the 
case with postcolonial studies.
 Hopefully now the reader begins to see the different paths followed by 
decolonial thinking on the one hand, and postcolonial studies and theory 
on the other. What happens in the majority of postcolonial studies? They 
start from the version of history that places the British Empire (or, some-
times, the French Empire) at the center of modern/colonial history. It is too 
late for us. Modern/colonial history originated in the Atlantic, in the com-
plexity of European imperial formations (Iberian Peninsula) and would-be 
empires (Holland, French, England), in the dismantling of Tawantinsuyu 
and Anahuac and the massive capture, transportation, and exploitation of 
enslaved Africans. This is one of the limits of postcoloniality seen from the 
historical perspective of decolonial thinking and struggling much before the 
advent of European postmodernity that makes possible the emergence of 
postcoloniality.
 Sometime around the 1970s, due to the impact of decolonization strug-
gles in Asia and Africa, the emergence of dictatorial regimes in South Amer-
ica, and the Civil Rights movement in the U.S., a radical transformation of 
intellectual and scholarly fields took place. In the “Third World,” the concern 
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was with the geopolitics of knowledge and, consequently, with decolonizing of 
the imperial knowledge. In the U.S., the concern was with the body politics of 
knowledge.14 It was the moment when a new organization of knowledge and 
understanding came into being: women’s studies, ethnic studies, Chicano/
Latino/a studies, African-American Studies, Queer Studies, Asian-Ameri-
can Studies, and so forth. Postcolonial studies emerged mainly in the U.S. 
in this particular context. The novelty was that they put the geopolitics of 
knowledge on the table of an already subversive scenario centered on the 
body politics of knowledge. Postcolonial theories and postcolonial studies, 
instead, entered the U.S. carrying in their bags the last word by and about 
postmodern thinkers; the bags were le dernier gadgé-d’outre-mer. Postcolo-
nial contributions are obvious: they brought into U.S. humanities scholar-
ship the relevance of the world beyond Europe and the U.S. The influence of 
postcoloniality was felt also in the social sciences, particularly through the 
influential work of Edward Said (1978). All in all, postcolonial studies and 
theories are connected to the splendors and miseries of French poststructur-
alism through which colonial experiences in British India were filtered. Par-
allel to that development, the Subaltern Studies, initiated by Ranahit Guha 
in London in the mid to late 1970s took Antonio Gramsci to India, i.e., an 
ex-British colony. It was Said who brought with him the British Maghreb and 
the Palestinian question and connected it to postcolonial debates. However, 
if in Orientalism Said fits the discourse and goals of postcoloniality, his book 
The Question of Palestine (1978), published in the same year, reads today 
as a decolonial critique parallel and complementary to Frantz Fanon’s The 
Wretched of the Earth (1967 [1961]), Albert Memmi’s The Colonizer and the 
Colonized (1957 [1991]), and the earlier José Carlos Mariátegui’s Seven Inter-
pretative Essays on Peruvian Reality (1928[1971]).
 In a nutshell, postcoloniality presupposes postmodernity, while decolo-
nial thinking and decolonial option are always already delinked from moder-
nity and post-modernity. It brings to the foreground a silenced and different 
genealogy of thought. The decolonial option originated not in Europe but in 
the Third World, as a consequence of struggles for political decolonization. 
And it emerged among ¨minorities¨ in the heart of the U.S. as a consequence 
of the Civil Rights movement and its impact on decolonizing knowledge 
and being through gender and ethnic studies. Furthermore, if we take into 
account the history of the Russian Empire, which was the first not-quite-
European imperial formation following the European model and, in case of 
the Soviet Union, the first non-Christian European formation modeled on 
the European Marxist ideas and ideals, we would have to deal with the impe-
rial difference (and imperial differentiation, since “differences” are never 
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static). Thus, decoloniality works on specific sets of issues built on particular 
historical legacies, languages, sensibilities, experiences, and senses affected 
through smells and food, bodies and sexualities, music and everyday life.
 It is also through these routes that decolonial thinking enters the ex-
Soviet world after 1991. We (Madina and Walter, as well as the collective 
modernity/coloniality/decoloniality) do not derive our ideas from European 
post-structuralism but from the colonial histories of South America and the 
Caribbean and of Central Asia and the Caucasus under the Russian Empire 
and the Soviet Union. In building our arguments, we may or may not use 
some of their concepts for convenience, but not the epistemic principles on 
which those concepts are grounded and the historical foundation of post-
structural arguments. Our subjectivities, experiences, languages, histories, 
desires, frustrations, and angers are different from the ones expressed by 
Foucault, Lacan, or Derrida. Theirs is a different history; their problems 
are not our problems; and we surmise that our problems are not necessar-
ily theirs.15 For this reason alone, geo- and body politics of knowledge is of 
the essence. This is what we meant when we made a distinction between 
focusing on objects and focusing on problems. Postcolonial theories and 
decolonial thinking are interrelated at the level of the enunciated (i.e., the 
content, the concern with colonial histories and their consequences for the 
present) but they do not intersect at the level of the enunciation (i.e., the 
terms of the conversation).16 Furthermore, imperial differences, encroached 
on colonial differences (e.g., racialization of China and Russia) and the way 
these encroachments engender and shape enunciations, are highly relevant 
in understanding the global coloniality (the darker side of global modernity). 
They are “next to” the encroachment on which postcolonial theorists and 
critics dwell.
 While anti-colonial struggles were shaking up the Third World, the 
Soviet Union and the U.S. (with the support of western European countries), 
were engaged in the Cold War. If, in the U.S., the Civil Rights movement 
opened up the waters for the decolonial body politics (e.g., for Chicanos and 
Native Americans as well as for African Americans in the 1970s, when the 
expressions such as “decolonization” and “internal colonialism” were already 
a common currency), the Soviet Union was successful in repressing the 
internal decolonial openings, particularly in racialized non-European colo-
nies devoid of any agency, where the empire destroyed, bought up, or exiled 
most alternative voices in order to wipe off any traces of heterodoxy on cul-
tural, ethnic, or religious basis. The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted 
in an unwanted independence of most of its colonies, but the process was 
quickly strangled, while Russia together with the whole post-Socialist space 
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became a large arena for global coloniality (embracing the (neo)liberal ver-
sion of the colonial matrix) and neocolonialism.
 Decolonial thinking was also available (Aimé Césaire, Frantz Fanon; 
the journal Presence Africaine; etc.) but silenced in places where Marxism, 
structuralism, and poststructuralism occupied all the intellectual debates 
at the time. Decolonial thinking was going on in Maghreb, in sub-Saha-
ran Africa, and in India but not in France or England. Decolonial think-
ing entered Europe with the massive immigration from South Asia, the 
Middle East, Maghreb.17 In today’s U.S., the massive migration is just joining 
decolonial thinking processes that can be traced back—in their conceptual 
awareness—to the 1970s, if not before. The field of “education” has changed 
radically. A diversity of “conceptual tools” became available, no longer con-
trolled by canonical disciplines and transforming the instructional dimen-
sion of education, mainly in the humanities and the social sciences but 
already entering into other fields as well. Most important, however, it had 
and continues to have a strong influence on “nurturing,” shaping, and trans-
forming subjectivities disputed in other realms by religious orders and mar-
ket gurus.
 It seems to us that postcolonial studies bring forward a change in the con-
tent but not in the terms of the conversation. The latter presupposes delink-
ing and shifting the geography of reasoning, which is not obvious to us in 
various manifestations of postcolonial studies. One can reformulate Jacques 
Lacan’s ideas and create on their basis the new concepts in the vein of Homi 
Bhabha, but one can also start not from Lacan but from Gloria Anzaldúa, 
from the Zapatistas, from the Caucasus cosmology, or from Nakshbandi 
Sufism. These are options that already distinguish decolonial from postcolo-
nial trajectories. It depends, in the last analysis, on how the world is inscribed 
in your skin rather than on how the novelty of post-structuralism affects 
your mind. Postcolonial studies seem to dwell in a skin different from ours 
and in need of the epistemic frame of Eurocentric modernity: the distinc-
tion between the knowing subject and known object is implied in both the 
notion of “study” and the notion of “theory.” For that reason, postcolonial 
studies do not alter the internal discourses inherent in and fundamental to 
modernity, such as progressivism and developmentalism: both are implied 
in the prefix “post.” Gandhi, Fanon, and Anzaldúa did not “study” or “theo-
rize” British imperialism in India, Black experience in the Caribbean, Berber 
and Arabic existentia in North Africa, or Chicana trajectories in the U.S. 
Their political stance went together with a decolonial shift in knowledge 
production. Their thinking is “actional,” as Lewis Gordon describes Fanon’s 
work (Gordon 1995). What they all have in common, beyond their differ-
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ences, is that they inhabit the colonial wound. All three of them “thought” 
and wrote from the “experience” of the colonial wound. And the knowledge 
produced from the colonial wound is not a knowledge that aims to change 
the “disciplines” but rather to “decolonize” knowledge, to undo imperial and 
colonial differences, ontologically and epistemically. Therefore, one of the 
vexing questions that emerged in the late 1980s about the relations between 
identities and epistemologies becomes a mute point: Fanon is not “studying 
the blacks” but instead, “thinking” ethically and politically from the colonial 
wound and shifting the ethics and politics of knowledge articulated in the 
distinction between the knowing subject and the known object. Learning to 
unlearn confronts us (scholars, intellectuals, students, professors, profession-
als of all sorts, officers of the state, and corporations officers) with the neces-
sity of delinking from the naturalized vision of society (the idea of Humanity, 
of happiness and reward, of a vertical structure of power) that was created in 
the sixteenth century by monarchies and the Christian church, then mutated 
into the secular project (secularism) that brought the European bourgeoi-
sie into the state and the Industrial Revolution and into reframing of the 
economy.
 What about post-Socialist Russia? Who are the equivalents to Gandhi, 
Fanon, or Anzaldúa? The complication in Russian history is that the Soviet 
revolution turned Marxism into a model of imperial domination and Marx-
ism became as oppressive as Christianity and liberalism. Post-Socialist Rus-
sia is facing the dilemma of having burned out one of the “hopes” still alive 
among Western Marxists and not having another way out of joining the new 
philosophy of Western empires—neoliberalism, which is only dusted today 
with the moth-eaten imperial nationalism and isolationism. Consequently, 
whereas decolonial projects and practices emerged in the colonies of West-
ern empires as early as the sixteenth century, in Russian modern/colonial 
history, the anticolonial sentiment proper was less pronounced than the one 
linked to the imperial difference with the West. So, within the history of 
today’s Russian Federation, the decolonial attitude starts, paradoxically, with 
the imperial wound. Intellectuals and writers such as Fyodor Dostoyevsky 
in the nineteenth century and Victor Yerofeyev today describe this as fol-
lows: “In Europe we were hangers-on and slaves, whereas in Asia we shall 
go as masters” (Dostoyevsky 1977 [1881]); and “From Moscow I can go to 
Asia, if I want, or to Europe. That is, it is clear where I am going to. It is not 
clear—where I am coming from  .  .  .” (Yerofeyev 2000). It is not clear yet 
what will come from the ex-colonies of the Russian and Soviet Empires, as 
well as from some of the colonies that remain under the Russian Federation 
(such as Chechnya, Tatarstan, or, Buryatia). What is clear, however, is that 
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a shift in the ethics and politics of knowledge that would cast Russian his-
tory beyond the Hegelian dictum and beyond its double dependency with 
the West—liberal and Marxist—will emerge at some point at some place, 
because neither Christian Orthodoxy (very much like Christian Catholicism 
and Protestantism in the West) nor second-class liberalism offers a promis-
ing future. Marxism as a model for the organization of society has also run 
its course in Russia as well as in Western industrial countries (Europe and 
the U.S.) and their dependent states (Latin America and the Caribbean).
The Colonial matrix of Power
The analysis and understanding of the logic of coloniality presupposes a 
reframing of the current view of history and of modernity. The very con-
cept of post-coloniality (and its corollaries, postcolonial studies and theory) 
would also have to be reframed once the logic of coloniality is brought out 
of its invisibility and placed side by side with the rhetoric of modernity. The 
idea of modernity, to begin with, has been conceived from the perspective of 
European history and framed based on the historical process and subjective 
experience of Western European countries and people—more specifically, on 
the complicity between Western Christendom and the emergence of capital-
ism as we know it today. Europe and modernity have become synonymous 
and essential components of modern European identity. Coloniality, instead, 
has been swiped out and made invisible in the Eurocentric narratives as an 
encumbrance for the glorious march of modernity. Where coloniality is vis-
ible every day is in the colonies, semi-colonies, and ex-colonies of Western 
empires. For that reason, it is not surprising that the concept of “coloniality” 
has been brought out in Latin America, whereas the concept of “modernity” 
is a European invention. These are not, however, concepts that stand at the 
same level in power relations. We can talk about modernity ignoring colo-
niality, as it has always been obvious. But you cannot talk about coloniality 
without invoking modernity.
 “Development” is a companion concept to modernity. “Underdevelop-
ment,” however, is not the equivalent, in economic terms, to coloniality in 
historical and philosophical terms. Underdevelopment is what development 
proposes to overcome. In other words, underdevelopment is an invention 
of the discourse of development to justify economic and political interven-
tions, with a good cause. Instead, modernity does not propose to overcome 
coloniality but rather tradition, barbarism, fanatic religious belief, and the 
like. Coloniality is what development needs to overcome under the guise 
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of underdevelopment. Coloniality is indeed the hidden weapon behind the 
rhetoric of modernity justifying all kinds of actions, including war, to elimi-
nate barbarism and overcome tradition. Thus, coloniality is, like the uncon-
scious, the hidden weapon of both the civilizing and developmental missions 
of modernity.
 The imbalance in power relations brings about—this time—the splen-
dors and miseries of coloniality. The misery is its dependency on modernity. 
The splendor is that the concept reveals the colonial matrix of power, illumi-
nates colonial and imperial differences, makes understandable the colonial 
wound, and delivers epistemic energy for a radical shift in the geo- and body 
politics of knowledge. The history and interpretation of the world can no 
longer be achieved from the universal perspective of the modern social sci-
ences and humanities. Perspectives from modernity (from the left and from 
the right, from neoliberals or from neo-Marxists) provide only half of the 
story—hence the perplexity of the student in Minsk who was familiar only 
with this half. Telling the other half is our task then.
 The logic of coloniality (the colonial matrix of power) is the “missing” 
half in current definitions of “modernity,” which passes for the totality. Take, 
for example, Anthony Giddens’s short description of modernity: “ ‘moder-
nity’ refers to modes of social life or organization which emerged in Europe 
from about the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently 
became more or less worldwide in their influence” (Giddens 1992: 1). Gid-
dens’s concept of modernity is very shortsighted, for he sees only one side of 
it—the European imperial side. From the perspective of coloniality, however, 
world history since the sixteenth century has had different colors and shades, 
different geohistorical locations for accumulations (of money as well as of 
meaning), enjoyments, and sufferings. We can therefore paraphrase Gid-
dens’s description of modernity to render visible the logic of coloniality, as 
follows:
“Coloniality” refers to the modes of control of social life and economic 
and political organizations that emerged in the European management 
of the colonies in the Americas and the Caribbean from around the 
beginning of the sixteenth century onwards and that subsequently have 
become more or less worldwide in their influence. This associates coloni-
ality with a time period and with an initial geographical location but for 
the moment leaves its major characteristics safely stowed away in a black 
box. Yet, they are being applied today in Iraq and the Middle East and 
North Korea, in Georgia (Transcaucasia) and Chechnya; in redefining the 
internal imperial difference between the U.S. and the European Union, 
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and the external imperial difference between the U.S. and the European 
Union on one side and Russia, China, and Japan on the other. Coloniality, 
indeed, has become since the sixteenth century more or less worldwide in 
its “influence.” (Mignolo and Tlostanova’s paraphrase of Giddens’s (1992) 
definition of modernity)
 Let us now explore further coloniality as a concept, rather than the set 
of historical processes that the concept uncovers. It is a disturbing concept 
indeed. Coloniality invokes colonialism, which is the complement of impe-
rialism. Thus, whereas “imperialism/colonialism” refers to specific sociohis-
torical configurations (i.e., the Spanish and British Empires’ colonies in the 
Americas and Asia), “modernity/coloniality” refers to the conceptual and 
ideological matrix of the Atlantic world that, since 1500, has expanded all 
over the globe. Third, coloniality or the colonial matrix of power, describes 
a specific kind of imperial/colonial relations that emerged in the Atlantic 
world in the sixteenth century and brought imperialism and capitalism 
together. The Roman Empire, for example, was not a capitalist empire, nei-
ther was the Ottoman Sultanate that coexisted in the sixteenth century with 
the Spanish Empire. The colonial matrix of power explains the specificity of 
the modern/colonial world and the imperial/colonial expansion of Christian, 
Western, and Capitalist empires: Spain, England, and the U.S.
 Coloniality is disturbing because it forces you to move back the clock 
of ¨modern¨ history, because ¨modernity¨ has been self-fashioned on the 
French Revolution (politics), the Industrial Revolution (economy), and class 
struggle (the logic of history and the future of the world). Historically, colo-
niality is the hidden logic of control and management, underlining (invis-
ibly) the European appropriation of land, the massive exploitation of labor, 
the slave trade, the extraction of gold and silver, and the plantation economy. 
It was not at that time a projected global design. Western Christians, after 
losing Jerusalem, where concerned about how to expand Christianity over 
the world—the oecumene that then did not include what would become 
“America.” Coloniality as a specific set of processes started with the Span-
iards and the Portuguese. The world we live in today is, decolonially speak-
ing, a consequence of the “colonial revolution” rather than the French or 
Industrial ones. The colonial revolution or revolution of coloniality started 
in the sixteenth century and does not consist in overruling something previ-
ous within the same history but in erasing to build something new: the New 
World, metaphorically, the modern/colonial world. This kind of revolution 
took place later on in Asia and in Africa, when European powers arrived 
with the tools of the empire; and when the U.S. and transnational corpora-
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tions, today, arrive with their juggernaut to dismantle the environment in 
search for natural resources and the colonization of the last remaining sub-
ject of colonization: life itself.
 In the seventeenth century, Dutch, French, and British merchants and 
entrepreneurs took advantage of the Caribbean lands and enslaved Africans 
to settle a plantation economy that contributed to increase the wealth and 
authority of Western European monarchies and created the conditions for 
the Industrial Revolution. The Dutch created the East India Company. The 
British soon initiated their own commercial relations with the Mughal Sul-
tanate; after Napoleon, France started its commercial and colonial contacts 
with Maghreb. From the late eighteenth century on, the colonial matrix of 
power was expanded, transformed, and enacted by the emerging European 
imperial nations of the western and Atlantic coasts. This story is well known. 
Less attention has been paid to the commonality, the three centuries after 
the “discovery” of America, of the underlying structure that united the Por-
tuguese, the Spanish, the Dutch, the French, and the English and also, with a 
few important provisions, the Russian.
 Eastern Christianity housed among other spaces in Russia had its own 
historically unsuccessful global pretensions of the specific Orthodox Chris-
tian kind (based on aggressive Russian Orthodox universalizing the ideal of 
a particular spiritually, taking over the whole humanity) and also, its own 
New World—first Siberia, which was colonized by the Russian equivalents 
of the conquistadors (the Cossacks) and under the supervision of the proto-
capitalist merchant families like the Stroganoff, from the late sixteenth cen-
tury on—and in the second modernity—the Caucasus and Central Asia (the 
Russian Orient or the hot Siberia, as it used to be called in the nineteenth 
century). In spite of lacking classical capitalist model, in the first modernity, 
Russia had its own variant of coloniality, with Orthodox Christianity in its 
center (Moscow as the Third Rome) and all the commercial and geopolitical 
reverberations, except for the ingenious “discovery” of Western modernity—
the firm link between racism and the shaping of the capitalist exploitation of 
labor in the colonies. Thus, already at that point in history, it became obvious 
that coloniality is wider and deeper than just “capital/modernity,”18 it cannot 
be taken exclusively to the economic sphere, and it allows us to conceptualize 
not just the West and its colonies but also the rest of the world, particularly 
Eurasia, which was later mentally colonized by the discourses of modernity. 
This deeper nature of coloniality, rather than capitalism, would keep coming 
forward again and again—in the Soviet modernity and in the late twentieth 
century, when capitalism would become polycentric and travel to non-Euro-
pean spaces.
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 It is disturbing, finally, because it forces you to a new beginning of mod-
ern/colonial history, to see the foundation of capitalism in the very “primi-
tive accumulation” that Karl Marx, with his progressive view of history, saw 
as a precondition of real capitalism in the northern European Industrial 
Revolution. Globalization, as it is understood today, goes hand in hand with 
coloniality, with the foundation of the colonial matrix of power. Postcolonial 
studies and theories, as currently understood in the U.S. and certain Euro-
pean countries, start from a different historicity and genealogy of thought, 
which places the British Empire and, sometimes, French colonial expansion 
at the center of modern/colonial history. This is one of the limits of postcolo-
nial studies seen from the perspective of global coloniality. Equally mislead-
ing and simplified are the attempts of certain scholars to apply postcolonial 
studies and theory to the analysis of the post-Soviet space, without paying 
attention to the differences both within their varied local histories and con-
figurations and vis-à-vis the rest of the world.19
Defining Colonial and imperial Differences
Colonial and imperial difference(s) are not fixed, stable walls. They change 
through time and space. What is maintained is the coloniality of both. If 
modern/colonial empires are one and the same with the foundation and his-
tory of capitalism and the idea of Europe, then the question is this: How does 
the colonial matrix of power, thus defined, relate and explain the Russian 
Empire and the Ottoman Sultanate, to take the examples of empires coexist-
ing with the capitalist and Western Christian ones? To answer this question, 
we need to unfold the concepts of the “colonial and imperial differences” 
introduced previously. Both are implied in the very structure of the colonial 
matrix of power. Imperial discourses are built on the bases of the differences 
with people, languages, religions, economies, and political organizations of 
the colonies. To exploit, it is necessary to dominate, and to dominate, it is 
necessary to build discourses and belief systems that produce the imperial 
image as the locus of the right and unavoidable march of history and the col-
onies as the locus of the erroneous, the inferior, the weak, the barbarians, the 
primitives, and so on. To conflate differences with values in human beings’ 
hierarchical order is not just to identify “cultural” differences but to build 
“colonial” differences, justified in a “racial” configuration of human beings 
on the planet, their languages and religions, their economies, and their social 
organizations. That is, modern imperial discourses have been founded on 
the basis of “colonial differences” at all levels of the social. On the other hand, 
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to maintain the control vis-à-vis competing empires, it is also necessary to 
assert the superiority of imperial hegemony and to found the “imperial dif-
ference” with coexisting and imperial formations. Thus, the Russian Empire 
that took off with Ivan the Terrible toward 1555 and the Ottoman Sultanate, 
whose moment of splendor with Suleiman the Magnificent coincided with 
Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire and I of Castile, were soon located in 
the margins of the Western Christian imperial discourses. The Russians were 
Christian but not Catholic, their alphabet was Cyrillic, and their language 
was Slavic (linked with Greek literacy and not Latin), whereas the Ottoman 
Sultanate was Muslim and its language was Turkish and Arabic. The Russian 
and the Ottoman may have been empires, like the Spanish one, but certainly 
only second class. That is, the imperial difference recognizes the similar but 
immediately reduces it to a second-class empire by extending to it the fea-
tures of the colonial difference.20 That is to say, both the Russian Empire and 
Ottoman Sultanate were inferior in terms of religion and language. Conse-
quently, the imperial difference was constructed on the same principle of the 
colonial difference, except that it was applied to sociohistorical configura-
tions that were not reduced to colonies.21
Zero-Point epistemology
The foundation of knowledge was and remains territorial and imperial. The 
world map drawn by Gerardus Mercator and Johannes Ortelius worked 
together with theology to create a zero point of observation and of knowl-
edge—a perspective that denied all other perspectives. Modernity in this 
respect is not a historical process but an idea that describes certain historical 
processes. This idea needs a system of knowledge that legitimizes it. Simul-
taneously, once the idea was created, it legitimized the system of knowl-
edge that created it (Mignolo 1992, 301–30). By the same token, the idea of 
modernity and the system of knowledge that legitimized it became a mecha-
nism to disavow other systems of knowledge and to make other historical 
processes non-modern. The system, in which coloniality is embedded, also 
created a meta-language wherein its own affirmation went hand in hand with 
the justification to disavow systems of knowledge that the meta-language 
described as non-modern. Meta-languages have the peculiarity of detach-
ing the known from the knower, the said from the act of saying, and create 
the effect of an ontology independent of the subject. Modernity then is the 
construction of a meta-language that originated the European Renaissance 
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(rebirth) coupled with European imperial expansion. Through the centuries, 
the meta-language was transformed and at the same time maintained during 
the Enlightenment and adjusted during the period of neoliberal globaliza-
tion, to become globally hegemonic.
 The hegemonic system of knowledge production, transformation, and 
transmission is grounded today in what Colombian philosopher Santiago 
Castro-Gómez described as the hubris of the zero point. The coexistence of 
diverse ways of producing and transmitting knowledge is eliminated because 
now all forms of human knowledge are ordered on an epistemological scale 
from the traditional to the modern, from barbarism to civilization, from the 
community to the individual, from the orient to occident. . . . . By way of this 
strategy, scientific thought positions itself as the only valid form of produc-
ing knowledge, and Europe acquires an epistemological hegemony over all 
other cultures of the world (Castro-Gómez 2007: 433).
 The hubris of the zero point is the place of the observer and the locus 
of enunciation that, in Christian theology, was taken by God and, in Secu-
lar Philosophy, by Reason. The zero point is the limit in which there is an 
observer than cannot be observed, the God of Transcendental Reason; that 
is, zero point epistemology is theologically Christian and egologically secu-
lar. Once a mortal human claims that he or she occupies that space, either 
in communication with God or in assuming the position of the observer 
at the top of the hill looking down the valley, a secure locus of enunciation 
is created that is hard to dispute. This happens because he or she observes 
not just with his or her eyes, but within certain languages and in certain 
linguistic tradition in the categories of thought; and consequently, whoever 
comes from knowledge systems incorporated in non-Western languages and 
relies on different principles of knowledge has a hard time entering the house 
where the hubris of the zero point dominates.
 Epistemological frontiers were set in place as a result of this move. These 
were the frontiers that expelled to the outside the epistemic colonial differ-
ences (Arabic, Aymara, Hindi, Bengali, etc.). Epistemic frontiers were reart-
iculated in the eighteenth century with the displacement of theology and the 
theopolitics of knowledge by secular egology and the egopolitics of knowl-
edge. Epistemic frontiers were traced by the creation of the imperial and 
colonial difference. Both epistemic differences were based on a racial classi-
fication of the population of the planet, where those who made the classifica-
tion put themselves at the top of humanity. The Renaissance idea of Man was 
conceptualized based on the paradigmatic examples of Western Christianity, 
Europe, and white and male subjectivity (Las Casas [1552] 1967, Kant 1798).
44   •   Pa rt   I ,   c Ha PtE r   1
Global Coloniality: The (Four) Spheres of the 
Colonial matrix of Power revisited
The colonial matrix of power emerged and was founded as a consequence 
of the Christian and Castilian colonization of the Americas. Radical changes 
took place during that period in the history of humankind. The changes in 
scale and orientation could be described in four interrelated spheres of social 
organization.
 In each sphere, there is a struggle, conflict for control and domination 
in which the imposition of a particular lifestyle, morale, economy, structure 
of authority, and so on implies the overcoming, destruction, and margin-
alization of the existing one. The four interconnected spheres in which the 
colonial matrix of power was put together in the sixteenth century, and has 
operated since then, are the following:
1.  The struggle for the economic control (i.e., the appropriation of land 
and natural resources and the exploitation of labor) oriented to produce 
commodities for the global market. As Anibal Quijano and Immanuel 
Wallerstein (1992: 134) suggest, the Americas were not incorporated 
into an already existing capitalist economy, but on the contrary, a capi-
talist economy as we know it today could not have existed without the 
discovery of America. The complementary movement of land appro-
priation and labor exploitation meant, simultaneously, the dismantling 
and overruling of other existing relations between human beings, soci-
ety, land, and labor, such as the one already in place in the so-called 
Inca and Aztec Empires.
2.  The struggle for the control of authority (setting up political organiza-
tions, different forms of government, financial, and legal systems or 
the installation of military bases, as it happens today). Thus, in the 
Americas, the Spanish and Christian institutions were established 
to dismantle and overrule the existing forms of control of authority 
between Incas and Aztecs.
3.  The control of gender and sexuality—among other ways, through the 
nuclear family (Christian or bourgeois), and the enforcing of norma-
tive sexuality and the naturalization of gender roles in relation to the 
system of authority and principles regulating economic practices, the 
third sphere of the colonial matrix of power. It is based on sexual nor-
mativity and dual “natural” gender relations. Christian morality, the 
idea of the family, and patriarchal superiority were imposed at the 
same time that homosexuality was condemned and placed on the side 
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of the Devil. The control of gender and sexuality also overruled gen-
der relations and sexual practices existing among Aztecs, Incas, and 
other communities reached by the spread of Christian itinerant mis-
sionaries. A decolonial gender theorist and activist, María Lugones, 
recently summarized this sphere in the concept of coloniality of gender 
(Lugones 2008), which we explore in more detail in Part II.
4.  The control of knowledge and subjectivity through education and 
colonizing the existing knowledges, which is the key and fundamen-
tal sphere of control that makes domination possible. The control of 
knowledge and subjectivity was part of the package of the colonial 
matrix of power on which the imperial control of the colonies was 
organized. Christian colleges were created all over the Spanish domin-
ions. The Renaissance University, already at work in places such as 
Salamanca and Coimbra, were installed (like McDonalds today) in 
Santo Domingo, Mexico, Peru, and Argentina during the sixteenth 
century; and in the seventeenth century, Harvard (1636) was founded 
as the first university in the British colonies. The control of knowledge 
goes hand in hand with the control of subjectivity, from the Christian 
subject, modeled according to theological principles of knowledge to 
the secular subject, modeled according to the egological, emancipat-
ing, and sovereign principles. Obviously, the control of knowledge and 
subjectivities was accompanied by the dismantling and overruling of 
Aztec and Inca systems of knowledge and formation of subjectivity, 
which were framed neither on Christian theological principles nor on 
secular egological ones. From the late eighteenth century onward, the 
colonial matrix of power that was put in place during the sixteenth 
century under Christian and Iberian forms of governments and econ-
omy was translated and adapted to the needs of the new emerging 
imperial powers, mainly France and England. Myriads of examples 
illustrate the transformations of the colonial matrix of power at the 
level of economy, authority, sexuality and gender, and subjectivity and 
knowledge in both local and global histories in the last five hundred 
years. We refer to a number of such examples in the following chapters 
of the book. Here, we should also consider the imperial aesthetic in 
molding colonial subjectivities contested within Western civilization 
by always rebellious artists and, more recently, specifically by decolo-
nial art and decolonial aesthetics (Tlostanova 2005, Mignolo 2007).
 These four spheres describe a) the totality of the social where the struggle 
for power takes place and b) the interconnectedness among the four spheres. 
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But, what holds them together? The enunciation—categories, institutions, 
and actors in a position to manage and legitimize each of the spheres includ-
ing knowledge itself—is precisely what “barbarians” and “primitives” and 
“Orientals,” underdevelopment, and the like mean: people, institutions, lan-
guages, religions, economies “behind” modernity.
 The colonial matrix went through successive and cumulative periods, in 
which the rhetoric changed according to the needs and the leading forces 
shaping the spheres of economy, authority, public realm (gender and sexu-
ality), and education (knowledge and subjectivity). And so, secularism dis-
placed theology; development displaced the civilizing mission, and so forth. 
In the first period, knowledge was framed by theology and the mission of con-
version to Christianity. That period dominated the scene during the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries and was in the hands of the Catholic Christian 
and southern European monarchies, although the Orthodox Christianity 
also had its limited success. It was marked by the compromises between 
the Roman Papacy and the Crown of Spain (from 1480 to 1555, from Fer-
dinand and Isabelle to Charles I of Spain and Charles V of the Holy Roman 
Empire). By the end of the seventeenth century, a secular and commercial 
language emerged in England, based on the profitable plantation economies. 
The combination of a growing economic discourse and an increasing secu-
larization of life was a step toward the second stage, the civilizing mission led 
by England and France. When imperial leadership changed hands again after 
World War II, the U.S. development and modernization mission displaced the 
British Empire’s mission. It was in strong competition with another modern-
izing and developmental mission called Socialism.22 When development and 
modernization failed because it was not possible for a capitalist economy 
to develop underdeveloped countries, the mission changed again to market 
democracy as the supreme point of arrival of neoliberal philosophy. Approxi-
mately from 1970 to 2000 was the moment of consolidation of neoliberalism 
that, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, translated the previous mission of 
development and modernization into the Washington consensus of the prior-
ity of market economy over social regulation. Through five hundred years 
of Western capitalist empires (Spain, England, the U.S., and their support-
ers), the rhetoric of modernity (i.e., the different types of “salvation” that the 
elites in power articulate in their discourses) has at once justified and hidden 
the logic of coloniality implanted during the sixteenth and the seventeenth 
centuries.
 Historically, the colonial matrix had a serpentine, not a vector, history. 
It unfolded not just in the Western empires, from Spain and Portugal, to 
Holland, France and England, to the U.S., but also—in a transmuted form—
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in the Russian and, particularly, Soviet modernity. Starting from the six-
teenth century and more intensively, from Peter the Great, Russia has been 
transforming gradually into a subaltern, second-rate empire that adapted 
the Western model of modernity, civilization, and later, progress, pushing 
the global expansionist Orthodox Christian project more and more aside or 
suppressing it in the collective unconscious. This only intensified Russia’s 
historical failure, as it could not possibly compete with the West in secular 
areas and was doomed to remain within the catching-up and resentful dis-
course that it is trying to overcome only today. Besides, adapting the rhetoric 
of modernity (as Russia did) went hand in hand with the logic of colonial-
ity, but it certainly went unannounced and was not properly conceptual-
ized. Efforts at revamping the aggressive Russian claims to world domination 
would take place in the nineteenth century as well, but only Soviet modernity 
would rebuild itself as an integral and seemingly secular system in which 
the rhetoric of modernity would change but the logic of coloniality would 
remain intact, altering only in its content. Thus, modernity in the twentieth 
century was implemented in two forms: the liberal/capitalist modernity and 
the Socialist/statist one. The Soviet modernity refashioned the rhetoric of 
modernity in the language of Socialism versus capitalism, but it reproduced 
the logic of coloniality in the control and management of its colonies, par-
ticularly the non-European racialized colonies of the Caucasus and Central 
Asia. As has been demonstrated by a number of scholars, the Bolsheviks 
wanted to build Socialism and have the colonial empire, too, and it would be 
sentimental and misleading to believe in their anticolonial rhetoric, particu-
larly when it referred to the spaces that were historically claimed by Russians 
as their “own.”23
 Soviet modernity was an ultimately unsuccessful attempt at creating an 
alternative world, where nonetheless we can find the distorted reflections of 
all the elements of liberal capitalist modernity. Parallel to its rival, the social-
ist world had been building its own successive forms of coloniality, which in 
the end proved only the derivative and mimicking nature of Soviet moder-
nity. Thus, the Soviet division of labor was also based on a racial hierarchy 
with a seemingly lacking idea of race (it was replaced with the specifically 
understood “nation”),24 but with a developed racial politics, the Bolsheviks 
inherited Eurocentrism, Orientalism, and racism from Western Socialism, 
albeit in distorted derivative forms. The Soviet modernity had its own devel-
opmental and progressive ideals, as well as a theatrical form of multicultur-
alism based on double standards similar to those of its liberal cousin and 
a caricature halfway decolonization (fashioned as the rehabilitation of the 
“enemy nations”) after Stalin’s death. In the realm of coloniality of knowledge 
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and being, based on the erasing of memory, history, literacies, and alphabetic 
traditions of the colonized and creating docile intellectual slaves, the Soviet 
modernity proved to be even more effective than that of the West. It is clear 
that the Soviet Union was a colossus with feet of clay and could easily col-
lapse because of its own contradictory strategies and the time bomb of its ill-
designed federalism, but it is also clear that the lack of immunity in the face 
of intellectual and cultural colonization by Western modernity, which the 
USSR inherited from Russia, was systematically used during the Cold War 
for the gradual disintegration of the Soviet Union from within. The collapse 
of the Socialist system coincided with the beginning of a new époque and 
became in itself one of the many manifestations of the new face of the global 
coloniality. In a way, Soviet modernity fulfilled its part and was dismantled.
 The second crucial moment is taking place in front of our own eyes: the 
reproduction of the colonial matrix is being “diversified,” so to speak, in the 
struggle for the control of authority and economy. Diversification means that 
the colonial matrix is slipping out of control of Western imperial states that 
created it and made it work in the last five centuries. A common global econ-
omy goes hand in hand with global racism and the struggle for the control of 
authority. Diversified or polycentric capitalism means that, in contrast with 
the world order that existed thirty years ago, the emerging economic nodes 
no longer follow the instructions and recommendations of the World Bank 
and the IMF; they are already unfolding globally.25 This also means that the 
struggle for authority and control is no longer between the European impe-
rial centers (World War I), or the European imperial center and a peripheral 
one (Japan), or the conflagration between liberal capitalism and Socialist 
economy that polarized the world during the Cold War and opened up the 
space for the nonaligned countries (basically the Third World).
 No matter if the diversification of capitalism takes sometimes more and 
sometimes less successful forms in various parts of the world (from China 
and Russia to Southeast Asia, from India to Brazil and the Middle East), it 
becomes clear that, in a polycentric world, the type of economy described by 
liberals and Marxists alike as “capitalist economy” is hegemonic.26 But that 
is not all, because economic transactions impinge upon and are modeled 
by the state competition in international arena, and state competition is not 
exempt from racial tensions, religious struggles, and rivalry for the control 
of knowledge. The colonial matrix of power is still at work but now outside 
its place of origin: the Atlantic economy from the sixteenth century on, and 
the European political theory, philosophy, and science since the eighteenth 
century. And no mater how great Western contributions were to the world 
history in the past half a millennia, the West is losing its global authority and, 
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therefore, the expectation that the rest of the world would follow the path of 
Western Europe and the U.S. is vanishing. It is clearly seen in the politics of 
the aforementioned locales that refuse to receive orders and recommenda-
tions from the IMF, the White House, or the European Union.
 While the era of liberal and secular civilizing missions opened up the 
doors to its opposite, the Socialist civilizing mission, the Washington con-
sensus, and the invasion of Iraq disguised as a war against terrorism (an 
example of rhetoric of modernity to justify the control of authority and nat-
ural resources), took the colonial matrix of power out of the Western hands, 
including its Socialist version. We do not know how polycentric capital/
modernity will manifest itself in different locales in the future. But, what 
seems to be clear is the decline of the era of peaceful coexistence between 
theology, mercantilism, and free-trade capitalism in the sixteenth- and sev-
enteenth-century Western nations; of the cohabitation of secular liberal-
ism and industrial capitalism after the eighteenth century, when England 
became the dominant empire; and the emergence of the nation-states that 
replaced communities of faith (religions) by communities of birth (ethnic-
ity), of coexistence of Western imperial nation-states under the leadership 
of the U.S., centered on global designs of modernization and development, 
translated into neoliberal projects of market democracy in the end of the 
twentieth century. Polycentric capital/modernity means, in short, that the 
five hundred years of Western domination is ending and the colonial matrix 
of power—created in the process of Western global domination—is now the 
terrain of global dispute.27
 Yet the colonial matrix is not going away. Coloniality will remain as long 
as the final horizon of human life is guided by the desire to accumulate capi-
tal, as long as the economic gains and benefits continue to define “develop-
ment” and the pursuit of happiness. The control of authority will continue, 
disguised by a rhetoric of progress, happiness, development, and the end of 
poverty and will justify the huge amounts of energy and money spent on the 
conflicts between the centers ruled by the capitalist economy.
next to and beyond hegel: 
Coexisting imperial Formations, the Colonies, and the 
mutations of Colonial and imperial Differences
We have thus far argued around the constitutive complex modernity/colo-
niality and described the colonial/imperial differences, the production and 
reproduction of the colonial wound in the name of the achievements of 
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modernity. There are no nor can there be any modern achievements with-
out inflicting colonial wounds. It is necessary now to displace Hegel’s ver-
sion of world history anchored in modernity, to shift the geo- and body 
politics and to anchor new world histories from the perspective of colonial-
ity. We suggested how the implementation of the colonial matrix of power 
created the conditions for the emergence of spatial epistemic breaks that 
emerged around the world in the form of decolonial projects and orienta-
tions, silenced in the map of world history by the rhetoric of modernity. 
We move now to the complex imperialism/colonialism as far as the impe-
rial and colonial differences have been defined by the rhetoric of modernity 
and implemented within Western, capitalist, Christian, and secular empires. 
The imperial and colonial differences are not, of course, “matter of fact” and 
ontological realities but imperial constructions on which the entire racial 
matrix of the modern world has been and continues to be built. Think, for 
instance, of the characterization of Islam in sixteenth-century Christian 
Spain and its counterpart, the interpretation of Islam in the twenty-first 
century U.S. Or think of the Circassian (Cherkess) people, who went from 
being treated by the Russian Empire as possible military allies and equals in 
humanity in the first modernity, through being racialized and dehumanized 
in the second modernity, during the conquest, then through their Soviet 
treatment as internal others and to their total othering and symbolic black-
ness today. Hence, the paradoxical metamorphosis of Circassians from the 
quintessence of the Caucasian race, in the German anthropologist Blumen-
bach’s ([1795] 1865) quasi-scientific interpretation, still around in some of 
the U.S. questionnaires, to their becoming subhuman in today’s Russian neo-
imperial discourse.
 In the unfolding of the linear history of Western empires that coincides 
with the history of capitalism (Arrighi 1995), the making and remaking of 
the imperial and the colonial differences became the empire’s companion, 
as Spanish philologist and grammarian Elio Antonio de Nebrija said when 
Queen Isabella asked him what would be the use of the grammar of the 
Spanish language.28 The foundation of imperial and colonial differences were 
articulated in the sixteenth century from the privileged perspective of West-
ern Christendom and with the imperial foundation of Castile, with the “dis-
covery of America” in 1492, and with the kingdom of Charles V of the Holy 
Roman Empire, which occupied almost the entire half of the sixteenth cen-
tury. It was in Christian Castile and the historical role it attributed to itself 
in the simultaneous events of expelling Moors and Jews from the Iberian 
Peninsula, conquering two empires in what became the New World, and 
initiating a massive appropriation of land and exploitation of labor (followed 
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by Holland, France, and England) that created the conditions for a theologi-
cal discourse in which the imperial differences with the Ottoman and the 
Russian Empires were established. Simultaneously, the colonial difference 
was articulated in the process of colonization of the Indians and the massive 
trade of African slaves.
 A genealogy of the word “imperium” is of the essence here. Imperium 
has sovereignty and management of the colonies as one of its basic meanings. 
These legacies were handed down to Spain, particularly through Charles 
V, Holy Roman Emperor (1519–58), and later on were appropriated by the 
kings and queens of England and France. In a nutshell, the genealogy goes 
from the foundation of the idea of empire in Rome to its continuation in 
Spain, England, and France. That is, in the foundation of Western capitalist 
empires, there are legacies of the noncapitalist Roman Empire. This narra-
tive is quite well known in the West, but it is particularly interesting that 
the Russian Empire has been left out as a silent and absent historical agent. 
The imperial difference begins, from the perspective of modernity, with this 
silence, which implies the inferiority of those who are, if not altogether out 
of history, then on its very margin, even if they are also imperial people. At 
the beginning of the sixteenth century, when Spain was not yet an empire 
but just a kingdom that happened to “discover” America, Russian imperial 
vision declared itself an heir of Rome and of Constantinople (the second 
Rome), self-defining and christening Moscow as “the Third Rome.” A Brit-
ish scholar of Russian descent, Dominic Lieven, wrote a book, Empire: The 
Russian Empire and its Rivals (Lieven 2000),29 which begins with the analysis 
of the coetaneous existence, toward the first century of the Christian era, 
of the Roman Empire and the Chinese Dynasties, and of Latin and Hanyu 
(Han language) as the two languages and carriers of a complex system of 
knowledge. Second, Lieven moves to the three heirs of the Roman Empire: 
the Islamic Caliphate that arose toward the eighth century a.d.; the Russian 
Czardom, rising at the end of the fifteenth century; and the Western Chris-
tian empires (as Lieven puts it), which carried the torch for the rise and 
growth of Western empires (capitalist, Catholic, and Protestant).
 The connections between these two genealogies (the Roman Emperor 
and the Chinese Huángdì, and their respective dominions) were forged in the 
eighteenth century. At this point, the imperial difference is not only crucial 
to understand the historical changes but also to reread Hegel´s imperial ver-
sion of world history. The Russian Czardom was translated into Empire and 
began a process of affirmation of sovereignty and establishment of colonies 
that transformed “frontiers” into “borderlands” (i.e., the political divisions 
with adjacent empires, such as the Ottoman Sultanate and Persian domains 
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under the ruling of the Shahanshah in the south, Qing China in the east, 
and Europe in the southwest). The Caucasus developed into a borderland 
between Islam and Orthodox Christianity as well as, later on, into a colony of 
the Russian Empire. Thus, imperial and colonial differences were established 
in the very act of setting up the physical and geographical borderlands—the 
colonial difference with the Caucasus was simultaneously the locale of the 
imperial difference with the Ottoman Sultanate. The Russian Empire that, 
from the eighteenth century on, imitated and followed the imperial, some-
times capitalist, and often liberal patterns emerging in England, France, and 
Germany—at least on the surface—had a local history that prevented its 
governors, intellectuals, scholars, and civil society from feeling that they also 
inhabited the house of the “Absolute Spirit.” Thus, the imperial difference 
was established and Russia became a lesser empire in the ascending history 
of “European modernity.” Russia and the Soviet Union as empires had their 
own colonies subordinated through their own adaptation of the colonial 
difference that in this case can be called a secondary colonial difference. 
The colonial difference in Russia and the Soviet Union was subordinated to 
the imperial difference and subjected to the superiority of Western imperial 
rhetoric.
modernity/Coloniality and the World of 
imperial Differences
The imperial difference brings its own configurations into modernity/colo-
niality picture. For instance, in those locales where the projection of moder-
nity was not direct but mediated by the presence of a secondary empire that 
created its own distorted, mimicking, and ineffective variant of modernity, 
the history, the genealogy of humanities, and the ways of their regeneration 
would be quite specific. The humanities as we know them are indeed respon-
sible for the shaping of the Western imperial reason, but in certain locales, 
this formula has to be complicated. For example, in Russia, this knowledge 
is not quite Western but imperial and its non-Western nature does not save 
it from a discriminatory stance toward its own internal and external others.
 All the Atlantic empires that came into power through the exploitation 
of labor and extraction of natural resources from America were Catholic 
or Protestant, whereas the Ottoman Sultanate was Muslim and the Russian 
Empire was Orthodox Christian. Historically, then, capitalism was complicit 
with the materialization of the Atlantic economy, with Catholicism and Prot-
estantism. If the very idea of “modernity” thus became part of the vocabulary 
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and the rhetoric that went together with the coming into sight of the West-
ern empires of the Atlantic and their colonies in the Americas, the colonial 
control of labor that materialized in the Atlantic was based on two systems 
of exploitation of labor to produce commodities for the world market. West-
ern exploitation of labor was organized around encomienda30 and slavery, of 
which the Spanish, Portuguese, French, and British took ample advantage. 
The implantation of labor systems that founded colonial capitalism displaced 
and destroyed the labor system in the Aztecs and Incas, which, whatever it 
was, was not capitalist. In contrast, Russia was not largely involved in the 
type of exploitation of labor that the encomienda and the transformation 
of the slave system implanted in the Atlantic (i.e., the triangle trade) during 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In contrast with the Spanish colo-
nization of America, Russian colonization did not take the shape of mas-
sive exploitation of labor to produce commodities for the global market. 
Geopolitical, military, and religious goals prevailed, as Russia did not find 
itself in the situation of having to deal with a “new” continent and its natural 
resources, and the only massive labor force it could exploit was that of its 
own serfs. Thus, if Spain and Russia had a similar beginning in their road to 
empire (e.g., “liberating” themselves from the Moors and the Mongolians), 
soon the differences became apparent: Russia was not part of the Atlan-
tic monopolistic capitalism, and therefore, it found itself on the margins of 
European modernity and the emerging logic of coloniality.
 Through modern/colonial (that is, decolonial) analysis, the world of 
imperial difference is dominated by two recurrent motifs: the problematic of 
subaltern empires (Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Sultanate, Russia), which 
act as intellectual and mental colonies of the first-rate capitalist Western 
empires in modernity, and, consequently, create their own type of secondary 
colonial difference; and a forceful Socialist modernity, which is a mutant, 
marginal, yet decidedly Western kind of thinking and acting, an emancipa-
tory global utopia, gone conservative and reactionary.
 In works touching upon the typology of empire(s) (Hardt and Negri 
2000, Ferguson 2004a, 2004b, Smith 2003, Spivak 1999), Russia/Soviet 
Union remains nonexistent or at the border, which, however, does not mean 
that its experience is not relevant for other locales. In fact, because of their 
uniqueness, the discourses and practices of the Russian and Soviet Empires, 
the “dark other” of Western Europe, can be used to illustrate and partly 
reformulate the problematic of modern colonial and imperial differences 
throughout the world. To understand from a border epistemic perspective 
how the European colonial model was replicated and transformed in subal-
tern empires such as Russia is one of the goals of this argument. To do so, it 
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may be interesting to briefly trace the main aspects of modernity/modern-
ization in Russia/Soviet Union interpreted both internally and externally. 
By “internally” and “externally” we do not mean ontologically existing enti-
ties but imperial inventions and creations. These terms mean indeed the 
self-making of the interior space and, by the same token, the invention of 
the exteriority that makes possible the construction of the interiority. So by 
“internally” and “externally” we mean both the frame of Russia’s compli-
cated relations with the capitalist empires of the West and the frame of its 
no-less-complicated and varied imperial discourses with respect to its own 
quite different colonies. Khazhismel Tkhagapsoev, an intellectual from the 
northern Caucasus, mapped the making of the imperial difference in the 
relationship between Russia and the West, starting from the “beginning,” 
that is, the adoption of Christianity, to Vladimir Putin’s presidency: 
In general the Russian reality appears as an existence of “transmuted forms” 
on all crucial and turning points in its history. For example, in the ninth 
century, Russia adopted Christianity, but it got so transformed within the 
Russian social-cultural context that it became very much imbued with the 
spirit and forms of pagan culture and it acquired a “transmuted nature 
(form)” in relation to Western European Christianity, based on the sys-
temic-rational philosophy of Aristotle and Aquinas. In the eighteenth cen-
tury, Russia began to assimilate European economic, political, and cultural 
ideas and forms of modernity—the ideas and forms of capitalism, market 
economy, and technological culture. However for another two hundred 
years (up to the beginning of the twentieth century), Russia preserved the 
dominance of the political class of landowners (latifundium), while the 
capitalist (bourgeois) class was denied access to the political decision mak-
ing. So capitalism also acquired in Russia a transmuted nature (form) as 
it was driven not so much by the rules of the market as by the subjective 
will of the main landowner of the country, the “tsar-autocrat.” In 1917 a 
new turn took place in the history of Russia—the Bolsheviks pushed it 
into the new historical trajectory, that of Socialism. But, as is well known, 
Stalin’s model of Socialism, which had never undergone any principal 
changes under other Communist party general secretaries from Khrus-
chev to Gorbachev, had little to do with the Swedish social political system. 
(Tkhagapsoev 2006: 519–20)
 The exemplary case of Russia shows how the canonical concept of “uni-
versal history,” a Christian invention and a fundamental tool of modernity/
coloniality later secularized by Kant and Hegel, could be reframed in terms 
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of borders and differences—imperial and colonial. Universal history in this 
sense is none other than the history of the world from the epistemic perspec-
tive of European modernity (Christian and secular), fashioning itself as such 
and building on the imperial difference with other rival empires and on the 
colonial difference with subjugated people.
 Within the world of imperial difference(s),31 modernity discourses 
acquire secondary and mutant forms. This refers to secondary Eurocentrism 
practiced by people who have often no claim to it (like the Russians), to 
secondary Orientalism and racism that flourish particularly in relation to 
the non-European colonies of subaltern empires, such as the Caucasus and 
Central Asia, giving them a multiply colonized status and a specific subjec-
tivity often marked with self-racialization and self-Orientalizing (Tlostanova 
2008). Without these additional categories, we cannot rethink humanities, 
social movements, or subjectivities in these spaces. At the same time, the 
Central Asian and Caucasus people would be unable to decolonize them-
selves without a robust reconceptualization of their location in the world 
history of the past five hundred years and the history of their relatively recent 
colonization by Russians and Soviets. This unstable and blurred world of 
distorted reflections and Janus-faced subjectivities produces a specific kind 
of scholar and humanities marked by only virtual, imagined belonging to 
modernity, based primarily on intellectual colonization, which is the most 
serious impediment for any decolonization of thinking, of knowledge, and 
of being in the world of imperial difference.
racism: 
a Criterion for Deciding Who belongs to humanity
The struggle for the economic control, the control of authority, of gender 
and sexuality, and finally of knowledge and subjectivity that the colonial 
matrix of power rests upon are interrelated and interdependent. Each of 
them impinges on the other. But, what glues them together? The answer is 
racism. By “racism,” we do not mean a classification of human beings accord-
ing to the color of their skin but rather a classification according to a certain 
standard of “humanity.” Skin color was the secular device used since the 
eighteenth century when the religious racism based on blood purity was no 
longer sufficient to accommodate, in the classification, peoples around the 
world that were not Muslims or Jews. In the sixteenth century then, while 
Christians in Europe were building a discourse that disqualified, in religious 
terms, Moors and Jews, the same Christians were building in the Americas 
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a discourse that disqualified not only Indians and Blacks, but also mestizos 
and mulattos, that is, the mix between Spanish and Indians and Spanish 
and Black. Although this classification was necessary for Spanish and Cre-
oles of Spanish descent in the Americas, Spaniards from Spain introduced 
a new distinction to cast Creoles of Spanish descent in America inferior to 
those Spanish born and raised in Spain. Thus, racism is an instrumental term 
in which the colonial difference is built and the colonial wound infringed: 
Racism is a device to deprive human beings of their dignity. The logic of 
coloniality is implied in the racialization of people, languages, knowledges, 
religions, political regimes, systems of law, and economies. Racialization of 
the sociohistorical spheres on a world scale means to degrade whatever does 
not correspond to the imperial ideals of modernity and to persecute and 
destroy whoever disagrees with the racial classification of the world. That 
hidden logic, justifying killing in the name of modernity, is precisely the 
constitutive logic of coloniality.
 Racism, in the final analysis, rests on the control of knowledge/under-
standing and subjectivity. The modern imperial missions were as much 
about the control of economy and authority as about producing new sub-
jects, modeled according to Christian, liberal, and Marxist concepts of soci-
ety and the individual. Knowledge has been, together with language, the 
companion of empires and, in the case of Western empires founded in capi-
talist economy (from mercantilism to free trade, from monarchy to nation-
states), knowledge has been under control of theology and egology. By 
“Egology,” we refer to the new principles of knowledge (“I think”) and sub-
jectivity (“I am”), which were both twisted by René Descartes (1596–1650) 
in his well-known “I think, therefore I am.” One cannot exist without the 
other, although Knowledge was placed before and above Being. And both 
contributed to a new direction in European thought and subjectivity that was 
already in place, for instance, in Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra’s Don Quixote 
(1605, explicitly stated in the Preface). The Cartesian thinking subject and 
constitutive being was not supposed to be a black African or a brown Indian 
from the Americas, a brown Indian from Asia, or a brown Arab from North 
Africa and what is today the Middle East. The Cartesian subject was immate-
rial and disembodied, without color and odor—an empty signifier of a sort 
(controlled by the principles of the theo- and egopolitics of knowledge) that 
embraced all, every skin color and religious belief under the control of the 
experience of white European man and Christian religion. Immanuel Kant 
was clear, following Descartes´s route, that “these” people were not yet ready 
to reach the highs of the Beautiful and the Sublime and, even less, of Reason 
(Eze 1997: Part 4).
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 Nelson Maldonado-Torres conceptualized this ontological dimension of 
coloniality through the idea of misanthropic skepticism, that is, a doubt in 
the humanity of the other, who is marked by constant violence and death. 
Therefore, he questions the Cartesian logic of the “ego cogito” that hides its 
darker side—the ego conquiro—as a crucial element of European conscious-
ness that led to global naturalization of the subhuman status of the colonized 
and racialized peoples. “If the ego cogito was built upon the foundation of 
the ego conquiro the “I think, therefore I am” presupposes two unacknowl-
edged dimensions. Beneath the ‘I think’ we can read ‘others do not think,’ 
and behind the ‘I am’ it is possible to locate the philosophical justification for 
the idea that ‘others are not’ or do not have being . . . should not exist or are 
dispensable” (Maldonado-Torres 2007: 252).
Shifting the ethics and Politics of Knowledge
The control of knowledge in the colonies implied, simultaneously, the denial 
of knowledges and subjectivities in Nahuatl, Aymara, or Quechua languages. 
In the sixteenth century, Arabic had been already cast out, and in the nine-
teenth century, Hindi, Urdu, and Bengali would follow the same path. The 
denial of knowledge and subjectivity created a spatial epistemic break that 
cannot be captured by Tomas Kuhn’s (1962) paradigm changes or Michel 
Foucault (1968) epistemic breaks. The panorama we face as scholars and 
intellectuals concerned and critical of the formation, transformations, and 
current persistence of the colonial matrix of power is not so much the “study 
of colonialism” or “postcolonial studies” around the world but the need to 
“decolonize knowledge.” And decolonization of knowledge can be hardly 
attained from within Western categories of thought—neither Spinoza nor 
Nietzsche will do. We need to move in different directions.
 Today, the spatial epistemic break is turning into geo- and body political 
epistemic shifts: those managed by the body politics of the state (unveiled 
by Foucault) are turning miseries into celebration and claiming the geo- and 
corpopolitical epistemic rights of enunciation. Both “breaks” are chrono-
logical and remain within the regional history of Europe. The spatial break 
emerged in the decolonial attitude which can be traced back to the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries (Waman Puma de Ayala in the Viceroyalty of 
Peru) but became more visible in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
(Gandhi, Mariátegui, Césaire, Cabral, Fanon, Menchu, Anzaldúa). Mariáte-
gui, Cesaire, Fanon, or Anzaldúa become the equivalents of Descartes for the 
decolonial epistemology that is already well underway, although not visible 
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in the publications of university presses, which are more and more attentive 
to the market. The concept of coloniality is not only a concept that describes 
a reality but also a concept that affirms its own locus of enunciation; a con-
cept that anchors the shift in the geo- and body politics of knowledge. This 
argument not only describes a phenomenon but also argues mainly from the 
new perspective that the phenomenon described allows us to create.
 Decoloniality (as synonymous with decolonization of knowledge and 
being) cannot be a knowledge at the service of the monarch, the church, the 
state, or the corporations, but knowledge that comes from the perspective of 
and empowering of the “the colonial subalterns”—that is, those whose lan-
guages, religions, social organization, and economic production have been 
denied and suppressed by structures based on the theo- and the egopolitics of 
knowledge. The first took away the geographical and biographical locations 
of knowledge and the knower in the name of God; the second—in the name 
of Transcendental Reason. The epistemic imperial and colonial differences 
were the instruments through which theo- and egopolitics of knowledge 
were established. The decolonial shift relocates the geo- and body politics 
of knowledge and reveals that both the theology and egology implemented 
a philosophy of knowledge that denied its own geographical and biographi-
cal location while projecting, as universal, what was indeed anchored and 
located at the geographical and biographical location of imperial agencies. 
Decolonial projects and actions cannot be subsumed under paradigmatic or 
epistemic breaks within the universal time of Western modernity but should 
be considered as a geo- and body political epistemic shift fracturing a cosmol-
ogy with no alternatives other than Christian, liberal, and Marxist.
 The spatial epistemic shift generated by the repressive logic of colonial-
ity engendered, as we suggest, decolonial projects and practices, including 
knowledge and subjectivity, and prompted the question of the ethics and pol-
itics of knowledge: Where do intellectuals stand in this enterprise? How do 
their subjectivities formed by ethnic belonging and discrimination based on 
race, gender, languages, regional histories, and so forth impinge on how they 
think, how they are seen, and how they want to imagine and create a future 
beyond discrimination? Imperial and colonial differences inflicted wounds 
and created borders—physical and mental lines that can be policed between 
one country and the other, between one neighbor and another, between an 
employer and an employee, between the population of ex-imperial coun-
tries (such as Russia) and the immigrants in imperial ones (such as the core 
countries of the European Union and the U.S.), between the police and the 
civil society. Borders are lines that divide people in the street and allow the 
police and the embassies of dominant countries to control entire populations 
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in other parts of the world. And borders are also conceptual and mental lines 
that divide different types of knowledge. What we need is the epistemic geo-
political and body political potential emerging from the borders (in the ex- and 
neocolonies as well as in the ex- and neoempires) to displace the epistemic privi-
lege of modern epistemology (theo- and egological; Eurocentrically oriented). 
The line of the colonial difference is common through time and space to all 
those who have been wounded by the coloniality of knowledge and being, 
one domain of the colonial matrix of power. Silenced through the history 
of modernity told from the perspective of modernity, those who have been 
wounded are taking the lead, not in the academicism of postcolonial studies 
but in the ethical and political arena of the epistemic decoloniality. Decoloni-
ality (the undoing of the colonial matrix of power) implies two simultaneous 
moves: to unveil the hidden logic of modernity (i.e., coloniality) and to work 
toward another globalization, as the World Social Forum has it.
BOrDer ThinKinG and theorizing emerged from and as a response to the violence (frontiers) of imperial/territorial epistemology and the 
rhetoric of salvation that continues to be implemented on the assumption 
of the inferiority or devilish intentions of the other and, therefore, contin-
ues to justify oppression and exploitation as well as eradication of differ-
ence. Border thinking is the epistemology of the exteriority and, as such, is 
the necessary condition for decolonial projects. Recent immigration to the 
imperial sites of Europe and the U.S.—crossing the imperial and colonial 
differences—contributes to maintaining the conditions for border thinking 
that emerged from the very inception of modern imperial expansion. In this 
regard, critical border thinking displaces and subsumes Max Horkheimer’s 
“critical theory,” which was and still is grounded in the experience of Euro-
pean internal history ([1937] 1999). “Decolonial border thinking” instead 
is grounded in the experiences of the colonies and subaltern empires. Con-
sequently, it provides the epistemology that was denied by imperial expan-
sion. “Decolonial border thinking” also denies the epistemic privilege of the 
humanities and the social sciences—the privilege of an observer that makes 
the rest of the world an object of observation (from Orientalism to Area 
Studies). It also moves away from the postcolonial toward the decolonial, 
shifting to the geo- and body politics of knowledge.
c h A p T E R  2
Theorizing from the borders; 
Shifting to the Geo- and body Politics 
of Knowledge
60
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 Why do we need border thinking (border epistemology)?32 Where is it 
taking us? To the decolonial shift as a fracture of the epistemology of the zero 
point. Decolonial border thinking brings to the foreground different kinds 
of theoretical actors and principles of knowledge that displace European 
modernity (which articulated the very concept of theory in the social sci-
ences and the humanities) and empower those who have been epistemically 
disempowered by the theo- and egopolitics of knowledge. The decolonial 
epistemic shift is no longer grounded in the Greek and Latin categories of 
thought that informed modern epistemology (since the Renaissance) in the 
six European imperial languages (Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese for the 
Renaissance; French, English, and German for the Enlightenment) but in 
the epistemic borders between European imperial categories and languages 
and categories that modern epistemology ruled out as epistemically nonsus-
tainable (e.g., Mandarin, Japanese, Russian, Hindi, Urdu, Aymara, Nahuatl, 
Wolof, Arabic). The epistemology of the zero point is “managerial,” and it is 
today common to business, natural sciences, professional schools, and the 
social sciences. Border thinking is the epistemology of the future, without 
which another world will be impossible.
 Epistemology is woven into language and, above all, into alphabetically 
written languages. And languages are not something human beings have but 
what human beings are. As such, languages are embedded in the body and 
in the memories (geohistorically located) of each person. A person formed 
in Aymara, Hindi, or Russian who has to learn the rules and principles of 
knowledge mainly inscribed in the three imperial languages of the second 
modernity (French, English, and German) would of necessity have to deal 
with a “gap”; while a person formed in German or English who learns the 
rules and principles of knowledge inscribed in German or English is not sub-
ject to such gap. But, there is more, since the situation is not just the one that 
can be accounted for in terms of the universal history of human beings and 
society. Knowledge and subjectivities have been and continue to be shaped 
by the colonial and imperial differences that structured the modern/colonial 
world.
 Consider, on the one hand, knowledge in the modern and imperial 
European languages, and on the other hand, knowledge in Russian, Arabic, 
or Mandarin. The difference here is imperial: In the sphere of knowledge, 
scholars, diplomats, and intellectuals in China, Russia, and the Arabic coun-
tries have to know English. The reverse is optional, not necessary. However, 
these languages are not just different. In the modern/colonial unconscious, 
they belong to different epistemic ranks. “Modern” science, philosophy, and 
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the social sciences are not grounded in the Russian, Chinese, and Arabic lan-
guages. That of course does not mean that no thinking is going on or knowl-
edge produced in Russian, Chinese, or Arabic. It means, on the contrary, 
that in the global distribution of intellectual and scientific labor, knowledge 
produced in English, French, or German does not need to take into account 
knowledge in Russian, Chinese, and Arabic. Furthermore, increasingly since 
the sixteenth century, knowledge in Russian, Chinese, and Arabic can-
not avoid intellectual production in English, French, and German. Strictly 
speaking, societies in which Russian, Chinese, and Arabic are spoken were 
not colonized in the way the Americas and South Asia were. Thus, any lan-
guages beyond the six imperial European ones, and their grounding in Greek 
and Latin, have been disqualified as languages with worldwide epistemic 
import. And, of course, this impinges on subject formation: People who are 
not trusted in their thinking are doubted in their rationality and wounded in 
their dignity. Border thinking then emerges from the colonial and the impe-
rial wound.
 If we consider, instead, Hindi or Aymara, the epistemic difference with 
modern European languages and epistemology is colonial. In both cases, the 
coloniality of knowledge and being goes hand in hand with modernity’s rhet-
oric of salvation. Today, the shaping of subjectivity, the coloniality of being/
knowledge are often described within the so-called globalization of culture, 
a phrase that in the rhetoric of modernity reproduces the logic of coloniality 
of knowledge and being.
borders are not Only Geographical but also epistemic
“Borders” are not only geographic but also political, subjective (e.g., cul-
tural), and epistemic; and contrary to frontiers, the very concept of “border” 
implies the existence of people, languages, religions, and knowledge on both 
sides linked through relations established by the coloniality of power (e.g., 
structured by the imperial and colonial differences). “Borders” in this precise 
sense, are not a natural outcome of a natural or divine historical processes in 
human history but created in the very constitution of the modern/colonial 
world. If we limit our observations to the geographic, epistemic, and subjec-
tive types of borders in the modern/colonial world, we see that they all have 
been created from the perspective of European imperial/colonial expansion.
 “Border thinking” (or “border epistemology)” emerges primarily from 
the people’s antiimperial epistemic responses to the colonial difference—the 
difference that hegemonic discourse endowed to “other” people, classifying 
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them as inferior and at the same time asserting its geohistorical and body-
social configurations as superior and the models to be followed. “These” 
people (we, Madina and Walter, included) refuse to be geographically caged, 
subjectively humiliated and denigrated, and epistemically disregarded. For 
this reason, the decolonial epistemic shift proposes to change the rules of 
the game—and not just the content—and the reason for which knowledge 
is produced: Decolonization, instead of working toward the accumulation 
of knowledge and imperial management, works toward the empowerment 
and liberation of different layers (racial, sexual, gender, class, linguistic, epis-
temic, religious, etc.) from oppression and toward undermining the assump-
tion on which imperial power is naturalized, enacted, and corrupted.
 Second, border thinking could emerge also from the imperial difference, 
i.e., through the same mechanism as the colonial difference but applied to 
people in similar socioeconomic conditions to the ones who are in a domi-
nant position. Western (Christian and secular) discourses about Indians and 
Blacks (that is, Africans transported to the Americas) founded the colonial 
difference and the modern matrix of racism. During the same period, the 
sixteenth–seventeenth centuries, Western Christian and secular discourse 
founded the imperial difference with the Ottoman Sultanate and the Rus-
sian Empires. Turks and Russians, in other words, were obviously not Indi-
ans and Blacks from Western hegemonic geo- and body classification of the 
world. However, it was clear for everybody in the West that, even if Turks and 
Russians were not Blacks or Indians, they were not European either. Start-
ing at least from Kant and Hegel onward, the Russians are not considered 
quite white/European and therefore, not quite human. In Kant’s classifica-
tion of the world in a decreasing order of meeting the requirements of the 
enlightened Reason, Russians held a very modest place, to put it mildly. In 
Anthropology from a Pragmatic View, he simply says that “since Russia has 
not yet developed definite characteristics from its natural potential; since 
Poland has no longer characteristics, and since the nationals of European 
Turkey never have had a character, nor will ever attain what is necessary for 
a definite national character, the description of these nations’ characters may 
properly be passed over here” (Kant [1798] 1996: 231). Hegel, reflecting on 
the universal history, was writing about the Slavs, who in his opinion were 
ahistorical people: “This entire body of peoples remains excluded from our 
consideration, because hitherto it has not appeared as an independent ele-
ment in the series of phases that Reason has assumed in the World” (Hegel 
[1882] 1991: 350). However, “second class” empires also had to deal with 
colonies. The Russian/Soviet Empire, Japan between 1895 and 1945, and the 
Ottoman Sultanate, before its demise, are all Janus-faced empires: One eye 
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points toward Western capitalist and dominant empires; the other toward 
their own colonies (Tlostanova 2003).
 Zero point epistemology manifests itself in the theo- and egopolitics of 
knowledge. Both Christian theology and secular philosophy and science are 
grounded in the Rationality of Ego rather than in the Wisdom of God. By so 
doing, the zero point epistemology posited itself not just as the right way of 
knowing but as the only way. Whatever did not fit the demands of theologi-
cal and egological principles was relegated to the world of the barbarians, 
the not quite yet or those who maybe, some day will. Both, Christian the-
ology and secular philosophy and Western science shaped Western impe-
rial expansion throughout the last five centuries. Border thinking began a 
process of detachment from the magic effect of theological and egological 
imperialism. Border thinkers dwell in the difference (colonial and/or impe-
rial), and dwelling in the borders, border thinkers look at, watch, ponder, 
examine, and study imperial thinkers. Imperial thinkers are not necessarily 
imperialists. Imperial thinkers think within theological and egological prem-
ises: They inhabit the house of zero point epistemology.
 Thus, border thinkers ask first, what are the relations between geohis-
torical locations and epistemology, on the one hand; and between identity 
and epistemology, on the other? Border thinkers do not believe that Aris-
totle’s or Kant’s ideas and reasoning were detached from their bodies and 
their geohistories, where their senses were soaking. Consequently, decolonial 
intellectuals do not believe in the universality of statements made from any 
local history. And there is nothing but local history. The ideas of global or 
universal histories are just an imperial epistemic euphemism. Border think-
ers quickly bring to the foreground Ibn-Sina, al-Gazhali, Ibn-Rushd, Gua-
man Poma, Ottobah Cugoano, Mahatma Gandhi, Nawal el Saadawi, and 
many others next to Aristotle and Kant. Border thinkers seat next to those 
in the “second row” (seen from the perspective of zero point epistemology) 
and watch and contemplate those sitting on a pedestal and looking down the 
valley, classifying the creatures who are in the valley and not on pedestals. 
The issues and questions deriving from them are never asked by theological 
and egological epistemologies.33 The array of possibilities for border think-
ing is indeed vast, but they all have one thing in common: How do people 
in the world deal with Western economic, political, and epistemic expansion 
if they do not want to assimilate or remain passive and if they/we choose to 
imagine a future that is their/our own invention and not the invention of 
the empires, hegemonic or subaltern? Someone born and raised in British 
India has little in common with someone born and raised in Spanish Amer-
ica; languages and religions are different, histories are incommensurable. 
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However, they have a common history: the imperial/colonial history of West-
ern capitalist and Christian empires—Spain and England. From the imperial 
perspective—either of the dominant empires (England, U.S.) or the subal-
tern empires (Russia, China, the Ottoman Sultanate of the past)—border 
thinking is almost an impossibility (one would have to give up the epistemic 
privilege of Western modernity and admit that knowledge and understand-
ing are generated beyond institutional norms and control), and from the 
colonial perspective, border thinking is straightforwardly a necessity. Dwell-
ing and reflecting in the borders does not take you to comparative studies 
but to border thinking. Comparative studies presuppose that the knowing 
subject dwells in the zero epistemic point; places himself on the top of the 
hill, observing from above the movements in the two valleys, one to his right 
and the other to his left. The observer is in neither of the valleys but remains 
detached on the top of his hill.
 The next question is whether border thinkers could dwell in the borders 
and emerge from the borders of subaltern empires or are their chances for 
emergence better in the colonies, and what kind of colonies at that—the 
(ex-)colonies of a subaltern empire (e.g., Uzbekistan, Ukraine) or a hege-
monic empire (e.g., India during the British rule, Iraq under U.S. impe-
rial moves, Bolivia and Ecuador in the history of the Spanish empire and 
the present of the U.S. domination in Latin America, or South Africa in 
its past and present).34 In the case of Russia, border thinkers have to deal 
with imperial borders—the borders between Russia and the West are not 
quite the same kind of borders as those between Mexico and the U.S. But, 
on the other hand, border thinkers also have to deal with borders between 
the Russian Federation and the ex-colonies of the Russian Empire and the 
Soviet Union. Uzbekistan is not exactly India; the Caucasus is not exactly the 
Andean region of South America. Border thinkers walk away from imperial 
abstract universals (e.g., critical theory, semiotics of culture or nomadology 
for everyone in the planet) that will account for all experiences and geohis-
torical violence and memories. They/we assume that border thinking is one 
way toward decolonial options and the promotion of pluriversality or, if you 
wish, the coexistence of universals. Global futures would be a world where 
universals coexist because, otherwise, there may easily be no future, global or 
regional. Pluriversality, and not universality, is the major claim made by bor-
der and decolonial thinkers, since, once again, there is no pluriversality from 
the perspective of theo- and egopolitics of knowledge. And without pluri-
versality and the decolonial coexistence of universals, the blinding impulses 
to domination and personal gluttony, prevail. Pluriversality is possible only 
from border thinking, that is, from shifting the geography of reason to geo- 
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and body politics of knowledge. Because, if pluriversality is coopted from 
the perspective of theo- and egological thinking (from the left or from the 
right), it will become an imperial abstract universal. This is precisely the 
logic of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is based on a pluriversal content 
controlled by a universal epistemology. Pluriversality predicated from the 
perspective of zero point epistemology (liberal, Christian, or Marxist) ceases 
to be such and becomes a mask, a content of imperial epistemic appropria-
tion. Thus, learning to unlearn is essential and becomes a road to decolonial 
options.
 Whereas imperial epistemology is based on theological and egological 
principles, as we stated already, the shift to geo- and body-political prin-
ciples is indeed a decolonial move. Geo- and body politics are the “displaced 
inversion” of theo- and egopolitics of knowledge. It is an “inversion” because 
it is assumed that John Locke’s “secondary qualities” cannot be bracketed in 
the process of knowing and understanding. In a world order in which the 
imperial and colonial differences establish all hierarchies, from economy 
to knowledge, “secondary qualities” that matter are colonial local histories 
(geopolitics) subordinated to imperial local histories, on the one hand, and 
colonial subjectivities (Fanon’s “wretched of the earth”), on the other. Colo-
nial subjectivities are the consequences of racialized bodies, the inferior-
ity that imperial classification assigned to everybody that does not comply 
with the criteria of knowledge established by white, European, Christian, and 
secular men. “Displaced inversion” changes not only the content but funda-
mentally the terms of the conversation: the geo- and body- political perspec-
tives delink from the imperial and totalitarian bent of theo- and egological 
principles. It is hardly enough to question the secularity of the social sciences 
from the perspective of theology, as John Milbank does. It is of the essence 
to move away from inversions internal to imperial epistemology and to shift 
the geography and the biography of reason.
 These positions are hard to reconcile, which is clearly seen in any jux-
taposition of Western and radical non-Western theorizing of borders. From 
the perspective of the imperial difference, the conditions and possibilities 
of border thinking and decolonization are not only different but also more 
difficult. If, in the history of borders marked by colonial differences, the 
opposition to the empire is clear and loud, in the history of borders marked 
by imperial differences, the assimilation (e.g., Peter the Great in Russia) and 
desire to become the West or competition (the Soviet Union confronting 
Western capitalist empires) takes precedence over decolonization (which 
would be a sort of deimperialization), as we see in the case of Russia today. 
China offers still another example of border thinking through the impe-
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rial difference: adaptation without assimilation.35 Overall, the conditions for 
decolonization seem to be more promising in the colonies and ex-colonies 
or in empires that had been reduced to colonies (e.g., the Islamic Empire, 
which, by the nineteenth century, was already subdivided and found itself at 
the mercy of the new imperialism, England and France).
 In the Eurasian space, sporadic instances of border thinking were prac-
ticed by people who experienced double and multiple marginalization and 
discrimination by several imperial (at least in their form) or quasi-imperial 
interventions at once. But, these histories largely remained undocumented. 
The views of these people (if ever they were put on paper) were erased by 
the empires and Western modernity, for instance, nineteenth-century Cau-
casus anticolonial movement activist Saferby Zan or late-nineteenth-century 
secular intellectual, journalist, and Tatar enlightener Ismail Bey Gasprinsky. 
In most cases, these border thinkers had to ultimately make a compromise 
with the dominant power(s) by manipulating in between them or choosing 
the assimilative position of Ariels, as it happened in the case of the Kazakh 
writer and intellectual Olzhas Suleimenov.
 In his book Az I Ya (Suleimenov 1975), he retold the Russian founda-
tional epic Lay of Igor’s Campaign from a Turkic viewpoint and stressed a 
utopian possibility of creating a great secular Eurasian Slavic–Turkic con-
federation or polity based on common history and culture. It is a meditation 
created similarly to Anzaldúa’s text, on the border of the generally accepted 
genres of the scholarly and fictional discourse. Suleimenov presents a cul-
tural manifesto that incorporates in a discursively unstable way elements of 
historiography, poetry, etymological problem, and a traditional novel. The 
Soviet scholarly establishment was infuriated with this book and regarded it 
as an infringement on the grandeur of the great Russian national tradition, 
with its fake secondary Eurocentric myth. Suleimenov got out of the pre-
scribed role of a secondary colonial other who, within the Soviet system, had 
to follow a simple rule: Soviet in its essence, ethnic-national in its form. What 
is more important, however, is that Suleimenov’s positioning in the long run 
is not so similar to Anzaldúa’s mestiza. The difference is that Suleimenov’s 
subjectivity is traditional for the Russian/Soviet Empire’s internal assimilated 
other. It is based on synthesizing and not on border impulse, in relation 
to the Russian and “Asian” nomadic traditions. In contrast with Anzaldúa, 
Suleimenov is not living in the border, constantly juggling traditions and 
identities. He is rather a subaltern brought up on the Russian dominant cul-
ture, viewed as the champion of (Soviet) modernity. By looking for similari-
ties between the Russian and the nomadic traditions, he is trying to upscale 
the Nomadic one instead of denigrating the Russian or draw attention to its 
68  •  pA RT  I ,  c h A p T E R  2
colonialist nature. Thus, what is at work in case of Suleimenov is a forbidden 
(for the late Soviet period) ethnic-cultural revivalist impulse of rewriting the 
dominant tradition by means of looking for similarities between the impe-
rial and the subaltern cosmologies and origins. Thus, he is not negating or 
rejecting the colonizer but rather trying to integrate into the sameness in 
yet another way. This is possible in a limited number of imperial/colonial 
configurations, mainly those that originated in the subaltern empires and 
their colonies. We cannot imagine an African writer proving the common 
roots of his native culture and the British one. But we can imagine a Circas-
sian slave in the Ottoman Sultanate looking for a kinship with the Turks. 
Suleimenov seems to be a Soviet Ariel who suddenly made a Caliban-like 
move and was punished for that by the empire. In post-Soviet period, when 
the ethnic political pendulum, in Emil Pain’s words, goes from minority eth-
nic nationalism to the predominance of fundamentalist Russian chauvinism, 
Suleimeinov’s utopian, but global and positive, model is equally unattractive 
to both parties.
 The world marked by imperial more than colonial difference lives on/
in the border, yet instead of border thinking, we mostly find blurred, in-
between, self-Orientalized models (the Ottoman Sultanate, Russia/USSR, 
central and southeastern Europe). It is difficult to conceptualize such locales 
and epistemic and existential configurations from the viewpoints of either 
the West or the radical non-West, as well as from the viewpoint of the very 
people who were colonized by Western thinking, infected with secondary 
Eurocentrism and unable to analyze their own split subjectivity (their double 
consciousness, as a necessary condition for border thinking), because it is 
always easier to analyze binary polar structures than soft and blurred differ-
ence—the same but not quite, different but too similar. The geo- and body 
politics of knowledge as well as border thinking implies the awareness of 
the double consciousness, which is not the case in the world of imperial dif-
ference that longs to belong to modernity’s sameness so much that it often 
erases it own difference.
 Double consciousness, as conceptualized by W. E. B. Du Bois lies in the 
very foundation of border thinking: One is not possible without the other. 
Imperial consciousness is always territorial and monotopic; border think-
ing is always pluritopic and engendered by the violence of the colonial and 
imperial differences. Internal imperial critique (be that of Bartolomé de las 
casas or Karl Marx) is territorial and monotopic and assumes the “truth” 
of abstract universals (peaceful Christianization by conversion, free mar-
ket, international revolution of the proletarians, etc.). Double consciousness 
emerges from the experiences of being someone (Black, inscribed in the 
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memory and histories of the slave trade in the Atlantic economy) who was 
classified by the imperial-national gaze (European imperial frame of mind, 
U.S. emerging imperial nationalism at the turn of the twentieth century). 
Thus, the problem of identity and identity politics is a direct consequence 
of imperial knowledge making all the inhabitants of the New World Indi-
ans and Blacks and all of Asia the Yellow Race. Identity in politics is a step 
forward: It means to build transformative projects on the identity infringed 
on “us” by the imperial “them.” “Infringed on us” means that identity is not 
ontological but conceptual and that identities are imposed by imperial dis-
courses rather than emerging from the soul of those who have been classified 
and identified. If border thinking is the unavoidable condition of imperial/
colonial domination, critical border thinking is the imperial/colonial con-
dition transformed into epistemic and political projects of decolonization. 
Hence, identity emerges in politics. For that reason, decolonial thinking is 
always already critical, it is border thinking and it is double consciousness. 
Hegel, Kant, and Marx, to name just three European luminaries, at differ-
ent times denied internal others—be they Slavic people or Turks—a place in 
the universal history, in the march of modernity, in the unfolding of global 
proletarian revolution, and so forth. Their disincorporated epistemology and 
their belief in a universal parameter blinded them to the subjectivity of oth-
erness and more so to internal others. It was beyond their scope to under-
stand why a Russian feels himself as a cockroach in Europe,36 while a Turk 
buying a coat from a French store is in fact buying a European dream.37
 The reaction of internal others to this rejection has been that of an uncon-
scious border, divided between the First and Third worlds, wanting to see 
itself as part of a center. The painful border splitness is being masked and at 
once reinforced, when in Istanbul they change the alphabet to Latin or make 
slightly crooked but recognizably Parisian boulevards, when in Moscow they 
speak only French or destroy their own economy in order to please the IMF. 
Today, the split configuration of internal others is expressed in the continu-
ing hierarchy of othering: The world of imperial difference, on the one hand, 
plays the role of unwanted and threatening immigrant into the West; on the 
other hand, the West guards its own borders (including epistemic borders) 
against the unwanted immigration from the ex-Soviet republics and the ex–
Third World. However, when border thinking does not emerge, the alterna-
tives are competition, assimilation, or resistance without a vision toward the 
future.
 For instance, when the European imperial/colonial model was replicated 
and transformed in subaltern empires or empires-colonies, like Russia or the 
Ottoman Sultanate, which became mirror reflections of each other, it led to 
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ideological and intellectual dependency on the West and the epistemic colo-
nization by the West, which resulted in the phenomenon of two cultures—
the culture of European-oriented imperial/national elite with secondary 
Eurocentric inferiority complexes and the impenetrable culture of people, 
that the elite is either ashamed of or attracted to, in the importing of the 
Western discourses of nationalism, cosmopolitanism, liberalism, socialism, 
modernization, progress, and the like (Tlostanova 2004a). The two empires 
shared the subaltern status in relation to the Western empires of moder-
nity, but each had its own configuration of imperial subalternity—Russia 
was a quasi-Western subaltern empire that, in order to survive, had to put 
on different masks for different partners and the Ottoman Sultanate was a 
quasi-Islamic one that also had to have multiple faces and in a sense, in con-
trast with Russia, even practice tolerance as the principle of survival. But, in 
both cases, paradoxically, the hierarchy of otherness was built exclusively in 
accordance with Western European racial, cultural, linguistic, and religious 
norms, which deliberately put both the Ottoman Sultanate and the Russian 
Empires into the situation of empires—colonies, creating peculiar inferior-
ity complexes and specific transitory, in-between and underconceptualized 
cultural, social, epistemic, and political forms.38
 The imperial and colonial epistemic differences create the conditions for 
border thinking but do not determine it. In the hierarchical structure of the 
modern/colonial world, we can identify the four main types of dependency 
relations:
1.  The oppositional attitude consisting in total rejection of Western epis-
temology and subjectivity based on fundamentalist defense of lan-
guages, religions, knowledges, and the like.
2.   The assimilating attitude, consisting in wanting to become like the 
superior other and, therefore, yielding to the imperial language, 
knowledge, and subjectivity at the high price of alienating oneself into 
the imperial other. This is the case of the trickster empire Turkey, mak-
ing its own subaltern status work for its benefit, through transcultural 
and transreligious mediation of Western ideologies and establishing 
new alliances based not on abstract principles of democracy and free-
dom but on religious, linguistic, indigenously economic and cultural 
expansionism, and soft penetration, which today turns out to be more 
effective than many European and American strategies (Özbudun and 
Keyman 2002).
3.  Competition within the capitalist rules of the game or adaptation 
without assimilation (e.g., China or modern defeated Russia, to some 
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extent, which is still grounding itself in the doomed imperial myths of 
grandeur and dominance, finding solace in understanding the border 
as an aggressive expansionistic “third way,” and reviving the dusted 
ideology of Eurasianism).
4.  Border thinking and critical border thinking, which consist in the 
incorporation of Western contributions in different domains of life 
and knowledge into an epistemic and political project that affirms the 
difference, colonial or imperial, to which most of the population of the 
world has been subjected throughout five hundred years of economic, 
religious, epistemic imperial expansion and its consequences in the 
formation of split subjectivities.
Dependency relations with the exteriority of Europe are established through 
the imperial and colonial differences. But these dependency relations with 
the colonies, revert back to its internal others like the Jews, the immigrants, 
and the states, ex-Soviet colonies, now joining the European Union. Aimé 
Césaire clearly saw, in the 1950s, that the colonial matrix of power set up 
and implemented through the four hundred fifty years of colonization, were 
implemented by the Nazi regime in Germany and by the Communist regime 
in the Soviet Union ([1955] 2000).These are all different historical conditions 
from where border positions could be developed as active decolonizing proj-
ects, both epistemic and political from the lived experiences (i.e., subjectiv-
ity) of diverse communities. The geo- and body politics of knowledge would 
be of the essence to disengage from the epistemology of the zero point in 
which the geo- and the body-political have been repressed. The epistemol-
ogy of the zero point that privileges political economy and political theory 
continues to repress the geohistorical and body-graphic politics of knowl-
edge in which critical border thinking is founded. The interconnections 
between geohistorical locations (in the modern/colonial order of things) 
and epistemology, on the one hand, and body-racial and gender epistemic 
configurations, on the other, sustain “the inverted displacement” we describe 
here as geopolitics and body politics of knowledge. If, say, René Descartes or 
Immanuel Kant suppressed (in their theo- and egopolitical epistemic foun-
dations) the geo- and body-political component of their thinking, Frantz 
Fanon and Gloria Anzaldúa brought both (geo- and body politics) wide and 
loud into the open.
 Border thinking needs its own genealogy and its own history; a history 
and genealogy that emerges in the very act of performing border thinking. 
Without it, border thinking would remain either an appendix of modern 
Western imperial epistemology and the variants of canonical history of 
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Western civilization told from the imperial perspective (from the Renais-
sance, to Hegel, to Marx) or an object of study for the social sciences (like the 
savage mind for earlier anthropologists). And decolonization runs the risk of 
being appropriated and immediately trivialized not only by the World Bank 
but also by the so-called progressive European intellectuals who prefer to see 
it as emerging from their own European history and out of their own epis-
temic universality. These champions of Eurocentered epistemic universality 
tend to ¨re-write¨ in their own terms the concepts, projects, and categories of 
thought that have emerged precisely to delink from both right and left Euro-
centrism (Driscoll 2010). If border thinking is ever to emerge in the world 
of imperial difference today, it would have to happen in the colonial and ex-
colonial locales of the subaltern empires, among the people who were multi-
ply marginalized and denied their voice by Western modernity—directly and 
through subaltern imperial mediation. These are the Caucasus and Central 
Asia (in connection with Russia); the Kurds, Greeks, and Armenians (in 
connection with the Ottoman Sultanate); the Yugoslavian bundle of contra-
dictions in the Balkans; and the like. But these voices will hardly be heard 
soon. These mute colonies of the subaltern empires are split in between the 
Western culture (now also directly accessible to them) and its bad subaltern 
empire copies, the ex mediators of civilization. Plus their own native ethnic 
traditions continue to play their part in the process of further disintegrating 
their already split selves, being shattered into even smaller pieces. That is 
why the manifestations of the “multitude” (in Georgia, the Ukraine, or Kir-
gizstan) have been so far geared more by a desire to assimilate to the West 
than to engage in imagining a possible future beyond the options offered by 
Communism and its aftermath and liberalism and is aftermath.
Thinking from the borders
Borders could be “studied” from the perspective of territorial epistemology 
(e.g., Western social sciences; Horkheimer’s traditional theory) but the “prob-
lem” of the twenty-first century would be not so much to study the life and 
deeds of the borders but to think from the borders themselves and therefore 
to be the border, in Anzaldúa’s words. The main problem of the twenty-first 
century is not just crossing borders but dwelling in the borders. We, Madina 
and Walter, are border dwellers, and hence the argument unfolded here is 
not an analysis of observers practicing a zero-point epistemology but that of 
border dwellers engaging in border and decolonial thinking. That is, dwell-
ing in the borders means rewriting geographic frontiers, imperial/colonial 
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subjectivities, and territorial epistemologies. Paraphrasing W. E. B. Du Bois, 
we can say that the problem of the twenty-first century would be—next to 
that of the color line announced by Du Bois—the problem of the “epistemic 
line”(Bogues 2003: 69–94). However, the epistemic line does not replace 
or displace the color line. The color and epistemic lines belong to different 
realms of reality, since epistemology is not supposed to have color, gender, 
or sexuality. In terms of social class, the problems are easier to deal with 
because it was assumed that epistemology belonged to a division of labor in 
which the “intellectual workers” do not belong to the same class as the “pro-
letarians.” However, intellectual workers, even if they are not proletarians, 
do have color, gender, and sexuality. Thus, the “borders” between the color 
(and gender and sexuality) line and the epistemic line are precisely where 
the “problem” appears and the solutions are being played out. For, there is a 
shift at work at the moment when the epistemic line is interrogated from the 
perspective of the color (gender and sexuality) line. It is at this very moment 
that border thinking or border epistemology emerges: It emerges in the crack 
and it emerges as an epistemic shift. It is a shift from the theo- and ego- to 
the geo- and body politics of knowledge.
 The question commonly asked is this: How do you engage (in) border 
thinking and how do you enact the decolonial shift? What is the method? 
Interestingly enough, the question is most often asked by predominantly 
white and North Atlantic scholars and intellectuals. It is impossible to imag-
ine Du Bois asking that question, because he prompted it with his own 
thinking, dwelling in what he called “double consciousness.” The question 
is interesting because it plays like a boomerang and returns to the person 
who asked it. Why is he or she asking that question? Where is he or she 
dwelling, in a single consciousness? Why was it an Afro American like Du 
Bois and not a German like Habermas who came up with a concept such as 
double consciousness? Furthermore, double consciousness would not admit 
the thesis that promotes the “inclusion of the other” (Habermas 1998). Dou-
ble consciousness and the inclusion of the other confront each other across 
the colonial difference. The question is not being asked because modern 
epistemology (theologically and egologically based) separated the geo- and 
corporal location of the thinker. The hubris of the zero point—by elimi-
nating perspectives—prevents the possibility of asking, how can I at once 
inhabit the zero point and what the zero point negates? Asking that question, 
“feeling” that modern epistemology is totalitarian (that it negates all other 
alternatives to the zero point) is the first step to border thinking. And, it is 
also a dwelling that is no longer the House of the Spirit—i.e., the dwelling of 
modern European philosophy and science.
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 To answer the previous question, let us look again at the Janus-faced 
empire of Russia/Soviet Union and think about how border thinking could 
emerge out of the imperial difference of Russia today dwelling in the mem-
ories of subaltern empires, on the one hand, and how could it emerge in 
the colonies or ex-colonies, on the other? How could border thinking and 
decolonization of knowledge and being (i.e., the decolonial shift) be thought 
out and enacted from the histories and perspectives of those locales? The 
blurred spaces of imperial difference once again link knowledge production 
and race (accepting as natural the idea that modern epistemology is and 
should be white). However, no matter how hard “the other” tries to imitate 
or adapt European or—today—American epistemological hegemony, for the 
West, the world of imperial difference continues to play the part of culture-
producing and not knowledge-generating regions of the earth, never really 
changing their ahistorical status assigned by Hegel. This scenario is particu-
larly clear in case of Russia and its imperial/colonial interdependence with 
its colonies in Asia and Eastern Europe. Russia did not have its own theology 
in the Western sense of the word; philosophy and science were shaped there 
following the Western model and borrowed from Europe in their already 
secularized variants, while later on there emerged a double alterity from the 
old Russia and from Europe that failed to fulfill its universalist promises. 
Epistemology, philosophy, and science were born in Russia at the point when 
European modernity had already managed to naturalize its dominance and 
erase all the inauspicious for itself, the histories and epistemic traditions 
(such as the Islamic one), while considerably altering and correcting others 
(like the Antiquity) to its benefit. Russia discovered epistemology as such at 
that very moment and has not ever since seriously questioned its basic Euro-
centric principles, consequently classifying the rest of the world, including 
its own non-European colonies, according to the Western European racist 
colonial matrix of power.
 The most promising case for border thinking in Eurasia is to be found in 
non-European (ex-) colonies of Russia that have managed to preserve their 
epistemic link with the indigenous cosmology and centers of thought, phi-
losophy, and science. That is why the logical step of the Soviet Empire was 
to erase completely and effectively all the traces of this link: to deprive these 
people of their past, epistemology, and culture; to rewrite history in such a 
way that their antiquity would be negated; to ban the previous (Greek or 
Arabic) alphabetic systems and make them start anew with the Cyrillic. Bor-
der thinking, in other words, could not be acknowledged by the territorial 
epistemology of the state without loosing its imperial control of knowledge 
and subjectivity. It is also symptomatic that virtually all instances of border 
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thinking in Eurasia come in fictional or semi-fictional forms, especially in 
the post-Soviet period. That is, border thinking presupposes the transgres-
sion of genre and disciplinary boundaries. Here, border thinking creates 
border or transcultural aesthetics with specific narrative viewpoints, dis-
course, and optics (Orhan Pamuk in Turkey; Milorad Pavič in Serbia; Zor-
ikto Dorzhiev, Afanasy Mamedov, or Vyacheslav Useinov in Russia and the 
ex-Soviet republics).
 Let us explore a different local history. In North Africa, the Moroccan 
philosopher Mohammed Al-Jabri asked an interesting question: Muslim phi-
losophers of the past as well as Christian philosophers of the Middle Age 
founded their philosophy on Aristotle’s Physics (1999). In that line of thought, 
Descartes built his own philosophy on Galilean physics that, in its turn, was 
built on Aristotle’s. What then happened during the time span between Ibn-
Rushd (1128–98), who brought Muslim thought to its most rationalistic 
point, and René Descartes? Living in Spain, in Seville, and making remark-
able contributions to philosophy, logic, medicine, music, and jurisprudence, 
he wrote his major philosophic work “Tuhafut al-Tuhafut” [The Incoherence 
of the Philosophers] in response to al-Ghazali (1058–1111), who was born 
and died in Tus, Iran, and had a profound influence on what would become 
known as European thought, at least until the beginning of modern philoso-
phy and experimental science. So, then, why, since Descartes, has the epis-
temic line erased Muslim contributions to human thought?
 In trying to understand how the Western Christians won the epistemic 
battle against the Muslim philosophy, let us remember, as an anchor before 
René Descartes, the name and works of Desiderio Erasmus, a Dutch human-
ist (1466 [Rotterdam]–1536 [England]) with a remarkable influence in 
Spain, during the kingdom of Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire (Batail-
lon [1950] 1965). Metaphorically, Erasmus was one of the main agents in 
pushing Ibn Rushd out of the memory of a reconstituting Christian Spain, 
shortly after the final defeat of the Moors in 1492. There is a straight line 
between Erasmus’s theology and Descartes’s secular philosophy; while there 
is a profound gap between Erasmus and Descartes, on the one hand, and 
Al-Ghazali and Ibn-Rushd, on the other. A historical and epistemic gap was 
converted into a mirage and translated into a natural and logical historical 
continuity. The mirage is that it appears as if “universal history and intel-
lectual history” follow an ascending temporal line, and therefore, it is natu-
ral that René Descartes continued and took advantage of an accumulation 
of meaning that had been taking place in a genealogy that went from the 
Central-Asian philosopher and physician Ibn Sina (born in a village named 
Afshana near the ancient Central Asian cultural center of Bukhara (modern 
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Uzbekistan), to the Iranian al-Ghazali to the Spanish-Morrocan Ibn-Rushd. 
But that, as we all know, is not the way the history was told. Ibn-Rushd was 
eradicated from the Universal march of Human thought and Descartes, after 
Bacon, inscribed a genealogy of thought that was grounded in Galileo and 
in Aristotle; while Kant followed suit by replacing Galileo with Newton. To 
redress this history and contribute to a pluriversal world in which many 
worlds coexist is one of the tasks of the border thinking and the decolonial 
shift.
 The conditions for border thinking illustrated in the three previous con-
figurations and the potential to make the decolonial shift are certainly there. 
Yet, the dominance and hegemony of Western Christianity (in its diversity) 
and secular liberalism (in its diversity), managed to engender both assimila-
tion and apartheid, which is illustrated by Muslim and other non-Western 
forms of fundamentalism today. During the existence of the Soviet Union 
and its aftermath, Communism, as an alternative to Christianity (including 
its Orthodox variant) within the modern/colonial world, enacted the same 
logic of coloniality of Western empires toward the Soviet colonies. But, on 
the other hand, in the domain of the imperial difference, the Soviet Union 
remained a second-class empire that implemented the same logic of Western 
coloniality but altered its content.
 Border thinking and the decolonial shift allows to imagine the ways out 
of the confrontation between Western promotion of its global designs and 
the Russian/Soviet Empire and colonies, on the one hand, and Islamic/Otto-
man legacies in the Middle East, on the other. It has yet to find a way in 
which “either-or” is at a deadlock, which seems to be maintained by the suc-
cess of capitalism in wearing different masks (liberal, Islamic, etc.). In Russia, 
however, there are no efforts at creating any alternative mediating bordering 
models and the two dominant ones, in this respect, remain the word-for-
word repetition of the Western discourses, rapidly going out of fashion today, 
and the return to the mixture of Russian and Soviet imperial ideology of a 
besieged camp. As a result we see today the full swing division of the ex-
Russian “property” between the more powerful rivals, as we can witness in 
several minor revolutions going on in the ex-colonies of Soviet Union: Geor-
gia, the Ukraine, Moldova, Kirgizia, Uzbekistan, and so on. What happens 
here is the redistribution of borders that are changing one master for another. 
In contrast with Japan, China, or the Islamic world, where the ancient and 
elaborate native epistemic, cultural, and religious systems did not allow the 
Western modernization to destroy this basis completely, in such unstable, 
in-between, and blurred spaces marked with incomplete or partial difference 
as Russia, central Europe, or the Ottoman Sultanate, the forceful insertion 
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of Western epistemology easily pushed their own problematic roots, which 
were not very deeply ingrained in the first place, completely out.
border Thinking at the Crossroad of 
local histories and Global Designs
One of the common views about modernity and globalization (i.e., a later 
stage of modernity) is to conceive the first in contradistinction with alterna-
tive modernities and the second in contradistinction with the local. Local 
histories/alternative modernities are dependent and surrogate components 
of the triumphal march of Global history/modernity. The assumed reality 
in both cases is that globalization “moves” to the periphery, and it is in the 
peripheries where alternative modernities take place as well. Our three the-
ses are an exercise in border thinking (or thinking from the borders) and 
they contest both the held view of the global/local and of modernity/alterna-
tive modernities.
 Regarding the first, the distinction between global and local is based on 
a territorial, not a border, epistemology that assumes the global emanating 
from Western Europe and the U.S. to the rest of the world, where the local 
dwells. In that regard, globalization is seen as a set of processes that engen-
der responses and reactions from those who defend the “authentic cultures” 
or political sovereignty threatened by global forces. Our theses assume, on 
the contrary, that local histories are everywhere, in the U.S. and the Euro-
pean Union as well as in Tanzania, Bolivia, China, or Mercosur. But, the 
question is that not every local history is in a position to devise and enact 
global designs; the majority of local histories on the planet have had to deal, 
in the past five hundred years, with an increasing spread of imperial global 
designs of all kinds: religious, political, economic, linguistic and epistemic, 
and cultural.
 The coloniality of knowledge and the coloniality of being, i.e., the spread 
of global designs from local histories where they emerged to local histories 
to which they are alien, create the conditions for border thinking (instead of 
authenticity), for the decolonial epistemic shift aiming at the decolonization 
of knowledge and being. And, it is in the precise sense of the imperial/colo-
nial conflicts between global designs that spread forms of knowledges and 
subjectivities from the local histories where they emerge to local histories to 
which they are alien, that the decolonial epistemic shift is geo- and body-
politically oriented in confrontation with the theo-and egopolitics that has 
sustained the global imperial designs.
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 From this emerges our second conclusion, our response to the emer-
gence of the idea of “alternative modernities” that are grounded in the terri-
torial epistemology of modernity. In other words, the very idea of alternative 
modernities makes sense only from an epistemological Eurocentered per-
spective that looks at the world as if the epistemic gaze was independent of 
any geohistorical and body-graphic location. That is precisely the epistemol-
ogy of the zero-point that, historically, has the name of theology and egol-
ogy. The government of Evo Morales is not claiming a colonial modernity 
but rather the decolonization of the state and the economy, altogether with 
decolonization of education (knowledge and being). From the perspective of 
border thinking and the decolonial shift, the idea of alternative modernities 
is, as we just said, already embedded in the Eurocentered idea of moder-
nity. There is no modernity, in other words, beyond the macro-narratives, 
invented since the Renaissance by means of which Europe was invented as 
geohistorically occupying the center of space and the present in time. From 
a border epistemology, the idea of alternative modernities is unsound and 
what is needed instead are “alternatives to modernity,” i.e., alternatives to the 
naturalized idea that the past five hundred years of European history are the 
point of arrival (or the end of history) of the human race, and as Anthony 
Giddens has it, it will be modernity all the way down. If that is the case, then, 
it will be coloniality all the way down, because from a border epistemology 
perspective, coloniality is constitutive (and not derivative) of modernity.
 “Demodernize” in this context would mean to reenact in Europe or in 
the U.S., decolonial projects that are emerging not as “colonial modernities” 
but as alternatives to modernity/coloniality, alternatives to the perpetuation 
of the colonial matrix of power. It is clear that decolonization and deimpe-
rialization do not mean the same for the U.S. and European Union citizens 
and for the immigrants to these countries or the citizens of Bolivia, Algeria, 
and India. In its turn, deimperialization does not indicate the same for the 
citizens of Germany and France and for those of Russia and China. There 
is no universal blueprint for either decolonialization or deimperialization.
To decolonize means at the same time to demodernize. And demodernizing 
means delinking from modern Western epistemology, from the perspective 
of which the questions of “representation” and “totality” are being constantly 
asked. Demodernize does not mean going back in time as it is usually under-
stood by the proponents of modernity’s vector models, who immediately 
react by refusing “to go back to the Dark Ages.” We mean something com-
pletely different here, and to understand what is demodernizing, one has to 
forget the generally accepted juxtaposition of modernity and tradition as its 
dark other. To do this would already mean a decolonial step.
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 Border thinking is indeed a way to move toward the decolonial shift; and 
the decolonial shift, in the last analysis, consists in “delinking” (“despren-
derse” is the word employed by Anibal Quijano in 1992) of theo- and ego-
logical epistemic tyranny of the modern world and its epistemic and cultural 
(e.g., formation of subjectivities) consequences: the coloniality of knowledge 
and being. But to delink is not to abandon, to ignore. No one could abandon 
or ignore the deposit and sedimentation of imperial languages and categories 
of thought. Border thinking proposes how to deal with that imperial sedi-
mentation while at the same time getting out of the spell and the enchant-
ment of imperial modernity. The decolonial epistemic shift, grounded in 
border thinking, aims at processes of decolonizing knowledge and being. 
Decolonizing being and knowledge is a way toward the idea that “another 
world is possible” (and not of alternative modernities). That world, as the 
Zapatistas had it, will be “a world in which many worlds will coexist” and 
not a world in which there persists “globalization” or the imposition of global 
designs and “authenticity,” nor will fundamentalists responses to imperial 
global designs reproduce an unending war against the enemies of imperial 
abstract universals. A world in which many worlds coexist cannot be imag-
ined and predicated on the basis of the “good abstract universal valid for all” 
but, instead, on pluriversality as a universal project. Critical border thinking 
and the decolonial shift are one road toward that possible future. Ours was 
an effort at theorizing in the borders and contributing to changing the geo- 
and body politics of knowledge.
 Today, the colonial matrix of power is dominated more than ever in the 
past five hundred years by the sphere of the economy. Once Christianity 
wanted to control the souls, now the spirit of economy controls the bodies 
and souls. The rhetorical promise is not “Paradise after death,” but “Hap-
piness after Development.” There is nowhere to go from here if we remain 
within the logic of coloniality.39 And more and more people realize that it 
is high time that we reject the rhetoric of modernity and, subsequently, the 
logic of coloniality and attempt to shift the biography and geography of rea-
son from its established Western place to the locales marked by the colonial 
difference. Here, the most instrumental concepts would be that of political 
society bursting the harmony of the liberal model apart and the new subject 
of the decolonial agency: the damnés. Modernity/coloniality inadvertently 
generates critical dimension from within and on its colonial side, it nour-
ishes the seeds of the decolonial consciousness and the future development 
of demodern agency, while the very concept of the colonial matrix of power 
is the first basic critical step in decolonial thinking.

P a r t  I I

i. 
Non-European Russian/Soviet (ex-)colonies such as the Caucasus and Cen-
tral Asia are one of the typical subjects of area studies research—the pro-
verbial subalterns who were taught to speak in the language of the Soviet 
modernity but presumably retained a number of unchangeable character-
istics pointed toward a negatively marked “tradition.” Their interpretation 
within the global and local configuration of knowledge in the Soviet time 
and today is an interesting subject in itself. The history of the Soviet anthro-
pology, race studies, and ethnography has been recently put at the center of 
the heated discussions in Russia, in the ex-colonies themselves, and in the 
West (Bertran 2003, Solovey 1998, Tishkov 1992, Ab Imperio, Slavic Review 
2009). The development of these social sciences was marked with colonial-
ity of knowledge within the twentieth-century Western taxonomy of disci-
plines and was closely linked with the construction of the social, cultural, 
and ethnic matrix of the Soviet Empire, with its sanctification of primordial-
ist theory of ethnos (from the 1960s onward), peculiar federalism, theatrical 
multiculturalism, and hidden colonialism. Today’s critical reassessment of 
these concepts is important for nation-building and identity construction of 
the ex-colonies, for the continuing post- and neoimperial politics of Russia, 
c h A p T E R  3
Transcultural Tricksters in between 
empires
“Suspended” Indigenous Agency in the  
Non-European Russian/Soviet (Ex-)Colonies and the 
Decolonial option
83
84  •  pA RT  I I ,  c h A p T E R  3
and for the Western efforts to know the other, which still mostly fall into two 
categories—alienation and appropriation.
 After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the following ideological 
decline, area studies both in the West and in the ex–Soviet Union hastily 
reoriented in their interpretation of the Russian/Soviet (ex-)colonies. They 
stopped to erase the ethnic-racial and religious differences and hierarchies 
for the sake of ideological conformity in the interpretation of the former 
national republics. In the West, the old Sovietology could not exist any more, 
because its ideological core, which glued together the heterogeneous mate-
rial it studied, simply vanished. Russia proper rapidly lost its significance 
as an object in the Western area studies configuration (Kotkin 1995, 2003, 
Dawisha and Parrot 1994, 1996, Aranaga 2009, Slezkine 1994, 2000, Suny 
1997), while the interest in the newly independent states grew and resulted 
in the emergence of Eurasian studies.40 This was a geopolitical more than a 
purely scholarly endeavor, while the new Eurasianists in the West, largely 
remained innocent Orientalists of a sort with few exceptions (Suchland 
2011).
 In many cases, scholars who did this new Eurasian research were the 
same old Sovietologists or their pupils. I do not mean to criticize them but 
just would like to draw attention to the fact that their ideological clichés 
(many of which they shared with their Soviet equivalents) turned out to be 
deeper rooted than it seemed and linked not even with a particular kind of 
ideology, be it Socialism or liberalism but rather with the rhetoric of moder-
nity as such. What lay in its basis? The familiar cult of progress and develop-
ment, the false but powerful opposition of modernity and tradition and the 
ideal of newness, the comical scientific pretensions and the hubris of the zero 
point. The political scientists both in Russia and in the West are the most 
vulnerable to criticism (Olcott 1993, Malashenko 1993), as they reproduce 
either Orientalism as an alibi for the lack of real interest in comprehending 
the non-Western other in its own terms, reducing the other to the site of dif-
ference to explain away the need to attend to its opacity and complexity; or 
modernist ideology, which sees history in linear terms as moving from the 
primitive to the developed, confering similarity on the other as the past of 
the self (Shu-mei Shih 2005: 5).
 In such works the Eurasian borderlands continue to be regarded within 
the Orientalist or progressivist frame that according to Shu-Mei Shih, cloaks 
the lack of the desire to know the other (Shu-Mei Shih 2005: 5). Therefore, 
Central Asia and the Caucasus are still largely seen as a source of exotic cul-
ture or dangerous terrorism and instability, as a new risk factor in the world 
T R A n S c u LT u R A L  T R I c K S T E R S  I n  B E T W E E n  E m p I R E S  •  85
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as a sinister “dust of empire” (Meyer 
2004) of which the West has to be aware. Russian political scientists also suf-
fer from this disease, but they are marked with the victory in defeat rhetoric 
and often continue to practice assertive imperial revivalist discourses.
 If we consider historians, literary and cultural critics, sociologists, and 
anthropologists, the situation is different. A number of scholars looking 
for a new paradigm to interpret the post-Soviet ex-colonies, turned to the 
ready-made model of postcolonial studies, which, as was pointed out in Part 
I, is hardly adequate to define the post-Soviet experience and local histo-
ries.41 But most of the scholars attempted to abstain from theorizing and 
remain within the limits of description and meticulous source study and 
field study. Starting in the early 1990s, Central Asia and the Caucasus have 
become a popular place for Western field work specialists, who produced 
a considerable amount of mostly descriptive works within a wide range of 
quality (Sahadeo 2007, Adams 2005, Kandiyoti 2002, Kamp 2006, Northrop 
2004, Beissinger 2008), typically published in journals defined as “Survey” or 
“Review,” which betrays their disciplinary and ideological framework. Rus-
sia, as usual, lagged behind and has started to slowly revive its interest in the 
study of Central Asia and the Caucasus only relatively recently (Kosmarsky 
2004, Kosmarskaya 2006, Abashin 2007, Tishkov 2003, Tyomkina 2005).
 Some of these new types of area studies scholars are marked with the 
coloniality of knowledge syndrome in a milder form and retain their ability 
at transcultural pluritopic hermeneutics when they “study” an alien “tradi-
tion.” This refers mainly to historians and anthropologists, particularly of the 
younger generation, in the West and Russia who are less contaminated by 
the Cold War mentality and more attuned to questioning and rethinking of 
historical meta-narratives. Their works are often examples of honest research 
that is still limited by their excessive reliance on often-biased archives (Rus-
sian, Soviet, newly (re)created national, seldom diasporic). Second, such 
works are still restricted by their Western methodology and primarily by the 
zero point epistemology lying in its basis, as well as the cult of objectivism 
and empiricism. Moreover, the very categories of analysis being used in such 
research distort the local histories they “study.” For example, they assume 
that the ideal for any kind of society is a well-developed Western-style civil 
society with clearly articulated forms of political and social struggle and 
resistance. All other forms of agency, historical or contemporary, are auto-
matically discredited as marginal, pertaining to the sphere of the nonrational 
and therefore subhuman. Consequently, any scholar who attempts to present 
these irregular forms of agency or indigenous epistemology not as tradition-
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alist archaic survivals to be marveled at, but as a serious form of agency pro-
jecting into the future, is automatically accused of Orientalism, romanticism, 
sentimentalism, and other such vices.
 Finally, the limitations of even the new generation of area studies spe-
cialists of the Caucasus and Central Asia in the West and in Russia are con-
nected with their authors’ body politics of knowledge, which alienates from 
them the world they strive to describe and define. Their mode of analy-
sis is far even from “participatory anthropology,” which still may remain 
within the object/subject divide, to say nothing of the epistemic and politi-
cal projects with indigenous agendas working with anthropologists, such as 
THOA (Taller Historia Oral Andina) or the Zapatistas (Cusicanqui 1990). 
Therefore, these works still describe Central Asians and Caucasus peoples 
as insects. However, there are a few exceptions, most of which belong to 
diasporic and border intellectuals living in the West (among them Adeeb 
Khalid 1999, 2007, Jeff Sahadeo 2007, Sada Aksartova 2005 and several 
others). For them, the problem remains their need to obey and mimic 
the Western scholarship rules to survive as academics in the West, which 
leaves them a rather narrow space for maneuvering. Some of these limita-
tions can be eventually overcome by the scholars from Central Asia and 
the Caucasus provided they stop being regarded as native informants and 
are not restricted by Western scholarly rules in their own research. At this 
point, there is less than a handful of such scholars (among them Svetlana 
Shakirova 2006, 2007, 2008, Marfua Tokhtakhodzhayeva 1996, 1999, 2001, 
Sofia Kasymova 2005b, Madina Tekuyeva 2006a, Elza Bair Guchinova 2005, 
and several others).
 Their position is often marked by the sensibility of internal others, mul-
tiply colonized by many imperial traditions and by the global coloniality as 
a constant reproduction of the imperial and colonial difference (see Part 
I). Such positioning can be found in bordering spaces, located in between 
Europe and Asia, Western modernity and Islam, the subaltern empires of 
modernity, such as the Ottoman Sultanate and the Russian Empire. The Cau-
casus and Central Asia fall out of the general logic, imposed on the world 
by several centuries of the Western European supremacy, but also out of 
the prevailing Arabic Muslim tradition. Moreover, being doubly or multiply 
colonized in epistemic as well as the economic, cultural, and political sense, 
these regions developed throughout the centuries their specific techniques 
and strategies for survival, resistance, and in some cases, positive models of 
thinking and subjectivity formation, which even if virtually unknown in the 
West and in the Muslim world at large, can constitute a way out of the con-
temporary dilemma—the West versus Islam.
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ii.
Central Asia and more so the Caucasus are paradigmatically border spaces. 
“Border” in this case is a geographic, geopolitical, and ontological phenome-
non, as these locales are positioned on the cracks of not just mountain ranges 
or deserts, caravan crossroads and between the seas, but also on the borders 
of empires and civilizations. Political scientist Karl Meyer, in The Dust of 
Empire, points out that “culturally and physically, Caucasia is the prototypal 
borderland. Its mountains, stretching six hundred miles from sea to sea, not 
only form the divide between Europe and Asia but also separate the two 
earliest Christian kingdoms (Armenia and Georgia) from Islam’s two major 
branches, the dissenting Shias, mostly inhabiting what is now Azerbaijan, 
and the majority Sunnis who predominate in the North Caucasus” (2004: 
145).
 Both the Caucasus and Central Asia have been always cultural, linguistic, 
religious, and ethnic crossroads. Various religions and ethnic and linguistic 
groups came one after another into these locales; some of them stayed and 
hybridized their cultures with those of the people who already lived there, 
creating a unique and complex history. For example, in the territory of mod-
ern Azerbaijan, antique Zoroastrianism gave way to Christianity, which later 
was replaced by Islam, when Azerbaijan became a part of the Arabic Caliph-
ate. Central Asia, with its heart in the Ferghana Valley (a place between 
two rivers Amu-Darya–Oxus and Syr-Darya–Jaxartes), also has been a site 
of multiple religious, ethnic and linguistic mixing, starting from the same 
Zoroastrianism, which many scholars believe to be born there, in Khorezm, 
and to Buddhism and Hellenism, the nomadic polytheistic cultures of the 
steppe and the metropolitan craftsmen and artisans traditions, the scien-
tific and cultural achievements, borrowed from India, China, Persia, Greece, 
the Middle East, and Turkey—all of them coming together in the flourish-
ing Central Asian culture, which came under the Arabic control in the sev-
enth through ninth centuries, finally to become Muslim under the Samanid 
dynasty, and in the thirteenth century, once again, being conquered by Geng-
his-Khan’s army. Both territories, from the start, had been the sites of intense 
transculturation and took an active part in the precapitalist world economy. 
They elaborated their own tolerant ways of dealing with this cultural multi-
plicity as well as strategies of survival under various regimes, which, though 
transformed, are alive even today in the subjectivity of the people living in 
these locales, even after the distorting influence of modernity brought with 
it concepts initially foreign to these territories such as ethnic and linguistic 
nationalism and the strong sense of ethnic belonging, religious and linguis-
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tic purism and intolerance, racialization and ethnization, artificial divisions 
of major ethnicities and minorities, into “Arians” and “Mongolians,” and the 
like.
 Therefore, the geopolitical understanding of the border in this case 
should be complemented by epistemic and existential rendering of this prob-
lematic, similar to the one to be found in the works of a Chicana philosopher 
Gloria Anzaldúa. Her border sensibility is very much in tune with transcul-
tural multiply colonized subjectivities of Eurasian borderlands. Anzaldúa 
(1999) states that “a borderland is a vague and undetermined place created 
by the emotional residue of an unnatural boundary. It is in a constant state 
of transition. The prohibited and forbidden are its inhabitants” (p. 25) . . . . 
“The new mestiza copes by developing a tolerance for ambiguity. . . . She has 
a plural personality, she operates in a pluralistic mode—nothing is thrust 
out, the good, the bad and the ugly, nothing rejected, nothing abandoned. 
Not only does she sustain contradictions, she turns the ambivalence into 
something else” (p. 101). Such a border sensibility develops in both Caucasia 
and Central Asia as these regions happen to be simultaneously inside and 
outside of the Muslim world, constantly finding themselves in the zone of 
clashing interests and transcultural processes between various empires and 
dominant cultures. This positioning gives them the epistemic potential of the 
border. The Caucasus and Central Asia for centuries have given birth to vari-
ous models of transcultural mediating thinking and subjectivity that, even 
if suppressed by various empires, turned out to be impossible to completely 
destroy. On the contrary, a trickster sensibility of a particular kind, incor-
porating various cultural, ethnic, religious, epistemic traditions and demon-
strating particular intersubjective models of treating the other, managed to 
survive and was in some cases even strengthened by the imperial control.
 By “tricksterism” here, I mean the contemporary understanding of the 
term, which is linked with yet departs from the classical mythological, reli-
gious, and folklore meaning, when it referred to gods, half-gods, anthro-
pomorphic animals, and less frequently, to humans with supernatural 
characteristics (Hynes and Doty 1993, Ballinger 1991–92). What is impor-
tant is the insurgent nature of any trickster, his or her tendency to disobey 
the normative rules and conventions. From the classical understanding of 
“tricksterism” come such qualities developed and sustained in modern trick-
sters as ambiguity, deceit of authority, playing tricks on power, metamor-
phosis, a mediating function between different worlds, manipulation and 
bricolage as modes of existence. In this sense, trickster becomes not only one 
of the most ubiquitous figures of world literature in modernity and postmo-
dernity (up to its Internet form as a Troll today) but also acquires specific 
T R A n S c u LT u R A L  T R I c K S T E R S  I n  B E T W E E n  E m p I R E S  •  89
features in colonial and postcolonial traditions, where tricksterism acts as a 
form of resistance and re-existence.
 This sensibility has a lot to do with the subjectivity of a transcultural 
migrant of the globalization époque, an individual who lives in the world 
and not in a particular national culture, who is rootless by definition, who is 
a wanderer with no links to any particular locality. More specifically, I mean 
a dialogic concept of a trickster negotiating between Dona Haraway’s (1991) 
and Chela Sandoval’s (2000) interpretations and also the real trickster tradi-
tions that grew out of the geo- and body politics of particular locales, such 
as peripheral Eurasia, where we encounter the less known in the West trick-
ster characters such as Hodja Nasreddin, found all over Central Asia, the 
southern Caucasus, and the Middle East (Kharitonov 1986), and Sosruko, a 
northwest Caucasus Prometheus (Jaimoukha 2010). Donna Haraway’s trick-
ster is a revolutionary form of human being who becomes an amalgam of 
technology and biology, the machine and the human, but also the dominant 
and the oppositional, the First and Third Worlds, the men and the women 
(1991). She takes up the Native American trickster metaphor (that of coyote) 
to formulate her position of radical critical “mestizaje” or a cyborg machine, 
which has to do with the indigenous people’s resistance, looking for similar-
ity in difference.
 In Sandoval’s dialogue with Haraway, a differential mode of social move-
ments and consciousness depends on the ability to read a concrete situation 
of power and consciously chose the ideological position most adequate for 
opposition to this power configuration. The individual practicing such a 
mode is required, according to María Lugones (2003), to make a nomadic 
journey between the worlds of meaning. In her article “Playfulness, ‘World’-
Traveling, and Loving Perception,” she rethinks the concept of the West-
ern agon and playing based on agonistics, regarding love as the essence and 
basis for any successful intercultural and intersubjective communication. 
Lugones’s homo ludens is not interested in who wins and who loses and is 
forever ready to change the rules of the game. Therefore, such a trickster sees 
others nonaggressively, retaining an absolute flexibility and easily switching 
from one world to another, as well as a playful attitude to all worlds, includ-
ing his or her own. Instead of the strict prescription of frozen social roles, 
Lugones stands for the flexibility and fluidity of one’s own images, for the 
constant process of self-creation and self-destruction as well as the creation 
and destruction of various worlds. “We are not self-important, we are not 
fixed in particular constructions of ourselves, which is part of saying that we 
are open to self-construction . . . .While playful, we have not abandoned our-
selves to, nor are we stuck in, any particular ‘world.’ We are there creatively. 
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We are not passive” (Lugones 2003: 96). Finally, Lugones sees “world-travel-
ing and identification through world-traveling as part of loving” others, and 
“a form of disloyalty to arrogant perceivers, including the arrogant perceivers 
in ourselves and to their constructions of powerful barriers between” people 
(2003: 98).
 Differential consciousness as a trickster’s mind inclines to other prin-
ciples of mobility and to metamorphosis and tranformationism. For Sando-
val, a trickster “practices subjectivity as masquerade, a nomadic ‘morphing’ 
not performed only for survival’s sake. It is a set of principled conversions 
that requires (guided) movements, a directed but also a diasporic migration 
in both consciousness and politics, performed to ensure that ethical com-
mitment to egalitarian social relations be enacted in the everyday, political 
sphere of culture” (2003: 62) Turning to the changeable trickster metaphor, 
which acquires concrete meanings in each cultural-epistemic locale, we can 
avoid the new abstract universal and attempt a mutual translation between 
the modern and transmodern idioms.
 Sandoval and Lugones’s interpretations of trickster consciousness and 
playful traveling, along with Anzaldúa’s new mestiza’s consciousness of trick-
sters dwelling on the borders of the imperial/colonial differences, are among 
the brightest realizations of border sensibility in the non-West. From such 
experience emerges a new transaesthetics connecting people throughout the 
world who have suffered the colonial wound (Anzaldúa 1999). This sensi-
bility finds parallels in the Caucasus and Central Asian subverted forms of 
agency residing mainly in the aesthetic realm, in the sphere of visual and 
verbal arts, as I demonstrate next.
iii.
For the West, both the Caucasus and Central Asia remain paradigmatic anti-
spaces or nonspaces—ultimately exoticized or demonized.42 This is quite 
logical, because the universal Hegelian history never unfolded in Tashkent 
or Baku. Even a Ferghanian Babur left his motherland in quest of fame; 
and only after he conquered Kabul, was he able to found the Great Mogul 
Empire. But in today’s global geopolitics, these remote (from Europe and 
America) spaces suddenly come to play a more important part in the new 
world order. Hence, there is a new round of struggle for dominance between 
various forces in these regions, where economic and social factors (from the 
high density of population to the low economic level, from the limited land 
and water resources to mass unemployment) are accompanied by ethnic 
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statism and, in some cases, religious extremism. It would be nearsighted to 
blame only the Soviet Empire for this. The USSR was the latest and most per-
sistent colonizing agent in these locales, but the forceful Soviet modernity/
coloniality itself was only an act in the larger Western modernity/coloniality 
play. Therefore, if we want to understand the present situation in the Cauca-
sus and Central Asia, we would have to frame it within the march of Western 
modernity in all its forms, which resulted, among other things, in the decline 
and fall of these previously prosperous and culturally rich places. Thus, the 
beginning of the end of Central Asian prosperity and its falling out of the 
future world history was linked with the foundation of the global capital-
ist world economy and the looming European dominance. It was then, that 
Vasco da Gama’s ships blazed the sea route from Europe to India and further, 
to China; and the Great Silk route lost its significance, while Central Asia lost 
its strategic economic importance on which it had rested for two millennia 
and became a periphery. Even today, when the Eurasian borderlands finally 
became politically independent, at least partially (in case of the Caucasus), 
they still cannot leave the vicious circle of multiple colonization.
 Up to the establishment of the global Western European dominance, the 
power asymmetry based on the Hegelian understanding of world history 
was not yet generally accepted and the “exotic” Tamerlane’s empire was not 
interpreted by Europeans as primitive, underdeveloped, in need of civilizing, 
or fallen out of history. The figure of Tamerlane is an interesting semiotic 
sign of transcultural exchanges between Europe, Russia, and Asia, which 
illustrates how Western modernity gradually turned anyone non-European 
and non-Christian into a subhuman through demonizing and Orientalizing 
and how various local versions of modernity, such as the Soviet, the Jadid, 
and the contemporary postindependent Uzbek one, continue to exploit the 
Timurids myth, supporting their ideological and geopolitical interests. This 
is how, from a willy-nilly equal, he soon became a standard manifestation of 
barbarous cruelty and despotism, marveled at in both the Western and later 
Czarist Russian interpretations, then went through a period of Soviet posi-
tive recycling, and today is once again recycled in Uzbekistan, often turning 
into a simply masquerade figure dismissed by both Russian and sometimes 
Western historians, who are trying to diminish Timur’s role in history to 
blame the Uzbek administration for exploiting the myth as a source of the 
new national identity (Allworth 1998, Marozzi 2006, March 2002, Abashin 
2007, Ilkhamov 2005). What is important here is not even the degree of 
Timur’s achievements or failures as such. Tamerlane semiotics is indeed 
ubiquitous in modern Uzbekistan and takes disproportionate dimensions, 
but the act of ridiculing this imagery from the side of modernity is not inno-
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cent either, as it clearly demonstrates yet another guise of Orientalism. As 
in case of any historical figure of the same scale, from Henry VIII to Peter 
the Great, we can equally easily depict Timur as a tyrant or as a benevolent 
monarch. What is more important is what is behind this black legend men-
tality, implied today in the Western, Russian, and Uzbek historian debate 
over Timur and his legacy. It is Eurocentrism, racism, a wish to put a wall 
between European (or Russian) history and the “barbarous” Orient, in short, 
coloniality of being and of knowledge struggling to prevent the subaltern 
from finding any viable historical source of agency by ridiculing it and dis-
missing as a superstition.
 In both the Caucasus and Central Asia up to the second modernity, a 
variety of independent and semi-independent polities existed that alterna-
tively came under control of various stronger agents, often successfully bal-
ancing between them for centuries. When the main colonial spaces were 
already divided among the large Western capitalist empires, a process of 
appropriation of the less attractive but still geostrategically important terri-
tories, such as Central Asia and the Caucasus, started. In the latter case, the 
rivalry took place between the secondary empires of modernity, marked by 
imperial external differences, and mainly, the Ottoman Sultanate and Russia. 
Both the Caucasus and Central Asia were colonized not directly by the West-
ern capitalist empires but by the second-class empire, which was itself epis-
temically and culturally colonized by the West and, thus, acted as a mediator 
of Western modernity, albeit in distorted forms. As a result, the Caucasus 
and Central Asia as colonies of a second-class empire took a specific doubly 
subaltern space in the complex global power structure. For example, the Shia 
Persia, the Ottoman Sultanate, and Russia all competed for Azerbaijan in 
the second modernity. Russia got it after its victory over Persia in the early 
nineteenth century. As a result, one of the many Eurasian artificial borders 
was drawn on the River Arax (echoing Gloria Anzaldúa’s border semiotic 
interpretation of Rio Grande, which continues to bring people death, suf-
fering, and humiliation). Even today it divides the Azeri people of northern 
Persia and those of Azerbaijan. A similar history is to be found in Central 
Asia, which after the collapse of the Timurids dynasty and several centuries 
of decay was conquered by the Russian Empire in the 1860s. Russia imposed 
on this space its own colonial model of modernization, copied from the West 
up to minute details, including the famous concept of the “tools of empire” 
and “kulturtreger mission.” It is worth noting that Russia almost immediately 
began making a cotton colony out of Central Asia, intending to shake the 
cotton monopoly of the U.S. South. This project of Central Asia moderniza-
tion was continued by the Soviets with larger and more violent excesses, ulti-
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mately resulting in ecological and humanitarian catastrophes of the second 
half of the twentieth century.
 It is only natural then that both the Caucasus and Central Asia were torn 
between modernization via the Russian Empire, via the Ottoman Sultanate 
model (in the case of the Caucasus) and more traditionalist Muslim Persia, 
and the countries of the Southeast Asia (in case of Central Asia). Their mod-
ernization model came from Russia and later from the Soviet Union, up to 
the 1990s, when the politically pragmatic secular Muslim state model (such 
as Turkey) and the renewed attempts at direct Western control, came back. 
Even if the West never succeeded in directly colonizing these locales, there 
were several attempts in modernity at establishing indirect rule over both 
the Caucasus and Central Asia—all of them within the logic of redistribution 
of colonial spaces when the collapsing empires gave a chance to their more 
successful rivals to gain control over their territories. This happened roughly 
in the period 1917–20, when the collapsing Russian Empire slackened its 
grip and both the Caucasus and Turkistan gained independence, if only for 
several years. Immediately, the Western European countries attempted to 
take over, but the strengthened Bolshevik Empire quickly restored its domi-
nance. We witness a more recent example of the same imperial tactic today, 
when once again the West is trying to establish control over these regions—
economically, politically, and culturally. However, neither the Caucasus nor 
Central Asia is ready to make a final choice, resorting instead to the age-old 
tactic of balancing, mediation, transcultural sensibility, and trickster resis-
tance that gives them at least some potential for the future.
iv.
Here it is a good place to say a few words about the genealogy of this resisting 
sensibility going hand in hand with epistemic models of alternative thinking 
and subjectivities in peripheral Eurasia. It demonstrates some intersections 
with the dissenting South American indigenous models, even if, in case of 
Eurasia, they have not yet had a chance to be sufficiently represented on the 
level of the state, the public discourse, or the social structures, being confined 
to the sphere of the nonrational, esoteric, artistic. The reasons for such dif-
ferences are linked with different ways modernity manifests itself in these 
locales, leading to the emergence of multiple and varied groups of “others” 
and, at the same time, inevitably generating the effect of resistance, which, 
as the Latin American experience demonstrates, can eventually become a 
powerful political force.
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 Furthermore, our use of indigeneity refers to people who were already 
in place when the march of modernity (directly by the West or indirectly 
by second-class empires, like Russia) began to interfere in their places and 
life. “Indigenous” then should not be limited to people whom the Europeans 
named “Indians” in the Americas or to Australian and New Zealand aborigi-
nals but should be extended to all people, irrespective of their way of life, 
religion, or culture, who became a hindrance for the march of modernity and 
progress.
 Therefore, the history of indigenous movements in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia cannot be taken out of historical context. These movements 
did not stay the same in some frozen form but changed together with the 
changing world. They were in the center of geopolitical events of the world 
history in the nineteenth century, acting as pawns in the struggle of several 
types of empire for geopolitical dominance. Both regions played a central 
role in the so-called Eastern question, which was a fight between European 
powers and Russia for control of the lands of the Ottoman Sultanate and 
also in the great game between the Great Britain and the Russian Empire 
over India. While Russia was unsuccessfully trying to win a better place for 
itself vis-à-vis Europe, its non-European colonies were often used to exercise 
the Russian imperial self-assertion that could not be expressed in the West. 
The indigenous people of these locales, even if they were and are used by all 
fighting sides—from Great Britain to the Russian Empire and from Germany 
to France, from the dying Ottoman Sultanate to the Bolsheviks reconquer-
ing these territories, and finally, by the Americans and the Muslim world 
and China today—remained completely stripped of human rights and any 
opportunity of taking part in nation building, generation of knowledge, and 
local social structures. They were and remain now the hostages of moder-
nity/coloniality great game.
 There are many examples of resistance of Central Asian and Caucasus 
people, such as the Adyghean Princes Union of the 1830s, an anticolonial 
organization of the leaders of all the Caucasus tribes, which made an appeal 
to the Russian authorities, asking them to stop the military actions on the 
lands of Adyghe (Circassians) (Zihia web-portal) and offering a project of a 
confederation of the Caucasus lands. Later, when their appeal was ignored 
and the colonization continued in its most cruel forms, they organized a 
volunteer corps to fight against Russia, as a result of which many of these 
Caucasus ethnicities were completely wiped from the face of the earth. But, 
the Caucasus decolonial movement did not end then, continuing well into 
the twentieth century—in the anti-Soviet movements of the 1920–30s, stran-
gled by Stalin and his local disciples, jealously eliminating all alternatives to 
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Soviet modernity, such as Nazir Katkhanov’s Shariah Column and his vision 
of the Bolshevik yet Muslim northern Caucasus (Tekuyeva 2003), and today, 
in the new Caucasus war of the late twentieth to early twenty-first centuries 
(Sahni 1997, Lieven 2000, The Circassians 2008).
 The same refers to many instances of Turkistan resistance, from the 1892 
uprising in Tashkent and the 1898 Andijan revolt to a more massive Dzhizak 
uprising of 1916–17, through controversial Basmachi movements and vari-
ous religious revivals to the late Soviet political organizations and groups 
protesting against the ecological catastrophe of the Aral Sea. Among them 
a special place is occupied by the Turkistan National Liberation Movement 
presided by an indigenous intellectual Zeki Velidi Togan (Togan 1967). Simi-
larly to the Caucasus, this movement also started with legal and nonviolent 
political actions, but by the end of the second decade of the twentieth cen-
tury, Togan created a Secret Society for the liberation of Turkistan and the 
anticolonial struggle acquired military forms (guerilla movements) on the 
one hand, and the underground struggle and infiltration of the Soviet struc-
tures in preparation for the major anticolonial war, on the other. In Stalin’s 
era, this ended with the death or defeat of all of its members except those 
who immigrated and attempted to continue their struggle from European 
capitals. Neither the Caucasus indigenous movements nor those of Turkistan 
ever stopped their resistance—for many decades, they continued to generate 
oppositional ideologies and leaders who were methodically eliminated by 
various imperial powers. (Khalid 1999, Traho 1956, Natho 2009).
 These histories remained undocumented at large, the views of these peo-
ple were erased, the oral histories (such as the Turkistan Dastan Koroglu, a 
story of the sixteenth century fighter for independence and freedom, used 
as a role model and inspiration for the early leaders of national liberation 
movement and the Caucasus oral history and epic tale of the woman-warrior 
and healer Khanifa Kazi, to say nothing of the newer documents and oral 
histories linked with the anticolonial movement of the late nineteenth to 
early twentieth centuries, such as the mardikor songs of the 1916 revolt) were 
buried, never published or mentioned in the Soviet Union.43
 Both the Caucasus and Central Asian liberation movements included 
political and social elements, as they fought to construct Turkistan and Cau-
casus polities and attempted to open a dialogue with the state, using peti-
tions, declarations, marches, and demonstrations, which always ended in 
bloody massacres and suppressions by both Czarist and later Soviet powers. 
The Bolsheviks, when reconquering Turkistan and the Caucasus, did not 
shun any means—first establishing contact with anticolonial and Muslim 
reformist movements then destroying them, often with the aid of local feudal 
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and parochial Islamic forces, as well as international pan-Turkic ones, who 
in their turn were also eliminated later in the millstones of Soviet history. 
In the Soviet tradition of double standards, which was much more skillful 
than the Czarist one in the sense of its official liberation rhetoric and the 
actual repressive and racist acts in relation to the reconquered colonies, the 
Soviet historians often called the leaders of anticolonial movements “fight-
ers for national liberation against Czarism.” But, as soon as they turned to 
Soviet history, the same people were labeled as bandits, brigands, traitors, 
“basmachi,” “abreks,” whose destruction was thus justified. Along with the 
massive destruction of anticolonial movement leaders and members, the 
Bolsheviks also generated a massive elimination of indigenous knowledges 
and cosmologies, which are almost impossible to restore, especially since the 
new governments of the independent states are not interested in promot-
ing the liberating spirit of these epistemologies. That is why they allow for 
only particular brands of Islam and sorts of ethnic culture to exist, while 
repressing all other forms of religious or ethnic-cultural expression today. 
The new/old corrected historical narrative promoted by the local leaders is 
often grounded in their efforts to create a strong and unified national iden-
tity and pride, which is opposed to the previous scattered tribes, conflicting 
tensions, small khanates—an easy prey to even such an ill-starred colonizer 
as the Russian Empire. Behind this postcolonial nationalism, we can easily 
detect familiar myths of stagism, development, newness, and other elements 
of the rhetoric of modernity. This creates an aftertaste of déjà vu recognizable 
in many official educational and cultural institutions (Abashin 2009).
v.
The tactics of the Russian and later Soviet variants of modernization in both 
regions were strikingly similar. They can be summarized in the motto “divide 
and rule.”44 The empire was afraid of a pan-Turkic or pan-Circassian unifi-
cation on any grounds; and this was the reason for Islam being one of the 
most persecuted religions in the Soviet Union, for the borders drawn by the 
ruler, for the well-conceived linguistic and alphabetic reforms that deprived 
them of the continuity, cut off the legacy, and today prevent any possibility 
of having a dialogue with others of similar cultural, religious, or linguistic 
heritage. New ethnicities were invented, mosques closed, and the so-called 
Oriental women forcefully liberated—all that done to ensure the imperial 
dominance—but at the same time causing, particularly in the Soviet period, 
passive yet successful resistance to and distrust of any official authority. 
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Examples of this devastating imperial tactic are abundant. Russians used the 
Shia and Sunni opposition in Azerbaijan to make sure that they cut off the 
Sunni Azeris from the possible alliance with Shamil Sunnis and their descen-
dants in the northern Caucasus. The Soviets mapped Turkistan in such a 
way as to prevent any attempts at Turkic and Islamic reunification, when 
they once again put artificial borders between artificially created republics 
and ethnicities, which were soon to be assimilated and dissolved in the Rus-
sian majority. Before the Russian modernization of the second half of the 
nineteenth century, there was no clearly defined idea of ethnicity in Cen-
tral Asia (although the Jadids efforts to build it from within were already at 
work at the time). People were much more socially mobile and flexible. They 
could leave one region for another and easily change their status and iden-
tity, entering into different hierarchies, due to specific local mechanisms of 
mutual adaptation. It allowed for this complex cultural multiplicity to peace-
fully coexist. Therefore, Central Asians categorized themselves in a cultural, 
regional, social, economic, and religious but not strictly ethnic or linguistic 
sense, and only the Russian and particularly the Soviet colonization force-
fully and nearsightedly introduced its own idea of ethnicity into this region, 
together with modernization model, based on the Soviet brand of ethnic-
national identity (Northrop 2004, Abashin 2007).
 The Soviets divided Turkistan ethnic-religious-linguistic unity into arti-
ficial entities. The tactic of Stalin’s deportations of the whole peoples into 
Central Asia (such as Meskhetian Turks, Crimean Tatars, Chechens, and 
Balkars) and setting artificial borders contributed to the future ethnic and 
economic tensions in these regions (Karabakh conflict between the Azeris 
and Armenians, as a result of which over thirty thousand people were 
reported, according to several sources, to perish and around one million 
became refugees, the Osh conflict and other ethnic clashes in the Ferghana 
Valley). This is a direct result of Russian and Soviet imperial tactic of ethnic-
ity building. Although the modern nations in Central Asia and the Caucasus 
were artificially formed, the result is there nonetheless. The scholarly con-
structs turned into political instruments that, in their turn, were implanted 
into the texture of economic, social, and cultural life and began to be seen by 
the people as ancient and given once and for all. Therefore, for the majority 
of modern inhabitants of Central Asia or the Caucasus today, nations are not 
“imagined communities” any more. In Rasanayagam’s words, the ethnic divi-
sions that were imposed on this region in Soviet times were not questioned by 
the leaders of the post-Soviet Central Asian states. Instead they stressed the 
validity of ethnic-territorial idea of the nation, but replaced Marxist ideology 
as its glue with ethnic nationalism (Rasanayagam 2004). As a result, nothing 
98  •  pA RT  I I ,  c h A p T E R  3
changed in the life of the common people, who remained as powerless and 
vulnerable as before. An important part here is played by Islam, which has 
been gradually transforming itself into ethnicity both in the metropolis and 
in the colonies themselves as the idea of race and nation have been replac-
ing the previous theological constructions of the first modernity. This is how 
from busurmanin the Muslim became a Tatar (an equivalent of the West-
ern Arab used to define all Muslims) and an “inorodets” (literally, the one 
who was born an “other”) in the nineteenth-century Russian imaginary, and 
today—simply the Black—completely replacing the religious difference with 
the racial one. A radical ethnization, racialization, and politization of Islam 
took place in a number of postcolonial spaces with a traditionally weak idea 
of ethnicity, where ethnic nationalism often takes Islamist forms and Islam is 
claimed for the new nations and interpreted as primarily a manifestation of 
the local culture. However, in the case of both Central Asia and particularly 
the Caucasus, the gap between Islam as such and the indigenous culture, 
epistemology, cosmology, and ethics is wider than it is often admitted. For 
a number of politicized studies, it is more convenient to see both regions as 
a fixed Islamic Orient, while in reality, as a few Western, Russian, Central 
Asian, and Caucasus scholars demonstrated recently (Abashin 2007, Yordan, 
Kuzeev, and Chervonnaya 2001, Sahadeo and Zanca 2007, Quandour 2006), 
religious Muslim identity is only one of the elements in the complex syn-
cretic sociocultural and civilizational belonging of the inhabitants of these 
ex-colonies. In peripheral Eurasia, Islam originally acted in a similar unat-
tractive role to that of Catholicism in the New World. However, in both 
locales, the indigenous peoples elaborated specific strategies of domesticat-
ing the imposed religions (be it Catholicism or Islam), by means of maintain-
ing their form yet changing the meaning and building these religions into 
the wider realm of indigenous cosmologies, thus shifting the geography and 
biography of reason. The Amerindian religious duality, the peculiar symbio-
sis of Muslim and indigenous beliefs in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and 
even the Russian “double faith” are all examples of this essentially decolonial 
sentiment, which was later recast in secular terms and today can be recast 
once again, in rethinking of humanities from the perspective of these locales.
 With the end of the Communist utopia, several models of nation building 
emerged on the ruins of the Soviet empire, from the meticulous reproduc-
tion of Western liberal nation-states in the Baltics to autocratic Turkmenia, 
to take just the two extremes. The nationalist ideologies, hastily created and 
put in the basis of ex-colonial countries, mostly use the Western ideological 
frame of the sovereign nation-state, even if filled with local content, some-
times lapsing into ridiculous examples of totalitarian and militant ethnic 
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nationalism. It is not by chance that all confederation projects in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia or the Caucasus, which could potentially lead to 
a more productive way around and beyond the rhetoric of the nation-state, 
quickly failed, giving way at times to a maniacal race for ethnic-territorial 
sovereignty, the quest for roots (and often their invention), the striving to 
reinvent their own history and make it more prominent within the univer-
sal historical metanarrative, and consequently, the careful erasing from the 
collective consciousness and from the official historiography any alternative 
models of polity, any different cosmologies, or epistemic systems that did not 
fit into the new/old idea of the nation-state promoted by the new/old lead-
ers of these ex-colonies. This is particularly sad in case of the Caucasus and 
Central Asia, both of which have a history of indigenous epistemologies and 
social models that had diverged from both Muslim or Christian and secular 
European modernity and later from Russian and Soviet modernization.
 If they chose a confederative way of unification on the basis of indig-
enous social and epistemic models, the political life of eastern Eurasia would 
have been quite different, the same as in the case of the initial confederative 
projects of the eastern and central European states (the ex-satellites of Soviet 
Union), which were never brought to life. However, instead of the revival of 
indigenous epistemologies, the liberation movements in Central Asia and 
the Caucasus went mainly in the Islamist direction, in contrast with con-
temporary indigenous movements in South America. Amerindians struggle 
mainly for decolonization from the Eurocentered racist epistemologies in 
their creole rendering, while the multiply colonized peoples of the Caucasus 
and Central Asia have to decolonize from the overall coloniality of Western 
modernity in its Eurocentered Western, Russian, Soviet forms and, also, to 
decolonize from militant Islamism, which uses the economic hardships to 
gain control over the ex-Soviet territories.
 Nation-building processes in the newly independent states have been 
controlled from the outside and by the “comprador” local elites, as always 
happened in the imperial times and continues to happen today. Both the 
Caucasus and Turkistan liberation movements of the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury to early twentieth centuries were originally local, not precisely religious, 
and dealt mainly with retaking control of their lands and their future from 
the Russian/Soviet Empire, seldom venturing in the global pan-Turkic or 
pan-Islamic direction, instigated later by European emissaries and their non-
European helpers (such as the Ottoman general Enver Pasha) to spite and 
weaken Russia. Today, the logic does not change much, which is clearly seen 
in the history of the northern Caucasus movements, quickly usurped by 
the forces of international Islamist organizations, and sometimes indirectly 
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supported by the West. Here, we find mostly transmuted forms of ethnic 
statism. As the northern Caucasus social philosopher K. Tkhagapsoev points 
out, the post-Soviet space generated ethnic states based on the ethnic-clan 
system of power. “The space of freedom of ethnicites” proclaimed with the 
collapse of the Soviet system and comprising postcolonialism, neoliberalism, 
and traditionalism, finally resulted in ethnic statism, regionalization, and the 
ethnization of power. “As a result, in ethnic republics the political instrument 
for the implementation of reforms—which were manifested as liberal and 
democratic .  .  . turned out in fact to be the authoritarian regimes of ethnic 
statism—which has nothing to do with democratic principles” (Tkhagapsoev 
2006).
 A citizen of such states today often has to become a new nomad against 
his or her will (see Chapter 6 on the question of citizenship). The inhabitants 
of Central Asia or the Caucasus, who are so much hated by xenophobic Rus-
sians and constitute a larger part of the labor migration today, go mainly to 
Russia and not to the West (which is possible only for the chosen few) look-
ing for jobs and better life, because in the modern global configuration of 
power, entering the world economic system as labor force is still impossible 
for them. These people can get to Europe or the U.S. through human traf-
ficking or as organ donors, because only for these kinds of activities have the 
borders become more permeable today if one is an ex-Soviet colonial other. 
With the present systemic economic crisis, fewer and fewer options are left 
for these involuntary migrants, even in the world of imperial difference.45 
This problematic has found an interesting rendering in Central Asian art. 
Uzbek artist Vyacheslav Useinov, in his installation A Guest Workers Flight, 
presents a plane made of adobe bricks, like those still used by the peasants 
of Central Asia to build their houses (Useinov). The unlikely combination 
is shocking, as is the forced modernity in this locale. What is awaiting them 
on the other side of globalization migration? The worker’s overalls closely 
resembling the prisoners’ clothes, made of checked plastic trunks—a staple 
of the post-Socialist shuttle traders and refugee life. They symbolize the ille-
gal migration status of millions of Uzbeks today, who flee their homeland to 
find low-paying jobs in Russia, Arabic countries, and Turkey. It is an ironic 
and sad way of telling an alternative history of Uzbekistan: from the adobe 
house through the high tech modernity to the same age-old status of a low-
paid worker with no rights, whose life has no value. The motif of dispensable 
lives remerges in the works of other Central Asian artists such as Kazakh Said 
Atabekov, with his almost decolonial project “Observatory of the Bereaved,” 
where the bereaved act as a new subjectivity similar to Fanon’s damnes, or 
Yerbossyn Meldibekov’s imagined state Pastan, in which the dispensability of 
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human lives is manifested in the image of live people sold in sacks as if they 
were food in the market (Miziano 2006).
vi.
A telling example of suspended indigenous activism is the northern Cauca-
sus, still remaining in the dubious capacity of a conglomerate of ethnic-fed-
eral republics and districts within the Russian Federation. Here, the Russian 
Empire first performed an artificial selection in the form of genocide and a 
massive deportation to the Ottoman Sultanate and later (in the Soviet period) 
“created” artificial small ethnicities and encouraged their hostility toward 
each other together with their accelerated assimilation. As a result there is 
really no spiritual reunification or even any dialogue of several million Ady-
ghean Diaspora in the world, who are more inclined to an imagined pan-
Circassian identity, and the remaining seven hundred thousand dispersed 
Adyghe community in Russia, who are divided by the invented ethnic iden-
tities and Soviet instigated jealousies. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
a number of Adyghean political associations emerged, aimed at territorial 
and political unification, sometimes irredentism, and repatriation of several 
million of diasporic Circassians. It certainly did not accommodate Russia, 
which was not planning to let the Caucasus go (although the situation and 
the sensibility started to change when I was preparing the second version of 
this chapter, so that Caucasus peaceful separation does not look so fantastic 
any more). For a long time, Russia considered the Caucasus to be an impor-
tant strategic point and continued its typical politics of keeping the land but 
getting rid of its inhabitants or keeping them at a low and docile number and 
preferably in quarrels with each other. The diasporic Circassians, in contrast 
with those who stayed in Russia, are more articulate in their criticism of Rus-
sian colonialism in the Caucasus and in formulating decolonial discourses 
for the future. They claim the old tradition of unsubdued Circassians and a 
pan-Circassian identity, and they also retain traces of indigenous cosmolo-
gies, at the same time attempting to use the civil society and international 
organizations to attract attention to the Circassian question.
 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was initially not religious but 
rather ethnic-cultural discourses and indigenous cosmologies and ethics that 
were used to restate the Adyghe identity (adyghe khabze, an indigenous ethi-
cal code being one such example). However, the local elites who used this 
sentiment in their fight for power were a typical comprador intelligentsia of 
Soviet modernity origin and future collaborators in the creations of Cauca-
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sus “banana republics.” Unfortunately, this virus infected the international 
Adyghean organizations as well, so that today, in the words of Haci Bayram 
Polat, the “International Circassian Association acquired an institutional face 
of collaborationism” (Polat 2008). As a result, the authority of local Adyghean 
organizations among the people quickly faded and the contesting sentiment 
was to be looked for in Islamism, starting in the 1990s and particularly now. 
The legal ways of resistance, including the media, were entirely wiped out by 
Russia in several years; and today, resistance has no other way than violence 
and the remnants of still surviving underground activities, internet sites, and 
the somewhat tired appeals to international organizations, usually initiated 
from abroad. The two contemporary forms of resistance among the Cauca-
sus peoples are therefore the Islamic one, often on the verge of extremist, 
and the ethnic-nationalist one, either tamed or no less extremist and based 
on hostility towards the neighboring Circassian ethnicities. This is a direct 
result of Russian, Soviet, and post-Soviet colonization of being and thinking.
 In contrast with the Zapatistas and other indigenous movements in 
South America, digging out the erased history is not sufficiently paired with 
the continuing living tradition in case of the multiply colonized Eurasian 
spaces. There is a crudely interrupted indigenous legacy that often makes 
any dialogue difficult and seemingly leaves only the option of going back 
to a tradition that would be artificially recreated in this case. The colonial 
minds were systematically fed with the colonialist interpretations of history, 
Soviet nationalities discourses, lack of continuous literacy tradition that 
would help to remember, and a constant fear of the cruel master. There-
fore, it is extremely difficult to decolonize. A more global power shift and a 
more visionary leadership are needed to make the two resistance flows—that 
inside the Caucasus and the diasporic one—reunite and, more important, do 
it without being manipulated by either Russia or the West. A long awaited 
process of delinking from both and building horizontal coalitions with other 
damnés of the world needs to be initiated as well.
 This problematic has already become a subject of ironic and encoded 
resistance and creative re-existence in art forms46 in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus. For example, contemporary Uzbek artist Utkam Saidov in 2005 
exhibited an installation called To Discover a Hero, which problematized the 
erased and forgotten histories inconvenient for the official Muslim inter-
pretation of the Central Asian identity, for the Russian and Soviet moder-
nity, and for today’s local autocratic power remake. We see seven human 
heads covered with a white cloth. It is an allusion to a real historical charac-
ter—Khashim ibn Khakim, a white-masked leader of a Central Asian revolt 
against the Arabic contest and forceful Islamization, who was later erased 
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from the history of Uzbekistan. He, as well as dozens of other unknown 
and erased heroes, symbolized by the rest of the heads, are inconvenient for 
power and thus remain masked (Kudryashov 2007).
vii.
What makes nearly all of the nation-building models in Soviet ex-colonies 
similar is the neoliberal and democracy rhetoric, based on the ideology of 
developmentalism, progress, and the rational building of society grounded 
in dependency logic, well known in South America. However, the Eurasian 
dependency discourse is somewhat different and deserves to be addressed. 
In contrast with the Russian Empire, which rather marginally but still 
belonged to the world system, the Soviet Empire presented itself as a case of 
extreme autarchy and implemented the unheard of experiment of a Social-
ist economic system as opposed to the capitalist one, a system that would be 
self-sufficient and insulated from the world market. This ideal was certainly 
never followed word for word, even in the darkest years of Stalinism, but it 
was the image of the Socialist world that was imprinted into the Western 
imaginary.
 Everybody knows about the fatal shortcomings of an ineffective planned 
economy, but not many people pay attention to the fact that the Socialist 
economic system, even if it looked so different from the capitalist one, was 
based on the same assumptions of progress, teleology, industrialization, and 
a cult of technological development. Another neglected fact is how, within 
this system, the coloniality of power was expressed in the phenomenon of 
chronic dependency and lagging behind, which was typical for the racial-
ized colonies. The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the initial stagna-
tion of certain countries (e.g., the Central Asian states) and advantages to 
others (the Baltics), although in the scale of the global world economy, this 
advantage is minimal, because even the more successful countries/survivors 
of the Soviet Union are still of no use to the European Union except in the 
capacity of cheap labor force and new markets. The hierarchy of colonial 
economies within the Soviet Union was not openly framed according to 
racist discourses, but again, through the mediated and blurred Eurocentric 
rhetoric, so that the more European Soviet colonies (the Baltic states, the 
Ukraine) were also less mono-economic, while the Caucasus or especially 
Central Asia were deliberately caught in a vicious circle of dependency that 
is reproduced today on the global scale in their being completely thrown out 
of the world system.47 Their condition copies on the next turn the imperial/
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colonial hierarchy shaped in modernity. If the Russian and Soviet Empires 
were caught in the catching-up ideology of “overtaking and surpassing,” the 
colonies of this second-rate empire, marked by imperial difference, turned 
out to be third-rate in comparison with the colonies of the capitalist empires 
of modernity. Their “master” was itself a slave of a more powerful master. 
As discussed previously, Russia’s own status remained dubious and anyone 
associated with it in the past or today automatically is assigned an inferior 
status. This is connected to the external imperial difference of Russia. To 
this general configuration of the wrong master, we must also add the Mus-
lim affiliation of both Central Asia and partly the Caucasus, which however 
superfluous and marginal, still adds to their stigmatized status. As a result, 
the inhabitants of both regions reacquire their subhuman status again and 
again.
 Not many theorists or politicians in the ex-Soviet world want to take 
into account the South American unsuccessful experience of development 
and modernization programs. The reason lies not only in simple ignorance 
but also in a peculiar snobbishness of the ex–Second World in relation to 
the ex–Third World. Thoughtlessly following the logic of modernity with its 
typical agonistic approach preventing from any meaningful dialogue, the ex–
Second World nourishes its imperialist and peculiar nationalist discourses, 
as well as a strange pride for the previously higher position on the ladder of 
modernity. It is scared to death to lose or endanger this position in any way, 
for instance, by associating with those who are still lower in the present hier-
archy of humanity. This is clearly the Russian case, a difficult combination of 
disgust toward the global South and a fear of being associated with it, except 
in the paternalistic capacity; at the same time, it makes constant efforts to 
hide behind a rosy imperialist mythology the cruel excesses of Russian and 
Soviet colonialism.
 Practically all newly independent states, including Russia, bought into 
developmentalism in its neoliberal form, which soon turned into various 
nationalist models, when all these states realized that they cannot find a place 
in the new global capitalist market, that nobody really wants them there. 
While preaching the gospel of the market economy as a global panacea, the 
West reluctantly allows the survivors of the Soviet Union to enter the world 
market in any capacity, except for its cheap labor force or raw resources. The 
non-European (ex-)colonies have been interesting to the West in the last 
two decades primarily as a springboard for military bases, necessary for the 
preparations of the righteous wars for oil. This results in devastating conse-
quences for practically all ex-Soviet colonies and satellites, from Central Asia 
to Central Europe, who have little choice in maneuvering between the West, 
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Russia, and the economic coalitions and regional agreements of various local 
kinds, once again, resembling South America. In this context, it is clear why 
dependency theory re-emerged quite soon in post-Soviet Russia and its ex-
colonies. One can often hear today the well-known ideas of protectionism, 
economic nationalism, boycott of the wto, banning of natural resources 
export, and so on—sometimes in the radical form of dependency discourse.
 However, economy in this case once again clashes with culture and ide-
ology, when the ex-Soviet colonies follow the well-known Soviet (and mod-
ern) slogan “socialist in its essence, national in its form.” Today, it changes 
into “market or developmentalist in its essence, ethnic-national in its form,” 
which does not alter the logic of the formula itself. In the non-European 
ex-colonies, the ethnic-national element is more pronounced in the nation-
building discourses, accompanied by some ideas of dependency theory and 
by the extreme authoritarianism of the ruling elites. A good example of this is 
Uzbek President Islam Karimov’s rhetoric, which attempts to justify the inef-
ficient economy and authoritarian power of the Soviet type with an appeal 
to the mythic ancient ethnic solidarity and the construct of “uzbekness” that 
are largely Soviet products, invented and imposed onto these people by the 
imperial ideologues (Karimov 1993). The really existing institute of makhalla 
is effectively used by the Uzbek state in its attempts to justify the repressive 
policies and lack of respect for the individual, while its leader becomes a rec-
ognizable and not very appetizing “father of the nation.”
viii.
If decolonial impulses have existed in non-European Eurasian colonies, in 
some cases, for many decades and even centuries, then why are they virtu-
ally absent from the political discourses and nation building today? Here, 
a comparison with South American indigenous movements could help. In 
a number of South American countries, such as Ecuador and Bolivia, in 
the last two decades at least, as a reaction to the multiple failure of both 
developmentalist projects and dependency theory, an alternative model of 
interculturality emerged, which was connected with questioning the sociopo-
litical reality of neocolonialism as it manifests itself in the present models of 
the state, democracy, and the nation (Walsh 2009). Interculturality is linked 
to decolonization as the goal of indigenous movements, and particularly, 
conaie, in whose political project emerges the idea of a plurinational state, 
based on “the full and permanent participation of the peoples and nation-
alities in decision making” and in “the exercise of political power in the 
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Plurinational State” (conaie 1997: 11). What is interesting here is that this 
initiative is born not on the level of the nation-state but, higher or lower, on 
a more global and more local level, although it attempts to change the state 
and the national imaginary the way it needs. According to Catherine Walsh, 
interculturality acts as an overarching principle signifying the construction 
of a different society, epistemology, state, political practice, and generally, a 
paradigm that is other than modernity/coloniality (2009). On the ruins of 
the Soviet Union are many examples of neocolonialism, discrimination, rac-
ism, lack of willingness to hear the voices of indigenous people. However, in 
spite of the growing grassroots resistance sentiment, the indigenous social or 
political organizations still do not play any significant part in the decision-
making and cannot even attempt to change the state.48 The allowed official 
forms of their existence usually come to culture and sometimes to religion. 
The majority of such organizations and movements play a ritualistic orna-
mental role, while their leaders are often manipulated and tamed by those in 
power or destroyed if they refuse to cooperate.
 One of the important differences between the northern Caucasus and 
Central Asia and the Zapatistas or conaie today lies in the religious sphere, 
which brings us back to the question of imperial and colonial difference. A 
decidedly Muslim basis of a number of indigenous liberating movements, 
often demonized by the official power as Islamist and terrorist, is a relatively 
new phenomenon, linked among other factors to the lack or erasing of any 
coherent other than Islam epistemology and cosmology to ground itself in 
and to today’s special role of Islam as an opposite to Western modernity 
and the global damnés. In spite of the efforts to present this Muslim face of 
indigenous resistance as an ancient one, it is less than half a century old. Even 
in the Caucasus War in the nineteenth century, the Jihad banner was not 
the main element of anticolonial movements, and most of them in all non-
European colonies shared a wider than Islam anticolonial sentiment that 
was subsequently lost. The West is familiar with the story of Chechen and 
Dagestan resistance and with the name of imam Shamil, who presided over 
the religiously marked uprising in the northern Caucasus. However, in case 
of the Circassians, the Islamic element was not initially as important as in 
case of those people who adopted Islam earlier. Their resistance was persis-
tent and continued for another five years at least, after Shamil was captured 
and taken to Kaluga (Jersild 2002).
 The same is true in relation to the early Soviet period Turkistan indig-
enous movements. Turkistan National Unity was not in the least interested 
in the struggle between Socialism and capitalism or in the creation of an 
Islamic state. They declared in 1921 that they “did not want to sacrifice the 
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future of the old Turkistan to plans in preparation for the deliverance of the 
Islamic world and to the yet unknown outcome of forthcoming struggle 
between capitalism and socialism” (Paksoy 1995b). A Bashkir leader of the 
anticolonial movement, Zeki Velidi Togan, wrote in a 1920 letter to Vladimir 
Lenin: “You accept the ideas of genuine national Russian chauvinism as the 
basis of your policy. . . . We have clearly explained that the land question in 
the East has in principle produced no class distinction. . . . For in the East it is 
the European Russians, whether capitalists or workers, who are the top class, 
while the people of the soil . . . , rich or poor, are their slaves . . . . You will 
go on finding class enemies of the workers, and rooting them out until every 
educated man among the native population .  .  . has been removed” (Caroe 
1967: 112–13).
 Even if often the repressive states in Central Asian countries or the Cau-
casus exaggerate the Islamist threat, one cannot ignore the growing milita-
ristic nature of anticolonial movements and their consent to Islamism (e.g., 
Akromiya in Andijan). One of the reasons for this lies in the nature of the 
Russian/Soviet colonization. It created and intensified the culture of violence 
in these locales. It pushed the great masses of people out of their previous 
social hierarchies, legal, and civil systems; it destroyed the traditional econ-
omy and imposed a colonial one, leaving no choice for the large groups of 
people than to join either the colonizers or the guerilla movements. Finally, 
it removed the indigenous ethics, replacing it by a cynical double standard 
Soviet servility. But the Caucasus and Central Asian Robin Hoods, as they 
were often presented by the Russian propaganda, by the early twentieth cen-
tury, turned into the well-organized and often quite-educated strata of the 
local elites, who envisioned the future of their homeland as rather secular 
and egalitarian (not necessarily in Western terms but sometimes in the sense 
of indigenous social relations). However, this stream of anticolonial move-
ments was strangled by the 1940s, and whenever it raised its head after-
ward, it was systematically destroyed both by the Soviet and today by the new 
local governments, which want to promote exclusively their own versions of 
the state and Islam and are not interested in establishing any dialogue with 
indigenous movements or the common people, for that matter. The pattern 
of state violence and instigated fear remains dominant all over the Eurasian 
space.
 The 2005 tragic events in Andizhan (Uzbekistan), when not only the 
armed insurgents but also a number of uninvolved civilians were killed,49 
and the same year Nalchik (the northern Caucasus) uprising50 (both with 
reemergence and relapses in the subsequent years) were presented by official 
propaganda of Russia, Uzbekistan, and the local governments of the north-
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ern Caucasus autonomous republics, as fundamentalist, Islamist, foreign 
(Western or coming from the Muslim countries), and criminalized, while 
a number of Western media and human rights activists, on the contrary, 
overestimated the figures of the death toll and rendered the same events as 
a liberating struggle of the unarmed population raising their voices against 
the absolutist power and for their rights and freedoms (Kimmage 2005, 
Andijan Massacre 2005). Both extremes are biased. Although indepen-
dent sources show that the action in both cases was indeed initiated by 
armed and trained insurgents, some of whom came from outside the region, 
the religious, economic, or even ideological content in both cases were in 
fact minimal. The socioeconomic demands of the impoverished popula-
tion of both Uzbekistan and Kabardino-Balkaria and their annoyance with 
the ubiquitous corruption on every level and the lack of prospects for the 
future were effectively used by yet publicly unidentified forces to start a 
coup d’état and, if successful, another flower or fruit revolution. But, no 
matter what were the concrete rationale and antigovernment forces in both 
cases, these events reflected how easily innocent bystanders could be vic-
timized and destroyed as dispensable lives by both the government and the 
insurgents.51 In neither case, we must admit, did the initiative come from 
the people themselves, in neither case did they actually raise their voices of 
their own accord. As Akiner points out, in the vacuum of a political will to 
solve the problems of the common people in Central Asia, “a coalition of 
social, political economic and religious grievances will surely emerge. This 
volatile compound could readily be manipulated and used as an ideological 
weapon by those who seek to challenge the present regime. . . . If this were to 
happen, it is the Islamist groups who would be best placed to take advantage 
of this situation. This is not because of their current strength or appeal, but 
because they have goals, commitment, leadership and organization” (Akiner 
2005).
 Today, the historical phenomena of both Basmachi and Abreks (Sahni 
1997, Bobrovnikov 2000, Paksoy 1995c, Botiakov 2004) arguably anticolo-
nial movements, originally far from religion, are often revived in Islamist 
forms and in the creation of networks with international Islamism, while the 
anticolonial resistance and possible coalitions with anticolonial movements 
of not fervently religious nature are downplayed. This situation is different 
from the South American indigenous movements, where Catholicism comes 
from the colonizer and is not used today as an inspiration for anticolonial 
movements,52 as happens with Islam, whose expansionistic nature is sym-
bolically forgotten in this case and even forgiven, in the larger dimension, 
where it lost to Christianity and Western modernity and started to be used 
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as a banner of the global anticolonial movement. However, in the complex 
imperial-colonial configuration of Eurasian ex-colonies, in order to revive 
the indigenous movements as a source of viable epistemic models and deco-
lonial struggles, it is crucial to remember, along with the local history of 
Islam and local Muslim identity, other alternative and forgotten paths of 
indigenous thinking, to preserve and nourish the pluriversality of epistemic 
and ethical models that always existed in both the Caucasus and Central 
Asia. It is also crucial to avoid the pattern of “going back” to true Islam or any 
other homogenous archaic culture, thus changing the terms of the conversa-
tion, questioning the established opposition to modernity and tradition. It is 
important to occupy instead the position of double translation and double 
critique of both Islam and Western modernity. Such a position is actively 
developed among the diasporic Muslim intellectuals living in Europe and the 
U.S., such as A. Khatibi (1990), A. Meddeb (2003), T. Ramadan (2003), and 
many others. It is yet to be coherently formulated and expressed politically 
in Central Asia and the Caucasus.
 Newly independent Central Asian and the southern Caucasus ex-col-
onies are a case of what can be called an indigenous neocolonialism (i.e., 
internal colonialism). Here, it is not the equivalent of the white creole elites 
(the Russians) that are in power today, as it seems these regions are in the 
hands of indigenous people, while the Russian ex-colonizers find themselves 
often discarded from the society and economy.53 But, the local regimes that 
are presided by the representatives of indigenous people turn out indistin-
guishable from the Russian or Soviet power. They reproduce the logic of 
coloniality, though in contrast with South America, it is a coloniality with 
respect to their own people and not to racialized others, which is a result of 
an external imperial difference with its secondary Eurocentrism as the con-
stitutive element that spreads over the colonized as well as the colonizers. 
The tradition of educating the local elites as champions of Russian, Soviet, 
or Western modernity, who would not be interested in the least in the future 
of the people, coded by the elites as subhuman, is still maintained. It remains 
the major tactic in the psychological and ethical mechanisms of forging new 
political identities, a tactic that has not changed much after a caricature of 
socialism turned into a caricature of capitalism. It was borrowed by the eth-
nic elites from the colonizer and allowed them to continue the economic, 
legal, and cultural genocide of their compatriots, hiding behind neoliberal 
values and marked with suicidal intellectual dependency on the West, even 
if masked as the revival of ethnic nationalism. Today, when neoliberalism is 
discredited, this predominant tendency is starting to change. However, the 
outcome is not clear yet.
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 We are risking a fall into the well-known mistake of developmentalism 
if we assume that there are certain stages in the development of other-than-
modern patterns of thinking and epistemic decolonization on a global scale; 
that some time needs to pass before these problems are understood, as hap-
pened in South America, which went through a long period of colonization 
and later independence; that in Central Asia or the Caucasus in due time and 
at some appropriate stage, the analogues of indigenous movements in other 
parts of the world will emerge. It is very hard to avoid the temptation of such 
developmentalist logic. In fact, the difference here lies not in stages but, once 
again, in the imperial/colonial configuration, burdened by complicated reli-
gious and ideological factors.
 In the ex-Soviet colonies, the idea of civil society remains nominal, while 
political society is often being strangled or tamed at birth. The local grass-
roots organizations cannot make the state and the local power hear them, 
while more global coalitions invariably fail (except for the Muslim ones) due 
to the “zombification” of the social and political imaginary, which is tailored 
to see the ethnic-national project in a Herderian sense of the unity of the 
people, their territory, ethnicity, and language. This does not allow for the 
emergence of any intercultural idea of uncoupling the state and one nation. 
It does not mean that, in the post-Soviet space, there are no examples of 
border thinking. But the social/political system is constructed in such a way 
that they remain sporadic and doomed to stay unheard, unless some major 
social cataclysm takes place. Until the recent global crisis and its aftermath, 
the latter option did not look feasible, due to the extreme fatigue, apathy, 
depolitization of the population, which is sick and tired of any reforms and 
social projects. People are skeptical about power, but they also do not believe 
in the possibility of any effective resistance based on legal political ways. 
Hence, the culture of violence, which unfortunately has long historical roots 
in Eurasia persists, as does the peculiar resistance without dialogue, based on 
going around and beyond the power, leading a parallel life and often success-
fully avoiding being reduced to the will of the state (McGlinchey 2007).
iX.
The lack of models similar to interculturalism and the plurinational state in 
the non-European (ex-)colonies is linked among other things to the “suc-
cess” of Soviet modernization, with its carefully elaborated strategies of 
mind-colonization of indigenous peoples, with the Jesuitical nature of Soviet 
ideology, which surpassed in this respect the clumsy and underreflected 
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double-facedness of the Czarist Empire. The cynicism and many-faced 
nature of the Soviet ethnic-national ideologies is hard to match, the same 
way as the repressive mechanisms of the accelerated Soviet modernization, 
as a result of which even traces of indigenous cosmologies and ethics were 
erased from the collective memory and replaced with either Soviet Euro-
centric progressivist discourse or, today, by ersatz ethnic nationalism. For 
the external world and mainly for the West, the well-developed rhetoric of 
proletarian internationalism was manifested, for example, in the affirmative 
action Soviet quota system in the national republics. The metamorphosis 
of the local elites into the Soviet nomenclature led to the elimination of all 
links with indigenous epistemologies and to the purposeful elimination of 
these ideologies themselves. The children and grandchildren of these elites 
are largely in power today, even if they turned from faithful Communists 
into the enlightened Caucasians or neoliberal Central Asians. The nature of 
this zombificaiton was rather complex—in the West, people assumed that 
all inhabitants of the Soviet Union were zombified by Marxism. But, in real-
ity, the Communist ideology was just an external shell, while the essence 
remained Eurocentric, chauvinistic, racist, and based on progressivist mod-
ernization, while the resistance shaped itself as anticolonial, antimodern, and 
often anti-Russian.
 Another difference between South America and the Soviet ex-colonies, 
which is a result of specific Soviet colonialism, is that the latter are alienated 
from each other and often hostile to each other. They lack the sense of unity, 
which the empire gave before, but they also lack the sense of the larger com-
munity of the damnés. This prevents possible coalitions with each other and 
with other others, while cultural and epistemic community of non-Soviet 
(also nonethnic and not exclusively Muslim) type, which existed in the Cau-
casus and Central Asia as specific border civilizational forms before, their 
linguistic continuum—similar to the Caribbean case—were erased from the 
social, political, and cultural imaginary in the Soviet years and continue to 
be forgotten or forcefully replaced with straightforward ethnic and linguistic 
nationalism today.
 The ex-colonial states of the post-Soviet periphery started their indepen-
dent nation building not of their own accord, not as a result of revolution or a 
national liberation movement. They were just informed about their new sta-
tus by Boris Yeltsin and the other two Slavic leaders, who decided to get rid of 
the Soviet Union without consulting the subaltern Central Asian or southern 
Caucasus leaders. This collapse, in itself, was an important step in the change 
of the global geopolitical order and the victory of neoliberal globalization, 
with its rhetoric of the end of history and the apotheosis of market economy. 
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These specific conditions also worsened the situation for the non-European 
ex-colonies. From dependent colonies within the Soviet Union, they turned 
into spaces, mostly ignored by the rest of the world, spaces inhabited by unre-
corded people whose future is not taken into account by the new architects of 
the world. These countries have not been used for the demonstration of the 
market economy advantages, as happened in case of several South Ameri-
can countries. The Global North uses them merely as tokens of geostrategic 
dominance, which does not even require capital investment. As a result of 
flower and fruit revolutions, the previous Soviet bosses and later presidents 
loyal to Russia were quickly pushed out and replaced with neoliberal politi-
cians. In post-Soviet Eurasia for more than a decade, an Evo Morales was not 
possible. Instead, there were the ex-Soviet bosses, the mercenary champions 
of Western neoliberalism, the representatives of mafia structures, or more 
often, a combination of all three. Today, it seems it is their turn to be replaced 
by a new kind of elites who, one can only hope, finally will be more respon-
sive to the needs of the people.
 The invisibility of anticolonial sentiment in the indigenous movements 
of the Caucasus and Central Asia has an ideological explanation as well. As 
mentioned previously, during the Cold War, the West did not see the anti-
colonial element, concentrating entirely on its anti-Soviet project. That is 
why, when the émigré leaders of indigenous movements called for assistance 
from the U.S. and Western Europe, they faced a lack of understanding on 
the Western part and an attempt to erase the racial, religious, ethnic, and 
ultimately, colonial difference. For example, the Turkistan liberation leaders 
were told to work in Western European centers under the auspices of Rus-
sian dissidents, which they refused to do because for them these dissidents 
were yet another manifestation of imperialism with a different ideology (not 
Czarist, not Bolshevik but liberal). Today these movements continue to be 
used in the opposition to post-Soviet Russia, quickly reorienting from anti-
Soviet to anti-imperial rhetoric. But the arguments often remain the same, 
based on persistent stereotypes and old phobias, as well as the black legend 
logic turned against Russia. The true needs and interests of those who are 
involved in anticolonial movements or live in those locales are invariably 
ignored (Paksoy 1995b). Yet, for many Third World intellectuals and leftist 
thinkers from the West, the Socialist element overclouds everything else in 
the complex history of the Russian/Soviet Empire. They truly believe in the 
Bolshevik rhetoric of decolonizing and liberating the people of the “national 
peripheries.” In reality, the Bolsheviks wanted to keep the empire and have 
Communism, too, hence the massacres in ethnic republics, the persecution 
of anticolonial movements, labeled by the Soviets as “bourgeois nationalism” 
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(for which no Russian was ever sentenced), hence the economic policy based 
on the hidden logic of coloniality that perpetuated the chronic dependency 
of Soviet non-European colonies. The disappointment of many Third World 
intellectuals in the second Socialist world, which did not cope with its mis-
sion, has remained a serious and undertheorized complex. Yet, Third World 
intellectuals are seldom ready to accept the equation between colonialism 
and socialism (or Second and Third Worlds).The collapse of the Socialist 
paradigm was catastrophic not only for the Socialist world itself, it also left 
many parts of the Third World without a vision. A different vision was soon 
found (and this is a subject of a separate reflection), but what is crucial is 
that the ex-Soviet world and particularly Russia have become a new invis-
ible and disabled entity. In this situation of void, it is an urgent task to finally 
get rid of the mythic Socialist notions and grasp the complex configuration 
of the Soviet Empire within the logic of the global coloniality and its local 
manifestations.
 In the idea of the plurinational state, the anticolonial struggle merges 
with the anticapitalist one. But, for the majority of ex-colonial subjects in 
peripheral Eurasia, the anticapitalist pathos does not hold. In their minds, 
the only alternative to capitalism is Socialism, which was discredited for-
ever for those who had to survive in it. The presence of other alternatives, 
not necessarily Socialist or Marxist, remains unimaginable for the people 
of peripheral Eurasia. One of the important tasks for the indigenous people 
is to decolonize from the mutant local neocolonial thinking. An epistemic 
revolution is possible in these (ex-)colonies, but to initiate it, it is necessary 
to combine the local and the global levels, to stop thinking in the limits of 
our own countries or even continents, to dismantle the chronically periph-
eral position of the Central Asian or Caucasus people in the world, to make 
them part of the informational and political space of alternative thinking 
and being on a global scale. This is what the leaders of the newly indepen-
dent states are afraid of, enforcing a statist and clannish form of patriotism 
instead and plundering their countries, while using anticolonial impulses to 
their benefit. To build coalitions and open a dialogue with other damnés of 
the world, the Eurasian ex-colonies would have to shape the new elites, who 
would be grounded in other epistemologies than mimicking neoliberalism 
or narrow and aggressive nationalism and would attempt a multiple transla-
tion between indigenous, Western, and Muslim elements, as happened in 
case of the Zapatistas in Mexico.
 In the world of imperial difference and particularly in the ex- and pres-
ent Russian colonies, the situation is more complex, and the decolonial 
impulse is expressed more coherently not in social and political agency but 
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in the areas expelled by modernity from the sphere of rationality and deci-
sion making—the arts, the occult, and nonrational knowledge, meaningless 
in the eyes of analytical reason. Any social and political initiative would be 
strangled immediately by the strong state, both in Russia and in neocolonial 
newly independent states. For this reason, often, the diasporic intellectuals 
from these locales present more interesting and independent examples of 
decolonial thinking and truly transepistemic, transvalue, transmodern, and 
not just transcultural humanities and arts.
 Such individuals make a virtual or aesthetic link between the erased his-
tory and the subaltern modernity. A good example is an Abkhazian by origin 
artist, philosopher, and spiritual Sufi leader, Murat Yagan, who was born in 
Turkey as a result of the nineteenth-century genocide of the northern Cau-
casus peoples by the Russian Empire and their massive exile to the Otto-
man Sultanate. Along with being a talented artist, who studied in the West 
and also knows perfectly the Circassian and the Islamic traditions, Yagan is 
also an oral transmitter of the Ahmsta Kebzeh, an ancient spiritual tradition 
or knowledge of the art of living an abundant life, which originated in the 
Caucasus Mountains but was preserved mainly by the Circassian diaspora 
abroad. The goal of Kebzeh is to awaken and develop the latent human fac-
ulties under divine grace and guidance. It is an oral teaching that has been 
passed on through story, song, and the way of being. Yagan who received this 
knowledge from Caucasus elders in exile later immigrated to Canada, and 
for more than twenty-five years, he has been sharing it with a small group 
of students in Western Canada. He wrote a spiritual autobiography, I Come 
from behind Kaf Mountain (1984), which has been translated into many lan-
guages. Recently invited to Abkhazia, Yagan was hoping to bring back the 
ancient wisdom. The question remains, however: Would he stay an exotic 
guru of an unknown ancient philosophy in Canada and no less exotic dia-
sporic intellectual for contemporary Abkhazians or would Kebzeh become a 
ground for a long-awaited decolonial subjectivity in the Caucasus?
X.
What I just sketched, however, is an open decolonial utopia that can unfold 
into a specific collective subjectivity only under favorable conditions hard 
to imagine today. Yet, in what follows, I attempt to demonstrate a few mani-
festations and traces of decolonial border thinking and border identities in 
the Caucasus and Central Asia, where for centuries “adaptive and creative 
resistance” and re-existence (Alban Achinte 2006) have been expressed in the 
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phenomenon of transcultural tricksterism, allowing the “re-appropriation 
of the spirituality rooted in the soil” (Marcos 2006). After two post-Soviet 
decades and in spite of the aforementioned problems, the Caucasus and Cen-
tral Asia still retain their particular transcultural sensibility and subjectivity. 
This was clearly expressed in such multicultural urban ex-colonial centers as 
Baku and Tashkent. Their Babylonian hybrid nature was not entirely a con-
structed proletarian internationalist product or the Czarist Empire colonial 
creation. The roots of this linguistic, religious, ethnic, and cultural tolerance 
and dynamic mixture were deeper than that and went far back into history, 
so that it is possible to talk about specific multiethnic nations of Tashkenters 
or Bakineans rapidly disappearing today and leaving a trace of nostalgia for 
the times of fruitful transculturation and mutual cultural penetration and 
dialogue, captured in various artistic forms, such as a Mark Weil’s (1996) 
documentary The End of an Era: Tashkent or Oleg Safaraliev’s (2006) film 
Good bye, Southern City and Azeri-Jewish writer Afanasy Mamedov’s (2000, 
2010) creative Proustian revivals of nonexistent Baku of his childhood.
 The big cities of the ex-Soviet Orient are still ready to embrace and accept 
the Russian/Soviet ex-colonizers as well as dozens of other ethnicities that 
have traditionally lived here or found themselves in colonial Soviet capi-
tals as a result of major historical cataclysms of the twentieth century. For 
instance, Tashkent which became an unofficial capital of the Soviet Union 
during World War II and also a Soviet Hollywood, accepted several large 
migration waves, from the adventurous Russian settlers of the late nineteenth 
century to the Russian, Ukrainian, and Jewish families from the West of the 
Soviet Union, evacuated here during World War II, from Uigurs to Japa-
nese and German POWs, from Chechens to Leningrad emaciated orphans, 
and later, after the major 1966 earthquake, thousands of construction work-
ers from all over the Soviet Union who came to rebuild Tashkent. Many of 
them preferred to stay here afterward. The topos of such colonial multicul-
tural cities carries traces of various traditions and imperial models—one can 
study it as a cultural palimpsest of different, often conflicting or merging 
meanings—one can find here a governor’s palace or a park from the Russian 
colonial times and traces of secular colonial architecture (which are almost 
always copies of a copy, meaning that the Russian imperial imagery was itself 
borrowed from the West and hence its colonial copies were double simula-
cra). This layer easily coincides with the later Soviet layers and the so-called 
old town, with its typically narrow streets, adobe houses, and fortresses (like 
the Bakinean Icheri-Shekher). A visual example is provided by Mark Weil 
in his tracing of the eleven monuments that replaced one another in the 
same spot in Tashkent in the course of the twentieth century, including the 
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monument of General-Governor Kauffman, Stalin, Marx, and finally, Amir 
Timur today (Weil 1996). But what is crucial in all these multicultural colo-
nial capitals is certainly not architecture or monuments but the people. As 
Afanasy Mamedov wrote in his nostalgic novel about Baku, it is the people 
that create this transcultural mood: “the old men with their Muslim beards 
under the palms and the tolling of the bells at the Armenian church that 
sounds so close from the Jewish quarter Juude-Meilesi—a real present for 
Shagal” (Mamedov 2000: 110). Ten years later, in his novelette “A Cop Had 
a Dog,” Mamedov imperceptibly changes the mood or, even, the modality of 
his post-imperial, post-Soviet narrative as one of the last representatives of 
this fiction and this cultural and linguistic imaginary. He creates a painfully 
sharp and disturbing image of the lost dog, left by an Armenian family flee-
ing Baku in fear of massacre. The dog is adopted by the new owner of their 
empty apartment, an Azeri policeman who is not a nationalist and Islamist 
monster in Mamedov’s rendering but a full-fledged human, imperfect yet 
prone to love and compassion, guilt and repentance (2010).
 It was modernity that ultimately made an antispace out of Central Asia 
and the Caucasus, a nonspace that can exist in the Western mind only in the 
form of a conventional topos of some exotic parable, where stereotyped Ori-
entals reside.54 But who were these people, the West never really wondered. 
In the case of Central Asia, they were interpreted as Deleuze and Guattari’s 
“nomads” at best, the abstract agents of some conventional speculative his-
tory, who just illustrated the concept of deterritorialization. However, in the 
East, this trickster, wondering, mediating, rootless sensibility is no news—it 
is just that, under globalization, it acquires an unexpected reification on a 
global scale. The abstract nomad turns out to be a real new Ahasuerus or, 
rather, an al-Hadir of the newest époque of the great migration of peoples 
and transcultural border subjectivities, or in a more pedestrian variant, an 
ever-wondering Hodja Nasreddin, who brings us back to the problematic of 
tricksterism.
 Saint al-Hadir, or the Green Man—important for several Sufi orders, 
with their specific culture of respect for the other, standing in the center 
of the ethics of interpersonal relations—is an initially transcultural per-
sonage, a quintessence of the people who for centuries have lived between 
empires, religions, languages, in a complex imperial/colonial configuration, 
and have managed to maintain their own system of reference marked with 
specific philosophy of treating the other. This transcultural personage is to 
be found in many traditions, from India to Palestine, from the Ferghana 
Valley to China, and arguably, even in Ireland and the Arthurian tales. Saint 
al-Hadir or al-Hidr, having a parallel in Christian Ilea, in modern terms, is 
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the immortal protector of all migrants and travelers and is himself constantly 
traveling around the world, fulfilling his mystical mission. This character 
is of pre-Islamic origin, and among its sources are the Acadian Gilgamesh 
epic, the novel of Alexander, the Judaic parable about Joshua ben Levi, and 
so forth, hence the Central Asian popular belief that hospitality cannot be 
selective, for al-Hadir can come to your house in any disguise, anyone can 
meet him, but what one would gain depends on how pure one’s intentions 
are. In this belief, we find a specific philosophy of treating other people and 
other cultures (Catherine 2004, 2007, Franke 2000) that in Muslim rendering 
is associated with the concept of adab ethics.
 A contemporary progressive Muslim intellectual, Omid Safi, claims that 
“adab .  .  . that most essential, basic and glorious of Muslim interpersonal 
codes, is the compassionate, human, selfless, generous, and kind etiquette 
that has been a hallmark of refined manners in Muslim cultures. Almost 
anyone who has ever traveled to areas that have been profoundly influenced 
by Muslim ethics has no doubt seen great examples of this wonderful way 
of being welcomed and put at ease.” But the scholar sadly continues that “it 
is precisely this compassionate humanness that is missing from so much of 
contemporary Islam” (Safi 2004: 13). Even if it is missing from many ver-
sions of contemporary Islam, it is not missing from such border spaces as the 
Caucasus and Central Asia and from the sensibility of the people who live in 
these locales. It cannot be taken to just Islam, however unorthodox. It is this 
inherent transcultural border element—forever open to the dialogue with 
the diversity of the world—that can be a way out of the persistent black-and-
white binary oppositions.
 I pointed out previously that, due to the Western epistemic monopoly, 
until now the only way of entering the spheres of philosophy, historiography, 
sociology, or other social sciences for indigenous people in many parts of 
the world has been exclusively through literature and the arts, the culture of 
the quotidian, the nonrational and esoteric knowledges, so that, in Carib-
bean writer and philosopher Wilson Harris’s words, the philosophy of his-
tory was “buried in the art of imagination” (Harris 1981: 24–25). A peculiar 
example of contemporary Central Asian realization of border subjectivity 
is to be found in case of the modern Uzbek “saint” Habiba (Allione 1997), 
who after a revelation that came to her in a dream, made a connection with 
Bahauddin Nakshbandi, a fourteenth-century founder of a Sufi order with 
over forty million followers in the world.55 The question is not if Habiba has 
real healing “powers,” it is more important to trace how she creatively mixes 
in her cosmology various cultural and religious sources leading to a tolerant 
and flexible ludic frame with a well-defined ethics, based on subject-subject 
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relations instead of the usual subject-object scheme. It is not surprising that 
orthodox patriarchal Islam is extremely hostile to such practices and such 
“saints.”
 Several elements of Habiba’s cosmology allow us to put it into an imagi-
nary dialogue with voices of Amerindian curanderas analyzed in Sylvia Mar-
cos’s book Taken from the Lips: Gender and Eros in Mesoamerican Religions 
(Marcos 2006). The mystical and transcendental dimensions are regarded in 
both cases as parts of everyday life, demanding from the people a cultivation 
of their skills and abilities to decipher such invisible signs. In the outlooks of 
Central Asian and Caucasus healers that I interviewed for my recent book 
on gender (Tlostanova 2010a), like in espiritualismo, a dynamic religious and 
cultural mélange erases the possibility of any fundamentalist stable interpre-
tation of religious or cultural identity. Various sources coexist and correlate 
in an explosive and fruitful, essentially decentered, interaction easily com-
bining monotheistic, polytheistic, and pantheistic grounds as only different 
languages expressing the same thing and serving as a means in the mission 
of saving people by sharing the healing spiritual energy with them.
 Habiba, Lira Karagulova, Fatima Zhakomikhova, and other modern 
healers in Central Asia and the Caucasus invariably stress the importance 
of keeping the world’s equilibrium by remaining silent when it is needed, 
talking when it is necessary, and acting when action is called for—always 
listening to the rhythms of the multiple universe. Each of them, in her own 
language and semiotic system, refers to the all-encompassing interrelation 
and interconnection of everything in this world—the people, the nature, 
the cosmos—where each of us represents the other. “Take a hand—we can 
concentrate on the differences between each of the fingers, marveling how 
different they are, but then we risk not noticing the movement of the hand 
as a whole,” says Habiba, following Nakshbandi (Allione 1997). In the revival 
and cultivation of this logic of respect for other cultures, religions, histories, a 
logic of open dialogue and fairness, still maintained in spite of any historical 
cataclysms, wars, and colonization, lies a possibility of intercultural under-
standing in the future.
 Such understanding requires the shaping or reopening of a specific trans-
cultural border subjectivity and epistemology grounded in critical think-
ing, which is born in between various equally questioned and destabilized 
models. It lacks religious or ethnic-national fundamentalism and is based on 
pluritopic hermeneutics. Instances of such sensibility are to be found in Cen-
tral and South America, in some parts of southeast Asia and Africa, and in 
peripheral Eurasia, with its hotchpotch of various traditions, most of which 
were doubly or multiply colonized spaces. This new subjectivity and episte-
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mology can be expressed in many ways—from the theology of liberation to 
progressive Muslims projects, from other thinking to border thinking—but 
is always based on questioning modernity from an in-between position of 
transculturation.56
 Transculturation requires the inclusion of many equal cultural and epis-
temic reference points, the crossing and negotiation of cultures, a specific 
state of cultural in-betweenness. In the case of Central Asia and the Cauca-
sus, such subjectivity has been always a norm in an ethnic-cultural, social, 
and linguistic sense (take, for example, the specialization of languages: Ara-
bic was used for the official sphere and law, Farsi referred to culture and 
poetry, the local vernacular languages like New Uzbek were connected with 
the sphere of everyday communication). Here, the imperial assimilation tac-
tic was needed, not as a way of coping with metisation (as in South Amer-
ica) but as a realization of the imperial principle “divide and rule.” However, 
behind the surface, the age-old processes of mutual interaction refusing to 
accept the imperial cultural hierarchy of assimilation have flourished, giving 
birth to new meanings and complex codes. To understand them one needs 
to focus on the texture of transcultural weave and not on the nature of the 
components, as Eduard Glissant described in relation to Caribbean opacity 
([1990] 1997: 190).
 Defying the continuing Western and Russian Orientalism, the Cauca-
sus and Central Asia today offer fascinating if not numerous examples of 
transcultural art, fiction, cinema, and theater as the means through which to 
channel their border sensibility, critically rethinking the caricature or exoti-
cist image of the East, created by the West, questioning both Western moder-
nity and ethnic nationalist or religious fundamentalist discourses. Such is the 
case of the famous Tashkent theater Ilkhom57 (Ilkhom 2009). What would 
happen when the breath of real history and real culture and people flow into 
the Western Orientalist metaphors and elegant parables, where Asia (e.g., 
Samarkand) acts as a paradigmatic antispace in which it is suitable to have 
a rendezvous with Death, to quote Jean Baudrillard’s famous essay (1979)? 
Ilkhom, in the words of its director Mark Weil, who called himself a patriot 
of Tashkent and a human of the planet Earth and was tragically killed in 
September 2007, mixes on its stage the languages and faces of Tashkenters, 
their tempers and their ways of life (Antelava 2008). This theater is as trans-
cultural and able to accommodate the unlikely opposites as the city where 
it stands. It remained so even at the point when Tashkent era ended and 
it started to change its multicultural nature. This sentiment is particularly 
clear in the signature 1993 production that still successfully runs today, a 
Samarkand fantasy based on Karlo Gozzi’s comedy Happy Beggars (I Pitocchi 
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Fortunati 1764). The show was built on the mutual penetration and hybrid-
izing of totally unexpected sources and traditions—comedia dell’arte and 
Uzbek street theater, “maskharaboz.” In fact, Ilkhom negates Gozzi’s Orien-
talism, which presented Samarkand as a fantastic dystopia, a place nowhere, 
fallen out of time and progress, as well as Baudrillard’s beautiful and sad 
parable of the rendezvous with Death in Samarkand. This production, in 
contrast with Baudrillard’s essay from De la Seduction, can be called “Life in 
Samarkand.”
 In 2005, Weil came back to this problematic in his controversial and risky 
Flights of Mashrab, dedicated to the 250th anniversary of Wolfgang Ama-
deus Mozart. Mashrab emerges in this show, not in his “combed” traditional 
appearance of one of the most talented Uzbek poets of the late seventeenth 
to early eighteenth century, a contemporary of Mozart, but as a wild, naked-
ass dervish of a Sufi order, a heretic castrate born in Andijan and a cheeky 
and arrogant wanderer who refuses to fear the power in any guise—Muslim 
or secular—who rejects any organized religion and cultivates intimate and 
direct connections between the human being and God. His life is a series of 
small and big acts of defiance similar to those that Ilkhom company and its 
director went through in the preceding two decades. Mashrab is a provoca-
tive radical and trickster who jokes with power and urinates on the khan’s 
throne and who does not keep silent if he disagrees, even when it threatens 
his life, just like Weil himself. The performance is not just transcultural (e.g., 
Mozart music is played using traditional Uzbek instruments); it is also pal-
pably connected with contemporaneity, as it obviously parallels the situation 
in modern Uzbekistan (Ilkhom 2009).58
 The lingering interpretation of Central Asia or the Caucasus as exotic 
or threatening antispaces is just a continuing Eurocentric practice of push-
ing the other out of the sphere of the valuable, out of the myths of progress, 
linear world history, science, and the like. While what is needed is to realize 
that these are not just fairy-tale spaces, continuously exploited as sources of 
exotic imagery, but quite real locales with their own local histories and, most 
important, people. Life never stopped here, even if modernity went around 
it, leaving it behind and beyond. And to learn what kind of life it was and is, 
we need to listen to the people who live, feel, and think in Samarkand, Baku, 
Tashkent, Nalchik, Grozny, or Dushanbe. The problem remains that decolo-
nial and other alterative thinking models are still not properly consolidated 
in spite of such exemplary events as the World Social Forum. What is needed 
is the development of coalitions of such border thinkers and transcultural 
multiply colonized locales on a global scale that, in spite of such technical 
means as the internet, still remains a problem to be solved. What is lacking is 
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not only financial support but also a sufficient global knowledge and global 
drive allowing us to embrace into the sphere of decoloniality such “others” 
as Circassians or Uzbeks, to name just two. A lack of communication and 
a void among those who have been marked by colonial difference and the 
colonial wound and have suffered from the same logic of global coloniality 
is immediately filled by ideologies that normally do not suffer from lack of 
resources to promote themselves on a global scale, such as ethnic and reli-
gious fundamentalism and extremism of all shades and, of course, neoliberal 
modernization in all its expected forms, from military bases and economic 
pressure to opening English-speaking universities in the vast spaces of Eur-
asian steppe.59 The Caucasus and Central Asian mentality still carries traces 
of other thinking and the ideal of other transcultural world of harmonious 
and just social structures and relations. Today, as before, this sensibility is 
only starting to develop a political manifestation. Yet, mainly, it is restricted 
to the allegorical language of the arts and the illusive culture of the quotid-
ian, to the nonrational and esoteric realms. Some examples I have touched 
upon here. This gives a small hope that the voices of Eurasian others will at 
some point be heard in the global chorus of modernity/coloniality otherness, 
defying and overcoming this category as such, and that they/we will finally 
take part in deciding of the future of the unknown world and their/our own 
future in this world.
i.
In the title of this chapter, I intentionally juxtapose María Lugones’s concept 
of coloniality of gender, formulated mostly in relation to the colonial world 
and mainly to South America though obviously having a global reach, and 
the local history and epistemic and ontological conditions of the Cauca-
sus and Central Asia, the two Russian/Soviet “Orients” with a specific local 
history within the global coloniality. Can Lugones’s concept be a traveling 
theory in this case? How translatable is it in the conditions of imperial differ-
ence and its secondary colonial difference complicated by Soviet modernity/
coloniality? What problems and issues are important for rethinking gen-
der in this locale, potentially pointing to the possibility of transcultural and 
transmodern gender coalitions on a global scale, and what assumptions, 
scholarly myths, and intellectual dependencies have to be unlearned in the 
process? This chapter traces the sphere of decolonial gender epistemology 
and adds an emerging yet still problematic voice to the polilogue of deco-
lonial feminism—the voice of the Caucasus and Central Asian gendered 
others.
 María Lugones’s concept of the colonial/modern gender system formu-
lated as a critique of A. Quijano’s blindness to the multiplicity and com-
plexity of gender issues in the colonial world (connected with the generally 
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accepted biological and heterosexual patriarchal interpretations of gender) 
(Lugones 2007) was an attempt to get rid of the continuing biologization of 
gender, which often leads to erasing the epistemic side, knowledge instead 
of nature. Regarding gender as a colonial concept, she stressed the cogni-
tive and pseudo-scientific mechanisms through which gender (along with 
race) has become one more criterion facilitating the massive dehumanizing 
of non-Europeans. Drawing attention to the hidden link between the trans-
ference of exploitation from the (European) man to nature and the essen-
tially colonizing invention of gender, Lugones focuses on the intersection of 
mainly racial, sexual, and gender aspects of coloniality and eventually comes 
to the idea of coloniality of gender as an overarching category of the modern/
colonial world marked with what Nelson Maldonado-Torres named “mis-
anthropic skepticism.” It makes colonial subjectivities become invisible as a 
result of racialized and gendered corporality. And, what becomes invisible in 
this case is precisely their humanity (Maldonado-Torres 2007).
 The concept of coloniality of gender brings us back to Lugones’s idea of 
traveling in other peoples’ worlds with a loving perception, mentioned in the 
previous chapter. Traveling as a mode of existence of a diasporic Third World 
intellectual sees culture itself as a journey, as a process of social construc-
tion instead of any essentialist interpretation of tradition and its myths. This 
mode is essentially open, unfinished, constructive, and positive in its empha-
sis of reexistence instead of negative resistance. For Lugones, opposition to 
coloniality of gender is a complex process that “starts from subjectification 
and comes to active subjectivity.” She accentuates the coalitional opposition 
to the coloniality of gender from the position of the colonial difference. This 
is the gist of decolonial feminism, its historical and bodily (in the body, as 
she puts it) ground, which Lugones sees not as a conceptual foundation but 
rather as “the peopled ground on which one stands, that runs through one, 
the ground that one is as an active subject” (Lugones 2008). Similarly to other 
contemporary theorists (Alexander 2005), she thinks feminism from and at 
the grassroots and from and at the colonial difference, with a strong empha-
sis on a historicized incarnate intersubjectivity.
 The local histories and the geo- and body politics of knowledge that lie 
in the basis of Lugones’s vision refer mainly to the colonial difference and 
clearly defined racial hierarchies. However, when we step into the world 
of external imperial difference and its secondary colonial difference, par-
ticularly if we deal with a deviant Socialist kind of modernity, the picture 
becomes blurred and complicated. In what follows, let us see how the colo-
niality of gender has been manifested in the Caucasus and Central Asia and 
what the potential can be for decolonial gender agency in these locales.
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ii.
Decolonial feminism efforts to delink from progressivism, stagism, and the 
general enchantment with the myth of modernity translating geography into 
chronology and into a binary human taxonomy are better realized in those 
spaces where race was initially put in the basis of the modern/colonial matrix 
of power—in the Americas and Africa. In these locales, race and gender 
have been traditionally coupled in a quickly naturalized way in the infamous 
stereotypes of the Black man that represents the act of rape (of the White 
woman) and the Black woman who is seen as the most legitimate victim of 
rape (Maldonado-Torres 2007: 255). Within the modern/colonial gender 
system, representatives of the non-Western world were excluded from the 
realm of the human and feminine to facilitate their discrimination, exploi-
tation, and objectification, as several scholars demonstrate in case of indig-
enous communities and enslaved Africans in the Americas (Lugones 2007, 
McClintock 1995). But Russia/USSR and its colonies seldom are regarded 
through the lens of the racial discourses, and gender in these locales in the 
interpretation of the majority of scholars (Navailh 1996, Wood 2000, Ashwin 
2000, Posadskaya 1994, Katz 2001) tends to remain a rather abstract cate-
gory, controlled through the social and political but not racial engineering of 
the state and interpreted mainly through the lens of Western feminism with-
out the intersectionality with race (or ethnicity and religion, for that matter). 
In reality, there was a specific realization of racial-bodily-gender politics 
in the Soviet modernity that was not openly discussed or even stated,60 yet 
rather consistently implemented. Many Bolshevik racial, gender, and body 
discourses were successors to the Czarist ones because both were the dis-
torted copies of the Western originals (Sahni 1997). In fact, almost all of the 
forms of treating the gendered other that emerged before continued to exist 
in the Soviet Union in various forms—from Romantic Orientalism to quasi-
scientific and culturalist racism, and from the “commodity racism,” in Ann 
McClintock’s formulation (1995), to Soviet theatrical multiculturalism, and 
to today’s zoological forms of othering. Practically all these discourses had 
women at their center.
 The paradox of colonial femininity and masculinity based on blaming 
the colonial others in mutually exclusive vices at once, thus building a nega-
tive self-identification, has been thoroughly discussed by many scholars in 
relation to the Western empires and their colonies (Alexander and Mohanti 
1997, Espiritu 1997, Sandoval 2000). In this case, racialization works through 
gender, and colonization itself comes to be symbolized as an act of rape or 
violence. However, this is typical of the confident empires with a positive 
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masculine identity, while Russia was far from it. The colonial gender para-
dox is based on the self-negating definition of the darker side of femininity 
and masculinity, which prevents working out any successful positive identity. 
The colonial man is at once feminized (castrated) and presented as an essen-
tial rapist and an aggressive animal threatening the chaste White lady. The 
non-White woman, in turn, is regarded as sexually available and willing to 
be raped, essentially lacking chastity or honor as such. In the Russian colo-
nization of the Caucasus and Turkistan, this perverse yet naturalized ethics 
was recast in particular ways, connected not with race but with essentialized 
ethnicity and Islam, which was early translated into symbolic race (Muslim 
equaled non-White and often subhuman; Tlostanova 2010b). The paradox 
of colonial masculinity and femininity was different from the West, because 
the gap between the Orientalist European fantasy and the reality of the Cau-
casus and Turkistan conquest was too obvious and based on the secondary 
Orientalist ideologies always poisoning any victory for Russia.
 The women in Central Asia were well protected by Muslim and local 
ethnic-cultural custom and could not possibly act in the role of the non-
White women in the European colonial imaginary. Yet the Caucasus women, 
for a while played the part of the exotic sexual slaves and even a profitable 
commodity for the Russian army. They were compared to exotic elegant 
creatures (gazelle) or dangerous but beautiful beasts (panther), which did not 
save them from having dispensable lives. Here, the pedophiliac tendencies 
of Russian officers were often justified by the presumable early puberty and 
free morals of the local girls (Nortsov 1904). However, there were no Blacks 
or Indians in Russia, so the European racial classifications were distorted 
and mechanically applied by the Russians to the newly colonized spaces. A 
good example is an 1837 diary entry of Lieutenant N. Simanovsky, who was 
surprised to find that the captured Cherkess princess was “quite attractive 
and—what is most strange—quite White” (Simanovsky 1999). Since, in his 
reference system, she belonged to the “savages” and was Muslim, she was 
supposed to be non-White. Traces of this mutant racism are abundant in the 
majority of Russian nineteenth-century romantic fiction, from A. Pushkin 
and M. Lermontov to sexual Orientalist tales of A. Bestuzhev-Marlinsky.
 The local men in the Caucasus and Turkistan alike refused to be inter-
preted within the Orientalist docile stereotype, and any comparison with 
them was not to the advantage of the much more tepid Russian masculinity. 
The erotic element of Russian imperialism was expressed in the male form 
and extrapolated into the Russian male anxiety and fear of the Caucasus 
machismo in war and sex (Sahni 1997: 33–69; Tekuyeva 2006a). In Russian 
colonization, only one side of the colonial gender paradox was at work: the 
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association of the local men with violence. Post-Soviet society retains this 
stereotype of the Caucasus man, which today is used as the basis of the stan-
dard racist accusations—from his desire to possess a Russian woman and 
humiliate Russian men, to his presumably dangerous tendencies of reckless 
courage and readiness to sacrifice lives, his own or other people’s, including 
women. The Caucasus man was used by the Russian officers as an attractive 
sexual role model—they massively changed into Cherkess traditional dress 
to borrow some of the aura of Caucasus masculinity. In this theatrical meta-
morphosis into a noble savage, there was a clear Rousseauistic touch in the 
interpretation of those fallen out of modernity and progress. In spite of all 
their borrowed enlightenment discourses, the imperial ideologues imbued 
the Caucasus people with inherent, stable, and given once and for all char-
acteristics, later reproduced in the Bolshevik constructions of the Orient. 
Here, the two sides of the medal—the light (modern) and the dark (colo-
nial)—merged in the interpretation of the colonies. On the one hand, they 
were racialized and presented as unreformable; on the other hand, it was 
assumed that, under the influence of the Russian/Soviet civilizing efforts, the 
mountaineers would gradually turn into another sort of people (Jersild 2002: 
9–125).
 As for the female colonial stereotypes in Turkistan, the local culture 
reacted to the Russian colonization by intensifying the defense of their cul-
turally valuable women by making the veiling codes much stricter than 
before (Northrop 2004: 44–45). Here, the logic of blaming the victim for 
her own rape could not work, neither did the gendered variant of the “black 
legend” in general (which in this case means the accusation of the Islamic 
culture in sexual deviance and lack of morals), by contrast with the prolif-
eration of such discourses in the interpretation of Muslim northern Africa 
by Catholic countries (Jiménez-Lucena 2008).61 The Russian/Soviet Empire 
did not go as far as to accuse the Muslim women in Turkistan in sexual dis-
soluteness. Any erotic relations of Russian men with the colonized women 
remained adventures outside the realm of the metropolis morale. These 
women were not turned into an important part of the economy of sexual 
and labor exploitation (until the Soviet colonial cotton industry emerged in 
Central Asia, with its decidedly racist and misogynist division of labor). So 
the gendered black legend took a more restricted form, of associating the 
Muslim Oriental women with backwardness, illiteracy, and lack of hygiene. 
As neither in the Caucasus nor in Turkistan was there a system of direct 
colonial slavery, it was impossible to create a unified and coherent system of 
labor and sexual exploitation of the colonized women. Moreover, the role of 
the sexually, economically, and psychologically exploited female compared 
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to an animal and taken out of the realm of the human and feminine, here, 
was performed not by an African slave but by an ethnically same and socially 
other Russian serf woman. With the borrowing of Orientalist discourses in 
the nineteenth century, when the Russian Empire was colonizing the Cau-
casus and later Turkistan, this problematic acquired the typically European 
racist forms of interpreting local women as animals. Yet, by contrast with 
African slaves, even the Caucasus women, who for a while played the role of 
the exotic dehumanized others, stood at the erotic Orientalist extreme of the 
racist hierarchy in which sexual exploitation was not directly linked to the 
labor one.
 Thus, the modern/colonial gender paradox functioned with a twist in 
the case of the Russian/Soviet non-European colonies: Men were seldom 
feminized or symbolically castrated and their aggressive macho overtones 
were consistently stressed, while the Russian colonizer was often paradoxi-
cally prone to mimicking the Caucasus savage, compensating his own need 
for masculinity. The Oriental beauty stereotype functioned almost identi-
cally with its Western master narrative version in the Caucasus (women as 
sexual goods), while in Turkistan the colonizer’s disappointment from the 
lack of access to harem erotic exoticism led to a discourse of “the fox and 
the grapes,” grounded in inferiority complex in relation to Europe and its 
original Orient. The labor economic exploitation element of gender/race 
discrimination was absent until late.
 Finally a specific role was assigned to the Russian woman in the Cauca-
sus and Central Asia. The Western myth of the White (European) woman as 
innocent, docile, and sexually passive was clearly transformed in this case, as 
up to today, it is the local woman that manifests purity, sexual passivity, and 
piety in the Caucasus and Central Asian mentality, while a more modernized 
Russian one often stands for the stereotype of aggressive sexual promiscuity. 
But, even so, the gist of this configuration lies in the same ideology of mod-
ernization based on racial differences. Symbolically, the Russian (i.e., more 
European) woman is forgiven her dissoluteness precisely on the grounds of 
her being Russian (i.e., superior).
iii.
As stated previously, modernity in the twentieth century was implemented in 
two forms: the liberal/capitalist modernity and the Socialist/statist one. Each 
had a sunny side and a darker side, each had its own kind of coloniality of 
being and gender. The understudied darker colonial side of Soviet moder-
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nity generated a second-rate type of Soviet citizen, in spite of the proclaimed 
internationalist slogans and overt goal of racial mixing of the population to 
create a future Soviet mestizo/a with an erased ethnic element brought up on 
Russian culture and on Soviet ideology. In the gender variant of this ideology, 
a “metropolitan” (Russian) woman was opposed to the stereotyped colonial 
female, who was in need of civilizing and reinvention as the New Woman 
of the East or a New Mountain Woman. These identities turned out highly 
problematic and self-negating at times. We cannot ignore the responses of 
the colonial women themselves and their efforts at negotiating their sub-
jectivities often around the paths offered by Bolsheviks and escaping their 
initially prescribed roles of the “surrogate proletariat” or the “liberated Ori-
ental” (Massel 1974). In the dominant Soviet gender logic, the women repre-
sentatives of the colonized people were accepted into the public sphere only 
within the frame allowed by the colonizing culture and in points of a particu-
lar understanding of the Soviet colonial woman, which was regarded as being 
fixedly determined by her culture and could be later redeemed by the Soviet 
enlightenment. This was a specific form of Soviet anthropological primordi-
alism mixed with a daring social engineering strike, both based on humilia-
tion, primitive stereotypes, and dehumanizing. If an indigenous woman did 
not follow the rules of the game and did not allow the Russian/Soviet civiliz-
ers to regard her as a mentally retarded “savage” in need of modernizing, if 
she did not correspond to the physical and behavioral stereotypes of predict-
able exotization, she was and still is immediately marginalized and seen to 
be in need of taming by means of forced assimilation or rejection. This issue 
of effective stoppages put in front of the colonial women who refused to cor-
respond to the Soviet models of either complete assimilation or the exotic 
(subhuman) colonial is seldom discussed in the works of gender theorists 
and historians of gender in the West or in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
 The reason lies in the continuing enchantment with the myth of moder-
nity and its presentation as the only and best option for all women. Any 
alternative women’s roles, such as the institute of otins (woman clerics and 
healers) in Central Asia or folk medicine women in the Caucasus who car-
ried an other knowledge, are quickly pushed into invisibility. The same thing 
happened with those who carried a different idea of modernity that was 
for various reasons inconvenient for the Soviet Empire. This was true in 
the case of the Jadids and their rendering of gender problematic and in the 
corresponding Caucasus modernizing discourses, which also attempted to 
fuse local cosmologies and ethics with modernity. What is important here 
are not even the concrete details of these struggles, which are often meticu-
lously rendered in the historical descriptive works of both local and Western 
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scholars (Kamp 2006, Tokhtakhodzjayeva 1996, 1999, 2001), but rather the 
stubborn clinging to colonialist racist stereotypes in the Soviet Union at any 
stage of its development. This gap between the law and propaganda and the 
everyday discrimination taking myriads of hidden and open forms is espe-
cially hard to analyze, as it can be captured only through the voices of the real 
colonial women who went and continue to go through the ordeal of surviv-
ing as others in Russian, Soviet, national, or global modernity today.
iv.
In gender discourses, no matter where they are created—in the West, in the 
non-West, in Central Asia or in the Caucasus—one can trace the underlying 
logic of modernity based on coloniality of knowledge, of being and gender. 
Its sources lie in the very fact of the invention of modernity and its opposite, 
tradition, that changed the course of universal history. The social sciences 
and the humanities, including Western feminism, were shaped in accordance 
with the spatial-temporal matrix of modernity (Mignolo 2002a). The main 
feminist arguments of gender egalitarianism and the struggle with patriar-
chy were formulated precisely in connection with the invention of secular 
modernity as a questionable ideal of emancipation and negatively marking 
all other models as traditionalist and patriarchal by default, particularly if 
they were connected with non-Christian cultures. As a number of schol-
ars demonstrated in the last two decades (Oyěwùmi 1997, Marcos 2005, 
Lugones 2007), the patriarchal nature of traditionalist society is a Western 
myth. In many cases, the patriarchal binary structures were introduced by 
and with colonization and modernization, together with the invented con-
cept of tradition. But, in work after work, we still find the worn-out mutually 
exclusive oppositions of emancipation and backwardness, neo-Orientalism 
and religious extremism, paranjee and mini-skirt. Svetlana Shakirova and 
other Central Asian gender activists attempt a nuancing of this simplified 
model of gender relations and stress the lack of negative or positive emo-
tional characteristics in the interpretation of traditional and emancipated 
women (Shakirova 2005). But, if we continue to use the binary opposition 
of modern vs. traditional, we cannot avoid the Eurocentric bias. In spite of 
the author’s good intentions, the binary model is inevitably grounded in vec-
tor teleology—from the tradition through the Soviet half tradition and half 
modernity to today’s Western emancipation. Any alternative and in-between 
forms are seldom analyzed or regarded independently, which is symptom-
atic in itself. Behind this selectivity is again a particular established scholarly 
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tradition, which artificially creates certain points of reference and codes 
everything else as a deviation.
 Western feminisms sometimes tend to ignore the difference between 
freedom and liberation, and its non-Western clones repeat this mistake. The 
history of Soviet gender discourses shows the nearsightedness of this posi-
tion. Soviet state feminism indeed liberated women, sometimes against their 
will, but this liberation led not to freedom but rather to more dependency on 
other factors and preserving the fundamental discrimination in all spheres 
intact. The woman had to perform both the feminine and the masculine 
roles in economic, social, professional, and other senses. In colonial spaces, 
in addition to that, she also had to keep at least minimally her role of the 
traditional Oriental female and her difference with the Russian emancipated 
one. In contrast with China, where the principle of equality was fulfilled 
almost literally (Li Xiaojiang 1999, Wu 2005, Shu-mei Shih 2005), in the 
Soviet Union, women faced a more complex task: They had to never yield 
to men in public and professional spheres, remain a motherly and nurturing 
figure in private family realm, and on top of that, look and behave as a tra-
ditionally feminine woman, corresponding to the stereotypes of patriarchal 
society.
 Egalitarianism, often considered to be an essential element of all femi-
nisms, is not viable in communitarian or mixed societies, where the ideal 
of equality is either nonexistent or coded negatively. An example of this is 
described by S. Marcos in her analysis of the Zapatistas women (2005), by a 
number of Chinese feminists (Wu 2005, Li Xiaojiang 1993), but it can also be 
found in the women voices from the Caucasus and Central Asia, who, taking 
an intermediary position between individualism and communitarianism, 
reluctantly accept the separatist Western ideas of the exclusion of men.
 Traditional feminist wars against sexism in language make sense in the 
majority of Western European and, wider, Indo-European languages, yet 
they would not hold for grammatically genderless or gender-neutral lan-
guages and those that started to develop gender-specific words as a result of 
colonization/modernization. A good example of this is a Nigerian scholar 
O. Oyěwùmi’s study of precolonial Yoruba culture and language (Oyěwùmi 
1997). The sexist power of Russian would be more blurred and less dimor-
phic than English, while even a more stunning discrepancy would emerge 
in case of gender-neutral Turkic (Braun 1999) or some of the Caucasus lan-
guages (mainly Georgian; Kikvidze 2001). The principles of gender identi-
fication in different languages vary and need to be contextually investigated 
in their own terms and not in terms of the universalized Western linguistic 
sexism.
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 The same discussion refers to the necessity of deconstruction of the 
internalized Western feminist idea of the visual (masculine) nature of any 
culture, which in fact is most typical of the Western European “gaze,” but not 
of many other cultures with a different or mixed predominant communica-
tion channels: sound, tactile, and so on. Thus, a combination of intonation 
and phonetic features of the Turkic or Caucasus languages with the specific 
influence of Muslim culture considerably shifts the role of the visual. The 
prescribed gender roles that radical feminists so much want to get rid of turn 
out to be different in non-Western locales (while gender roles themselves are 
far from being the central division in many societies) and need to be under-
stood before being dismantled.
 Most feminist interpretations of gender problematic in Central Asia and 
the Caucasus remain blind to the imperial/colonial difference and unani-
mously assume that a progressivist liberal model of gender relations remains 
normative for everyone. In the logic of imperial difference and its secondary 
colonial difference, gender discourses in Russia or the Caucasus and Central 
Asia, with few exceptions, become watered down copies of the Western origi-
nals, infected with someone else’s zero point epistemology and enunciation, 
appropriated as their own, thus creating a comical impression of intellectual 
mimicry. The subjectivity of researchers themselves is carefully hidden in 
these works, while the reality they analyze, and a part of which they often 
are, has little to do with the standard revelations of Western feminism. The 
majority of studies flourishing in and about Eurasian borderlands in the last 
decade and written by a number of Western scholars, their Russian bleak 
copies and the works of the colonial gendered subjects who mostly received 
a Western-style education for lack of anything else (Kamp 2006, Vigmann 
2005, Tyomkina 2005, Harris 2000, Solovyeva 2006, Abasov 2005, Zubkovs-
kaya 2007), are based on a simple binary opposition of presumably archaic 
gender discourses (here conceptualized as Muslim ones) and modernized 
Western models of women’s liberation from the universal patriarchal system. 
What often remains unaddressed is the complex juxtaposition of several lay-
ers and forms of modernization in these locales, which often lead to con-
flicting subjectivities and negotiating gender forms. The Russian imperial 
model acts parallel to Muslim countries modernizing influences. The Soviet 
radical modernity strangles all alternatives, allowing for only a trickster type 
of passive or cunning resistance and today is itself replaced by the predomi-
nant internal colonialist yet also global version, which is projected directly 
without the Russian/Soviet mediation anymore, together with a possibility 
of Muslim patterns and role models. In all cases, the epistemic premises 
largely remain the same—it is the Western categories, value systems, and 
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paradigms, while the cosmology, ethics, and epistemology of the inhabit-
ants of Caucasus and Central Asia are neglected and dismissed as supersti-
tion or always negatively coded as traditionalism, while the new old local 
elites rewrite the Caucasus and Central Asian cosmologies in such a way as 
to create a convenient national myth—a new master narrative shaping the 
loyal subjects of the post-neocolonial regimes, including the gender sphere. 
Therefore, anything traditional is automatically associated with these official 
national narratives and immediately rejected, while the only option remain-
ing for thinking subjects in the Caucasus or Central Asia is once again, pro-
gressivism, modernization, Westernization, leading to another deadend, for 
no place is reserved for them in this narrative.
 It is important to emphasize here that my intention is not to go back to 
some initial primordialist pure sources when criticizing the negative inter-
pretation of tradition by Western-style disciplines. The indigenous gendered 
tradition is a living, changing variable within itself and not fixed or given 
once and for all, not something that one has to go back to. This cosmology 
slips out of the Western logic of either/or, assuaging what the Western culture 
would interpret as contradictions in the all-penetrating act of balancing the 
change and the continuity. So, what is needed is not to go back to tradition 
but rather to stop gripping it in the vice of Western disciplinary divisions, 
concepts, assumptions, categories of thought and action. What is needed is 
to stop denying contemptuously its ways of expression and resistance that 
would not necessarily be academically sanctified by the West.
 Such categories and compartments of analysis are products of Western 
feminism that distort gender relations and discourses in other locales. Thus, 
women’s activism in the Soviet colonial period is still measured by their par-
ticipation in demonstrations and protests or their enrollment and involve-
ment in the Soviet education and ideology, as if they cannot be regarded as 
full subjects before they started to use the accepted Western form of politi-
cal and civil activity. This approach is perfectly expressed in a 2006 book 
by American historian Marianne Kamp, The New Woman in Uzbekistan 
(2006), which incorporates many interesting facts62 but in the end provides 
a biased picture, as often happens when a foreign scholar studies the impen-
etrable other, relying too much and uncritically on his or her disciplinary 
approaches, political and moral ideals, liberal feminism, and naively believ-
ing that surrounding oneself with archival documents can facilitate the dif-
ficult task of pluritopic hermeneutics.63 Of course, I do not mean to blame 
Kamp, as I think her approach is unconscious and inadvertently linked to the 
coloniality of knowledge at large. However, applying readymade methodolo-
gies or disciplines created in the West in the analysis of the non-Western 
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subject always carries a danger of objectification, an unconscious drive to 
regard the world and the studied other from some kind of disinterested 
imagined objective position—the previously discussed epistemology of the 
zero point.
 In the case of Soviet modernity the situation is further complicated by 
the fact that Western and Western-oriented scholars are still divided between 
two extremes—the passing extreme of demonization of everything Soviet 
and the younger generation of scholars who were shaped after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and whose problem is often that they trust the Soviet 
propaganda too much and do not see the gap between propaganda and real-
ity, remaining also blind to the psychological and existential realm. Many 
leftist Western intellectuals have stepped into this trap before. The younger 
generation of scholars of Central Asia and the Caucasus in the West often 
repeats this mistake, sentimentalizing gender slogans of the Soviet empire. 
A large number of local women intellectuals of all ages also tend to interpret 
the Russian/Soviet modernization positively, by contrasting the Soviet mod-
ernizing projects in the colonies, including the gender ones, and those of the 
Muslim developing and Third World countries. The favorite argument here 
is the following: If it were not for Russia, Uzbekistan would be like Afghani-
stan now or worse. In other words, the symbolic rising to the status of the 
Second World (instead of the Third) together with the Soviet Union is still 
regarded by a considerable number of local intellectuals as an unquestion-
ably positive step. While any possible intersections with any women of color 
or Third World gender discourses are automatically erased as threatening, 
irrelevant, or humiliating. There is no understanding or meaningful dia-
logue yet between Third World and women of color feminists and ex-social-
ist gender studies and discourses, including the colonial ones. In this context, 
Kalpana Sahni’s work mentioned previously is much more rewarding, as it is 
written from the border and marked by the colonial wound that is lacking in 
Western works and carefully hidden and suppressed in post-Socialist/post-
colonial ones.
 On the other hand, it is symptomatic that a large number of post-Soviet 
feminists tend to deny completely the previous Soviet forms of state-sup-
ported gender discourses in their Amazon forms of physical equity (the 
notorious Soviet women crane operators and asphalt layers were, after all, 
the modern versions of women warriors) or in their gender forms of ineffi-
cient and double-standard quotas, and they promote Western feminist mod-
els as an absolute novelty without seeing the common sources of Western 
and Soviet gender discourses and ignoring and erasing the existing diver-
gent history and genealogy of Soviet gender discourses and practices in both 
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the colonial and imperial forms. As the women question was regarded as 
solved and forgotten if not forbidden already in the early Soviet history and 
feminism since then was regarded as a harmful bourgeois influence, gender 
studies in their critical form indeed emerged in post-Soviet societies only 
after the collapse of the USSR and the flooding of different Western NGOs, 
often forcefully indoctrinating women activists with some ideal prescribed 
set of feminist goals and aims that had little to do with their own history and 
present situation. It was particularly painful in the case of the non-European 
ex-colonies, where the newly emerged gender studies remained blind to the 
geo- and body politics of gendered and racialized knowledge of the colonial 
others and insisted on the idea of discrimination of women as a result of 
some abstract male dictate, in this case also intensified by the demonized 
and in most cases totally invented idea of the Muslim gender system. Thus, 
one more time in these new works, created in and about Central Asia and 
the Caucasus, gender as a myth, a contextually determined construct, turned 
into some absolute universal given.
v.
Gender discourses in post-independence Central Asia and partly in the Cau-
casus also have been marked by the oversimplified dichotomy of tradition vs. 
modernization and built on the mechanical application of Western feminism 
to local material as a direct result of the main feminist indoctrination vec-
tor. The majority of the collections of essays, field studies, and oral histo-
ries published in the post-independence Caucasus and Central Asia retain 
a developmentalist approach. This refers to a 2005 Tadzjik collection with a 
telling name, Gender: Traditions and Modernity (Kasymova 2005a), as well as 
partly to an earlier 1995 Uzbek collection of fascinating oral histories, Des-
tinies and Time (Tokhtakhodzhayeva,. Abdurazzakova, and Kadyrova 1995). 
In the Introduction, the editors mix the unreflected-on Soviet and Western 
modernization ideologies, marked by stagism and universalist notions of the 
patriarchal nature of any traditionalist society as the main impediment for 
women as such. The legitimacy of Western/Soviet modernization for any 
woman is never questioned in the book (except in the oral histories them-
selves), as it drags a number of values and features, which were naturalized 
in the collective unconscious and are associated with modernity/modern-
ization, such as an access to secular Russian (and colonizing) education, 
to decision making, career, social security—exclusively in the variants pre-
scribed by the Soviet and Western modernity. Zombification by the rhetoric 
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of modernity and its knowledge matrix is obvious in the texts, written by 
the scholars of gender in Central Asia and the Caucasus. They still cling 
to the tripartite model of the traditional woman/Soviet half-emancipated 
one/fully emancipated Westernized woman. Western-style emancipation is 
often regarded in a mythologized way when, for example, local anthropolo-
gists and sociologists seriously consider changes in body care to presumably 
more Western ones as a manifestation of unproblematic emancipation. It has 
long become commonplace for feminists that gluing artificial nails or being 
scared to death of gaining half a pound and losing one’s similarity to a Barbie 
doll are not signs of real emancipation. Yet no one seems to ask this ques-
tion: Isn’t the so-called traditional woman who calmly understands that each 
of her life stages is associated with a particular body, a certain appearance, 
who flexibly changes her social identities in different contexts and pays more 
attention to parameters other than primitive erotic appeal in the way she 
looks or behaves, isn’t she fundamentally much more free than the presum-
ably “emancipated” one?64 Instead of praising the Central Asian or Cauca-
sus women for finally learning to understand their physical bodies as social 
entities (thus, erasing the difference between sex and gender altogether), it 
is important to remember that, in many precolonial societies, in Oyěwûmi’s 
words, the (sexed and/or gendered) body was not the basis of social roles, 
inclusion or exclusion, it was not a foundation of social thought or identity 
(Oyěwûmi 1997: x–xi), and it does not have to be today.
 However, it would be unfair to fail to mention that a number of Central 
Asian and Caucasus gender scholars have started to develop an in-between 
model presented as an alternative for Eurasian borderlands women (Kasy-
mova 2005a). This alternative is still conceptualized mostly in terms of the 
Western model of turning geography into chronology (Mignolo 2009a), 
the predominance of time over place, pushing of traditionalism outside the 
world history and, consequently, the interpretation of border as a deficiency, 
as a state of being stuck in time, which requires synthesizing or negation in 
one or the other direction. Understanding of the border not only in temporal 
sense (between tradition and modernity) but also in spatial-cultural one is 
not typical of Western thinking. It is necessary to go away from this simple 
scheme, imposed onto the world by Western social sciences and humanities, 
and rehabilitate space as a concrete locale, and corporality as a concrete body. 
The first steps in this direction are already being taken. In August 2006, a 
summer school on postcolonialism and the prospects of gender studies in 
Central Asia took place at Lake Issyk-Kul. One of the painful issues discussed 
was the continuing necessity for the Central Asian scholars to correspond 
to Western gender theories and assumptions with their hidden Orientalist 
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stereotypes, thus re-Orientalizing ourselves in peculiar ways by, on the one 
hand, playing the role of the eternal other (a native informant or a native 
instrument of feminist imperialism; Shu-mei Shih et al. 2005: 145), or study-
ing our own ex-colonial space using the Western area studies or feminist 
tools.65 Identity then is being re-essentialized again and again. Central Asian 
gender activist, ex-director of the gender center in Almaty (Kazakhstan) and 
a supervisor of the Central Asian Gender Net, Svetlana Shakirova shrewdly 
pointed out: “The proliferation of such themes as the kidnapping of brides 
in Kyrgizia, the sexual women traffic in Central Asia, the self-immolation 
of women in Uzbekistan, the arranged by parents marriages in Tadzhikistan 
and prostitution in Kazakhstan—what is this all if not following the Orien-
talist clichés?” (Shakirova 2006).
 However, Svetlana’s position is dubious and self-negating at times, 
marked with typically colonial double discourses (one for the ex-metropolis 
and a different one for Central Asian community) and silences, symptomatic 
on the whole of gender studies in the region. Shakirova is perfectly aware 
of the problems and limitations of non-Western feminism connected with 
self-indoctrination and neo-Orientalist tendencies. Yet, she is clearly a prod-
uct of mainly Western and Russian feminist sources and traditions. On top 
of that, Svetlana is well institutionalized within the state, the NGO system, 
and most important, the academic feminist community, which has man-
aged to rebuild in the post-Soviet space a neoimperial/colonial hierarchy. 
That is why she is very cautious and evasive when discussing issues that 
may endanger her place within this hierarchical feminist community. This 
is obvious in her recent discussion of my book Decolonial Gender Episte-
mologies (Tlostanova 2009) with one of the leading Russian anthropologists 
of Central Asia, Sergey Abashin, published in a Ukrainian journal, Gender 
Studies (2009). Svetlana’s discourse betrays her essentially trickster position 
on the difficult verge where subjectification finally results in a new subjec-
tivity: She obviously does not agree with the Russian scholar in many points 
but tends to accentuate similarities instead of bluntly pointing to his blind-
ness or a conscious reluctance to notice various internal issues of the Central 
Asian problematic closely linked to Russian/Soviet modernity/coloniality. 
Yet, Svetlana manages to indirectly raise certain painful topics and at least 
point to her own difference with Sergei Abashin and also the post-Soviet 
gender scholars, without losing her assigned space in the hierarchy of area 
studies on Central Asia and post-Soviet gender studies traditionally presided 
by Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian scholars (i.e., those with (pseudo)
(secondary) European claims). I am far from trying to discredit Svetlana’s 
position. Yet, I think that institutionalization on any level can effectively 
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disempower contesting discourses and their activists by imposing an invis-
ible set of rules that they are not allowed to transcend. It is clear that we need 
other forms and ways of coalition and dialogues that would not be co-opted 
and minced by the dominant structures.
 Another interesting and symptomatic example is the works of a diasporic 
Kalmyk anthropologist and scholar of gender Elza Bair Guchinova, living in 
Moscow and working in a top academic institute of anthropology and ethnol-
ogy. She represents a position that is closest to the post-Soviet kind of deco-
lonial and women-of-color feminism. Being well read in these discourses 
and aware of the postcolonial dimension, having the variegated experience 
of studying and working abroad, and a decidedly transcultural stance, Elza 
remains a Kalmyk for whom the experience of her people’s forced deporta-
tion in 1943–56, including its effect on gender roles and relations, is not a 
detached subject for research but a lived history of her ancestors, compa-
triots, and relatives. A specific version of the Soviet/colonial wound allows 
Guchinova to better sense and understand the gendered version of the his-
torical trauma of dislocation, the effect of Eurocentrism on the idea of the 
beautiful and appropriate in mixed cultural contexts, the survival strategies 
of multiply disenfranchised others, and so forth. Elza’s position is a border 
one, as she combines a critical cosmopolitanism with a truly participatory 
anthropology (Guchinova 2003, 2005).
 Gender studies of the Russian/Soviet non-European ex-colonies seldom 
venture into the spheres of epistemology and theorizing, leaving this privi-
lege to Western feminism and thus agreeing with their own dependency. In 
this respect they repeat the path already taken and largely rejected by Third 
World and women-of-color feminists. Disavowing the Eurocentric universal 
theory often leads to stagnation and fear of any meta-theory as such, hence 
the proliferation of mini discourses and going into specific and often narrow 
problems of race, sexuality, class, nation; grounding oneself exclusively in the 
empirical research of a concrete group of others. Paradoxically, Third World 
feminism helped reproduce what it was fighting against. Such a position was 
critically analyzed by Chinese feminists, who managed to overcome the fas-
cination with Western modernity and claim that there is no need to repeat 
the Western way, that they already went a long way along their own road (Li 
Xiaojiang 1993: 104). The same impulse is to be found in the radical works 
of Egyptian gender activist and writer Nawal el Saadawi. She draws attention 
to the new multicultural forms of gendered Orientalizing and the imperial/
colonial asymmetry when she criticizes the organizers of a rigidly structured 
feminist conference, who “did not understand at all why the Third World 
women were uncomfortable . . . at their powerlessness to contribute in any 
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meaningful way .  .  .  the well meaning U.S. organizers and panel conveners 
had and probably still have no idea how maternalistic and condescending 
they sounded . . . when they read papers or talked at the participants, telling 
them how to behave . . .” (el Saadawi 1997: 148). Instead of a dialogue, here, 
we encounter an asymmetrical colonial communication. “The oppressor 
here blames protest and dissent on the character defects and the hang-ups 
and the shortcomings of the colonized” (el Saadawi 1997: 149). For el Saa-
dawi, the roots of this approach are clearly colonial and masculine, but the 
Western feminists willingly reproduce them. Gender discourses generated in 
the Caucasus and Central Asia unfortunately did not reach this conclusion as 
yet on any massive scale, silently agreeing to erase the path they have already 
gone and start again from scratch, mimicking someone else’s foreign model, 
which does not fit yet is considered normative.
 The continuing dependency of local gender discourses on the West is not 
surprising if we take into account that the majority of these works are sup-
ported by Western grants and NGOs. What is at work here is what African 
feminist Obioma Nnaemeka called “the politics of poverty” and “the politics 
of the belly” (Shu-mei Shih et al. 2005: 159), which makes the work for NGOs 
the only safe harbor and often the only material means of existence for many 
local women. We cannot blame them for their position. It only proves again 
the vitality of the naturalized, universalist Western notions and scholarly cat-
egories, models and paradigms, and forms of thinking and subjectivity. This 
is not just a post-Soviet problem. Oyěwùmi points out similar tendencies in 
her African colleagues (Oyěwùmi 1997: xv) as well as a Chinese feminist Y. 
Wu (Wu 2005: 41) and S. Marcos, who claims that she refused the role of the 
Western feminism mirror (Shu-mei Shih et al. 2005: 145). This role is associ-
ated with a number of advantages, not entirely material but also symbolic—
the exoticized non-Western women are accepted only if they translate word 
for word the ideas of Western feminism. Then, they are immediately given 
a chance to travel around the world, speak at international congresses, and 
act as legitimate representatives of their cultures and women’s movements in 
academic and political spheres. This problem is in fact a problem of ethical 
choice, which is harder for non-Western feminists than for Western ones 
because of the persistent epistemic and economic asymmetry. The expert 
community not only defines the dominant scholarly discourses but also con-
trols the accessibility and centrality of particular positions and points of view 
in the academic world, so that the “sanctioned ignorance” about the non-
Western paradigms is promoted in the global intellectual community. The 
works that go beyond the generally accepted mainstream gender notions 
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would be never translated, published, or promoted, remaining known only 
to selected enthusiasts.
vi.
However, a growing body of works on gender demonstrates a different 
approach today, unlearning Western feminist ways and notions in a complex 
border position of gender tricksterism. Representatives of border in-between 
gender positions and decolonial feminism shape the new transmodern gen-
der discourses, rethinking both Western feminism and traditional (for lack 
of a better term) cultures. They are based on the principle of dialogic knowl-
edges and constant traveling between the West and the non-West, opening 
points of confluence between Western philosophy (usually of a contesting 
kind) and cosmologies, subjectivities and social justice systems of indig-
enous people. Such is Oyěwùmi’s attempt to question the very category of 
woman as a Western construct imposed on Yoruba culture that previously 
lacked the category of gender (Oyěwùmi 1997). Instead of biological gen-
der divisions, the society is based on clan and professional principles and a 
much more flexible seniority principle. In Central Asia and the Caucasus, the 
woman in indigenous society was also far from being constantly and always 
discriminated against. Her roles changed dynamically through life, from a 
relative condition without rights typical for the young wife, to the respected 
mother of the family with grown-up children and grandchildren who took 
an active part in the decision making. Adyghean cosmology retains traces 
of gender parity, women’s active participation in politics, their well-defined 
property rights, the specific gendered division of labor, which was never 
based on coding one (female) labor as less prestigious than the other (male), 
even the predominance of female over male in certain spheres, as a result of 
a longer sustaining of feminocratic systems. Many local histories manifested 
such traditions of gender egalitarianism and lack of fixed gender divisions. 
Traces of these alternative relations and models are to be found in the Amer-
indian and African cultures but were erased from the collective memory 
of the Caucasus or Central Asian people and hard to restore. In contrast 
with Mesoamerican cosmology, which always remained a living tradition, 
in the Caucasus and Central Asia, there were more layers and radical forms 
of colonization, interacting with each other, each of which added a new wall 
between the string of indigenous cosmology and the people, preventing from 
a link with their history and epistemology.
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 In the Caucasus mythology, the oldest layers tend to be feminocratic, and 
the later social structure of the northern Caucasus Nart epic still clearly car-
ries traces of gender egalitarianism. In the Caucasus, women remained for 
a long time outside the patriarchal law, while in the social life of Adyghean 
community the guiding principle of fluidity and flexible contextuality of gen-
der roles was linked with seniority: the older wise women were no less but 
often more respected than men and connected with a number of sacred acts 
and rituals that only they could perform (healing, the control of rain and 
thunder, rituals at the building of a new house, the initiation rituals, etc.). In 
the oral poetry and songs of the Adyghe people, created when they fought for 
their independence from Russia, we find “texts” made by women themselves 
and from their perspective. These “texts” did not describe them from outside 
but concentrated on women’s feelings and emotions, on their willingness to 
be active and to make decisions in all spheres of life, including the erotic one. 
These poems and songs, as was the case with Mesoamerican culture, were 
later predictably erased or edited by the indigenous tradition itself, which 
was becoming more and more patriarchal, and by the no-less-patriarchal 
interpretations by Western and Russian ethnographers and anthropologists, 
who condescendingly misinterpreted the majority of symbols, images, meta-
phors, connected with the women’s world and their perception of this world 
(Tekuyeva 2006b).
 On a larger scale, everything threatening the colonizers was simply taken 
out of these texts, from heroic and liberating identities to strong women war-
riors. This is true about the aforementioned genre of the heroic epic dastan. 
In many dastans, the central part belonged to the woman warriors, the Ama-
zons of Central Asia. The subversive tradition survived in other oral forms 
as well. An example is Khanifa Kazi series of epic poems from the northern 
Caucasus. Khanifa had a real historical prototype and combined the woman-
warrior faculties with healing ones. Her story was closely connected with the 
Caucasus war—an outstanding situation of colonization of the whole people 
in which a woman was allowed to cross the usual gender boundaries. As 
M. Tekuyeva points out, for Khanifa, there was a priority of patriotic motifs 
over the personal feelings. She served as a role model of selfless devotion to 
the idea of liberation and a stimulus for the continuation of struggle (2006a: 
142).
 The idea that the dichotomous structure of gender roles is largely a West-
ern phenomenon naturalized due to modernity worldwide is proven by the 
practices of marginal Muslim cultures, such as in the Caucasus and Cen-
tral Asia. In Chapter 3, I mentioned the tradition of the bacha cult, which 
could take male and female forms with a distinct transsexual element. A 
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milder example, which does not cross the boundaries of sexuality, comes 
from a medieval Muslim culture with its nuanced gender system. Along with 
the Sharia ideal woman and its opposite (a whore), it has a powerful image 
of a beautiful and sly coquette—the treacherous Afet (translated literally as 
“disaster”). This “beautiful dame” of Eastern poetry, in N. Mekhti’s words 
(2005: 137), takes an in-between position. It is a good example of non-West-
ern cultures’ sensitivity and intuition in grasping intermediary transcultural, 
transvalue, and transgender models, hard to reconcile with Western binary 
thinking, vacillating between the extremes of the Madonna and the whore or 
in, this case, the veil and the mini skirt.
 In the case of Mexican Zapatistas women, the central goal is decoloniza-
tion from the Eurocentered racist epistemologies in their creole rendering. 
In case of Caucasus and Central Asian women, there is a more complex task, 
as the modernizing/colonizing agents here were multiple and varied, and 
negotiating women’s identities between and beyond neoliberalism, Islam, 
and their ethnic/national cultures becomes a truly challenging task. What is 
meant here is not a simple, straightforward negation of one tradition for the 
sake of the other. A dynamic interpenetration and mutually directed trans-
culturation is at work.
vii.
A lack of understanding between Western feminism and non-Western 
gender discourses is obvious in the ongoing discussion on the meaning of 
veiling, which remains unresolvable unless we attempt to unlearn certain 
Western assumptions on Muslim women and their agency. Wearing a hijab 
does not always carry the fixed religious meaning of controlling the aggres-
sive manifestations of male sexuality; it can also be a symbol of resistance to 
colonization and Western cultural influence or carry an openly feminist and 
anticapitalist meaning (Shaikh 2003). In Central Asia and parts of the Cau-
casus, the function of hijab is close to the Turkish model, as described by N. 
Göle (1996). She claims that the very emergence of the civil society in Turkey 
was linked directly with the beginning of understanding women as humans 
and citizens and their specific socialization, together with Turkish modern-
ization. The women of Kemalist Turkey were real symbols of the civilizing/
modernizing project (1996: 131). Something similar—although with a Com-
munist ideology at its core and the outward atheism on top of the colonial 
difference—we find, in southern and eastern provinces of the Soviet Union 
during the infamous campaigns for the liberation of the women of the East 
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and the mountain women. Later these Soviet republics shaped their own 
model of the secular educated and socially active working mother.
 Soviet modernity, in contrast with the Western one as described by 
Oyěwûmi in the Yoruba case (Oyěwûmi 1997: 122), was very active in 
involving the local women in the new life style. But, the Soviet emancipa-
tion of racialized gendered others was still based on double standards and 
attempted to keep the colonized women in a downtrodden state, at the same 
time making them believe they are liberated. The Bolsheviks’ interest in the 
“Oriental” women was not confined to redeeming them through conver-
sion to the Communist faith. It was necessary to make women enter the 
public sphere in the capacity of new working hands and reformed voices in 
the mass construction of the ideal society by the ideally docile workers with 
maximally erased gender differences. The easiest way of making the change 
palpable was through appearance and clothes, hence the early Bolshevik 
campaigns in the non-European parts of the Soviet Union, such as “a coat for 
a mountain woman” in the Northern Caucasus in the 1920s, which consisted 
in the supply of European style overcoats to the local women to make them 
come to the elections, or an anti-paranjee campaign in Central Asia, which 
was part of the larger “hujum” movement. In both cases, the impetus behind 
them was similar to Soviet anthropology and biomedicine, based on interfer-
ing in the woman’s most intimate world, which was in itself a manifestation 
of imperial violence in the control of sexuality and subjectivity.
 When Caucasus and Central Asian women revert to hijab today, they “go 
back” to what is interpreted in the collective unconsciousness as the “tradi-
tional” (though it is not always so) in the form of the protest against mod-
ernization in its Soviet, national, or global variant. In Turkey, Central Asia, 
or the Caucasus, this consciously chosen hijab identity is often appropri-
ated by young and middle-aged urban, educated, professional, and socially 
mobile women, who are attempting to legitimize the social, political, and 
cultural changes and the shaping of alternative normative values. The dif-
ference with the Turkish model is that the previous national secular moder-
nity in Turkey is opposed to a more religious and presumably independent 
and authentic version of national identity today, while in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia, the conflict is between the mothers who were brought up on 
the ideals of Soviet modernity and daughters who prefer to forget about this 
secular modernity in its (post-)Soviet or neoliberal forms, turning to a highly 
constructed notion of the modern Muslim identity instead, yet allowing for 
the technological sides of Western culture. Besides, in Turkey, the process 
of radical Islamist revival and the emergence of the new Muslim identity 
took several decades (from the 1950s on), accelerating toward the end of the 
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twentieth century. The Soviet ex-colonies became independent almost over-
night and not of their own will, finding themselves in need of an immediate 
and often unconscious choice of the new woman identity. In the Caucasus 
and Central Asia, with their peculiar forms of cultural and ethnic Islam, the 
local gendered identity could be manifested in the phenomenon of the “vir-
tual hijab,” to quote Nijazi Mekhti (2005), which was a compensatory tech-
nique of Muslim culture during the Soviet years.
 Islam was and still is not a singularly misogynist or women-liberating 
tradition, the same way as the local pre-Islamic traditions incorporated vari-
ous contradictory elements. Often, it was the patriarchal society and clergy 
that distorted Islam (similarly to Christianity) to make it more misogynist 
than it was. The imposition of Islam was sometimes used by the local men 
to enforce patriarchy. They artificially muted the genderly egalitarian parts 
of Muslim culture and reinforced or invented the discriminating ones. In 
the Arabic countries, there is already a whole tradition of Muslim women 
theologists, who regard it as their goal to prove that Muslim texts were dis-
torted by male interpreters and are in need of reinterpretation by women 
(Ali 2003). In the Caucasus and Central Asia, this impulse has not yet been 
expressed in the academic form, though there is a continuing tradition of Sufi 
orders linked in a complex way with a well-developed system of pre-Islamic 
saints who were often women, the institute of modern women healers and 
otins questioning and destabilizing the Muslim male master narrative from 
their marginal positions (see Chapter 3). By contrast, the male forms of new 
Islamism in the northern Caucasus turn women into dispensable lives, as 
in case of the so-called black widows. This attitude toward women is not an 
ancient tradition but a rather new one, linked with modernity/coloniality.
viii.
In the process of unlearning the Western feminist notions and assumptions, 
a crucial part today is played by women’s voices themselves, their oral histo-
ries, with rich subtexts and eloquent voids and silences often unnoticed by 
the interviewers zombified by Western scientific and scholarly principles. 
Particularly interesting are those oral histories that belong to women born or 
raised before or outside the Soviet indoctrination. Such is the interview with 
Muborakhanum Gaffarova (born in 1905) (Tokhtakhodzhayeva et al. 1995: 
38–45), a refugee to Sindzyan (which later became a part of China), who 
came back to Uzbekistan only in the early 1960s. Gaffarova is free from the 
Soviet ideology and ethnic/nationalist intolerance, generated by reaction to 
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the forced modernization/colonization. She offers an alternative and pluri-
topic way of reconciling modernization with local ethnic, cultural, epistemic, 
and religious models, such as Jadidism.
 She is clearly a border dweller, open and tolerant to otherness to a much 
larger degree than any other informants. From the oral history of this elderly 
woman emerges a different image of the Central Asian Muslim culture, than 
the one created by Western feminists and endorsed by their local pupils. She 
does not specifically discuss gender, but her oral history indirectly points to 
such features of the presumably backward and more traditionalist Sindzyan 
Uzbek diaspora as an obvious respect for women and children, a lack of gen-
der inequality in the questions of education and career, and even a certain 
parity between men and women to a larger degree than in Soviet Uzbekistan, 
where colonial subjects were persuaded that they were free and happy. She 
stresses that, in the history of Central Asia as well as other colonized spaces, 
the ugly excesses of patriarchal discourses and practices were not initially 
inherent in the local or Muslim culture, rather being an indirect result of col-
onization. Gaffarova seems to be the only informant sensitive to this impe-
rial/colonial side of the problem, while people shaped in and by the Soviet 
system, even if critical, think entirely within the developmentalist progres-
sivist paradigm, demonizing any traditional culture, and particularly Islam, 
and remaining unaware of any alternative models. Only Gaffarova openly 
speaks of the reasons for the degeneration of her people, regarding coloniza-
tion by Russia as a direct source of the slave psychology of the Central Asians 
(Tokhtakhodzhayeva et al. 1995: 45), which she was so shocked with after 
her return from China. As an outsider, she clearly sees the typical colonizing 
tactics of zombification and is able to detect the darker side of the modern 
colonial gender system, which is not accessible to other informants—both 
the colonized and the colonizers.
 The women representatives of the colonizing culture, by contrast, remain 
insensitive to the ethical ambiguity and manipulative nature of their own 
positions. A. Memmi formulated an opposition of a colonialist and a pas-
sive colonizer (1991: 52). The majority of Central Asian or Caucasus Rus-
sians are precisely such reluctant colonizers, who are often offended that the 
aboriginals are not able to appreciate their noble civilizing efforts (Tokhtak-
hodzhayeva et al. 1995: 107). Their minds unconsciously carry racist and 
discriminatory ideologies. The colonizers of both genders share a number of 
typical features, such as the condescending attitude to local languages and the 
interpretation of Russification as a civilizing norm, as well as the well-known 
idea of the conservation of traditional culture as opposed to teaching the 
locals the new and progressive European/Russian ways (Tokhtakhodzhayeva 
n o n - E u R o p E A n  S o v I E T  E x - c o Lo n I E S  A n d  G E n d E R  •  145
et al. 1995: 107). For Central Asian and Caucasus Russians alike, it is habitual 
to compare their ancestors who ended up in the Russian colonies with the 
North American pioneers and adventurers of the West, a comparison that 
helps them elevate their own status (and the status of their empire by asso-
ciation) and erase the stigma of colonization and imperialism. There are 
also important clashes between the Russian and the colonial women in these 
locales that have not been yet commented on, such as the social status and 
the economic and sexual differences and asymmetries marked by racism.66
iX.
The Soviet empire was Eurocentric and patriarchal in spite of its external 
rhetoric. But, this does not mean that the women themselves were simply 
passive victims. The women definitely created ways out of the imposed bina-
rism as well as conscious ways of flexibly (re)constructing their subjectivities 
within different social discourses. These models offer mediation, an ironic 
tricksterlike vacillation and play on stereotyping and discrimination, as a 
way of coping. Such positioning steps beyond the persistent double stan-
dard maintained by the coloniality of gender. The modern/colonial gender 
system has always sustained one ideal for the Western (or Russian in case of 
Soviet modernity) gendered subject and the opposite ideal for the colonial 
and ex-colonial spaces, whose women need to be redeemed by means of vari-
ous discourses and tactics—from Christianity to a civilizing mission, from 
Socialism to overall consumerism today. A specific variant of the second-
class colonial modernity was and is on sale in the Third World/global South, 
in Socialist colonies and in ex–Second World today. This colonial moder-
nity is a cheap throwback to the culture of modernity zombifying (ex-)colo-
nial people and incarcerating them into a triumphant vector pointed toward 
emancipation in accordance with stagist heresy. An alarming recent ten-
dency is that more and more locales (including the ex–Second World and its 
colonial difference) are branded as unreformable and imprisoned within an 
essentialist (neo-)Orientalist paradigm.
 The women marked with difference in cultural, ethnic, religious, sexual, 
linguistic, and other senses or taking a bordering position between the cul-
tures of several colonies or a colony and a metropolis form a rather large 
group, particularly inconvenient for anthropology and gender sociology, as 
it does not fit the readymade categories and conventional schemes. In the 
context of complicating the simple tripartite scheme of traditional-Soviet- 
Westernized women, one of the most interesting and understudied phenom-
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ena is the Soviet colonial gender tricksterism, whereby the Soviet and the 
colonial merge and balance on the verge of resistance and re-existence, acting 
around the power structures to successfully avoid their policing censorship.
 The emergence of a well-defined generation of colonial gendered intel-
lectuals in Central Asia and the Caucasus coincides with the massive politi-
cal decolonization in the world and should be regarded within this crucial 
context as one of its elements. By the late 1950s, there was already a discur-
sive space of those Soviet colonial women who refused to slide either to the 
paranjee or to the parachutist with the Young Communist League badge on 
her chest. How did they negotiate their identity between these binaries and 
eventually beyond them? They lost the freedom of thinking in their native 
language. Their link with the local culture, value system, and knowledge was 
seriously damaged, but it does not necessarily mean that the culture itself 
was lost, that it was replaced completely with a different and artificial sys-
tem. The necessity of corresponding to Soviet values was often negotiated 
in unexpected forms. This became obvious in career trajectories, fashion, 
hobbies, intersexual relations, and leisure activities. If, in Northrop’s book, 
we find mostly the photographs of the entirely veiled enigmatic Tashkent 
women, even as late as the 1940s (2004: 319, 322, 236) and Marianne Kamp 
presents us mostly the official encyclopedia photographs of the New Uzbek 
women who made their careers through Soviet modernity propaganda, my 
own mini-field study of the photographs and testimonies of several Uzbek 
families from Tashkent of the same period shows something more complex. 
Far from being a massive phenomenon, this particular gendered trickster 
subjectivity is still symptomatic as it promises the possibility of re-existence 
around, beyond, and at the crossing of several models—from soviet Orien-
talism and multiculturalism, to Muslim culture, from ethno-cultural patterns 
of Uzbek people to Western modernity and today’s internal neocolonialism.
 There is a flexible change of identities, a play on them, which Soviet 
educated gendered colonials used with various goals—from mimicry to stra-
tegic positioning at the border, giving a double vision and a multidimen-
sional understanding and perception of oneself in the world, a possibility of 
remaining within the rigid Soviet multiculturalism yet practicing a differ-
ence in forms that would be impervious to imperial censorship (Tlostanova 
2010a).
 It is a much more complex picture than the women wrapped in paranjee 
from Northrop’s book or party activists and Turkmen women crane opera-
tors of Soviet multiculturalism, where colonial gendered individuals had to 
act as symbols of themselves, liberated Oriental women, but always remem-
ber not to become better than the Russian originals. Such a colonial gender 
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tricksterism has survived until today both in the ex-metropolis and in the 
ex-colonies. What is crucial here, according to Lugones, is the multiplicity 
in the fracture of the locus of the colonial difference that incorporates the 
enactment of the coloniality of gender and resistance from a subaltern sense 
of self, of the social, of the self in relation, of the cosmos, all grounded in a 
peopled memory. For Lugones, as for a decolonial intellectual, it is particu-
larly important to always feel this tense multiplicity and movement, “people 
moving: the tension between the dehumanization and paralysis of the colo-
niality of being, and the creative activity of be-ing” (2008).
 The locus of imperial difference and a secondary colonial difference 
marked by the Socialist modernity generates still another response. The well-
known feminist slogan “the personal is the political” is not attractive to the 
women of the (post-)Socialist countries, because the whole social field in 
these places, including the private and everyday spheres, was so politicized 
that a natural reaction was precisely an apolitical or a depoliticized stance. In 
the USSR and China to different extents, an opposite tendency is natural as 
a reaction against the system, which in many cases is realized in the outward 
manifestations of conventional femininity, a phenomenon that not many 
Western feminists have even been able to grasp. Chinese gender theorist 
Li Xiaojiang elaborates on the discourses of femininity in modern China, 
which are interesting to compare with the post-Soviet ones. It seems that the 
resexualizing of woman’s body in China after the 1980s is a more distinct 
and expressive reaction against the Socialist excesses than in the ex-Soviet 
Union, where there was never such a powerful and successfully implemented 
discourse of women’s desexualizing in all realms (Li Xiaojiang 1993: 104).
X.
The gender sphere, along with the arts and nonrational knowledges, seems to 
be one of the few remaining areas of colonial subjectivity in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia, where the revival of indigenous and transmodern models and 
the building of other trajectories for the future is still possible. Such a revival 
is necessarily linked with bringing forward the erased histories of resistance 
and re-existence of the colonized peoples and efforts to establish their dia-
logue with indigenous movements around the world. The acquaintance of 
Central Asian and Caucasus gender activists with voices of decolonial femi-
nists is crucial, as it offers them an alternative instead of the prescribed cor-
respondence to only Western standards, an alternative that does not have to 
be reproduced word for word but awakens the gene of freedom and decolo-
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niality—of being, of gender, of knowledge, of sensing, and so forth. In this 
respect, one of the most promising areas of the post-Soviet decolonizing is 
the intersection of gender and the arts. Central Asian and Caucasus women 
artists, writers, film, and theater directors, little by little, create a decolo-
nial discursive space and agency. As Kazakh artist Saule Suleimenova (2010) 
pointed out recently, 
[A] true artist is always in a quest for the new formula of the beautiful and 
is always free and ready to create something that would liberate others as 
well, while beauty equals freedom, joy and life, but also simplicity and the 
glowing of truth as it is, and therefore it cannot be a quotation or a mimick-
ing, and is devoid of the annoying factors of cultural discrepancies. It must 
be your own and not a second hand colonial use of someone else’s freedom, 
or joy. I am trying to reconnect and reconcile the traditional Kazakh cul-
ture and the aesthetics of revolt, the modernist artistic devices, the pathos 
of eternity, and the poetics of everyday. (Suleimenova 2010)
 For the development of understanding and cooperation on a global level 
and coalitions at the points of difference with other racialized, colonized, 
and gendered subjects, Caucasus and Central Asian women need first of all 
to decolonize their own thinking. Second, they need a kind of feminism that 
would not be a clone of the Western (or Russian) one and that would not be 
a repetition of the Soviet state gender discourses either. It would have to be 
an independent and critical feminism based on a careful differentiating and 
empathic grasping of particular values and sensibilities born in historical 
and cultural contexts of the Caucasus and Central Asia, including the indig-
enous epistemology. In the case of the Caucasus and Central Asia, there is a 
danger that having gotten rid of the hijab as a result of Soviet gender politics, 
the women of these locales can find themselves today in the clasp of a much 
more hierarchical regime—not of veiling but of silencing and leveling of 
their opinions and selves—promoted by Western epistemology and Western 
(and mimicking Russian) feminism as its integral part.
 What is important in Maria Lugones’s formulation of coloniality of gen-
der and what can and should be taken into account by the emerging decolo-
nial feminism in Central Asia and the Caucasus is oppositional fragmented 
and coalitional gendered subjectivity and activism projected into the future. 
The coloniality of gender generates a counteraction, a virus of resistance 
from the crack and in terms of the colonial difference. Lugones stresses that 
“from the fractured locus the movement succeeds in retaining creatively 
ways of thinking, of behaving, of relating . . . Subject, relations, ground, pos-
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sibilities are continually transformed incarnating a weave from the fractured 
locus that constitutes a creative peopled re-creation” (2008). Conducting a 
dialogue under the preservation of difference and multiplicity is a difficult 
task—money and power remain in the hands of the feminist mainstream, 
and if they get into the hands of freely thinking and acting gender activists, 
unfortunately, this can cause a change even in their nature, making their 
dialogues false and their institutions suffocating (Shu-mei Shih et al. 2005: 
150). Echoing the opinions of many gender theorists from D. Haraway to 
B. Preciado and S. Marcos, Lugones points out that “the emphasis should 
be on maintaining multiplicity at the point of reduction, not in maintain-
ing a hybridity (as a product, which masks the colonial difference) but in 
the tense workings of more than one logic, not to be synthesized but tran-
scended  .  .  .  The responses from the fragmented loci can be creatively in 
coalition. This decolonial coalitional resistance generates oppositional con-
sciousness of a social erotics that take on the differences that make be-ing 
creative, that permits enactments that are thoroughly defiant of the logic of 
dichotomies” (2008).
 Even if it is hardly possible to avoid the dependence on Western grants 
and NGOs, we can still keep and cultivate a certain degree of freedom and 
self-reflection, a conscious delinking from the dominant ego politics of 
knowledge and an attempt to build a geo- and body politics of the gendered 
border thinking, which can help elaborate an other dynamic of action, a 
specific transcultural language that would be linked with more symmetrical 
and dialogic relations between Western and non-Western cosmologies and 
epistemologies. It does not mean that we need to reject the Western influence 
altogether or take the position of aggressive and rigid nativism or national-
ism. But, having shaped the multiple paradigm of critical other thinking, 
which can hope to see and adequately reflect the diversity and contradictori-
ness of various experiences of multifarious global world, we thus exercise our 
right to keep our dignity and not to plead to be accepted by the West/global 
North (or Russia).

P a r t  I I I

i. The issues: experience and Philosophical Categories
Chapter 4 raised the issues of gender in non-European ex-colonies. When 
the gender issues are debated by mainstream feminists in Europe or the 
U.S., it is de facto assumed that race is not constitutive of gender. However, 
outside Europe and the U.S., racism and gender are mutually constitutive. 
When it comes to Human Rights, the same principle applies. Thus, while 
debates on the issue focus generally on “rights,” this chapter shifts the accent 
toward the “human.” Early claims, by non-European nations, to have their 
own regional declaration next to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
of 1948, reframed in the context of the geopolitics of knowledge, (knowing, 
and being, i.e., in terms of global racial hierarchies) showed indirectly that 
the question of “rights” applied to both human beings and regions (e.g., the 
Third World) (Rana, 2007; Barreto 2009, 2012). This chapter follows up on 
the intersection of gender and race and focuses on the idea of “human” in 
Human Rights and the idea of humanity as well as the Humanities in higher 
education. In the next chapter, we examine the complicity of the concepts of 
humanity and citizenship in the Western imaginary. In the interregnum, the 
concept of “rights” emerged at two complementary levels: first in interna-
tional law, in the Atlantic in the sixteenth century; and second, in the sphere 
of the legal status of individual citizens (above all, the French Declaration of 
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the Rights of Man and of Citizen). We now concentrate on the question of 
Human/Humanity in relation to categories such as citizenship, rights, and 
knowledge.
I.1.
The idea of Human Rights combines an ontological assumption (being 
human) and a legal question (rights). It would appear that the almost seven 
billion human beings on the planet are endowed with the “rights,” since the 
declaration says that rights are universal. In this chapter, we concentrate 
on the “human” aspect of the equation and will question the assumption of 
the universality of human rights. Three major events of Western modernity 
prompted the universal declaration of human rights: the genocides in Ger-
many (Nazism) and in Russia (Communism) and the atomic bomb in Hiro-
shima (the inauguration of the U.S. imperial era).
 “Human Rights”—as they were conceived in the Universal Declaration 
of 1948—presupposes not that “rights” are universal but that “human” is a 
universal category accepted by all and that, as such, the concept of “human” 
does justice to everyone. The wrong assumption is that what is enunciated 
as “Universal” also corresponds to the universality of the enunciation. We 
have been arguing that a universal enunciation is a mirage; enunciation can 
emerge only from a local genealogy of thoughts and needs. The only occa-
sion in which the universality of the enunciated coincides with the Univer-
sality of the enunciation is through the world of God. It is only in God that 
the enunciated and the enunciation can be one and the same. When that 
pretense is assumed by human beings, we have good reason to suspect that it 
is an excuse and a justification of imperial and totalitarian designs.
 The concept of “human” that is used in general conversations, by the 
media, at universities, and in seminars and conferences is a concept that 
leaves outside of “humanity” a quite large portion of the global population. 
That men (and women) are all born equal,,is a statement that, since eigh-
teenth century Europe, we can find in the Bill of Rights and the European 
and American constitutions. The statement has been made under the pre-
supposition that everybody basically educated, no matter where (in China, 
in the Middle East, in any region of Africa, Central Asia, and South America, 
in Russia, etc.), will agree with such a statement. And, indeed, it makes a lot 
of sense and it can be taken as, if not universal, a global truth. The problem 
is right there, in the equality status at birth. And, the problem is that if men 
(and women) are born equal, they do not remain equal the rest of their lives. 
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The statement I have never seen written as such but implied in countless 
places is the following: “Men and women are all born equal but they do not 
remain equal the rest of their lives” should also be globally, if not universally, 
accepted. It certainly would be endorsed by the majority of the population of 
the planet, knowing by experience that such a statement is true. Indeed, this 
should be a basic principle of global governance if democracy/socialism is 
taken seriously, for there cannot be true democracy or socialism without the 
decolonization of both concepts. Decolonization of democracy and social-
ism would be to overcome both of them in building decolonial transdemo-
cratic and transsocialist societies. For all human beings born equal, losing 
their equality is a humiliating experience. In the modern/colonial world, the 
humiliating experience has been infringed by coloniality: the colonial wound 
is both racial and patriarchal.
 This time, instead of making Central Asia and the Caucasus the center 
from which our reflections emerge, our point of reference is the millenar-
ian civilizations of the Americas at the moment they were interfered with 
and described and controlled by the Spaniards. And we keep Islam (e.g., the 
Moors) in consideration, since it also has been a point of differential refer-
ence for the European humanist to create the notion of Man and Human-
ity. Man and Human are European differential concepts on which the racial 
matrix was construed. We do not trace here the history of losing equality 
since the origin of the world (created by God or emerging from the Big Bang) 
but examine how, when, why, and which population of the planet was clas-
sified and ranked as Human. And above all, who did it and who has the 
legitimacy to classify and speak for all human beings. The classification and 
ranking was not a “representation” of an already existing world already clas-
sified and ranked. Someone invented and enacted the classification. Who did 
it and how was it legitimized? We also argue that the concept of Man and 
Human went hand in hand with the emergence of the concept of Rights. In 
other words, the idea of Human and the idea of Rights both separately and in 
conjunction have been invented by humanists of the European Renaissance, 
responding, on the one hand, to the internal history of Western Christianity 
in what would become Europe in their long-lasting conflicts with Islam and, 
on the other hand, to an external history of Christianity, indeed a beginning 
of a historical process with no precedent: the emergence of the New World 
and new people that forced Renaissance humanists to review their epistemic 
premises and forced Indigenous intellectuals in Anahuac and Tawantinsuyu, 
as well as leaders and thinkers of enslaved Africans in the New World to 
make sense of a history of which they were the real origin: cut off from Afri-
can histories, enslaved Africans had to start anew in the New World. This is 
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the initial moment in which massive number of people began to loose their 
equality, their humanness, and their rights.
 It shall be repeated, until it is naturalized, that concepts such as Man 
and Humanity were inventions of European humanists of the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries, an invention that served them well for several purposes. 
Man and Human are not categories of thought ontologically embedded in 
entities that have been conceptualized as Man and Human. Both concepts 
are relational, and the relations in question are based on racial hierarchies. 
And we know that racial hierarchies are not embedded in people or regions 
but are an invention of imperial knowledge. Consequently, the universal-
ity of both concepts is a pretense and a mirage of the locus of enunciation 
that asserts the universality of its enunciation; it is an imperial invention 
that hides its foundation in a relational ontology (racism) and claims that is 
founded in an essential ontology (humanitas). Because the enunciation was 
not taken into account, scholars, activists, and politicians have written hun-
dreds of pages about the quarrel of the universal and the particular in the 
enunciated. A mute point indeed when we shift the geography of reasoning 
and decolonize Western epistemology. Although the planet was populated by 
living organisms standing in two extremities, using their hands freely, their 
brain to communicate and organize in communities and build sophisticated 
civilizations, all over the planet, there was nothing “essentially human” in the 
sense that Renaissance philosophers, following on Greek legacies, selected 
a portion of that population and labeled them “animal rationals,” that is, 
“human.” The inhabitants of Anáhuac and Tawantinsuyu did not know that 
they were being observed and ranked in a classificatory order of which they 
were not aware and not invited to discuss.
 First, then, European humanists introduced the concept of Man to detach 
themselves (humanists) from the control of the Church and the principles of 
divine law. For the Church, being Christian counted more than belonging 
to the class of Man. Humanists began to twist that belief toward a secu-
lar idea of humanity. Second, by inventing the idea of Man, the humanists 
distinguished themselves from coexisting communities they perceived as a 
threat, challenge, or enemies: Saracens or Easterners and pagans or rustic 
religions served to establish the difference with Man. These two terms are 
already revealing: He, the humanist (because it was always a He), who placed 
himself in relation to the Saracens or Easterner placed himself as Westerner. 
Westerner then defined the locus of enunciation (not as geohistorically and 
geopolitically located but as the enunciation of the universal). Easterners 
became instead the enunciated, to whom the enunciation was denied. West-
erners were able to secure the control knowledge and legitimize their uni-
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versal authority to name without being named in return. He (the humanist) 
who defined the pagans assumed that his own religion (Christianity, in this 
case) was the point of reference and the most sophisticated religion in rela-
tion to more rustic religions, the pagans. He (the humanist) who named and 
described the heathen anchored his locus of enunciation in Christianity and 
Judaism, since “heathen” was used to refer and describe all those who were 
neither Christian nor Jews. Here, we enter the terrain in which learning to 
unlearn in order to relearn is of the essence.
 We have no doubt that the ones who were labeled as such by Christians 
and humanists of the Renaissance did not see themselves as pagans, hea-
thens, and Saracens. They were classified, certainly, but being classified by 
others does not mean that one is what the classifier wants that person to be. 
First of all, the Arab-speaking population in the East of Jerusalem and in the 
South of the Mediterranean, on the one hand, and the Latin- and vernacular-
speaking population in the West of Jerusalem and North of the Mediterra-
nean did not share the same history, memories, subjectivities, experiences. 
What we have here, in Western classification, is just half of the story—the 
regional and provincial history told by Western Christians and Renaissance 
humanists. However, the Latin and Western vernacular categories have been 
naturalized in a one-to-one correspondence with the designated entity. I 
(Walter) am writing this paragraph inhabiting the Latin and Western ver-
nacular cosmology (which is not Madina’s dwelling), not in its smooth and 
uninterrupted history form Athens and Rome, but in its discontinuity: the 
discontinuity of Western classical tradition disrupted by the emergence 
of the New World in the consciousness of Western Europeans. Christians 
repeated with the population of the New World what they had been practic-
ing with their undesirable neighbors and faraway coexisting populations (the 
Far East, where Marco Polo went): They named as Indians all the inhabitants 
of the New World and Black people in Africa and enslaved Africans in the 
New World.
 Being and feeling oneself Western Christian meant also having “domi-
nium” over the enunciation (and thus having the right to classify) and 
assuming that whatever was named and conceived according to Greco-Latin 
principles and categories of knowledge corresponded to how the world really 
was. Here, we encounter the regional enunciation that not only pretends to 
have captured the Universal but indeed invented it. For, the Universal did 
not preoccupy most of the civilization of the planet before the expansion of 
Western theology and secular epistemology. The problem is that the force 
of this belief is with us today, thus, another instance in which learning to 
unlearn is of the essence. In sixteenth century historiographical treatises, it 
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is often stated that history is made of word and things, an assumption that 
was analyzed by Michel Foucault. Humanists felt authorized to speak for 
Man and the Human. The warranty of such belief was religious and episte-
mological—religious, because it was stated in biblical narratives (which was 
the dictation of God), and epistemological, because Saint Thomas Aquinas 
(1224–1275), who brought together Greek philosophy and biblical narra-
tives, framed religious belief in logico-philosophical arguments. Needless 
to say, while Western Christians in the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries 
were demonizing differences that allowed them to create their own identity 
as Western Christians, Muslims from Africa to Central Asia were living their 
lives and doing their deeds in the same way as communities and societies in 
China and India.
 It was not quite the same, however, for the communities and societies 
of Anahuac and Tawantinsuyu. Since the first half of the sixteenth century, 
they could no longer continue living their lives as they were before that time. 
Kingdoms of Africa that were broken by the kidnapping and enslavement of 
their young population and Black communities in America had to rebuild, 
overcoming the differences of their original Kingdom. It was force and vio-
lence on the part of Western Christians and merchants (Portugal, Spain, 
Holland, France, England), but it was mainly the growing power of their own 
locus of enunciation that allowed themselves to assume that there was just 
one God and that they were His representatives on earth. At the top of the 
human species (humanitas) were Western Christians and placed below the 
rest: Saracens, Heathens, Pagans, Indians, and Blacks. The assumption here is 
the belief in the absolute possession and control of knowledge and the denial 
of it to all the people classified outside and below.
 Thus, when the idea and the category of Man came into the picture, it 
came with a privilege: the privilege of being under the framework already 
created by Western Christians. If being Christian was, for Christians them-
selves, the ultimate point of reference of civility and the correct life, then 
being Man was the ultimate point of reference of beauty, morality, and 
knowledge for the humanists. Man and Humanities updated the Roman idea 
of humanitas and the sphere of learning. Humanitas and Civitas (close to 
the modern idea of citizens) presupposed an educated person. During the 
European Renaissance, Man was conceived at the intersection of his body 
and his mind, his body proportion and his intellect. Leonardo da Vinci’s Vit-
ruvian Man translated into visual language what humanists were portraying 
in words (Leonardo da Vinci 2009) Man and humanitas became the frame 
of reference allowing the enunciator inscribed in Greco-Latin genealogy of 
thought to decide who belonged (not just to Christianity) but to Humanity. 
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During the European Renaissance He who spoke for the Human was the 
humanist.
ii. he Who Spoke for the human Spoke also for rights
In the European Renaissance, the question of “rights” was indistinguishable 
from he question of “law”: divine and natural law. Jus gentium served well 
both to talk about the “rights of the nation” and “international law.” However, 
the question of “rights” became one of the key concepts of international law 
in the construction of the modern/colonial world and the formation of the 
colonial matrix of power. The works of Castilian Dominican Francisco de 
Vitoria (in the mid-sixteenth century) and Dutch jurist Hugo Grotious, are 
truly founders of a new type of discourse that German political and legal phi-
losopher Carl Schmitt described as Jus Publicum Europaeum ([1952] 2003).
 The distinction between divine and natural law came from the Roman 
Empire and the influential works of Cicero. The question of “rights” is prop-
erly a question of the modern/colonial world and not of ancient Rome and, 
even less, ancient Greece. The question of “rights” was inaugurated by and 
of the historical foundation of modern colonialism—the initial moment of 
imperial/colonial expansion of the Western world and the “spread” of the 
ideal of being Christian, the ideal Man and, by the eighteenth century, the 
ideas of citizen and democracy. From the sixteenth century to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, He who speaks for the Human is an actor 
embodying the Western ideal of being Christian, being Man, and being 
Human. In other words, the “human” in Human Rights is a racial (that is, 
hierarchical in relation to the standard model of Man and Humanity) inven-
tion of Western imperial knowledge rather than the name of an existing 
entity to which everyone has access, too. Being an invention of Western 
knowledge means that the idea of Man and Human is controlled by certain 
categories of thoughts entrenched in particular, regional history and experi-
ence—for a Jamaican woman like Sylvia Wynter, the idea and ideal of what 
does it mean to be Human certainly differs from the same question asked 
and responded to by Francesco Petrarch, for example.67
 It is precisely in this regard that “Human” is a Western differential (e.g., 
vis-à-vis lesser humans) and fictional (e.g., not based on a preexisting essence 
of humanity) concept based on Greek and Latin categories and translated 
into modern European vernacular languages (Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, 
German, French, and English) controls (e.g., owns) the concept of Human. 
It is not a concept based on Aymara or Mandarin categories of thought and 
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even less based on the “essence” of living organism standing on two legs. If 
you want to dispute it from the genealogy of thought of Arabic, Urdu, Rus-
sian, Aymara, Bambara, or any other language and experience embedded in 
non-Western history or indirectly related to Western categories of thought 
(and “indirection” here refers to imperial expansion and colonization), you 
would have two options: to bend and accept what is Human according to 
Western knowledge (grounded in Greek and Latin, i.e., not in Greek and 
Arabic); or you could prefer to delink, to engage in epistemic disobedience, 
denouncing the provincialism of the universal and engage in a collective, 
differential, planetary assumption that being Human is not being Vitruvian, 
Christian, or Kantian but being able first to dispute the imperial definition 
of humanity and second to engage in building communities and societies 
in which Human is not defined, rhetorically affirming that we are all equal, 
but Human is what comes out of building societies on principles that pre-
vent classification and ranking to justify domination and exploitation among 
people who are supposed to be equal by birth. If you decide for this second 
option, do not attempt to provide a new truth, a new definition of what it 
means to be Human that corrects the mistakes of previous definitions of the 
“human.” Since there is no such entity, the second option would be decolo-
nial, that is, it moves away (delinks) from the imperial consequences of a 
standard model for the human, humanity, and the related ideal of civiliza-
tion. If you choose this option, it does not mean that you accept that you are 
not human and you are also a barbarian. On the contrary, placing yourself 
in the space that imperial discourse gave to lesser humans, uncivilized and 
barbarians, you would argue for radical interventions from the perspective 
of those who have been made barbarians, abnormal and uncivilized. That is, 
you argue for justice and equality from the perspective and interests of those 
who lost their equality and have been subjected to injustices.
 “Rights,” then, emerged in the process of building what today is con-
ceived as the modern/colonial world; that is, “rights” is a concept responding 
to imperial necessity. I sketch three moments of the trajectory of “rights” and 
conclude by showing that “human rights” today continues to be an imperial, 
tool at the same time that it became a site to fight for injustices qualified 
as “violations of human rights.” In other words, while we should praise the 
appropriation of the declaration of human rights by actors and institutions 
who engaged in dangerous enterprise in the defense of human rights, we do 
not lose sight of their use to advance imperial agendas. “Humanitarian inter-
ventions,” which entered the vocabulary of international relations in the past 
decades, brings back to the present the generally forgotten history of human 
and rights (Hinkelammert 2004).
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II.1
In the first stage, the question of “rights” was treated as belonging to peo-
ple or nations (e.g., communities of birth, nation). Theological and legal 
theorists at the University of Salamanca, in the sixteenth century, began to 
address such questions, prompted by the “apparition” (pretty much like the 
apparition of Virgin Mary) on the intellectual horizon of Western Christians, 
of people who were not accounted for in biblical narratives. Led by Domini-
can Francisco de Vitoria, one of the main issues was to solve the problem of 
jus gentium, rights of people or of nations. The question of “natural, divine 
law and human law” were not new issues; both had a tradition in Christian 
theology and were laid out by Saint Thomas Aquinas. What is crucial here 
is not so much the “novelty” within the same classical European tradition 
(that is, the newness within a unilinear and universal idea of history) but 
the discontinuity—the moment in which the Western genealogy of thoughts 
that men of the European Renaissance were attempting to build on the lega-
cies of Greece and Rome, was dislocated by the emergence of people totally 
outside Greek-Roman (and Hebrew Jerusalem) legacies. Vitoria had to deal 
then with the authority of the Pope and the authority of the monarch. He 
questioned the authority of the Pope, who arrogated himself the power to 
appropriate and to “give” half of the New World to the Spaniards and half to 
the Portuguese and the emperor. A second issue Vitoria had to deal with was 
the relation between “belief ” and “right to property.” He argued that unbelief 
does not cancel natural law, and since ownership and dominion are based on 
natural law, the right to property is not invalidated by unbelief. Indians are 
not believers, but because of natural law, they have, like the Spaniards, prop-
erty rights. Vitoria’s openness and fairness missed a crucial point: He did 
not stop to ponder whether Indians care about rights and whether Indians’ 
relationship to land was a relation of property, like the Spaniards, and not 
something else. In other words, as a good humanist and theologian, Vitoria 
spoke for Humanity and told half of the story without realizing it, assuming, 
indeed, that he (and his colleagues) was dealing with the world as is and not 
as it was for him or them.
 The logic of Vitoria’s argument was flawless. The premises are suspect. 
Why would Vitoria assume that Aztecs and Incas (whom he referred to as 
“Indians”) and other communities in the New World would have the same 
“avarice” toward property as Spanish Christians? Why he did not stop to 
think for a minute that life and economy, among the inhabitants of the New 
World, was organized on different principles? He did not. And, therefore, the 
next step was to justify the rights of the Spaniards to dispose “Indians” (not 
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Aztecs or Incas) of the “property” that Indians did not have because they did 
not conceive their relation to land as “property.” Remember, “Indians” have 
property rights, and the question was how to find a way to legitimize Span-
iards’ appropriation of Indian properties having acknowledged that Indians 
had property rights. There were two positions among Spanish men of let-
ters about the “nature” (humanity) of the Indians. For the most conserva-
tive, Indians were irrational, dirty, immature, barbarians and so forth. For 
more progressive men of letters, like Dominicans Bartolomé de Las Casas 
and Francisco de Vitoria himself, Spaniards and “Indians” (and not for them 
Nahuatls-, Aymara-, Quechua-, Tojolabal-, speaking people) were rational 
in their own way. Both Spaniards and Indians were bound by a system of 
natural law; therefore, both Spaniards and Indians were subjected to jus gen-
tium (natural law of the people or nations). However, there was something 
“lacking” among the Indians that placed them in an inferior echelon vis-à-vis 
Spaniards.
 As far as he was Spaniard and not Aymara or Tojolabal, Vitoria managed 
to articulate the legal colonial difference, based on his control of knowledge 
(e.g., his assumptions on the principle of argumentations as well as the belief 
that whatever questions were relevant for the Spaniards were also relevant for 
Indians because his questions were universal).
 Siba N’Zatioula Grovogui explored some issues concerning the historical 
foundation of international law. His summary runs parallel to the analysis of 
the historical foundation of the colonial matrix of power, for international 
law is the instrument to ensure the control of authority in international 
relations.
I seek to demonstrate that the dependence of international politics on the 
European dominated political economy and its legal apparatus resulted in 
two of the most significant paradoxes of decolonization: The first is that 
only the rights sanctioned by the former colonialists were accorded to 
the colonized, regardless of the needs and demands of the latter  . . .  The 
second paradox is that the rules and procedures of decolonization were 
determined and controlled by the former colonial power to effect specific 
outcomes. This is a paradox because the rights to self-determination is 
generally understood to mean the absolute political authority to create 
rights and obligations for oneself  . . .  The rules and processes of decolo-
nization not only denied African communities the right to the protection 
of the law, they failed to recognize African’s need for such protection. (1995: 
96)
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 There is a straight line, to which we return in the next two sections, in 
the history interrelating the concept of people, men, citizens, human, and 
rights, from the colonial revolution of the sixteenth century to the decolonial 
revolutions of the second half of the twentieth century (starting with India 
in 1947). Although Grovogui starts his argument with Hugo Grotius (which 
is a common beginning for scholars of international law in the English- and 
French-speaking worlds), it is obvious for most scholars in the Spanish and 
Portuguese worlds68 that his two paradoxes are nothing else than two cases 
of the constitutive and complementary character of modernity/coloniality. 
What appears as paradox is, and has been, the node, the technological key 
of the simultaneity, always simultaneity, between the rhetoric of modernity 
announcing salvation, happiness, progress, development, and the like, and 
the necessary logic of coloniality, appropriation of natural resources, exploi-
tation of labor, legal control of undesirables, military enforcements of the 
law to ensure “salvation” through the imposition the interests and worldview 
inherent to capitalist economy.
II.2
The second moment has been self-fashioned and enacted between the Glo-
rious Revolution in England (and the Bill of Rights), at the end of the sev-
enteenth century, and American (Virginia Declaration of Rights, 1776; the 
English Bill of Rights, 1689), and the French Revolutions (The Rights of Man 
and of Citizen, 1789), at the end of the eighteenth century. The main differ-
ence between the centuries in which the Bill of Rights and The Rights of Man 
and of Citizens came to the foreground and the century of Vitoria (in Spain) 
and Grotius (in Holland), for whom jus gentium was integral to the historical 
foundation of international law, was that the pronunciation that the Bill of 
Rights and The Rights of Man and of Citizen were no longer intervening in 
an international arena but, instead, limited to national issues. It was indeed 
the period in which nation-states were being forged and the advent of the 
bourgeois ethno-class being legitimized. “Rights” were linked to the con-
struction of nation-states and the coming into being and stabilization of an 
ethno-class commonly known as the European bourgeoisie. Being Human 
meant to be rational, and rationality was limited to what philosophers and 
political theorists of the Enlightenment said it was.
 By the end of the seventeenth century, being Human became identi-
fied more with being secular bourgeois than with being Christian. That was 
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the Man of the “Right of Man.” However, being Christian did not vanish; 
it remained in the background. Exteriority was no longer a problem. The 
battle had been already won and the energy was concentrated on an idea 
of Humanity that was recast as The Rights of Man and of Citizen after the 
French Revolution. “Nations,” in the emerging nation-states displaced the 
idea of “nation” (gentium) in Vitoria and Grotius. A new figure of exteriority 
was necessary when the concept of “citizen” was introduced: The “foreigner” 
enriched the list of “exterior Human,” that is, of “defective Humans” next 
to pagan, Saracens, Blacks, Indians, women, and those with nonnormative 
sexual preferences. The Enlightenment idea and ideal of Man and Humanity 
was adopted and adapted in the colonies. The so-called American Revolu-
tion was in the hands of White men of British descent. They did not have yet 
the problem of the “foreigner” as in Europe, but the Founding Fathers had 
the problem of Indian and Black populations, which of course Europe did 
not have. In other words, Man and Human in the U.S. were defined at the 
crossroad of British and European philosophy and in contradistinction with 
Indians and Blacks surrounding the Founding Fathers.
 In South America (Spanish and Portuguese colonies and ex-colonies), 
the situation was similar to that of the U.S. but with significant differences. 
The similarity was that independence was in the hands of White men of 
European descent (Spain and Portugal). Leaders of independence move-
ments and nation-state builders of continental South America and the Ibero-
Caribbean, too, conceived Man and Humanity in the European tradition 
and in contradistinction with Indians (mainly continental Spanish America) 
and Blacks (mainly Brazil and the Caribbean). However, in the dominant 
discourse of northern European ranking of Man and Human, Spain and Por-
tugal, and their nationals, were already considered second-class Europeans. 
Immanuel Kant and George W. F. Hegel canonized this view. In short, by the 
eighteenth century, who spoke for the Human were secular philosophers and 
political theorists in the heart of Europe (France, Germany, and England). 
That vision was adopted by creoles of European descent in the U.S., South 
America, and the Caribbean. And, that vision became constitutive also of 
the model of Man and Humanity when England and France began their 
expansion to Asia and Africa. “The civilizing mission” was nothing else but 
(a) imposing a model of Man and Humanity and (b) assuming (after Kant’s 
and Hegel’s canonization) that not only were non-Christian religions inferior 
but people of color who spoke languages not derived from Greek and Latin 
were less Human. The Roman legacy of humanitas and civitas were rehearsed 
when European men and citizens appointed themselves to carry civilization 
to the anthropos of the planet.69
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II.3
This view did not go away with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
in 1948. All the talks, problems, and dramas of immigration in the European 
Union and the U.S. cannot be properly understood, and obviously addressed, 
without asking who speaks for the Human in the modern/colonial world and 
cast immigrants in different scales of the subhuman. Old racial categories are 
being recast when it is no longer the colonist who encounters the anthropos, 
but the anthropos that is knocking at the door of the colonist in his imperial 
home.
 “Human” in the Universal Declaration was redefined according to a 
changing world order and the change of hands in imperial leadership, from 
England to the U.S. Subsuming the nation-state stage of the Bills of Rights 
and the Rights of Man and Citizen, the Universal Declaration returns to the 
arena of interstate relations and international law set up by Vitoria and Gro-
tius. In fact, for Grotius, distinct from Vitoria, the problem of international 
law was twofold: On the one hand, international law meant inter-Europe and 
Dutch colonies in the East. He was living and writing in the middle of the 
Thirty Years Religious War. And, at the same time, he was sitting, literally, 
on Holland’s imperial reach in its short-lasting but quite influential imperial 
moment. Grotius and Descartes, indeed, were in Amsterdam when Hol-
land was gaining its imperial momentum. Grotious’ Mare Liberum could 
have been named “universal declaration of rights to the sea in international 
law.” Vitoria did not label the issue he was discussing “universal declara-
tion of rights and international law,” but that is what he was doing: defining 
and profiling the Human by tracing the colonial difference, epistemic and 
ontological.
 After the interregnum of nation-state building in Europe and nation-
state imperial expansion (mainly England and France), the Declaration was 
forged with three horizons in mind, under the leadership of the U.S.: (a) the 
rebuilding of Europe after the Holocaust and World War II; (b) the “Com-
munist menace,” which were added to the old list of pagans, Saracens, Indi-
ans, Blacks, and now Communists; and (c) the uprising in the Third World, 
of which the independence of India was already a strong sign of alert. The 
bombing of Hiroshima was seldom mentioned next to the Holocaust and 
Stalin’s crimes against humanity, because the bombing was the event that 
brought “peace” and the end of World War II. The Ougtherson Commision 
Study estimated that 45,000 people out of a population of 255,000 were killed 
the first day; 19,000 died from radiation poisoning during the next fourth 
months. It is estimated that several hundred survivors will die of cancer and 
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leukemia in the years to come. As for the Third World, the U.S. politics of 
foreign relations strongly supported self-determination of colonial locales. 
The motifs were not so much the right to self-determination but, rather, the 
U.S. global designs. Very much like the “independence” of South Americans 
from Spain and Portugal— to build a nation-state that under the fiction of 
sovereignty depended on France for knowledge, culture, and politics and on 
England for the economy—decolonized countries in Asia and Africa sooner 
or later moved under the arm of Uncle Sam.
 The idea of “human” in the Universal Declaration was taken for granted: 
It had been already profiled in the Renaissance and rehearsed in the Enlight-
enment. What else could be said about what being “human” means? How-
ever, a geopolitical remapping took place, with the same hidden assumptions 
under which Renaissance humanists were operating. Parallel to the Universal 
Declaration, a reclassification of the planet was taking place: First, Second, 
and Third Worlds. By the 1970s, Indigenous people from all the Americas, 
New Zealand, and Australia made themselves heard: Where is our face, they 
asked, in this world order? A new category was invented to “please them”: the 
Fourth World. Do you think indigenous people of the planet were happy to 
be a fourth-class global citizen? And, who is talking and celebrating, today, 
global citizenship? Frequent travelers, has been one answer.
 “First World” looked like an objective category, the naming of an existing 
entity. What was hidden (as stated in the Introduction, Section II) was that 
the classification was made from the perspective of the First and not from 
the Second, Third, or Fourth World. The First World controlled the enuncia-
tion and therefore knowledge. It was and continues to be both the enunciator 
and a member of the classified world. Five hundred years separated politi-
cal scientists and economists after World War II from Renaissance human-
ists. The logic, however, was exactly the same. Only the content changed. 
No more pagans, heathens, or Saracens, but Communists, underdeveloped, 
and—still!—Indians.
 The First World was, and continues to be, the place where humanity par 
excellence dwells. That is why immigration is so disturbing. The rest was 
inhabited by different kinds of anthropos. Liberalism and Christianity set the 
ideological stage against Communism. Humanity par excellence was sur-
rounded by the dangerous Second World, Communism, in the Soviet Union, 
in its colonies at the border of Europe (the Caucasus, Belarus, and Ukraine), 
in Central Europe and the Balkans. And, then, there was the Third World, 
further away from the model of humanity par excellence. But, since the Dec-
laration of Human Rights was universal, the entire population of the planet 
has the rights to have rights. This was the First World’s gift to the Second and 
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Third Worlds. But, it was a gift similar to stating that all men and women are 
born equal. People of the Second and Third Worlds were told that they have 
the right to have rights. However, they were also told that they were in the 
Second and Third World, that the latter were underdeveloped and the for-
mer were under a totalitarian regime—and that it was mainly in the land of 
the anthropos where it was expected human rights were to be violated. In the 
First World, there was a struggle among countries that would soon be part of 
the First World, countries that divided among themselves the entire African 
continent. Violation of human rights was not a question for Africans; after 
all, they clearly where not considered to be part of Humanity. It was in the 
Holocaust that, as Aimé Césaire remarked in 1955, the White man applied 
against White people the techniques of extermination that Europe learned 
and practiced through its colonial experience against people of color (that 
is, not quite human). Thus, at this moment and in this occasion, the ques-
tion of Humanity was strictly entrenched in the decision to formulate the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Previous genocides in the name of 
Christianization and the Civilizing Mission did not move the White Man to 
think about Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
 In other words, the international order was mapped no longer in terms 
of jus gentium and international law but of human rights. Until 1989, one of 
the main functions of Human Rights was to watch closely their violations 
in Communist countries and countries of the Third World not aligned with 
the U.S. Human Rights. Violators are to be found, in general, in the non-
European world (Second or Third World). That is, they are at the fringe of 
Humanity and violate the rights of people who are considered human for a 
while to chastise the non-European violator (generally State officers). How-
ever, human rights violators in the Third World (like corporations) are not 
considered to be violators of human rights but agents of progress and devel-
opment. At that moment, the victims who protest against the exploitation of 
labor and contamination of nature are considered “rebels,” that is, less than 
human, and they lose their rights to the corporations. 
 The violators or perpetrators of human rights were denounced, accused, 
and if possible penalized. The saviors, in the First World, defended the cause 
of democracy. It was mainly with Guantánamo and Abu-Grahib that the 
First World was caught as violator and perpetrator and no longer as—just—
a savior. The difference with the Second and Third World was that the vio-
lation did not take place in the First World but in Third World territory. 
Humanity was not, it is not, a transcendental and neutral essence that anyone 
can appropriate and describe: Humanity has been created on philosophical 
and anthropological categories of Western thought and based on epistemic 
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and ontological colonial differences. If someone else wants to use Human 
rights, that person has to specify what kind of Human he or she is. For exam-
ple, “Indigenous rights” are predicated on the assumption of the difference: 
“Universal (or White Euro-American) Rights.” However, by the sheer fact 
of naming a set of rights–say, “Indigenous rights”—it becomes clear that it 
cannot be universal rights and that what passes as universal is indeed “Euro-
American White rights.” That is, there are two “species” of the Human, by 
convention, which is spoken by everybody who wants to speak and locate 
her- or himself in a specific community of rights. La Via Campesina put on 
the table a ground-breaking concept of “right”: Food and water are basic 
Human Rights. The new Constitution of Bolivia and Ecuador made similar 
claims—a conquest of Indigenous nations for whom water, nature, and food 
were never commodities but an integral part of living and being alive.70 In 
that statement, the entire commercialization of food and water, the economic 
corporations—Western and transnationals—are called into question as basic 
violators of Human Rights that Human Rights organizations are not paying 
attention to: Human Rights has been restricted to politics and law not to 
the corporations that play the capitalist game of competition and economic 
gains. In a nutshell, since capitalist economy is based on private property 
and justified by expansion, growth, and development, anything that gets on 
the way (like the self-determination of farmers and peasants of the world), 
shall be eliminated. Thus, corporations incur in double violation of Human 
Rights: the commodification of life by converting food into a commodity 
(erasing the fact that food is a Human Right) and eliminating the agencies 
that act on the conviction and the principles that food and water are Human 
Rights.
 When the Cold War ended, the defense of human rights took a new 
impulse and it was associated with the second wave of development, which 
soon turned out to be a project (development) that to be advanced must 
violate human rights. The first wave took place between 1950 and 1970, and 
the labels were “development and modernization of underdeveloped coun-
tries.” The International Monetary Fund and World Bank were the two main 
institutions in charge of advancing the project. After the fall of the Soviet 
Union, development came back under the label of “globalization and market 
democracy.”
 Human Rights have been recast after the fall of the Soviet Union with 
one of its consequences: the Washington Consensus and the neoliberal doc-
trine. This scenario, that dominated the 1990s, was extended to deal with the 
consequences of 9/11’s aftermath. The question of Islam and Human Rights 
then became central. Basically, the Washington Consensus—a doctrine of 
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about ten points advanced by John Williamson in 1989 (Washington Con-
sensus 2003)—was the second wave of “development and modernization” 
launched in the 1950s and ending around 1970. In the interregnum, West-
ern rhetoric turned to “modernity” and “globalization,” and in the 1990s, 
modernity and globalization were subsumed under the Washington Con-
sensus. What does all of this have to do with Human and Rights? A lot, 
indeed.
 It has been documented by many that the Washington Consensus and 
the neoliberal doctrine were a road to global disasters. One well-informed 
analysis is the classic book by Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discon-
tent (2002). Parallel to the implementation of the Washington Consensus, 
a significant expansion of Non-Governmental Organizations took place. 
Although civil society organizations to help the needy can be dated back to 
the mid-nineteenth century, it was officially established as a Non-Govern-
mental Organization in 1945 within the charter of United Nations. As far as 
the growing influence of neoliberal doctrine increased, since Ronald Reagan 
and Margaret Thatcher, so increased its devastating consequences. NGOs 
proliferated. The Washington Consensus operated, at the economic level, 
in the same frame of mind that missionaries operated at the religious level 
in the sixteenth century. Conquering the soul of the Indians by conversion 
is equivalent to conquering the soul and labor of underdeveloped countries 
and people. The differences are also important: Conversion did not imply 
exploitation. Exploitation, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, was 
the job of merchants, plantation owners, encomenderos, and gold and silver 
mine owners. However, at that time, they were not attempting to impose 
their economic behavior but just taking advantage and accumulating wealth.
 Thus, parallel to the increase of poverty and widening of the line sepa-
rating the haves from the have-nots, violations of human rights proliferated 
under damaging conditions. Whether leaders of the Washington Consensus 
and NGO officers see the connection or not, the fact remains that NGOs 
have been working to take care of damages inflicted by neoliberalism and 
the Washington Consensus. Both the Washington Consensus and NGOs 
are Western creations under the global mask of the United Nations. The 
proliferation of nationally based NGOs still depends on the master plan. In 
the same vein, the Washington Consensus managed to find and found their 
branches in the underdeveloped world (i.e., Menem in Argentina, Gonzalo 
Sánchez de Lozada in Bolivia). Consequently, both the Washington Consen-
sus and NGOs were based in the ex–First World and their action directed 
mainly toward the ex–Second, Third, and Fourth Worlds. Or, if you wish, 
they were both institutions in the humanitas geared toward developing and 
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taking care of the anthropos. The consequences of the logic of coloniality 
(disastrous consequences of the Washington Consensus doctrine) were sold 
and disguised by updating the rhetoric of modernity (development, market, 
and democracy). The injuries were inflicted by the logic of coloniality to 
advance what the rhetoric of modernity promised; someone has to take care 
of the damage. And, the NGOs were there to help the anthropos.
 The situation reached a point in which the closed circuit of the rheto-
ric of modernity, the apparent collateral damages that indeed are the actual 
consequences of the logic of coloniality, prompted the emergence of a global 
political society taking destiny in their own hands. In other words, while 
NGOs operate in the sphere of civil society, repairing the damages of neolib-
eral capitalism, the political society came into being with a different horizon 
in mind: decoloniality. While NGOs work to help the anthropos, the political 
society is the anthropos in arms and thoughts. This very chapter is located 
in the sphere of the anthropos and of the political society. The concepts of 
Human, of Rights, of First and Third World, of developed and underdevel-
oped countries are called into question. Indeed, what are being called into 
question are not exactly these categories but the epistemic locus of enuncia-
tion that created them as if they were universal and good for all. What is 
being called into question is the saying behind the said. That is, it is a call 
and a process toward decolonization of knowledge and being, knowledge 
and being entrapped by the imperial and modern idea of Man, Human, and 
Humanities. If, then, the Humanities (a field of knowledge since the Renais-
sance) is in part responsible for the creation and maintenance of the concept 
of Human, the first step is to engage in decolonial Humanities. Or if you 
wish, decolonizing the Humanities is tantamount to engaging in practicing 
decolonial humanities (Transcultural Humanities 2006).
iii. Decolonial humanities and the Question of rights
Contrary to the global order during the European Renaissance and Enlight-
enment, the relative success of Western empires to manage discontent today 
rests in the mainstream media that transforms other ways of thinking into 
pieces of information. The political society is marching next—and some-
times in confrontation—to the civil society and NGOs. Muslim and Aymara 
intellectuals are jumping on the debate about human, humanity, and rights. 
And scholars in the humanities and Chinese history are putting in con-
versation Confucianism and Human Rights. Afro-Caribbean philosophers 
are taking front stage. Global projects like La via campesina are following 
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Monsanto’s step closer and proposing alternatives for the enhancement and 
preservation of life rather than initiatives for growth and accumulation and 
the fertilization of death.
 What this means is that Human and Rights are no longer trusted to West-
ern initiatives and its rhetoric of salvation. Decolonizing human rights means 
to take them out of imperial hands and institutions and place them in a global 
community of interests, not just the interest of the leading developed coun-
tries. Human and Rights have been placed in a different universe of discourse, 
that of the political society and decolonization. And, what all of this amounts 
to, with pros and cons that should be analyzed in each case, is that everyone 
is ready to speak for the Human and for Rights. The premise is to change the 
terms and not just the content of the conversation. To provide a “new” (and 
satisfy modernity’s desire newness) will be more akin to the task of NGOs 
than to decolonial projects. When, for example, Jamaican intellectual and 
activist Sylvia Wynter outlined the horizon “after man, toward the human,” 
statement in which the story I told previously is implied, we are already in a 
change of terrain in our conversation about “what does it mean to be Human” 
(Wynter’s question). Once we asked this question, the one about the rights 
will follow: What kind of social, legal, and economic organization is required 
to secure the “rights” of human beings? Who in that society are the viola-
tors? Is it possible to think of social organizations in which “human rights” is 
not necessary because there is no violator? What, if not a society organized 
on domination and exploitation to produce more and to succeed, can be the 
“perpetrator” of rights violations and creator of a concept of Human that 
legitimizes him or her as “savior” when indeed it is a “perpetrator”?
 The idea of human, humanity, and rights became a contested arena. The 
“victims” are not always waiting for the “savior,” and the “savior” willingly 
may or not may work to the benefit of the “perpetrator.” Taking their desti-
nies in their own hands, political society’s diversity of projects involve actors 
whose experiences and subjectivities do not match the expectations of NGOs 
or peripheral European economic investments. Some actors place themselves 
in the wide array of imperial interests, now widespread.
 On another level, that of the nation-states (instead of the sphere of the 
civil and political society), current conflicts between the U.S. and the Euro-
pean Union, on the one hand, and Russia, China, Iran, India, and Brazil, on 
the other, are conflicts between two types of nation-states: Western nation-
states embedded in imperial history congruent with capitalist economy 
and nation-states encountering capitalism. A polycentric capitalist world is 
emerging. The principles of a capitalist economy are the same, but national 
histories, sensibilities, desires, tensions, and anger with Western imperial 
172  •  pA RT  I I I ,  c h A p T E R  5
arrogance makes the same economic logic be put at the services of particular 
interests, national or regional. Responses are not always manifested in diplo-
matic wars among country leaders visiting each other and in many summits 
among the G7 or G8 or at the United Nations Security Council. Violence, 
as Frantz Fanon convincingly argued, is a necessary response to violence. 
The question of human rights emerges here as a place in which the so-called 
democratic and industrialized states use the rhetoric of human rights vio-
lations to confront their economic rivals. Western expansion and capital-
ist economy is a terrain of “capitalist contention” today. In that contention, 
a polycentric capitalist world order goes hand in hand with a polycentric 
discourse on Human and Rights in non-Western histories and sensibilities 
that cut across Western history of the idea of Human and Rights from the 
European Renaissance to World War II. The distinction made previously 
between civil society and NGOs, on the one hand, and political society, on 
the other hand, is also valid for the following analysis. China has not only 
built a powerful economy; it is building a powerful discourse unveiling the 
double standards of Western discourse on human rights.
 The political society has been and continues to be formed by dissent-
ers and activists whose goal is not to remedy the damages of the capitalist 
economy in order to make its functioning smoother but to delink from that 
system of belief and work toward a society built not on principles of accumu-
lation and the belief that the more produced, the better it is for “the people.” 
There already is enough evidence sustaining and justifying the directions 
(decolonial, I would say) of the political society.
 Let us make clear that the political society cannot be subsumed under 
decolonial processes. Many sectors and projects advanced in the political 
society have visions and horizons that are not decolonial: theology of libera-
tion, Marxism, or progressive liberalism. Having said that, it is imperative 
to remember that the decolonial option (or decolonial options, if you prefer 
the plural) is not the new and only game in town. It is called “option” pre-
cisely because it is an option among others. The purpose of decolonial think-
ing is not to debunk concurrent projects but to capture more converts and 
become the one and only. Pluriversality, and not universality, is the horizon 
of decolonial thinking. Under decolonial processes projects are under way, 
are emerging and proliferating all over the world and delinking from the 
major spheres of dissension in the West (liberation theology, progressive 
and critical liberalism, Marxism; white feminism, and white queer activists). 
Decolonial projects and the political society join forces when the horizon 
and the vision are guided by the struggle for liberation from Western control 
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of the economy (control of labor and natural resources), authority, knowl-
edge, subjectivity, gender, and sexuality.
 Decolonial humanities (or the decolonial option within the humanities) 
is coming into sight as a consequence and out of the demands of the deco-
lonial political society).71 Decolonial Humanities assumes, in the first place, 
that the humanities has been and continues to be a fundamental dimension 
of Western scholarship. Second, it is assumed that the Humanities (as a set 
of disciplinary formations) are bound to the Renaissance concept of Human 
and the Enlightenment concept of Reason. In Western genealogy of thought, 
the Humanities have a double face: On the one hand, under the name of 
Humanities, art, literature, philosophy, and to certain degree the social sci-
ences flourished in the West and enchanted the non-Western world. On the 
other hand, the Humanities were the epistemic site in which it was possible, 
for social actors, to speak for the human. The humanities naturalized, in the 
modern/colonial world, the distinction has been brilliantly summarized and 
argued by Japanese scholar Nishitani Osami (2006), the long-lasting distinc-
tion, since the sixteenth century, between humanitas and anthropos.
 Osami’s argument can be recast (I hope without causing violence to it) 
in the language and the purposes of decolonial humanities. The decolonial 
humanities project is not to take on a new definition of the Human, a defi-
nition that includes (inclusion is off decolonial discourse) everybody and 
presents decolonial thinking as the point of arrival. Decolonial thinking, in 
this sense, is naturally non-Hegelian. What the decolonial option proposes, 
and Osami’s article clearly illustrates, is that (a) the concepts of Man, Human, 
and Humanity are inventions of Western scholarship since the Renaissance; 
(b) these concepts have links to the concept of Rights, which is also a Euro-
pean Renaissance invention in its colonial expansion (e.g., its darker side); 
(c) in a world order of polycentric capitalist economies, the concepts of 
Man, Human, and Humanity became also a polycentric dispute at the level 
of states (Jordan, Iran, France) and international institutions that followed 
up after Mohammad Khatami, former president of Iran, who launched the 
project Dialogue among Civilizations to counter Samuel Huntington’s Clash 
of Civilizations (Afrasiabi 2006). UNESCO, in 2005, formed a truly inter-
national committee, the Alliance of Civilizations (Alliance of Civilizations 
2009), whose main charge has been to work toward peace. UNESCO’s proj-
ect is not the only one. Prince Hassan of Jordan has been leading a simi-
lar project under the name of Dialogue of Civilizations, which follows after 
Khatami’s pronunciation. In the Middle East, Prince Hassan is concerned 
mainly with dialogue between Muslims, Jews, and Christians All these proj-
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ects are, I repeat, unfolding at the level of states and institutions of interna-
tional scope (Dialogue with the Islamic World 2009).
 Decolonial projects are closer to grassroots movements than to state and 
institutions in which, directly or indirectly, the question of Human, Human-
ity, and Rights is being redressed—which of course does not mean that col-
laboration between decolonial and state institutional are not possible. It 
means only that these two kinds of projects operate at different levels: one 
at the level of state-related institutions and the civil society; the other in the 
sphere of the political society, where new institutions shall be created.
 In decolonial thinking, peace, a peaceful world, a peaceful society require 
two main conditions:
a.  To delink from capitalist economy, organized societies, nationally and 
internationally.
b.  To accept, even if for the ruling minority it will be a hard act to fol-
low, that indeed the vast majority of marginalized human beings are 
human as well as the privileged economic and political elites, nation-
ally and internationally.
 If these two conditions are fulfilled, no one in particular will speak for 
the Human because the Human will just be taken for granted. And, in such 
societies, there would be no need for Rights, because there will be no perpe-
trators violating Human Rights and Life Rights, where the victim is directly 
the planet and indirectly a limited species of the living that has been cast as 
Humanity. The ideas of man and humanity, as articulated in Western dis-
course since the sixteenth century, from Francisco de Vitoria to John Locke 
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, went hand in hand with Fran-
cis Bacon’s conceptualization of Nature as something that has to be con-
trolled and dominated by Man.
 In sum, decolonial thinking is not arrogating on itself the legitimacy of 
talking for the Human, as the last word, but proposing that there is no need 
for some specific one to talk about the Human, because Human is what we 
are talking about. However, what lingers upon us are five hundred years of 
epistemic and ontological racism constructed by imperial discourses and 
engrained in the last five hundred years of planetary history (not global, 
because global reproduces the unidimensional view of history).
i.
In Chapter 3, it was noted that nation building in Central Asia and the Cau-
casus posses a particular problem of citizenship:
The inhabitants of Central Asia or the Caucasus, who are so much hated 
by xenophobic Russians and constitute a larger part of the labor migration 
today, go mainly to Russia and not to the West (which is possible only 
for the chosen few) looking for jobs and better life, because in the mod-
ern global configuration of power, entering the world economic system as 
labor force is still impossible. These people can get to Europe or the U.S. 
through human trafficking or as organ donors, because only for these kinds 
of activities have the borders become more permeable today if one is an 
ex-Soviet colonial other. (Chapter 3, section V)
To further explore the relevance of the trickster, it would be useful to revisit 
the concept of citizenship in a decolonial frame and in Western political 
culture. In this chapter, we expand on several issues touched upon in the 
previous one.
 When the idea of “citizenship” came into view—and was linked to 
the materialization and formation of the nation-state in secular northern 
c h A p T E R  6
Thinking Decolonially
Citizenship, Knowledge, and the Limits of Humanity
175
176  •  pA RT  I I I ,  c h A p T E R  6
Europe—it enforced the formation of communities of birth instead of com-
munities of faith. But, at that time, the imperial and colonial differences were 
already in place, and both were recast in the new face of Western empires. 
The figure of the “citizen” presupposed an idea of the “human” that had 
already been formed during the Renaissance and was one of the constitu-
tive elements of the colonial matrix of power. Henceforth, there was a close 
link between the concept of Man (standing for human being) and the idea 
of Humanities as the major branch of higher learning in both European 
universities and their branches in the colonies (the universities of Mexico 
and Peru were founded in the 1550s, Harvard in 1636).72 If Man stood for 
human being (at the expense of women, non-Christians, people of color, 
and homosexuals), the Humanities as high branch of learning was modeled 
on the concept and assumptions of the humanity that, in turn, was modeled 
on the example of man. Our goal in this chapter, therefore, is to explore the 
hidden connections between the imaginary of citizenship, the coloniality of 
being, and the coloniality of knowledge. Control of knowledge (the coloni-
ality of knowledge) was absolutely necessary to build an imaginary where 
citizens were defined and noncitizens were cast as the difference (colonial-
ity of being). We describe the veiled connections as the logic of coloniality, 
and the surface that covers it, we describe as the rheto ric of modernity. The 
rhetoric of modernity is that of salvation, whereas the logic of coloniality is 
the logic of imperial oppression. The unfinished project of modernity car-
ries over its shoulders the unfinished project of coloniality. We conclude by 
suggesting the need to decolonize “knowledge” and “being,” advocating that 
the (decolonial) “humanities” has a fundamental role to play in this process. 
Truly, “global citizenship” implies overcoming the imperial and colonial dif-
ferences that have mapped and continue to map global racism and global 
patriarchy. Changing the law and public policies is not of much help in this 
process. What is needed is that those who change the law and public policy 
change themselves.
 The problem is how such changes may take place if we would like to 
avoid the missionary zeal for conversion; the liberal and neoliberal belief in 
the triumphal march of Western civilization and market democracy; and the 
moral imperatives and forced behavior imposed by socialism. As we do not 
believe in a new abstract universal that will be good for the entire world, the 
question is how people can change their belief that the world today is like it 
is said to be and that only through the “honest” projects of Christians, liber-
als, and Marxists/Socialists could it be better for all, and citizenship will be a 
blessing for all.
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 The changes we are thinking about are radical transformations in the 
naturalized assumptions of the world order. The naturalized assumptions 
in question are imperial/colonial (not universal), and they have shaped the 
world in which we live over the past five hundred years, when Christianity 
and capitalism came together and created the conditions for the self-fash-
ioned narrative of “modernity.” Hence, the transformations we are thinking 
about require an epistemic decolonial shift. Not a “new,” a “post,” or a “neo,” 
which are all changes within the same modern colonial epistemology, but 
a “decolonial” (and not either a “deconstruction”), which means a delink-
ing from the rules of the game (said many times) (e.g., the decolonization 
of the mind, in Ngugi Wa Th’iongo’s vocabulary) in which deconstruction 
itself and all the “posts-” for sure are caught. Delinking does not mean being 
“outside” of either modernity or the Christian, liberal, capitalist, and Marxist 
hegemony but to disengage from the naturalized assumptions that make of 
these four macro-narratives “une pensée unique,” to use Ignacio Ramonet’s 
expression.73 The decolonial shift begins by unveiling the imperial presup-
positions that maintain a universal idea of humanity and human being that 
serves as a model and point of arrival and by constantly underscoring the 
fact that oppressed and racialized subjects do not care and are not fighting 
for “human rights” (based on an imperial idea of humanity) but to regain the 
“human dignity” (based on a decolonial idea of humanity) that has and con-
tinues to be taken away from them by the imperial rhetoric of modernity 
(e.g., White, Eurocentered, heterosexual, and Christian/secular). The condi-
tions for citizenship are still tied down to a racialized hierarchy of human 
beings that depends on universal cate gories of thought created and enacted 
from the identitarian perspectives of European Christianity and by White 
men In the Afro-Caribbean intellectual tradition, the very concepts of the 
human and humanity are constantly under fire.74 Would indeed a Black per-
son agree with the idea that what “we” all have in common is our “human-
ity” and that we are “all equal” in being “different”? I would suspect for one 
would suspect that the formula would rather be of the type advanced by the 
Zapatistas: “[B]ecause we are all equal we have the right to be different.”75 
The universal idea of humanity is not the same from the perspective of Black 
history, Indian memories, or the memories of the population of Central Asia.
 The humanities, as a branch of knowledge in the history of the univer-
sity since the European Renaissance have always been complicitous with 
imperial/colonial designs celebrating a universal idea of the human model 
(see Chapter 7). The moment has arrived to engage (and to further the pro-
cess of learning to unlearn in order to relearn) the humanities in decolonial 
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projects in their ethical, political, and epistemic dimensions. To recast the 
re-inscription of human dignity as a decolonial project in the hands of the 
damnés rather than given to them through managerial designs of NGOs and 
Human Rights Watch, which seldom if ever are led by actors whose human 
dignity is at stake. Decolonial projects imply downsizing human rights to 
its real dimension: an ethical imperative internal to imperial abuses but not 
really a project that empowers racialized subjects and helps them to regain 
the human dignity that racism and imperial projects (from the right, the left, 
and the center) took away from them.
ii. The myth of Global Citizenship
Those of you who have the tendency to trace History to its initial moment 
and the origin of Humans on earth would find that people have always 
moved across lands and seas and across continents. However, people moving 
around the globe before the sixteenth century did not have a “global view” 
of the globe as we have today, thanks to the world map drawn by Gerar-
dus Mercator and Abraham Ortelius.76 Furthermore, there are no traces in 
the long and hazy past of wandering human beings (and wandering living 
organisms) in which they had to show passports at the frontiers or that there 
were clear, delineated frontiers. Frontiers that demand passports do not have 
the same long history of getting lost in the hazy times of the human spe-
cies. Citizens, foreigners, and passports are part of a short history of the 
same package that constructed an imperial idea of the “human” and traced 
the frontiers with “the less humans” and the “nonhumans.” The paradigm 
of the “human” defined by Christian men of letters during the Renaissance 
became the paradigm of the “citizen” defined by secular philosophers dur-
ing the European Enlightenment. “Citizens” is the frame that allowed for the 
definition of the “foreigner,” which was the translation, in secular terms, of 
Christianity’s “Pagans” and “Gentiles.” Members of the community of faith 
did not need passports or the administrative identity that was required of 
citizens (name, birthday, town of resi dence, and—as technology and urban-
ization developed—street name and number, driver’s license, and telephone 
number).
 If one is stubborn and persists in finding antecedents of citi zens as social 
entities or citizen as a concept, and in that task the origin of humanity proves 
to be a difficult point of reference, one could take a shortcut back to Roman 
history and the idea of civitas and most likely develop from there an argu-
ment showing how the idea of the city and its dwellers, the citizens, evolved. 
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And, most likely, a large percentage of historians looking at the history of 
humanity from that “uni versal” point of origin would jump from Roman 
civitas and the birth of citizenship to the post–French Revolution and find 
that the citizens are fully grown up and ready to go. The Kantian cosmo-
politan citi zen was ready to march all over the world—starting from France, 
England, and Germany (Kant’s paradigmatic example of civitas, reason, and 
sensibility) and move at his will (because the idea of the citizen was modeled 
first at the image of Man), through the globe.77
 But, let us try another route, neither that of the hazy past of humanity 
nor that of the partial and provincial Roman origins. Miguel León-Portilla, 
a well-known scholar of Anahuac (Eurocentered scholarship refers to pre-
Columbian Mexico instead of Anahuac) and the transformations of Aztec 
civilization during the Spanish colonial period, explored the meaning of the 
word “Toltecáyotl” and defined it as the consciousness of a cultural heritage.78 
He pointed out that, in ancient Náhuatl (the equivalent of ancient Greece), 
the word “tlapializtli” means “the action of preserving something” (León-
Portilla 2003: 17). It is not something in general that is being preserved but 
“what belongs to us” (León-Portilla 2003: 17). “Tlapializtli” is connected in 
Nahuatl vocabulary with “yuhcatiliztli,” which, according to León-Portilla, 
literally means “the action that drives us to live in a given way” (2003: 18). 
This is, understandably, the basic knowledge human beings have for building 
communities. Hegel then Heidegger, for instance, used the term “dwelling” 
to name a similar kind of experience. We can say now that “dwelling” means 
a certain way of living in the experience of Euro pean history, whereas “yuh-
catiliztli” means a certain way of living in the experience of the communities 
of Anahuac.79 More recently, Afro-Caribbean intellectuals have brought to 
light the sense of dwelling for African communities that descend from the 
experience of the massive slave trade by imperial Europe during the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries. An equivalent to Hegel’s and Heidegger’s 
dwelling is, at the same time, just the opposite in the hierarchy of the human 
in the modern colonial world. Thus, what is universal is the human drive 
to build communities grounded on memories and expe riences that consti-
tute the house, the dwelling place of different peo ple and not the way that 
that experience was defined on the bases of European imperial histories and 
memories (by which I mean, since the Renaissance, because before then the 
very idea of “European history” is problematic).
 Back to León-Portilla. A third concept is toltecáyotl or toltequidad (equiv-
alent to anglicidad or hispanidad; i.e., the word that names the identity of a 
given community, that defines a sense of belonging and a logic of exclusion). 
Now, toltécatl has been derived from the word “Tollan,” a word describing the 
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place where the Toltecas (a community from whence the Aztecs emerged) 
lived; “tollan,” in Nahuatl, could be translated as “city” in the Latin tradition. 
Thus, “toltécatl” came to refer to a certain type of dwellers in Tollan that, in 
translation again, would be the people of wisdom, artists, and intellectuals in 
modern terminology—briefly, the elite of Tollan. Consequently, “toltécayotl” 
was the expression describing a certain style of life of all those who lived in a 
Tollan, i.e., in a city. León-Portilla makes the educated guess that “toltecáyotl” 
describes a certain set of habits that, in the West, were described as civiliza-
tion. Now, if “Tollan” is equivalent to city and “toltecáyotl” to civilization, 
then all the inhabitants of a Tollan who follow the rules of toltecáyotl are citi-
zens (from civitas, in the West, from which “citizens” and “civilization” were 
derived). But alas, for Christians, Tollan was a place inhabited by barbarians 
and pagans; and when the very idea of citizen emerged in the West (in the 
eighteenth century), the memories of Tollan had already been significantly 
(if not totally) erased from Mexican indigenous memory. And, of course, 
there was no particular interest, on the part of Western scholars, to investi-
gate a history that could jeopardize their own roles and disciplinary ground. 
It is not by chance that a Mexican scholar, León-Portilla, revamped a history 
buried under the noise of five centuries of imperial/colonial “histories”: that 
is, not a history of Europe grounded in Greece, but histories Europeans wrote 
about a past that did not belong to them; a past to which they did not belong; 
a past that did not belong to the knowledge, memories, and being of the his-
torian telling the story.
 The logical conclusion is that looking for the ontology of Western and 
post-Enlightenment concept of the citizen will not do. It would be more 
advantageous to look for the conditions that, today, make the idea of global 
citizenship a myth and an illusion, an illu sion of the modern or postmod-
ern idea of globalization that even a Marxist like Masao Miyoshi described 
with certain enthusiasm in the early 1990s as a borderless world. Global 
citizenship for almost seven billion people, after five hundred years of mod-
ern/colonial world order, may be a little to much for a world controlled by 
perhaps 20 percent of the global population. The need to learn to unlearn 
becomes crucial in bringing the myth of global citizenship to common sense 
and learning to relearn a necessary decolonial vision of global futures.
 To start with, today, global citizens have to cross colonial and imperial 
differences; and those two frontiers, apparently invisible and most of the 
time unconscious, are very much ingrained (like a blue chip) in the brain of 
gatekeepers in the frontiers of southern and eastern Europe, in the consul-
ate and embassies of western European countries and the U.S. around the 
world, and in the U.S. South, as well as in the so-called civil society. If you 
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have a Brazilian passport in Japan and you are not an employee of the Brazil-
ian Embassy in that country or a CEO of a Brazilian branch of transnational 
corporations, your citizenship sta tus is far from flexible. It would be closer 
to Black citizenship in the South of the U.S. before the Civil Rights move-
ment. All is relative, as the dictum goes, and global citizenship applies to 
only a very small percentage of the world population, those belonging to the 
political and economic elite and those of us working and consuming for the 
ruling elite. The rest, the civil and political society in France and Germany 
as in Bolivia or Tanzania, Russia, or Uzbekistan, are subjected to the rules of 
the imperial and colonial differences.
 Before describing the noninstitutional frontiers created by the imperial 
and colonial differences, let us make a disclaimer. We are not assuming that 
global citizenship shall be defined by the desire of the entire population of 
the world to be citizens of the European Union or the U.S. And it is not the 
case that the western European U.S. institutions are knocking the doors of 
180+ countries to move over there. Beyond that double directionality, global 
migrations (to which the very idea of global and flexible citizenship is wed-
ded) are going on everywhere. One could argue that not all migrations in the 
world move to Western Europe and the U.S. from the rest of the world. There 
are also migrations between the rest of the world. That is right. But there is no 
massive migration from Western Europe and the U.S. to the rest of the world 
and, above all, only in the U.S. and Western Europe that the issue of global 
citizenship was created as an issue. However, whatever particular case you 
look at, you see that the rules of the colonial and imperial differences are at 
work. What is important for our argument is the directionality of migrations 
for which the very idea of citizenship is today at stake. It is obvious that there 
are more Nigerians, Bolivians, Indians, Ukrainians, or Caribbeans who want 
to migrate to Europe or the U.S. than people in the U.S. desiring to migrate 
to any of those places. We do not know of any stories of Anglo-Americans 
dying in the Arizona desert when marching to cross the Mexican border.80
 Similar examples could be found outside the U.S. and Europe. For exam-
ple, more Bolivians are crossing borders and migrating to Argentina and 
Chile than Chileans are immigrating in mass to Bolivia. Argentineans and 
Chileans who move to Bolivia are not people but capital. And, as we know, 
global capital is much more flexible than global citizenship. The directional-
ity is parallel to the U.S. and Latin America or Europe and North Africa: Peo-
ple move from the south to the north and capital moves from the north to the 
south. In the case of Chile and Argentina, the geographical parameters do 
not apply, because capital moves to the north and people to the south—the 
racialization of the Bolivian population and colonial difference are equally at 
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work. It is estimated that, in Iraq, more than four thousand Americans and 
more than one hundred thousand Iraqis died in an invasion that was justified 
for the good of Humanity.81
 Well, you may say, that is natural: People move to find better living con-
ditions and, right now, better living conditions are in the U.S. and Argentina 
and not in Nigeria or Bolivia. And better living conditions in this polycen-
tric and capitalist world we are living in mean more money. And, you can 
argue that democratic states go to war to eliminate the Evil from the surface 
of the earth. Fair enough. However, better living conditions are also a myth 
and an illusion for immigrants from a lesser country in the global distribu-
tion of wealth that largely would have difficulties enjoying the privileges of 
the nationals of the better country. We would ask, then, what are the rela-
tionships among capitalism (in its current, global form), citizenship, and 
racism? Why does capital move freely while people do not? We say people 
and not citizen because not every person is a citizen—and that space (the 
space between the person and the citizen) is divided by racism, on which the 
colonial and imperial differences have been built in the social and political 
imaginary of the modern colo nial world. You are not stopped at the gates (of 
frontiers or embassies) because you are poor but because of your religion, 
your language, your nationality, your skin, whatever is taken as indicator of 
the colonial and imperial differences. Being poor and white is not the same 
as being poor and of color. In a country like Bolivia, the connection between 
race and poverty is more evident than in the U.S. where, today, poverty is 
reaching a vast sector of the White population. Racism is the condition 
under which the agents of the state and of capital decide who shall be poor, 
because in the capitalistic eco nomic system, poverty cannot be avoided: It is 
ingrained in the very structure of the system.
iii.  racism, the Colonial matrix of Power, and 
  Colonial/imperial Differences
We return to colonial and imperial differences, two complementary concepts 
introduced in Chapters 3 and 4. Before the citizen emerged in the imagi-
nary of the modern/colonial world, there were the heathens, the pagans, the 
gentiles, and the bar barians. Who defined them, and how were these social 
roles described? Where was the standard, the model on which these cate-
gories were defined? To put forward the question in the way we did already 
presupposes accepting Christian theology as the epistemic standard to clas-
sify the world. If we look at the world from the conceptual eyes of Islamic 
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theology or Arabic philosophy or from Aymara pacha-sophy (as an Aymara 
equivalent to Greek philosophy has been described),82 we reach at least two 
different conclusions.
 The categories of pagans, gentiles, heathens, and barbarians are not found 
in Islamic, Arabic, or Aymara thought. We are not saying that there were no 
categories by which the intellectual elites and officers of the “states” and the 
population, in any of these language communities and religions, made a dis-
tinction between “insiders” and “outsiders.” The question is whether they 
made it with the viru lence we find in many theologians of the Spanish Inqui-
sition as well as progressive intellectuals of the time such as Bartolomé—de 
Las Casas so fearful of the enemies of Christianity—and with the virulence 
that was reproduced through the history of the modern colonial world, 
going through France, England, Germany, and the U.S. A commonly held 
belief cutting across the most extremely conservative and the most extremely 
progressive theologians was that heathen, barbarians, pagan, gentiles, and 
so on all had some kind of deal with the devil (sound familiar?). After the 
Enlighten ment and secularization, the role of the devil receded and lack of 
civilization took its place.
 When theology was displaced by secular philosophy and the monarchic 
states in complicity with the church were replaced by the secular nation-
state, the logic of exclusions that Christians applied to Jews, Moors, Indians, 
and Blacks was rearticulated. How? Sixteenth-century reclassification of lan-
guages and religions in the planet operated mainly in three frontiers. One, 
the most immediate, was the frontier between the religions of the books 
that were reestablished when Moors and Jews were expelled from the Ibe-
rian Peninsula. The second, in chronological order, was the new question 
of the limits of humanity. To what extent could the Indians be considered 
human beings? The question was not asked about African slaves, implying 
that there was no question that they were not quite human. Secularization, in 
the eighteenth century, replaced the “friends of the devil” with the “foreign-
ers.” Foreigners were not necessarily enemies of the nation. They were just 
not born (i.e., they were not nationals) in a given language, territory, culture, 
and blood. The for eigners were not citizens, because they were not under the 
adminis tration of the secular state, that is, a state no longer controlled by the 
church and the monarch, but by a state that protected the people against the 
monarch and the church—a state of the people, for the people, by the people. 
It was then that the “citizen” was born, ambiguously cast in between the 
state and the nation in such a way that all modern states were assumed to be 
mononationals. By this, I mean that those who were not born in a language, 
a blood, a culture were not considered members of the state—an adminis-
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trative unit without blood, language, or memory but, instead, with a flag, a 
national anthem, and an army.
 Immanuel Kant is a good case study for our argument. In the histori-
cal context of Europe at the end of the eighteenth century, when imperial 
powers were changing hands from the Christian and Catholic south to the 
secular and Protestant north, Kant was at the crossroads of several debates 
and new developments. One of them was to rethink universal history with 
a cosmopolitan intent. Why rethink?—because universal history, which was 
the property of Chris tian theologians, needed now to be rethought in secular 
terms and in relation to the state.
 As any frequent reader of Kant will remember, when thinking about the 
ideal society and the ideal history, he replaced God with nature. Theologians 
used to talk—like charlatans on television and best-selling authors claim-
ing that they know how to save the believers—of God’s will. They knew 
what God planned, what God wants for you, and what God knows is good 
for you. Thus, God was and still is a floating signifier you can appropriate 
and fill to your taste in private life or in the public sphere. The same thing 
happened with Kant and nature. Kant knew what nature’s designs were for 
a peace ful society and cosmopolitan peace. Kant’s political thought main-
tains a pyramidal order of society, from the top down, following the Western 
tradition in political theory. He places, then, between nature’s design and 
the human nation-states, the civil constitution. The civil constitution plays 
the role of the master, because all human beings need a master, whereas no 
human being could be master of other human beings (Locke had already 
developed the same idea). The civil constitution as the supreme document 
of state management is the document through which citizens are managed. 
A sort of law-politics, to play with words. law-politics, parallel to bio-poli-
tics, manages the “right” and the “legality” of the citizens; not their bodies, 
but their mind. From the recasting of the idea of civility and citizen, civili-
zation also became the global secular design that took the place of Chris-
tianization. Thus, Kant’s cosmo politan order and the universal history he 
needed to rewrite was the necessary knowledge to back up the state as well 
as state imperial designs in “propagating” the ideals of civilization all over 
the globe.
 Willingly or not, Kant wrote about anthropology and aesthetics in a way 
that revealed the underpinning of his abstract universals in philosophy and 
political theory. Let me quote a couple of examples then elaborate on them. 
The first comes from anthropology, from a pragmatic point of view:
The Spaniard who evolved from the mixture of European blood with Ara-
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bian (Moorish) blood, displays in his public and private behavior a certain 
solemnity; and even the peasant expresses a consciousness of his own dig-
nity toward his mas ter, to whom he is lawfully obedient.
 The Spaniard’s bad side is that he does learn from foreigners [who are 
the foreigners from whom Spaniard have to learn? Are German learning 
from foreigners]; that he does not travel in order to get acquainted with 
other nations; that is he is cen turies behind in the sciences. He resists any 
reform; he is proud of not having to work; he is of a romantic quality of 
spirit, as the bullfight shows. (Kant [1798] 1996: 231)
 Remember that Kant is here describing national characters. And this is 
what he had to say about the Germans: “The Germans are renowned for their 
good character; they have the reputation of honesty and domesticity; both 
are qualities which are not suited to splendor.” However, not all is lost in that 
domesticity, for “Of all civilized people,” Kant continues, “the German sub-
jects himself most easily and permanently to the government under which 
he lives” ([1798] 1996: 233). And here is an interesting complement to the 
previous characterization:
If he arrives in foreign lands as a colonist, he will soon form with his com-
patriots a sort of social club which, as a result of unity of language and, 
partially, of religion makes him part of a little clan, which under the higher 
authority of the govern ment distinguishes itself in a peaceful and moral 
way through industry, cleanliness, and thrift from the settlements of other 
nationalities (1[1798] 996: 233).
 So much for Kant’s cosmopolitanism—apparently derived from how 
Germans feel at home and bond among themselves in for eign land when 
they go as colonists. Kant’s national characters, as he himself explains, are 
based on blood although he will slide color in without justification. First, let 
us take a look at how Kant connects blood with nature. When Kant gets out 
of Europe, he encounters the Russian, the Polish, and the European Turks. 
Let’s listen to what he has to say (stand with me for a little bit longer and you 
will see how global citizenship and the humanities walk parallel to each other 
and meet in the same corner) about Russian, Polish and Turks: “Since Russia 
has not yet developed definite characteristics from its natural potential; since 
Poland has no longer any characteris tics; and since the nationals of European 
Turkey never have had a character, nor will ever attain what is necessary for 
a definite national character, the description of the nations’ characters may 
properly be passed over here” ([1798] 1996: 235).
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 In section four of Observations on the Beautiful and the Sublime, Kant 
takes on the Arabs, Chinese, Indians, Africans, and American Indians. But, I 
do not go into details here. What I am interested in underlining is that, once 
you get out of Europe, you get into the downhill road of the human scale. 
What is interesting, however, is that Kant is describing national characters as 
innate, as natural characters who, so to speak, lie in the composition of the 
person’s blood. And he further adds that, “since we are not talking about the 
artificially acquired (or affected) characteristics of nations, we must be very 
cautious in sketching them” ([1798] 1996: 235).
 Now, it so happened that nature provides the global designs for the state 
and the Constitution and the innate national character of the human race. 
Therefore, because nature provides “natural” designs, it would be very dif-
ficult to contest Kant as interpreter of nature’s will. What we have here is a 
sort of secular fundamentalism that brings together the figure of the citi-
zens of both law and blood. For that reason, the nation-state cannot be but 
a monoracial state and the citizen a composite of an administrative and 
racially constituted entity.
 We have chosen Kant as an example for two reasons. One is that Kant 
offers the chronological link between sixteenth-century Spanish theologians 
and their first classification of the world population in racial terms and the 
twentieth-century updating and transformation of his national characters at 
a global scale. There is not much difference between what Las Casas thought 
of the Moors and what Kant thinks of the Arabs. For, beyond the particular 
descriptions of national characters worldwide, Kant has a scheme in mind 
that I described elsewhere as the Kantian ethno-racial tetragon. In a nutshell, 
for Kant, yellow people were in Asia, black in Africa, red in America (he was 
thinking of the Indians and not of the population of European descent in 
America), and white in Europe. The ethno-racial scheme, during the Nixon 
administration, presupposed the Kantian tetragon. It added Hispanics to 
form what David Hollinger named the “ethno-racial pentagon” (Hollinger 
1995). Behind this scheme, we can also recognize—second reason—Kant’s 
transformation of the colonial and imperial differences as racial configura-
tions put in place by Chris tian theologians and secular philosophers from 
the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. Thus, truly global citizenship pre-
supposes overcoming the colonial and imperial differences, which means 
that Chicanos/as in the U.S., Aymaras in Bolivia and around the world, and 
Russians in Europe have the epistemic power to intervene and question the 
naturalization of an order based on global racism.
 Colonial and imperial differences are ingrained in dominant imperial 
descriptions and justifications of their control over the pop ulation in the 
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colonies as well as in imperial superiority over other empires or imperial 
histories (e.g., Christian and capitalist empires confronted with the non-
Christian and noncapitalist empires, such as the Ottoman Sultanate and the 
Russian and Soviet Empires). For the colonial differ ence, Indians and Afri-
cans offered Spanish theologians the opportu nity to remap the configuration 
of the chain of human being; and Blacks ended up at the lower level of the 
scale. That is to say, if Indi ans were suspicious of not fulfilling the require-
ments established for humanitas; Blacks were out of the question simply 
because they were not considered human. That is the only way to understand 
why they became a com modity in the global market, and they were the first 
dramatic exam ple of how the dispensability of human life in the formation 
of capitalism goes hand in hand with the emergence of the Atlantic com-
mercial circuits. For the same theologians who were disputing the humanity 
of the Indians and assuming the lack of humanity of the African slaves, Jews, 
Moors, Ottomans, and Russians were not at the same level. They were not 
disputed because of their humanity but because of their lack of Latin and 
Latin alphabetic writing (Las Casas named it “the lack of literal locution”; 
[1552] 1967: 637) and in their wrong religion. Or, in the case of Christian 
Orthodox in Russia, they were seen as deviating from true Christianity. Asia 
was less relevant for Christian theologians.
 The Ottoman Sultanate was the closest case in the sixteenth century in 
relation to which the emerging Christian empires (the Holy Roman Empire 
of the German Nations and the Castilian Empire) could measure a period 
of differences. China was a second case in point. The first Jesuits arrived in 
Japan and China in 1582. But, certainly, Asia was relevant to Kant, because 
the Dutch and the British, from the second half of the seventeenth century 
on, have made their entry into the Asian continent. And, at this point, the 
colonial difference articulated in the Americas (Indians and Blacks) began 
to be restruc tured and reinterpreted. France, during the first half of the nine-
teenth century, made its way to North Africa when the clout of the Islamic 
Caliphate and Ottoman Sultanate was vanishing. Thus, the colonial differ-
ence was rearticulated here, too. And, when that happened, when Asia and 
North Africa (and the Middle East, since the begin ning of the twentieth 
century) were brought into the sphere of colonial and imperial differences, 
Orientalism was born. Kant’s characterization of the Arabs, the Chinese, and 
the Indians were part of the transformation of the colonial difference from 
the foundation of Occidentalism (the Spanish Indias Occidentales), to the 
French and British construction of Orientalism.
 Why are we telling you this story? To argue that global citizen ship is 
being vetoed by the colonial and imperial differences and not by gatekeep-
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ers working for the U.S. and European embassies or patrolling the borders. 
Central Asia and the Caucasus are not alien to this nation-building and cit-
izenship (and the emergence of tricksters), all this is articulated through 
imperial difference and the second-class status of the Russian Empire, the 
Soviet Union, and their colonies. What we are saying is that these dividing 
lines (the imperial and colonial difference, based on the racial classifica tion 
of people on the planet) are still alive and well and preventing the concreti-
zation of global citizenship. In other words, global citi zenship is part of the 
rhetoric of modernity (salvation, development, progress, well-being for all, 
and democracy), whereas the imperial and colonial differences are the invis-
ible divides that maintain the logic of coloniality (oppression, domination, 
exploitation, and mar ginalization). Gatekeepers are the tools of a historically 
formed belief that has been naturalized and transmitted from generation to 
generation of schools, colleges, universities, state institutions, tourism agen-
cies, and the like. For this reason, you cannot change subjectiv ities and the 
principle of knowledge by means of public policies that maintain the exist-
ing subjectivities and principle of knowledge. Reforms are better than noth-
ing, but the result is making more palatable the chronicle of an announced 
dead. It may improve but not change the situation. If changes cannot come 
from new laws and public policies, they should come from changes in peo-
ple’s minds, in their understanding of the historical roots that have formed 
their sensibilities and beliefs. And, to that end, the decoloniality of being and 
knowledge is of the essence.
 It is our contention that global citizenship today is being challenged by 
the underground history of racism that impinges on the sub jectivity of the 
population of white countries as well as policy mak ers and their preferential 
attitude toward who gets in and who does not. It is true that the needs of the 
market produce the effect that technologically trained people from the Third 
World or non-Western imperial countries are less dark to the eyes of employ-
ers and passport control. The control over the global circulation of people, 
par ticularly from the European Union and the U.S. administration (although 
the example of the “terrorist’s menace” is spreading to other countries) is 
enacted not only in the borders but also in the countries of origin. Con-
sulates and embassies act like frontiers over there, as the first scanner. The 
racial structure with which the imperial and colonial differences have been 
historically founded (i.e., the foundation of the colonial matrix of power) is 
the major impediment today to thinking seriously of global citizenship. Once 
again, decoloniality of being means to regain the dignity that humanitas took 
away from other humans casted as anthropos. Citizenship can be global only 
once the colonial and imperial differences are erased and with it the supe-
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riority of humanitas over the anthropos. To achieve this goal it is necessary 
to delink from the imperial hegemony of the humanitas and, therefore, from 
the hegemony of modern/colonial racial classifications. But, to reach this 
point, we need the decolonial epistemic shift—not a “new turn” (linguistic, 
pragmatic, or what have you) within the epistemic perspective that does not 
admit other epistemic perspective; not a new post (modern or colonial) that 
recasts the old within a new vocabulary, but a decolonial delinking from the 
hegemony of Western thought from the Renaissance and the Enlightenment 
to the postmodern and the postcolonial.
iv. The role of the humanities and the Decolonial Option
How can we bring the Humanities into the previous historical scheme and 
toward encountering the decolonial option? Well, let us go back to Kant, 
this time to his The Contest of the Faculty ([1798] 1955). Three aspects are 
relevant to my argument. The first is that The Contest introduced an inter-
nal shift in the history of modern Europe since the Renaissance, replacing 
theology with secular philosophy. He assigned to theology a very impor-
tant role, next to medicine and law. The three primary disciplines had the 
responsibilities of ensuring the well-being of society: theology to take care 
of the soul, medicine of the body, and law of the society. The second aspect 
is the role Kant gave to philosophy: On the one hand, philosophy was itself 
one among many secondary disciplines; on the other hand, he assigned to 
philosophy the role of policing the practice of the three primary disciplines 
(very similar to the role Jacques Derrida gave to grammatology). And the 
third aspect introduced in The Contest is the reorganization of knowledge. 
In this regard, philosophy fulfilled the function that theology had in the 
Renaissance university (Kant [1798] 1955). Kant is with good reason one of 
the masterminds of what has been called the Kantian-Humboldtian Univer-
sity (Readings 1996), a new university and a new cur ricular organization at 
the service of the state and no longer at the service of the monarch or the 
church.
 Basically, the Kantian-Humboldtian University, which is contextualized 
in the next chapter, was a university in which the crucial role the humanities 
played in the Renaissance became secular but equally important. It was a 
mutation from theological to secular humanities. In both cases, the univer-
sity was no longer a European business but an imperial/colonial one as well: 
The imperial expansion since the Renaissance and the formation of colonies 
had in higher education a major way to control knowledge and subjectiv-
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ity. The humanities and science (Copernicus, Galileo, etc.) shared the same 
house of knowledge in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries and were 
cast under a curriculum composed by the trivium and the cuadrivium. After 
the Enlightenment, in the reorganization of the curriculum—which had in 
Kant’s work an exemplar articulation—science and the humanities began to 
take separate routes. At the end of the nineteenth century, Wilhelm Dilthey 
distinguished between ideographic and nomotetic sciences, between under-
standing and explanation, between the natu ral and the human sciences (les 
sciences humaines, in French vocab ulary) or the sciences of the spirit, as 
Dilthey would have it (1991). After World War II, three important changes 
were introduced in the tradition of the Kantian-Humboldtian University. 
First, the social sciences gained ground in complicity with the transforma-
tion of capitalism. Corporations began to intervene in the transformation of 
the university, particularly in the last twenty years, in various forms known 
to us. Second, the division between the social sciences and the humani-
ties (which in Europe were lumped together as human sciences) gained 
ground, and the three hard social sciences (political science, sociology, and 
economics) came to dominate the scene. The humanities receded to a sec-
ondary role: Philosophy, no longer the queen of the human sciences, is now 
an exotic practice among the humanities that is struggling for survival in 
Europe (western and eastern) and has been reduced to analytic philosophy 
and logic in the U.S. The same could be said about literature, art history, and 
the like. And third, and this is the direction in which I move and conclude, 
an epistemic decolo nial shift emerged simultaneously with the social move-
ments of political decolonization during the Cold War. These periodizations 
in the history of the European university always had consequences in the 
colonies or ex-colonies (Mignolo 2002b).
 However, Kant has also the merit of articulating the concept of cri-
tique that in Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud (both European Jews) took a 
decisive turn: The underlying logic of capital and the underly ing logic of 
consciousness became the target of critical examination. Some thing has 
changed between Kant, on the one hand, and Marx and Freud, on the other. 
In 1937, Max Horkheimer (also a German Jew) artic ulated that change in 
terms of traditional and critical theory (1937). By “traditional,” he did not 
mean to value one type of theory over the other but, rather, to distinguish 
between two types of theorizing. One type of theorizing, what he called 
“traditional theory,” occurs when theory is constructed on facticity, i.e., on 
assumptions that the world is as it looks to us, and theories are necessary to 
organize and explain what is disorganized and not understood. Natural and 
social sciences, particularly of the positivist kind, operate at this level. The 
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second type of theorizing, which he called “critical,” examined the underlying 
logic and the social consequences of social phenomena and scientific knowl-
edge. Basically, Horkheimer followed the path opened by Marx and Freud in 
unveiling the darker side of nine teenth-century modernity, the exploitative 
nature of capitalism, and its consequences in the (de)formation of subjectiv-
ity. Marx, Freud, and Horkheimer followed, in Europe, a critical path in the 
humani ties that had started in the colonies three centuries before them.
 Neither of them, in fact, has much to say about coloniality, a concept that 
was not available or even thinkable, although decolonial thinking and doing 
(as well as thinking by doing) was already in place in European colonies in 
the Americas. And, the reason was that European thinkers were aware of 
colonialism but not of coloniality or the fact that the responses to coloniality 
were not limited to the European critique of colonialism. This is yet another 
instance showing the need for learning to unlearn. Marx saw colonialism 
as a derivative phenomenon. Freud was quite unaware of it, and after an 
initial enthusiasm about the global role of psycho analysis in India, as has 
been shown by Ashis Nandi in Savage Freud and Other Essays on Possible 
and Retrievable Selves (1995), Freud’s critical diagnosis remained operative 
in the domain of European subjectivities. In the 1950s and 1960s, Frantz 
Fanon showed the limits of psychoanalysis for subjectivities formed in the 
African diaspora since the sixteenth century and the massive slave trade 
as well as for North African Arabs and Berbers. What has been forgotten 
from the eighteenth century on was the critique of colo nialism by Bartolomé 
de Las Casas and the decolonial shift taken by indigenous intellectuals like 
Waman Puma de Ayala in the Viceroyalty of Peru imposed over the Inca’s 
Tawantinsuyu (e.g., their social and historical organization conceived as the 
land of the four corners). Decolonial thinking in South, Central America, 
and the Caribbean as well as among Latino(a)s in the U.S., builds on what 
was silenced, partly because not understood and partly because to recognize 
it would have been dangerous not only for imperial forces but also for crit-
ics like Las Casas himself, who would have had to recognize that his critique 
of colonialism, as important as it was, was equally limited to his dissenting 
and critical Christian and European perspective. Waman Puma was dwelling 
in a different memory, in a different language, in a different epistemology, 
and, when confronting the imperial control by Spanish men of letters and 
missionaries, he natu rally took the decolonial shift: He delinked from the 
supremacy of theological categories of thought and included them within 
indige nous (Quechua and Aymara) categories of thoughts. Border thinking 
was the consequence of Guaman Poma’s doing—his historical narrative and 
his political proposal to reorganize the Tawantinsuyu and not, of course, the 
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Viceroyalty of Peru, which was the colonizing job of the Spanish monarchy 
to which precisely Guaman Poma was decolonially responding.
 The emergence of imperial internal critique (Las Casas, Kant, Marx, 
Freud, and Horkheimer) silenced the emergence and continu ation, since the 
sixteenth century, of the decolonial option, as the cri tique of modernity from 
the perspective of coloniality, of which Waman Puma, in the Viceroyalty of 
Peru under Spanish rules, is one of the foundational examples. Mahatma 
Gandhi is a second case in British India, under British imperial rule. And, 
after World War II, the genealogy expanded through the works of Amilcar 
Cabral (in the Portuguese colonies), Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon (in the 
French Caribbean), Fausto Reynaga (in Bolivia), and Gloria Anzaldúa (in the 
U.S.). Our own argument is inscribed and follows this later genealogy. We are 
now in the middle of a decolonial epistemic shift; and it is from this shift that 
the role of the humanities could be not only imagined but also reoriented. 
How shall we understand the deco lonial epistemic option? The next question 
we ask is this: What are the relationships between the decolonial epistemic 
shift, the humanities, and global citizenship?
 The decolonial epistemic option is both geopolitical and body political; 
that is, it respond to the needs and perspectives of people and regions who 
do not see that plans and designs made for them by developed countries 
and corresponding institutions (IMF, World Bank, Monsanto, etc.) as really 
“convenient” for their regions and the people who live in the region. The 
decolonial epistemic option is becoming also, for similar reasons, an option 
for immigrants to developed countries who organized themselves to work to 
participate (instead of assimilate or accommodate) in the democratization of 
knowledge, of economy of political life. In other words, the decolonial is an 
option for all those human beings who want to participate and share rather 
than be managed and integrated to master plans that are not theirs or to be 
expelled and marginalized.
 The geopolitics of knowing brings to the foreground the relationship 
between geohistorical locations and epistemology. It came to the foreground 
during the Cold War and its point of origination was the Third World, not 
Europe. Argentinean philosopher Enrique Dussel in 1977 launched his phi-
losophy of liberation by asking for the relationship between geopolitics and 
philosophy and established a correspondence between economic and epis-
temic dependency in the history of the modern colonial world. In the mid -
1990s, Franco Cassano, Italian philosopher from Bary (south of Italy), raised 
the question of the relationship between the sea and epistemology. And dur-
ing the same years, Portuguese sociologist Bonaventura de Sousa Santos 
advanced the idea of an “epistemology of the South,” which became inte-
T h I n K I n G  d E c o Lo n I A L Ly  •  193
grated into the philosophical platform of the World Social Forum, initiated 
in Porto Alegre, Brazil. The three of them raised their voices to claim that 
there is no knowledge detached from experience. But, more important, that 
“experience” cannot be reduced to the universality of Human Experience, 
which was claimed by Kant: “Experiences” have been marked and continue 
to be marked by the imperial/colonial modern world order. Whether you 
have been born and raised in London or Beijing, and whether you have been 
put in those places or move around the world, you cannot escape from “expe-
riencing” the world order you received when you were born and educated—
the experience and memories in question are part of the modern colonial 
world, structured by the colonial and imperial differences. You can try to 
narcotize imperial and colonial differences if you are trying to assimilate to 
a dominant culture or to emulate ideas that emerged from bodies embodied 
in local histories (like Germany or France) and languages that are not the 
histories and languages in which—unfortunately—your skin and brain were 
formed. Or you can accept—with pride—what you are, to embody the place 
you occupy in the colonial matrix of power (metaphorically similar indeed 
to the places that people occupy in the film The Matrix)
 Learning to unlearn becomes then of the essence, since what you have 
learned was already established by theological and egological (e.g., secular 
nation-state education) rules of the game. The geopolitical and body-polit-
ical shifts are decolonial in the sense that they delink (i.e., it is no longer an 
internal critique, like those of Marx, Freud, or Horkheimer) from the hege-
monic history of Western civilization and the corresponding categories of 
thoughts founded in Greek and Latin and expanded in the six modern Euro-
pean imperial languages (Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, French, German, and 
English).
 The geopolitical shift emerged in the Third World (during the Cold War) 
and in the south of Europe (the post-USSR Europe that lost the train of the 
Enlightenment). The body-political epistemic shift surfaced instead in the 
U.S., during the Cold War but, above all, after and as a consequence of the 
Civil Rights movement. The ques tion prompted by the Civil Rights move-
ment was not the relationship between geopolitics and epistemology but, 
rather, that between identity and epistemology. New spheres of knowledge 
came into being (women’s studies, gen der and sexuality studies, gay and les-
bian studies, Afro-American studies, ethnic studies, Latino/Latinas studies, 
etc.). What do all of them have in common? First, all of them incorporate the 
knower into the known, the personal and collective memory of communities 
con figured around race, gender, and sexuality. Second, they all intro duced 
into the social sphere of knowledge the perspective from the damnés, those 
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disposed by colonial racism and patriarchy. And, third, they introduced a 
new justification of knowledge: knowledge not at the service of the church, 
the monarch, or the state, but knowledge for liberation, that is, for subjective 
and epistemic decolonization.
 Now, we invite you to think about this double shift in relation to the 
story we told before on the making of the colonial matrix of power and the 
colonization of knowledge and being. You would be able to make the con-
nection, on the one hand, between the stumbling block for global citizenship 
and the structure of knowledge, and on the other, between the coloniality 
of knowledge and being (which prevents global citizenship) and the criti-
cal role the humanities can play to demolish the stumbling block built on 
the colonial and impe rial differences. The ultimate question, then, would 
be to determine the role of the humanities in dismantling global racism that 
prevents the full achievement of global citizenship. However, the task is not 
possible without changing the current common sense, in which happiness is 
related to accumulation; well-being is predicated on increasing production; 
and competition and meritocracy are the final destinations of human beings 
for their full satisfaction. All these goals predicated in the rhetoric of moder-
nity imply running over, exploiting, and killing others; that is, they imply the 
logic of coloni ality without which the ideals of modernity could not be car-
ried out.
 The map we draw of the internal critique and decolonial option sug-
gests that there are two different tasks, although complementary, for the 
humanities. The internal critique (i.e., a critique that main tains the theo- 
and egopolitics of knowledge) is very prominent in the U.S. and Europe. In 
the first case, foundations supporting the humanities (Ford, Mellon, Rock-
efeller, McArthur, etc.) allow for a fundamental critique of the increasing 
dominance of corporate values within the university. The internal critique 
is also very prom inent, within and outside of the university, in the works of 
the Euro-American left (followers of Marx, Freud, and the initial years of the 
Frankfurt school). The decolonial shift brings another critical dimension of 
the humanities, this time the geo- and body politics of knowledge (the epis-
temology of the South and of the color of reason) as epistemic and political 
projects from historical agents, experiences, and memories that were dis-
qualified epistemic subjects. If global citi zenship requires the dismantling of 
global racism, it is from the deco lonial shift (from the geo- and body politics 
of knowledge) that such a task will have its leadership. Last but not least, the 
decolonial option is at odds with the liberal dictum that we should empha-
size what we have in common rather than the differences, for the “common-
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ality” is predicated on an idea of the human whose paradigmatic example is 
a White European heterosexual man.
 I heard a dictum (I do not have a scholarly reference, just oral say-
ing, undocumented but no less relevant) attributed to Spanish writer Fer-
nando Savater that goes like this: “We are all equal in that we are different.” 
Whether Savater said it or not, the formula is very common: It presupposes 
and defends the commonality of human beings—which means that Human 
Beings are what hegemonic knowledge allows you to say what they are. The 
Zapatistas prefer—instead—the following version: “Because we are all equal, 
we have the right to the difference.” My argument and the task I see for the 
decolonial humanities goes with the Zapatistas’s dictum. This is one of the 
fundamental tasks for the decolonial humanities in the twenty-first century: 
to acknowledge that global citizenship is a myth while global racism is not 
overcome and to work toward the decolonization of imperial knowledge that 
engendered the coloniality of being.
In ChaPTerS 3 TO 6, we explored different aspects of the modern/  colonial world order, focusing on the coloniality of knowledge and being 
and, simultaneously, the attempts and decolonial possibilities in which the 
formation of global political societies and scholarship are engaged. Ethnic 
(Chapter 3) and gender decolonial formations (Chapter 4) in Central Asia 
and the Caucasus were followed by a decolonial readings of the complici-
ties in Western imperial imaginary of the concepts of Human(ity) and citi-
zenship. In this closing chapter, we make a case for education, particularly 
higher education, to engage the Humanities as a branch of learning from the 
perspective of decoloniality.83 We further claim that the Humanities shall not 
be conceived as a branch of knowledge next to Natural and Social Sciences 
and the professional schools (engineering, law, medicine, business admin-
istration) but as the overarching ethical horizon of research and learning. 
Nevertheless, thus conceived, the Humanities can offer and follow different 
trajectories. One of them would be the Humanities in line with and depen-
dent on market ideologies of progress, development, capitalist accumulation, 
and the like. The other, would be more in tune with theology of liberation and 
liberal ideals of a democratic and just society ,without calling into question 
the basic principles of capitalist economy. And, the third trajectory would be 
the one we are arguing here: learning to unlearn the previous two hegemonic 
options and engage in decolonial Humanities. To argue this point, we review 
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the history of the University in the Western world and take Amawtay Wasi 
[House of Learning] in Ecuador as a model of learning to unlearn in order 
to relearn, that is, to engage in decolonial education.
 To start with, two kinds of histories of the university as an institution may 
help us understand the dilemmas now confronting universities all over the 
world. The Plan Bologna in Europe and the meeting in Davos on the future 
of the University (Mignolo 2009b) are turning learning into a tool for effi-
ciency and economic development, giving to “learning to manage” the cen-
tral role in the corporate university. The task of learning to unlearn becomes 
urgent as far as management and efficiency are the terms of the rhetoric of 
modernity and progress that conceals the logic of coloniality and domina-
tion. For whom are management and efficiency beneficial? In the recent 
past, the world witnessed or is witnessing two failures of management and 
efficiency: the invasion of Iraq and the collapse of Wall Street. That route of 
knowing, the belief under which knowledge is created and argument built, is 
no longer tenable. To imagine nonmanagerial futures based on the principle 
of “living well” rather than in efficiency and belief (or make belief) that good 
management and efficiency bring happiness to all is an ideal that benefits the 
elite, who put forward the idea and can maintain it through various means 
(institutions, money, media). We need then to recap the history of higher 
learning in Western civilization. Since the history of the university has been 
linked to colonial expansion, since the sixteenth century, and therefore the 
imperial, learning to unlearn is a decolonial endeavor in two senses: It is 
necessary to decolonize imperial education and it is of the essence to work 
toward decolonial education.
 Since the European Renaissance and European colonial expansion in 
the sixteenth century—that is, the foundational moment of the modern/
colonial world—the accumulation of money has gone hand in hand with 
the accumulation of meaning and of knowledge. Today “historical/struc-
tural dependency” still structures the world, both economically and epis-
temically. How did that happen? How was it possible that a local conception 
of knowledge, grounded on Greek and Roman experiences and categories 
of thought, become hegemonic through various stages of five centuries of 
imperial expansion? In what follows, we sketch how that happened, and in 
the end, we advance some ideas of how to delink from that imperial legacy 
and engage in epistemic disobedience. Before engaging in this task, we need 
to identify the logic and the consequences of imperial thinking.
 Western categories of thoughts (let us remember, grounded in Greek 
and Latin and translated into the six modern European imperial languages: 
Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, French, German, and English) put any other 
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category in a double bind: they are either “incorporated” (and their singular-
ity erased) into Western categories (e.g., transforming Hinduism and Bud-
dhism into “ religions”) or dismissed and rejected (all economies based on 
capitalist principles and knowledges that cannot be assimilated to Western 
normativization of life and subjectivities, from governments to “popular” 
knowledge, e.g., Vandana Shiva’s report on traditional knowledge of the for-
est or the administration of water in conditions of water scarcity).
 The logic of Western imperial epistemology consists in a meta-discourse 
that validates itself by disqualifying the difference. That is, it consists of mak-
ing and remaking the epistemic colonial difference: Barbarian, primitives, 
Orientals, Indians, Blacks, and so on, are qualified as people “outside” or 
“behind” who need to be brought in and to the modern present. Modernity 
then is not a historical epoch but an imperial category of self-validation and 
disqualification of the epistemic difference. Take philosophy of science, for 
example. Once these categories of knowledge have been institutionalized 
in Western scholarship and translated into common sense (or in Western 
appropriation of Greek and Roman legacies), they become totalitarian, pre-
venting any other kind of knowledge to be recognized at the same level as 
philosophy and science. Similarly with political theory (democracy) or polit-
ical economy (capitalism), after the financial crisis of 2008–2009, the main 
issue in the media and high learning institution was how to save capitalism, 
not to propose an-other economy (based on reciprocity instead of gain and 
accumulation that promotes destruction and killing in all forms, from war 
to food crisis). Learning to unlearn means to delink from the illusion that 
knowledge in all spheres of life is bound to one set of categories that are both 
universal and Western.
 To start shifting the geopolitics of knowledge, delinking and engage in 
epistemic disobedience, it is necessary to excavate the foundation of Western 
categories and principles about the knowledge itself and the values attached 
to a certain kind of knowledge used to devalue epistemic differences, that 
is, building and maintaining the epistemic colonial difference that reverts 
to and complements imperial epistemic differences: Mandarin, Russian and 
Arabic, to name a few languages spoken by billions of people are not lan-
guages epistemically sustainable in the epistemic world order. Knowing how 
and critical thinking can be found in any community of living organisms that 
can use their hands to do while thinking and thinking while doing. Know-
ing how is a matter of surviving and living in community. But with knowing 
how comes knowing, that, which is the first level of theoretical knowing. If 
you know how to make shoes, it is not the same as birds knowing how to 
make a nest. Making shoes implies already a level of doing that goes beyond 
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living on the basis of what nature gave you, feathers, fur, or renewable leaves. 
Knowing what projects theoretical knowing that into a level of complexity 
in which other doings and thinking enter into consideration: Knowing what 
is the theoretical level that operates in the domain of options. One, perhaps, 
could say that the Greek breakthrough was to move from knowing that to 
knowing what and the achievement of Western civilization was to capitalize 
on it: Theology, philosophy, and sciences are three disciplinary formations 
responding to the same basic principles on which knowing what has been 
built. Exploring and unveiling such principles became an urgent task for 
decolonial humanities in confrontation with the corporate values of man-
agement and efficiency. Therefore, decolonial humanities means epistemic 
disobedience (since critiquing the foundation of Western knowledge accept-
ing Western epistemic rules of the game does not go very far—it remains 
within an obedient kind of criticism) and delinking. It means learning to 
unlearn (delinking, epistemic disobedience) in order to relearn (inventing 
and working out decolonial categories of thought that allow building non-
capitalist and nonimperial values and subjectivities.
 We say the “humanities,” and not just “the humanists” (as a species dis-
tinct from natural scientists and scholars in professional schools) for the 
reasons stated previously regarding the role of the Humanities and decolo-
nial Humanities. Since all knowledge and understanding is human under-
standing (from genomics to dance, from electrical engineering to literature, 
from mathematical models in economy to political economy), every scholar, 
academic, and scientist has a responsibility toward the humanities; in other 
words, he or she has critical, ethical, and political responsibilities in the pro-
duction, dissemination, transformation, and enactment of knowledge. The 
Humanities can and must do something else in relation to what they have 
been doing in the past. If the Humanities, since the Renaissance, has contrib-
uted enormously to the expansion of the realm of interactions and imagina-
tions of human beings, it was oblivious to what laid out beyond the realm 
of a regional concept of the Human that was projected as universal. Unfor-
tunately, the achievements in the Humanities were the brighter side that hid 
from view the Humanity that was being negated. Therefore, the task of deco-
lonial Humanities is to redress the lost balance for which imperial Humani-
ties was responsible. In other words, the Humanities have to be recognized 
in their contribution to the very idea of Modernity as well as for the creation 
of its negated side: the idea of the Unhuman.
 As we said, the accumulation of money, in the constitution of Europe, the 
West, or Western civilization, went hand in hand with the accumulation of 
meaning. The role of imperial Humanities was crucial in this regard. Think 
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about “museums of natural history,” for example. They are a clear example of 
the accumulation of meaning and knowledge; and the “histories” of muse-
ums of natural history parallel those of capitalism and European expansion 
all over the globe. Let this serve as a paradigmatic example in the sketching 
of two kinds of histories, the proper knowledge of which is beyond my reach 
at this point. As I said earlier, I am not interested in history per se, or in cov-
ering all the important details that would satisfy the empiricist scholar, but 
in underlining two historical trajectories: ﬁrst, the linear history of the West-
ern university, and second, the fractured histories of universities in colonial, 
Third World, and “emerging countries.”
 Redressing the balance in decolonial education, we have the case of 
Amawtay Wasi, showing all of us a way out of these two histories, those of 
the Western universities and of the West’s colonial surrogates. In describing 
colonial universities as “colonial surrogates,” I do not ignore the fact that 
universities embedded in colonial histories are centers where critical schol-
ars and intellectuals have emerged and continue to emerge.84 What we say 
is that critical scholars, scientists, and intellectuals trained in the universi-
ties of colonial, Third World, or emerging countries do not fail to recognize 
their position vis-à-vis Western universities. In fact, the concept of “colonial 
surrogates” emerged from my encounters and conversations with critical 
scholars, scientists, and intellectuals working in Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina, 
Venezuela, South Africa, North Africa, and South Asia.
 In other words: universities, in the Americas since the sixteenth and the 
seventeenth centuries, were created and run by Spanish and British immi-
grants and their creole (Anglo and Spanish) descendants. In Russia, the 
Soviet Union, and the Russian Federation, higher education and universities 
were Western models that displaced, as in other parts of the world, original 
schooling, nurturing as if Western universities offered the latest and most 
“advanced” model, good for all over the world. Thus, in the history of this 
place (America), a group of transplanted Europeans ignored and marginal-
ized indigenous knowledge from Patagonia to Labrador and destroyed the 
African memories that the slaves brought with them. They started a type 
of institution (the university) and a kind of education that was rooted in 
European history since the Middle Ages. The colonial universities both were 
and were not European universities; they aspired to be but were not quite. 
The colonial difference implied in this relationship explains the long, his-
torical inferiority complex, in both Anglo-and South America, with respect 
to Europe. The theory embedded in the creation of the Universidad Inter-
cultural led me to review the history of the university in the Western world 
and its links to colonialism—or, better yet, to coloniality. It is argued today 
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that “colonialism” is no longer a valid description of our “postmodern” era. 
I argue, however, that although “colonialism” as a system of historical and 
geographical structures of power may have ended, “coloniality” is alive and 
well.85 “Global coloniality” is an appropriate description, in my view, of the 
current restructuring of the colonial patterns (e.g., coloniality) that shaped 
the modern/colonial world, from the sixteenth to the twenty-ﬁrst century. 
“Global coloniality” does not imply a global university but, rather, the repro-
duction of coloniality at a global scale under neoliberal values and principles 
of education.
 An important chapter in the history of the university in the modern/colo-
nial world (through the different phases of colonial and imperial European 
and U.S. expansion) was written in the nineteenth century, during the tran-
sition from the Renaissance to the Kantian-Humboldtian era, when secular 
philosophy and science triumphed over Christian theology and rhetoric. The 
nation-state became the prevailing form of government, displacing despotic 
political regimes (which reappeared in the twentieth century as different 
forms of totalitarianism and dictatorship) and the foundation of the modern 
nation-states in Europe and in modern/colonial states elsewhere. The ﬁrst 
wave of “postcolonial” states emerged in the Americas. The colonial Renais-
sance university, organized around the trivium and the quadrivium in the 
service of the church and the Crown, gave way to the colonial Kantian-Hum-
boldtian university, organized around philosophy and sciences in the service 
of the emerging nation-states. However, in the seventeenth century several 
temporalities coexisted that were not alien to the planetary transformations 
of the Renaissance university. While, in the Americas, the university was 
part of the process of decolonization and the construction of colonial nation-
states, in South Asia and (North and sub-Saharan) Africa, which were falling 
under the colonial control of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, the 
Renaissance university did not have the same strong institutional stature.
 The university was and still is part of this set of changing processes, which 
maintains the logic of coloniality through “nation building.” Nation-states 
are not the end of coloniality; they are simply its restructuring. British edu-
cation in India in the nineteenth century (Viswanathan 1989), for example, 
followed a logic similar—although with different content—to the one that 
organized the study of Latin and rhetoric in Mexico in the sixteenth century: 
In both cases, the university was crucial to the introduction, and eventual 
displacement, of existing forms of knowledge that were labeled “traditional” 
and measured against the “modernity” of secular philosophy in European 
science. The practice of science in nineteenth-century India86 and the 
creation of state universities in Latin America (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, 
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Brazil) were processes complementary to both nation building and the dif-
ferent temporalities in the restructuring of coloniality of power and knowl-
edge.87 The difference was that, in Latin America, the new universities, built 
according to the Kantian-Humboldtian model, coexisted with universities 
from the colonial/Renaissance period, which entered into a process of radi-
cal transformation. In nineteenth-century Latin America, the state universi-
ties were linked to the process of nation building, although this occurred in 
“dependent” countries—or, if you prefer, under conditions of “internal colo-
nialism.” Decolonization meant, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
that an elite of “creoles” or “natives” took power and reproduced the patterns 
implanted by colonial rulers. In this sense, nation-building was a form of 
colonialism, of internal colonialism. That is, it was a pattern of coloniality 
in the hands of creoles of Spanish descent or mestizos of Spanish and Indian 
mixture. The university of the nineteenth century, in British India as well as 
in Spanish America, followed the Kantian-Humboldtian model of the Euro-
pean university.88
 The “corporate” university is the type of university that, in industrial-
ized countries, has been displacing the Kantian-Humboldtian tradition since 
the 1970s. Its exemplar model is the U.S. university (see Wallerstein 1997). 
In ex–Third World countries, the “model” began to be imposed in the late 
1980s but more clearly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The initial 
manifestations of the newly imposed “quality control” of the faculty as well 
as of departments and special programs, in Argentina or in Mexico, were 
the demands that professors publish in refereed journals, account for their 
research and publications periodically, and so on. Another manifestation has 
been the progressive deterioration of major state universities and the parallel 
and complementary divergence between accumulation of money and accu-
mulation of meaning, characteristic of capitalism and Western universities. 
In Latin America, state universities had been the home of the humanities or 
the human sciences of critical thinking (sociohistorical, ethical, and politi-
cal) and, of course, major centers of political upheaval against the various 
versions of dictatorship. The deterioration of state universities has been mir-
rored by the proliferation of private “universities,” the majority of which are 
centers for professional and technical training only. Philosophy and other 
humanistic disciplines either have a low proﬁle or are not part of the cur-
riculum in the private “universities” emerging in Latin America. They are, so 
to speak, the latest manifestation of “modernization,” in which local elites see 
the university as both a business like any other and a sign of “modern” status. 
A new facet of coloniality manifests itself in the turn that higher education is 
taking in both developed and emerging countries. Historically, Italy and the 
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Iberian Peninsula provided the model of the Renaissance university, while 
Germany and France provided the model of the Enlightenment university, 
in the tradition of Immanuel Kant and Alexander von Humboldt. Today, the 
U.S. that is mainly leading the way in the transformation of the latter model 
into that of the corporate university, a phenomenon that should be seen in 
the context of other neoliberal developments in Latin America, such as the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and Plan Colombia.89
 Let us consider the three moments in the histories of the university and 
the temporal epistemic fractures in its European version then look at the spa-
tial epistemic fractures emanating from its colonial version. We also examine 
spatial epistemic fractures in the emergence of the Universidad Intercul-
tural, which has been led by indigenous intellectuals with the collaboration, 
of course, of mestizos and Whites. It may be objected that we are trying to 
cover too much ground in too few pages. Not really, since our goal is not to 
describe in detail the full history of the European and colonial universities 
but to highlight three epistemic fractures of the institution. The temporal 
one fits Michel Foucault’s conceptualization of “epistemic breaks” in the his-
tory of Western thought. The other two largely escaped Foucault’s model, at 
the same time, as they allow for a critique showing the regional limits of his 
“epistemic breaks.”
 One of the spatial fractures, in the Americas, is the history of the colo-
nial university in the hands of Hispano-, Luso-, and Anglophone creoles as 
well as mestizos, particularly in South America, where the first four major 
modern/colonial universities were created. By “spatial fractures,” we mean 
that the colonial university (in its Renaissance, Kantian-Humboldtian, and 
corporate versions) was always coeval with and dependent on the metro-
politan university, while at the same time disrupting the memories of the 
colonies. It was not the same thing to read Aristotle in Salamanca or Paris 
as in Mexico City/Tenochtitlan or Cuzco. Similarly, it was a different experi-
ence to read Rousseau in Paris than to read him in Nigeria or Bolivia in the 
middle of the nineteenth century. In contrast to the Renaissance and (Kan-
tian-Humboldtian) Enlightenment universities, which generated two colo-
nial fractures (one when the university was at the service of the monarchy 
and church and the other when it served the metropolitan or colonial state), 
and to the corporate university, which expanded and introduced a new set of 
values over the state university (both in the metropolis and in the ex-colonies 
or independent states), Amawtay Wasi, the Universidad Intercultural de las 
Nacionalidades y los Pueblos Indígenas, introduced a fracture of a differ-
ent kind. For the ﬁrst time in the history of the modern/colonial world, a 
university was created whose epistemic foundation (e.g., the principles and 
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the type of knowledge) was no longer that of the European Renaissance uni-
versity and its medieval and classical (Greek) foundations. The foundation 
of the Universidad Intercultural is not Greece but the Tawantinsuyu. “What 
is that?” you may ask. If you indeed asked yourself this question, that is the 
point I am trying to make, since you would not have asked it if I referred to 
Ancient Greek society and cosmology or to the Greek polis, doxa, and epis-
teme (“Tawantinsuyu” is the Quichua word for “the Four Territories,” a map 
of the world for the Inca Empire; Barja 2001). Of course, Western knowledge 
and civilization is part of the curriculum of the Universidad Intercultural. It 
will be duly “included” and processed. The radical difference here is that we 
are talking about the “inclusion” of Western civilization within a curriculum 
grounded in indigenous philosophy and not about the “inclusion” of indig-
enous knowledge within the state (and corporate) university, whose founda-
tions remain in the Renaissance and the Enlightenment types of universities.
 The history of the European university since the Renaissance has been 
framed as part of the larger macro-narrative of Western civilization. In this 
narrative, history originated in Greece, spread through the northwest of the 
Mediterranean, then crossed the Atlantic to culminate in the U.S. Samuel 
Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” is as good an example as any other in 
rehearsing such macro-narratives, although he mainly covers the twentieth 
century. In this framework, the university is an invention of the Middle Ages, 
of the High and Late Middle Ages around the twelfth century, to be more 
precise. The creation of the university as an institution was the culmination 
of a process of scholastic learning. There were continuities, writes Marcia 
Colish (1997), linking the revival of speculation in the eleventh century with 
the interests and methods of masters and cathedral schools and universities 
in the twelfth century and after. One of the major links was the belief and the 
conﬁdence that reason could shed light on any subject and that the increas-
ing use of logic and semantics would take medieval philosophy well beyond 
its classical roots (Colish 1997: 266). Since the university, today, is rooted 
in a tradition of learning originating from monastic and cathedral schools, 
the university is complicit with both philosophical universalism and Chris-
tianity. The mottoes of many universities, inscribed on their official seals in 
Latin, with that language’s corresponding legacy in the conceptualization 
of knowledge, is an obvious reminder. Latin was not only the language of 
learning; it was also the language of power. Previously, Arabic and Hebrew 
had been pushed out of the temples of learning in favor of Greek, which sup-
ported a Greco-Latin tradition in learning parallel to the Judeo-Christian 
tradition in religion. These centuries-old epistemic power struggles have 
clear ramiﬁcations in the history of Israel, and the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict, 
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as well as, of course, for the most recent history of colonialism, from the 
British Empire to U.S. imperialism. The medieval university, in other words, 
laid the foundation for the geopolitics of knowledge under whose hegemony 
much of the world still lives.
 In the university of the European Renaissance scholastic learning was 
displaced by humanistic learning. Accordingly, the role and profile of the 
humanist replaced that of the scriptor and notarius as well as new roles that 
had emerged in the twelfth century, the magister and the grammaticus (Gil 
Fernández 1981: 231–428). At the top of the pyramid were theologians and 
the “masters” of the law. The names they received at the time were literaratus 
and jurisperitus. The appearance of these social actors in the Middle Ages is 
linked to “the emergence of written culture” (Stock 1983: 30–88). In the late 
Renaissance, the towering symbolic image of the humanist, the Renaissance 
man, cut across the redistribution of knowledge in jurisprudence, political 
philosophy, history, grammar, rhetoric, poetics (or literature, as we say since 
the Enlightenment), mathematics, music, and dialectics. Latin was still the 
master language, and the trivium and the quadrivium remained as a general 
frame for the organization of knowledge.
 But an extraordinary series of events intervened in the history of the 
Renaissance. And here is where the second kind of history begins. The out-
of-the-ordinary event I refer to is the colonization of the New World and the 
creation of New World universities. The colonial university, in the Americas, 
had a function different from that of the European Renaissance university. 
It had a mission that was clearly “out of place”; that is, the university in the 
New World did not have the medieval university’s burden of the past (hence, 
the temporal epistemic fracture). It had the burden of the present, since it was 
implanting itself over the institutions devoted to education in the Aztec and 
Inca “empires,” as well as over the remains of Mayan knowledge in astronomy 
and mathematics (hence, the spatial epistemic fracture). The colonial univer-
sity was a university without history, so to speak, a university out of place, 
since it did not include the educational tradition of the Aztecs but did include 
that of the Greeks and Romans. Nahuatl, in other words, was not considered 
as valuable as Greek and Latin. Indigenous knowledges and epistemologies 
neither corresponded to the history of the West nor were recognized by the 
missionaries and men of letters who founded the Universidad de México and 
the Universidad de San Marcos in Lima, Peru. The model of the Renaissance 
university, on the contrary, contributed to the eradication of the Aztecs’ and 
Incas’ educational institutions and the displacement and subalternization of 
their ways of knowing. Inca and Aztec knowledges, in the minds of mission-
aries and men of letters, were dictates of the devil and consequently should 
206  •  pA RT  I I I ,  c h A p T E R  7
be eradicated. What the Spaniards called the “extirpation of idolatry” was in 
fact an epistemic lobotomy. The mission of the Universidad Intercultural is 
precisely to ground itself in the knowledge tradition that was marginalized 
and disrupted by the installation of the colonial/Renaissance university in 
the New World. But, of course, the mission of the Universidad Intercultural 
is not a recuperation of ancient knowledge but its reactivation in the process 
of appropriating Western technical contributions, although not Western val-
ues of education, which are increasingly complicit with capitalism.
 The second spatial epistemic fracture is harder to understand. To some, 
it may sound “New Age” or “new Rousseauian.” Those who think thus may 
be limited by the very frontiers of “modernity” that allowed for the success-
ful invention of “traditions” to bolster the epistemic position of “modernity.” 
Other skeptics may not know that the Universidad Intercultural is a political 
project—as were the Renaissance and Kantian-Humboldtian universities—
grounded in many years of indigenous social movements and emerging from 
the 1987 reform of the Ecuadorian constitution. Still other doubters will 
remain unconvinced because they cannot accept that indigenous people and 
people of African descent can meet their own needs instead of waiting for 
the Whites and mestizos in power to generously offer what they—as inferior 
people—need. In other words, one of the difﬁculties in truly understanding 
the radical nature of the project, of the Universidad Intercultural, is com-
ing to terms with the fact that there are other forms of knowledge (beyond 
the Western tradition) that are equally valid. One of the impediments to 
overcoming the blindness of the ideology of modernity and modernization 
is understanding that the great intellectual and scientiﬁc achievements of 
the West are indeed great achievements, but that, at the same time, there 
is no reason why the rest of the world has to bend to them. Linked to the 
need to uncouple the recognition of achievements from imperial motiva-
tions is the fact that the complicity between the accumulation of money and 
the accumulation of meaning (knowledge) are two sides of the same coin. 
“Knowledge,” in the prevailing view, is still conceived of as, above all, a kind 
of materiality and geopolitics available to everyone, regardless of sex and 
sexuality, color, belief, or the part of the world where one was born, grew up, 
and went to school and the university.
 The “conquest” of America meant the demolition of indigenous educa-
tional and economic systems. Universities in the New World were located 
in the land of people whose languages and histories bore no relationship to 
either Greek and Latin or Arabic and Hebrew. In sixteenth-century Mexico, 
a very interesting and intense effort was made to teach Latin to the Nahuatl-
speaking Indians. The Crown soon came to believe that this was a risky 
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proposition (since indigenous people might use what they learned against 
the Spanish institution for their own liberation), and by the seventeenth cen-
tury, teaching Latin to the Indians was a forgotten episode of the early stage 
of colonization. Frederick Douglass told a similar story, later on, in the con-
text of African slaves’ relationships with their masters in the U.S. There is 
here a “discontinuity of the classical tradition” (Mignolo 1992), a discon-
tinuity that can be attributed to colonialism (Mignolo 1995, 2000), which 
I identiﬁed as one of the two spatial epistemic fractures. The second, and 
radically different, fracture is the Universidad Intercultural.
Before going into more detail about the Universidad Intercultural, let us look 
at the internal colonial transformation of the colonial Renaissance university 
into the colonial Enlightenment one, that is, at the ﬁrst temporal epistemic 
fracture in the history of the university within Western civilization. Toward 
the end of the eighteenth century, secularization and the French Revolution, 
together with a redistribution and reconceptualization of knowledge, led to 
the emergence of what is known in the history of learning as the Kantian-
Humboldtian university, that is, the university at the service of the emerging 
nation-states. The nineteenth century witnessed the birth of the social sci-
ences—required by the need to organize government and civil society—and 
also the consolidation of political economy. Wilhelm Dilthey, at the end of 
the nineteenth century, conceptualized the distinction between the natural 
and the human sciences, between the nomothetic and the ideographic forms 
of knowledge, between explanation and understanding. Knowledge of nature 
became detached from knowledge of society and of human beings. Such a 
conception of knowledge is alien to the indigenous histories in the Ameri-
cas, as well as to concepts of knowledge and understanding beyond Euro-
pean modernity. The transition, across the Americas, from the colonial to 
the national period implied the transformation of both the colonial Renais-
sance university into the colonial Kantian-Humboldtian university and the 
colonial provinces into nation-states. The colonial elites that controlled the 
economy, the church, and the government were not bourgeois elites, as in 
Europe. There were signiﬁcant differences between the Anglo- and Span-
ish-American revolutionary elites; in both cases, however, coloniality was 
a physically invisible but always present force among the creoles in both 
Anglo-and Spanish America.
 While this transformation was under way in the Americas, the British 
in India were beginning their version of a process that the Spanish and Por-
tuguese had started in the “New World” almost three centuries earlier and 
the Anglo-Americans a century after that with the foundation of Harvard 
and other early universities in what would become the U.S. (see Viswana-
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than 1989, Prakash 2000, Gortari 1979, and Jardine 1999). A similar pro-
cess would unfold in the nineteenth century in other places in Asia, Africa, 
and the Caribbean, where the British and French Empires extended their 
colonial administration. These processes were part of the second moder-
nity, the Enlightenment. In the ex-colonies, the story evolved somewhat dif-
ferently depending on whether the metropole was Spain, Portugal, France, 
or England. Between 1776 and 1831, approximately, these colonies became 
independent from their former masters and began the process of building 
themselves into nations. The colonial Renaissance university founded in the 
sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries had to transform itself under new 
social demands and a New World order. New universities were created. The 
University of North Carolina, the ﬁrst state university in the U.S., was char-
tered in 1789 and opened its doors in 1795. The point here is that, while 
the model of the Kantian-Humboldtian university was that of higher educa-
tion under new forms of colonialism, in the emerging nation-states of the 
Americas, the same type of university began to replace the model established 
during the Renaissance. But, of course, the process in the Americas, particu-
larly in South or Latin America, was not the same as the process in Europe. 
Europe and the Americas were separated by the colonial difference (“the 
colonial difference” meaning not only that people in the colonies are “differ-
ent” but that they are “inferior” and need to be “civilized,” “modernized,” or 
“developed”), a difference that is in place today, although their histories have 
followed divergent paths. The university, in other words, played a fundamen-
tal role in nation building. However, while for England and France, and of 
course for Germany, nation-building was part of Western expansion and the 
civilizing mission in the Americas, it was linked to nation building and the 
articulation of a new form of colonialism, “internal colonialism.” In India, as 
well as other places in Asia and Africa, the university was instead part of the 
colonial regime. This was also the period in which philology, in the Euro-
pean universities, contributed to the creation of the idea and the images of 
the “Orient,” as well as the idea of the “South” of Europe (e.g., see Dainotto 
2000). The Kantian-Humboldtian university was, in other words, the univer-
sity in what Hegel labeled as “the heart of Europe” (Germany, England, and 
France), while the Renaissance university was, mainly, the university in what 
became the “South” (Italy, Spain, Portugal).
 And now, at the intersection of the two histories (the colonial and the 
modern), we come to the period after World War II. The U.S. started to 
assume the role played until then by England, France, and Germany. This 
was the era of the Cold War and the Cold War university (Wallerstein 1997), 
the era in which the social sciences, in the U.S., gained preeminence over the 
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humanities. It was also the era of decolonization in Asia and in Africa, and 
the era of the Cuban revolution and dictatorship in various Latin American 
countries. The social sciences in the U.S. were associated with the materi-
alization of “area studies.” Even if there were conﬂicts between those who 
defended the purity and rigor of the disciplines and those who became 
experts in the “content” of certain areas, the fact remains that “area studies” 
was an affair of the social sciences as much as “Orientalism” was an affair 
of the humanities. It was also the heyday of the social sciences in the sense 
that they were part of the project of the “development and modernization” of 
the Third World. In Latin America, the social sciences are a recent addition. 
Although there were cátedras of sociology before 1950, the social sciences as 
a branch of knowledge were introduced in or after the late 1950s. Interest-
ingly enough, the report of the Gulbenkian Foundation, Open the Social Sci-
ences (Wallerstein et al. 1996), emphasized the crisis of these disciplines not 
only in the “central countries,” where they were born and prospered, but also 
in the Third World. The “Gulbenkian report” was followed by thirteen small 
volumes in which the future of the social sciences in various regions of the 
former Third World was discussed.
 But, this was also the period when the corporate university began to dis-
place the Kantian-Humboldtian model. The more technologically oriented 
social sciences (economics, political science, and sociology) remained the 
exemplars of rigorous and useful knowledge, while the humanities and the 
interpretive social sciences (history, cultural anthropology, and interpretive 
sociology) lost their previous standing in the hierarchy of efﬁcient knowl-
edge required by corporate values associated with knowledge. The conse-
quences of the corporate university’s emergence became apparent after the 
end of the Cold War. In the former Third World, including Latin Amer-
ica, the principles of “excellence” and “efﬁciency” became guiding tenets of 
knowledge production. Parallel to these processes, the large state universities 
in various Latin American countries started a process of disintegration (see 
Chomsky et al. 1997 and North American Congress on Latin America 2000). 
The fuga de cerebros, or “brain drain,” accelerated in various countries, as 
well-regarded intellectuals, scholars, and scientists migrated to Europe and 
the U.S. Scientists in former Third-World nations also voiced their discom-
fort with the deprived and meager conditions under which they had to do 
their jobs. The “network society” (i.e., the world society connected through 
the internet more than by means of transportation), as Catalan sociologist 
Manuel Castells calls it, does not have the same intensity in the South as in 
the North. Until 1996 or so, Africa and Latin America were not yet on the 
map of this society. “Excellence” and “efﬁciency” turned against the scientiﬁc 
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and scholarly production of the Third World. And, once again, the possi-
bilities for technological expansion have been restricted by the demands and 
expectations of economic designs.
 The preceding story is a blueprint of two kinds of histories of the univer-
sity. However, we are often reminded of the canonical names in the history of 
Western thought (Diderot, Smith, Marx, Freud) but not of those whose intel-
lectual production was part of the canon not of “modernity” but of “colo-
niality.” A few examples of the latter are Guamán Poma in Peru (in the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries), Mohandas Gandhi in India, Aimé 
Césaire and Frantz Fanon in the Caribbean, Nelson Mandela in South Africa, 
and Subcomandante Marcos and the Zapatistas in Mexico. In all these cases, 
the production and transformation of knowledge and understanding was not 
restricted to the university.
 Here are the issues from the previous narrative that I consider relevant to 
our discussion:
1.  Our main thesis is that the history of capitalism runs parallel to the 
history of knowledge. Also, an implicit distribution of values and labor 
places knowledge in relation to nature. Asia, Africa, and Latin America 
became the providers of “natural” resources to be processed in the 
countries in which the Industrial Revolution took place and prospered. 
These three continents were also placed in the role of providing infor-
mation and culture but not knowledge. Or, the knowledge produced in 
the regions that were either colonized or remained outside the scope 
of colonial expansion was considered relevant only in and for those 
regions. The situation today is not radically different from the one 
that began to unfold ﬁve hundred years ago, when the Renaissance 
university was transplanted to the New World. Of course, since then, 
numerous “nation-states” have been considered “developing coun-
tries.” Universities are institutions that depend, today more than ever, 
on the economy. Thus, in “developing countries” one can surmise that 
we also have “developing universities.” There is not yet a transnational 
institution for higher education with the function that the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund perform in relation to the state 
in developing countries. The United Nations Educational, Scientiﬁc, 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) may be the closest we can get 
to a transnational institution related to research and education.
2.  The histories, as I have told them, imply a relation of “dependency” 
that is not just economic but also epistemic (that is, cultural, intellec-
tual, scientiﬁc in a larger sense of the word, and technological, as well 
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as related to the natural and social sciences) and manifests itself at the 
level of the disciplines. This was one of the concerns of the Gulben-
kian report. Dipesh Chakrabarty, a South Asian historian now teach-
ing at the University of Chicago, noted the particular kind of epistemic 
dependency in the domain of history as a discipline. Chakrabarty 
remarks that the “history” of the Third World cannot be written on 
“its own,” since history (as a discipline) is a European invention. Con-
sequently, the history of the world “depends” on European history. 
In this regard, Chakrabarty (2000) underscores that, while European 
historians do not need to quote, mention, or take into account the his-
tory of India when they write the history of Europe, Indian historians 
cannot write their own history without taking into account European 
history. My own understanding of “epistemic dependency” runs paral-
lel to economic dependency and touches all areas of knowledge, as I 
suggested earlier in describing colonialism as disruption of the epis-
temic and economic organization in the Andes and Mesoamerica. You 
may be thinking that I ignore the fact that “dependency theory” has 
been harshly criticized. But, I am aware of that. However, just because 
“dependency theory” has been criticized and because “dependency” 
does not “depend”—so to speak—on the evil designs of foreign capitals 
(only), it does not follow, necessarily, that we should not think in terms 
of “dependency.” How else can one describe the situation of Argentina 
today? As I ﬁnished an earlier version of this essay, Eduardo Duhalde 
was the president and the Argentine crisis seemed to be hitting bot-
tom. It would be difﬁcult to ignore that, while the “ﬁnancial depen-
dency” of Argentina on the IMF and the government of the U.S. is not 
the only explanation for the crisis, “structural interstate dependency” 
is a foundational factor of capitalism at the international level. Capi-
talism functions not only by exploiting the labor of individual work-
ers but by taking advantage of interstate export and import, natural 
resources in “Third World” countries (oil, for example), and ﬁnancial 
ﬂows of capital and interest.
3.  If the map I just traced has a grain of truth, what then are the needs 
and possibilities for interuniversity cooperation, given the framework 
of the corporate university and the need to think in terms of inter-
national and interdisciplinary relations and cooperation? To address 
these questions, we need to remember that, while the Kantian-Hum-
boldtian university was linked to nation building, the corporate univer-
sity appeared at a time when certain nation-states are being rendered 
less and less relevant. That is, the corporate university is linked to a 
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global and, in a certain sense, postnational era. How are the conditions 
of knowledge production changing today in terms of the invention of 
new tools (e.g., the internet and other technologies that are opening 
up new avenues for the production and distribution of knowledge tra-
ditionally supported by the book)? How are these changes challenging 
and perhaps making obsolete the conceptualization of knowledge we 
inherited from the Kantian-Humboldtian university (natural sciences, 
social sciences, and the humanities)? And, what would be the humani-
ties’ role in the response of the corporate university to the needs of 
globalization?
 The story is not over yet, however: a crucial chapter—the second spatial 
epistemic fracture (that is, a fracture from the European legacy as well as 
from the creole/mestizo colonial version of that legacy)—began to unfold 
with the creation in Ecuador of Amawtay Wasi. This university, conceived 
from the perspective of indigenous knowledge but not for indigenous people 
only, constitutes a reversal, but not an opposition, of and to the history of the 
university in the Western world and its colonies that I outlined previously. 
From the perspective of the European university, whether in its Renaissance 
or Enlightenment model, whether in Europe or in the colonies, indigenous 
knowledge was, at best, an interesting object of study, but never part of what 
was considered true, sustainable, or generative knowledge. The project of 
Amawtay Wasi radically reverses these relations. However, while, in the 
European model of the university in Europe and the colonies, indigenous 
knowledge was an object of study, from the perspective of Amawtay Wasi, 
modern (Western) knowledge is incorporated as sustainable and generative 
knowledge. This is a paradigmatic example, in my view, of the epistemic 
potential of border thinking. From the perspective of subaltern knowledges, 
all knowledge and understanding is potentially sustainable and genera-
tive, while from the perspective of Western hegemonic knowledge, the only 
generative and sustainable knowledge is founded on the canon of Western 
thought and scholarship.
 Let me address ﬁrst, then, the notion of “interculturalidad” as the indig-
enous intellectuals leading the project and the implementation of the Uni-
versidad Intercultural are using the term. “Interculturalidad” refers not to 
the universality of certain phenomena but, rather, to the singularity of the 
perspective from which intercultural (epistemic, political, ethical) relations 
are being conceived. We should dispel from the outset the suspicion that 
“interculturalidad” is just another name for what in the U.S. is called “multi-
culturalidad” (in Spanish) or “multiculturalism” (in English). To avoid mis-
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understanding and false alarms, it should be said ﬁrst that the meanings 
of “interculturalidad” and “multiculturalism” are similar when used in the 
discourse of the state. The differences are historical. That is, they lie in how 
multiculturalism and interculturalidad, as seen from the perspective of the 
state, have been formed.
 Multiculturalism is, in the U.S., an updated version of the “melting pot.” 
Both terms have been prompted by massive immigration transforming the 
U.S. society. However, the “melting pot” refers to a society transformed by 
European immigration at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the 
twentieth centuries, while “multiculturalism” refers to a society transformed 
by massive migration from the Third World and by the internal transforma-
tion prompted by the Civil Rights movement at the end of the 1960s. The 
differences between “multiculturalism” in the U.S. and “interculturalidad” 
used from the perspective of the state in Ecuador or Bolivia are based on the 
conﬁguration of the ethnoracial maps in those countries.
 In the U.S., the ﬁrst three sides of the ethnoracial pentagon were formed 
by the colonial history of Native Americans, African slaves, and European 
Protestant Whites. To this basis was added the largely Catholic and Jewish 
European immigration of the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of 
the twentieth centuries. The ﬁfth side of the pentagon has been added since 
1970, with the extensive immigration from the Third World. This is the point 
at which the “melting pot” has transformed into “multiculturalism.” Further-
more, with the sudden “visibility” of Muslim Americans since 9/11, it has 
become clear that the pentagon is being transformed by public immigration-
control policy into an ethnoracial hexagon.
 In Ecuador, and more generally in the Andean region of Latin America, 
the ethnoracial foundation was laid out by the Indians, that is, the popula-
tion under the administration of the Inca Empire, and by the Spaniards. 
Creoles/mestizos, that is, people of Spanish (or European) descent (mixed 
with “Indian blood”), became the third component of the ethnoracial 
conﬁguration. Later on, with the end of slavery, the Afro population that 
was concentrated mainly in the Caribbean began to migrate to other areas 
of Latin America, chieﬂy to the west of modern Colombia and Ecuador. The 
European immigration of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
did not greatly affect the ethnoracial composition of Ecuador. The bottom 
line is, then, that Indians (about thirty-ﬁve distinct groups) form 40 percent 
of the country’s population, estimated at around twelve million. Mestizos 
constitute another 40 percent. People of Spanish descent, that is nonmestizos, 
are calculated to be 15 percent, and people of African descent make up the 
remaining 5 percent. The meaning of interculturalidad should be understood 
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in this context. Moreover, it should be remembered that the Indian popula-
tion has a strong organization, the Confederación Nacional de Indígenas del 
Ecuador (CONAIE) and that its representatives have occupied and continue 
to occupy important positions in the government. There are thirty-three cit-
ies, at this writing, governed by indigenous leaders, and many indigenous 
people have been members of the Congress; an indigenous woman, Nina 
Pacari, was vice president of the Congress until recently (Consejo Nacional 
de Cultura del Ecuador 2000). Luis Alberto Macas, a lawyer by training, was 
very inﬂuential in the foundation of the CONAIE and is currently director 
of the Instituto Cientíﬁco de Culturas Indígenas, or ICCI-Rimmai. He is also 
the leading figure in the instrumentation of the Universidad Intercultural.90
 The government conceives of interculturalidad as a generous move 
toward the inclusion, in education as well as in other spheres of life, of the 
population that has not been included during the long years of nation build-
ing and creole/mestizo concentration of power. The university in Ecuador, 
state or private, complemented the construction of the nation-state, which, 
in Ecuador as in any other country in Latin America, North America, or 
Europe, is a uninational state. However, from the indigenous perspective, 
the Universidad Intercultural should lead toward a plurinational state. The 
aims and goals of the Universidad Intercultural, from the perspective of the 
indigenous people, are not the same as the goals and principles of the creoles/
mestizos who created the nineteenth-century university in Ecuador on the 
European Kantian-Humboldtian model.
 The Universidad Intercultural is not framed on a “campus” but dissemi-
nated throughout the country, among the communities, like a net. The nodes 
of the net are mainly in areas with high concentrations of indigenous popula-
tion. However, the university is for everybody and not for indigenous people 
only.
 All the degrees that the university offers are named in Quichua. The 
official language of all universities in Spanish America is (still) Spanish, 
although the colonial languages of the second modernity (English, French, 
and German) are, in relation to Spanish, what Spanish is to Aymara. That is, 
“valuable” knowledge nowadays is produced in English, French, or German, 
not Spanish. There are significant grammatical (not to mention historical) 
differences among these languages, but it is still “easier” to translate between 
Spanish and German than between Quichua and Spanish or German. By the 
same token, translation between Quichua and Aymara or Nahuatl is easier 
than translation between any of these languages and German or Spanish, and 
so on. As one example of the difficulty, for a speaker of modern European 
languages, the future is “in front” of the speaker, thus the possibility and the 
importance of the idea of “progress.” For Quichua or Aymara speakers, the 
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future is “behind,” because it cannot be seen. The past can be remembered 
and therefore “seen”; it is thus “in front” of you, hence the difficulty among 
Quichua or Aymara speakers of naturally inventing an idea like “progress.”
 Let’s give an example from the organization of graduate studies. The 
name of the program is “Amautai,” amauta meaning a person of wisdom in 
ancient Quichua and Aymara. The program is composed of cycles: “Amautai 
Kallari” (general wisdom, first cycle) and “Sumak Amautai” (particularized 
wisdom, second cycle, equivalent to the PhD). The first focuses on speciﬁc 
knowledges, either practical or reﬂexive. The second is devoted to the pro-
cess of researching and writing the doctoral dissertation. The two cycles are 
linked through the axis of “communitarian practice” in the sense that, while 
preparing the doctoral dissertation, the candidate has to do work in the com-
munity. The other two cycles are “Runa Yachaikuna” (cycle of indigenous 
sciences) and “Shuktak Yachaikuna” (cycle of universal sciences). The sec-
ond is seen as “complementary” to the indigenous sciences that are the main 
component of the curriculum. The ﬁrst cycle, “Runa Yachaikuna,” has as its 
main objective “to socialize indigenous knowledge to allow the students to 
consolidate their identity and to strengthen their self-valorization. That is, 
the goal is to allow student learning to be” (Boletín ICCI-RIMAI 2000: 53).91
 Tinku is an Aymara-Quichua word meaning a conflict of power, con-
trary as well as contradictory, a dialogue of feelings as well as a conceptual 
struggle, a dialogue of experiences and conceptions of life. Tinku alludes to 
physical as well as conceptual encounters that are embedded in the history of 
colonialism and, certainly, in the installation and survival of the Renaissance 
and Kantian-Humboldtian universities in the history of (Latin) America. 
The very conceptualization of the Universidad Intercultural is redirecting the 
future, and changing the path of history. It is a tinku, but now one performed 
by indigenous agents instead of one performed on them, as was the case with 
the Renaissance and Kantian-Humboldtian universities. The Universidad 
Intercultural opens up a wide range of opportunities but, above all, it makes 
possible an education from the perspective of those knowledges that have 
been subordinated and displaced in the history of the Western and colonial 
universities, from the Renaissance university to the corporate one. At this 
juncture I see two types of university for the future, and a wide range of pos-
sibility in between. I say “two types” and not “two universities.” Each type 
may have a variety of manifestations, but there is a “difference” between the 
two types that cannot be transcended without serious negotiation. That dif-
ference is “the colonial difference,” which has been historically articulated in 
a wide array of conﬁgurations, through the diversity of colonial experiences. 
The two “types” of possibilities I see are the following. At one extreme is the 
potential of improving the university within the neoliberal ideals of civiliza-
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tion and democracy. That is, a society in which democracy is managed from 
above, by “skillful and efﬁcient managers,” and in which 30 percent of the 
population enjoys prosperity and the remaining 70 percent is left out of the 
social order. At the other extreme is the promise offered by the Universidad 
Intercultural as a model reproducible around the world. This type of univer-
sity is guided by the ideal of a “critical cosmopolitanism,” that is, an educa-
tion whose ﬁnal goal is to generate, simultaneously with positive knowledge 
(medicine, law, economy, technology), a critical understanding that balances 
“efficiency” and “justice,” “development” and “democracy,” “freedom,” and 
“violence to defend freedom,” and so on.
 The role of the humanities in the corporate university is larger than the 
role it may play within one history, that of the modern (European) univer-
sity. The critical role of the humanities should be involved with the criti-
cal legacies within the colonial university and the radical transformation 
being enacted by projects like the Universidad Intercultural. At this point, 
the humanities cease to be the “humanities” of the European tradition and its 
colonial legacies. They become something else, a space of “border thinking” 
and political transformation in which the Western contribution to univer-
sal knowledge is only one, as important as any other, but regional, not itself 
universal. And in the same way that the Western and modern epistemology 
and its institution, the university, built itself by absorbing and integrating 
other legacies (e.g., Arabic epistemology, so crucial to European modernity), 
the myriad subaltern knowledges around the world are a living example that 
Western legacies survive by dying in the womb of those knowledges that 
modernity itself had to subdue in order to survive as modernity. The next 
step in the transformation toward a better world, where knowledge no longer 
is controlled by corporations and imperial states and the uni-versity becomes 
a pluri-versity, can no longer emanate from Western modernity. The incom-
plete project of modernity can no longer be completed by and from the ide-
als under which European modernity was built. Modernity belongs to the 
planet, and it is up to the rest of the planet to complete the project that 
European modernity can no longer ﬁnish. The total collapse of morality 
and expertise that we have been witnessing with Enron, WorldCom, the 
Catholic Church, the IMF in Russia, Turkey, and Argentina, and the silent 
secrecy of the Pentagon and the CIA vis-à-vis 9/11 are all signs of the limits 
of Euro-American modernity. More than the accumulation of knowledge 
and an information superhighway, what is valid are new principles of under-
standing. In that regard, Western humanities can join forces with the reacti-
vated subaltern knowledges in the modern/colonial world, as the example of 
Amawtay Wasi illustrates.
IT iS Time to return to our main line of argument: learning to unlearn in order to relearn, the decoloniality of knowledge and of being, and the 
decolonial option. How are these three concepts related and how do we relate 
to them?
 First of all, the principle of learning to unlearn in order to relearn is, as 
explained in the Introduction, the starting point of Amawtay Wasi. There-
fore, it is a proposition of Indigenous philosophical and decolonial thinking. 
As neither of us is an Indian in blood or in the way of life, philosophy, or 
education, what would the consequences be of taking this principle as the 
first step? We are not trying to appropriate and expropriate the proposition 
of learning to unlearn and by so doing contribute to reactionary forces that 
would be happier if such an institution (Amawtay Wasi) did not exist and 
the traditional imperial/colonial universities (e.g., state universities) or pri-
vate and corporate ones were the only options. On the contrary, rather than 
appropriating the breakthrough, advanced by Amawtay Wasi, we submit to 
it, in the same way as other intellectuals prefer to submit to the Hegelian or 
Marxist options instead of submitting to Indian epistemology and wisdom. 
By so doing, we shift our own epistemic geography and contribute to shift-
ing the geography of reasoning and the geopolitics of knowledge. As stated 
previously, by geopolitics of knowledge, we are spatializing epistemology and 
delinking from the idea that there is only one house of knowledge, that being 
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the one built on two classical and six modern Western European imperial 
languages.
 Second, in which way does the argument advanced in this book con-
tribute to learning to unlearn and to the decoloniality of knowledge and 
being? The first chapter introduced border thinking and border epistemol-
ogy ingrained and embodied in colonial and imperial differences. It then 
framed the entire argument that was developed in two types of local histo-
ries responding to imperial local histories and Western locally based global 
designs. Central Asia and the Caucasus, on the one hand, and South Amer-
ica and the Caribbean, on the other, are not objects we studied, “applying” 
border epistemology, but are precisely the local histories from where bor-
der epistemologies emerge, very much like the local histories of Western 
Christendom transmuted into secular European philosophy and science. The 
difference is that border epistemologies around the world advance decolo-
nizing projects while Western Christian and secular epistemologies advance 
national European formations and their imperial expansion. The concept of 
“humanity” was crucial in that endeavor, since it was a key concept to clas-
sify and rank the world according to races, gender, and sexuality. Chapters 
3 and 4 describe, through the imperial and colonial differences, what needs 
to be unlearned and what the horizons are for relearning and, therefore, for 
decolonial education and agency. Chapters 5 to 7 focus on the concept of 
humanity within Western imperial histories and its complicity with the idea 
and practice of citizenship. Thus, our argument closes with a history of the 
Western modern and colonial university, on the one hand, and the break-
through, the discontinuity introduced by Amawtay Wasi.
 Border epistemologies, very much like Western hegemonic and terri-
torial ones, emerge from political, epistemic, and ethical needs. Territorial 
epistemology directly and indirectly contributed to found and consolidate 
the modern/imperial world order, the diversity of local histories that had to 
deal with the encroachment of Western political, economic, epistemic, and 
subject (trans)formation, where the need to emancipate, liberate, and decol-
onize becomes a question of fighting for human dignity that Western impe-
rial ambitions needed to negate to advance the project of one world united 
by one global design. Border epistemology should be distinguished from 
anti-Western and anticapitalist doing and thinking. Anti-Western options 
are forms of resistance, while border epistemologies, in and from different 
local histories confronting imperial Western designs, not only oppose but 
mainly think forward, imagining and building a pluriversal and nonimperial 
world order(s). Thus, learning to unlearn becomes the starting point of bor-
der epistemologies and border epistemologies are the origination for delink-
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ing from what hegemonic education tells us (all of us) to learn and for what, 
instead of claiming for recognition and inclusion.
 We have been working on the final version of this book during the finan-
cial and economic crisis that shook the world. We are not economists. But 
the crisis is not just an economic and financial problem to be solved by econ-
omists, bankers, and presidents of the G8 or the G20, or the G8 and the 
“emerging countries.” It is a civilizational crisis that affects all levels of life, 
and crisis is also a good time for initiating the rethinking and delinking 
from the neoliberal model that has demonstrated its complete failure. As the 
economy has become increasingly the guiding horizon of Western civiliza-
tion, subjectivities were formed and transformed according to economic and 
financial values based on the belief that development (that is, increasing pro-
duction) is the road to freedom because it offers more options to people, but 
these options are of the same kind and in the same sphere of belief and val ues: 
Happiness has been tied to consumption and accumulation. Development is 
supposed to put more money in the pockets of people, from the multimil-
lion-dollar salary of the CEO to the working class and the middle class—the 
entire spectrum of society dancing in the happiness of an infinite growth.
 Instead we have been arguing for decolonial options. While development 
argues for increasing economic options, decoloniality argues that develop-
ment is the latest rhetoric of modernity and the new modulation of colo-
niality. The question then is not how to make development work for all, to 
defend globalization or save capitalism. The argument of the book focuses 
on particular cases in which the civilization model has been analyzed from 
the margin of developed countries before the crisis, to be sure but in retro-
spect, in instances that were already signs of a nonsustainable world order 
structured, over the past five hundred years, on the making and remaking 
of imperial and colonial differences. If the management and control of econ-
omy within the colonial matrix of power established hierarchies on the bases 
of material wealth manifested in buildings, banks, corporations, institutions, 
monuments, museums, universities, and above all, national reserves, the dis-
courses naturalizing such a world order and forming subjectivities perme-
ated all other spheres of the colonial matrix: management and control of 
knowledge, subjectivities (citizens and consumers), and gender/sexuality. 
The financial crisis that started in 2008, and in 2011 affected the core of the 
system (The European Union and the U.S.), is another indication that the 
West (meaning the core of the EU and the U.S.) can no longer control the 
colonial matrix of power. The international dispute of our time is, indeed, 
for liberation, be it at the level of the States (cf. the BRIC countries) who are 
disputing who controls the matrix; or be it at the level of the political soci-
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ety (e.g., decolonial social movements and projects, like The Zapatistas and 
La Vía Campesina), which is aiming to delink from the colonial matrix of 
power. 
 What options are available to imagining a world beyond the colonial 
matrix of power? The world is linked today by a common conception of 
what the economy is and should be, let us call it “capitalism.” The struggle 
takes place at the interstate level and centers on the control of authority. Iran 
and Venezuela base their strength on oil and dispute the control of author-
ity in the name of Islam and Socialism of the twenty-first century, respec-
tively. Bolivia joins forces but with a different claim: indigenous concepts of 
life, and therefore of politics and economy to move toward nonindividual-
istic, non-self-serving model, not governed by success through competition 
and killing, which is ingrained in Western conceptions under the name of 
democracy. China and India, two countries that account for half the popula-
tion of the world, have been moving toward political disobedience in rela-
tion to Washington, the European Union in the Doha Round, and joining 
other emerging countries (Brazil, Australia, Mexico, South Africa) in rejec-
tion of the G8 plan for emission control. However, beyond the interstate 
system and the transstate network of the corporations, the novelty in the 
past thirty or so years is the growing forces of the global political society (i.e., 
the social movements). While the civil society has remained dependent and 
obedient to the dictates of the states, the corporations, and the supporting 
international institutions (UN, IMF, World Bank), the political society began 
to delink, to disobey the uniform conception of life based on individual 
success, accumulation, gains, growth of the GNP (Gross National Product), 
securing consumers to buy commodities with the single function to increase 
gains for the makers of these commodities, who, to do so, need to exploit 
labor, destroy the natural balance of Pachamama/Gaia as a living organ-
ism, and invent, in a very creative manner, the financial structures based on 
subprime mortgages that generated the most dramatic expanded moment 
for the majority of about 30 percent of the global population who “benefit” 
from a philosophical conception of life based on overproduction and over-
consumption. For the rest of the world population, about 70 percent, the 
changes are not significant: They have been living under the level of poverty, 
increasingly, since 1820, the symbolic date of the Industrial Revolution and 
the splendid takeoff of Western civilization and industrial production.
 All of this is what needs to be unlearned in order to relearn and to imag-
ine a world not driven by the survival of the fittest in a society created by a 
handful of people, who constructed a world for the fittest and defined fit-
ness according to their own will to power. The fact is that the majority of the 
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population, who are not interested in the will to power, suffered the conse-
quences of a world in which the will to power was naturalized. The time has 
come to build a world according to the needs and visions of those who are 
not driven by the will to power and the survival of the fittest.
 The decolonial option proposes and promotes social organizations glob-
ally interconnected but not globally dominant or hegemonic, based on coop-
eration rather than competition, and on a horizon in which institutions are 
at the service of life rather than life at the service of institutions. Today, for 
example, the restructuring of the state and “saving” the capitalist economy 
are the two main concerns, at the expense of life in general, not only of 
human beings but of life of which human beings share in minimal propor-
tion because life is much and very much larger than just human life.
 It has been reported that, in industrialized countries, the crisis motivated 
people to go to church and find comfort in religion. Religious movements 
have been also instrumental in supporting people in stressful situations. 
However, religious options created by the need of the people do not nec-
essarily match and correspond to the religious options promoted by the 
theologians (the Pope or theologians of liberation) in their will to help. If 
the papacy shares some features with liberal and democratic government 
and institutions concerned with “the end of poverty,” theologians of lib-
eration share some features with NGOs: NGOs present themselves as sav-
iors, but the vision of NGOs seldom coincides with the vision of the people 
and communities they want to help. NGOs are embedded in the rhetoric of 
modernity, while the communities they are helping are victims of the logic 
of coloniality.
 Another option is Marxism. As we stated previously, in Russian and 
Soviet ex-colonies, Marxism has become a difficult and complex option—
contrary to the West, where it still has some purchase. Because of lack of 
information and the continuing zombification by the rhetoric of modernity 
and its binary division into right and left, these people have not yet perceived 
the decolonial option as a viable alternative, as it is, for example, for the 
countries of South America, where colonial Marxism (i.e., Marxism trans-
planted into the history of countries in which Amerindians and peasants live 
at the margins of industrialization and the formation of an industrial work-
ing class) has been in crisis for at least three decades.
 Learning to unlearn, delinking from the naturalized conception of life 
that has been increasingly dominant in the past five hundred years, is the 
starting point of decolonial agency and thinking. The decolonial option 
emerges from that horizon. But, contrary to existing options based on uni-
versal assumptions and the drive to collect adepts as members of the insti-
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tution (Christianity in its various forms, liberalism in its many variants, 
Marxism in all its modulations, Islamism in its different manifestations), the 
decolonial option does not offer a readymade horizon, like the options just 
mentioned: The decolonial option starts from delinking, learning to unlearn 
that the objectivity and truth without parentheses in which universal options 
are grounded, have been exhausted. The decolonial option is not a new uni-
versal, a convenient project for the future but, on the contrary, a starting 
point where the future has to be made in the process of learning to unlearn. 
This is precisely what the Zapatistas meant in their dictum: a world in which 
many worlds will coexist.
 We are not offering a blueprint of how to learn to unlearn, because learn-
ing to unlearn is the constant process of delinking rather than a revolutionary 
act. The modern concept of revolution is being displaced by the transmod-
ern and decolonial process of delinking and rebuilding (to relearn). We are 
ourselves in the process of unlearning, conceptualizing new categories of 
analysis that would not be infected by the rhetoric of modernity, but it is a 
difficult task and an open field that we invite everyone to join. Our book was 
one of the first attempts at learning to unlearn.
 Since our anchor has been Amawtay Wasi, we do not imply that learn-
ing to unlearn is a process limited to the academy and higher education. To 
start with, Amawtay Wasi, as we explained, is a different type of academy, 
an other university, which is not competing on the same level as the mod-
ern and corporate universities are competing with each other (to get more 
grants, to have more students, national and international, to promote devel-
opment, etc). Rather it is moving in a different direction, shifting the history 
of the university toward the needs of people who do not partake of the idea 
that rewards and recognition should be based on money and political posi-
tion. If the bourgeoisie was the ethno-class that emancipated itself from the 
monarchs (European monarchs) and the Christian European church, we are 
living at the time in which the global political society is no longer contained 
in one ethno-class governed predominantly by males, but in a world in 
which the human dignity of the damné is at stake. The main social actors in 
the present and pointed toward the future are the many decolonial projects 
designed and enacted by the global political society, whose members share 
more than gender or ethnicity—the commonality of the colonial wound that 
makes them/us less human or less able to take their/our destiny in their/our 
own hands.
 Learning to unlearn is an activity and thinking processes taking place 
not merely in the sphere of higher learning but in all spheres of life. The 
Zapatistas have a lot to offer, in a different domain of the social, the same 
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way as Amawtay Wasi has in the sphere of higher education (Universidad de 
la Tierra). We made several passing references to the Zapatistas throughout 
the book. We would like to close by invoking the four domains in which 
the Zapatistas initiated, in their own movement, the process of learning to 
unlearn in order to relearn.
 The first one, in random order, was initiated by the “urban intellectuals,” 
such as Rafael Guillen, a group of Mexican activists who went to the Lacan-
don Jungle in the mid-1980s. In that process, Rafael Guillen became sub-
comandante Marcos and understood (learning to unlearn) that the Marxist 
ideals of the urban intellectuals were of little significance to communities 
who have been in the struggle for five hundred years, much before, and in 
a different context from, the Industrial Revolution in Europe and the emer-
gence of the ethno-class of proletarians. Learning to unlearn was followed 
by a long and creative process—for and by the urban intellectuals—of learn-
ing to relearn. The teachers or better yet the people of wisdom were Indians 
from the south of Mexico, of the Maya region and Mayan languages. In other 
words, the people who have been classified from the initial days of the con-
quest as humanly deficient and in need of “learning” what Christians had to 
teach them, became the teachers. ‘Governing by obeying at the same time” 
is simply a political treatise that is being unfolded in the very deeds of the 
Zapatistas.
 From this political treatise, “Juntas de Buen Gobierno” or “Los Cara-
coles” emerged (González Casanova 2006). The name of this decolonial 
organization invokes the initial step taken by Guaman Poma de Ayala, in the 
Viceroyalty of Peru/Tawantinsuyu in his by now well-known historiographi-
cal and political treatise, Nueva Coronica y Buen Gobierno. “Los Caracoles” 
is just the enactment of the radical and decolonial political treatise in one 
sentence. Indians/Mexicans now have the option of managing their own life 
and destiny rather than casting votes for Mexican presidents who will ignore 
them and prevent them from taking their life into their own hands. That is 
they are learning to unlearn, delinking, in order to relearn, re-exist.
 Correlative and complementary to the political principle and its enact-
ment, is another well-known and powerful Zapatistas’s statement: “Because 
we are all equal, we have the right to be different.” The dictum shifts the 
naturalized Western modern (Christian and secular) hegemonic idea that, 
since we are all equal and humans, we should forget the differences. Such 
principles go badly with the very practice of Christian and liberal deeds, 
where differences are always repressed, suppressed, disavowed in their sup-
port for a homogeneous world that guards the interest of the global bour-
geois ethno-class.
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 Last but not least (and introduced in “La segunda campaña”) is the 
Zapatistas’ reversal of any missionary will of conversion into existing ide-
ologies (Christianity, liberalism, Marxism, Islamism) and their emphasis on 
the open orientations of decolonial options. This principle was expressed as 
“Andar preguntando” rather than “andar predicando” (“walking while ask-
ing rather than walking and conversing”). It should be understood as bi- or 
pluridirectionally. In other words, it is not a privilege of the Zapatistas to ask 
questions while walking, focusing on what the Zapatistas are interested in 
and preventing other “walkers” (i.e., the actors of converging but different 
decolonial projects) to do the same. If the process of asking while walking 
was unidirectional, it would not be a contribution to learning to unlearn but, 
rather, an enactment of missionary principles, only giving a false impression 
of contesting them. Learning to unlearn in order to relearn is a difficult pro-
cess due to the fact that Western modernity is inscribed in all of us (West-
erners or non-Westerners). But it is already an ongoing process enacted by 
many of us, because while recognizing that modernity is in all of us, we also 
recognize that coloniality is constitutive of modernity. Western contributions 
to world history must be celebrated, but the self-appointed role of mod-
ern actors and institutions to demand that the rest of the world follow their 
example has been and will always be totally illegitimate. The emerging global 
political society is responding to this false demand in a variegated process of 
delinking, learning to unlearn, and engaging in relearning.
amawtay Wasi, Universidad 
intercultural de los Pueblos y 
naciones indigenas del ecuador1
The Political Trajectory
The political process that eventually created UIAW (Universidad Intercul-
tural Amawtay Wasi) goes back to the 70s when “los pueblos originarios” in 
the Américas, and in the world, began a new stage in their long-lasting strug-
gles (500 years in the Américas, 300 years in New Zealand, Australia, Africa, 
and Asia) to survive under the increasing pressure of Western imperial Pow-
ers (Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, France, England, the U.S.). Amawtay 
Wasi emerged from specific local histories of the Andean regions that were 
conquered first by the Spaniards and that lately are engaged in political, mili-
tary, and economic entanglement with the U.S. Above all, it depended on the 
Euro-centered categories of knowledge, institutions of learning, and social 
actors that, in Ecuador, provide the local continuity of global designs under 
the rhetoric of modernity, progress, and development.
 1. The diagrams are here reproduced in black and white. In the original version, the col-
ors are very important. Red invokes planet earth, orange—culture and society; yellow suggests 
energy and strength and sustains the moral principles of Andean runa (human being in the 
West); white points toward time becoming, the permanent transformation of the world (physi-
cal constitution) and society (politics, ethics, economy). Green appeals to the economy and the 
nurturing of life, the territory that includes the soil, the sky, and the air. The color blue calls 
for the cosmic space, and violet evokes the political and ideological spheres. Interested readers 
should consult the Amawtay Wasi web page.
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 In this most recent cycle of struggles, land claims acquired priorities in 
the 70s, followed by claims of linguistic and cultural rights. However, toward 
the end of the 70s, Indigenous intellectuals and political leaders understood 
that without claiming epistemic rights, the previous claims were subject to 
arguments based on epistemic principles of Western epistemologies. They 
understood that it was not possible to go very far thinking with the tools of 
the master, so to speak.
 Thus Amawatay Wasi was born not from the idea that Indigenous people 
also shall have a university following the model of European institutions 
adopted and adapted by the Creole elite in Ecuador. On the contrary, it was 
born from the idea that they needed to have their own educational institu-
tions, just as their ancestors had. For why would Indigenous societies have 
an education based on the education of the ancestors of Creole and Mestizos 
of European Origin? Only a Western prejudice that Greek and Roman ances-
tors are the universal model could deny the Indigenous the right to orga-
nize education responding to their needs and not to the needs of Creole and 
Mestizos, as it is the case today in the Andes, in all South America, in New 
Zealand and Australia, and in the U.S. and Canada. However, the creation 
of educational institutions was disrupted by the direct invasion of Spanish 
conquerors and, during the republic period, by French, German, British, 
and U.S. ideas mediated by the Creole elite that created the republic, the 
nation-state, and the university, emulating the Renaissance and the Kantian-
Humboldtian model.
 Amawtay Wasi emerged at the confluence and entanglement of political 
and cosmological ways of thinking and doing, of being in the world in the 
Andes and in Europe. Politically, the Andes (and the ancient Tawantinsuyu, 
which is somewhat analogous to ancient Greece), have been constantly dis-
rupted in its social and economic organization by the social and economic 
organization of the Spaniards directly, and indirectly, with the emerging 
imperial states since the eighteenth century. All of them replaced Incas by 
incorporating Spanish institutions, concepts, and socio-economic organiza-
tions. However, what was replaced was indeed displaced, and it never died: 
it is alive and well in the Andes. Amawtay Wasi is a consequence of that 
long-lasting survival of the displaced, and that means that Amawtay Wasi is 
not a return to the past. Such return is impossible, and Indigenous peoples 
know that better than non-Indigenous peoples accusing the Indians of want-
ing to live in the past. That is not the point for most of Indigenous visions 
of the future, a future of which they will take control rather than waiting for 
a future made for them by new colonial programs (like development). In 
such case, Indigenous cosmologies must be articulated with Western cos-
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mologies (the mixture of ideas coming from Greece and Rome, through 
the Renaissance and the Enlightenment), and Western cosmologies had to 
be subsumed within Indigenous ones. And that is precisely what Amawtay 
Wasi intends to do: to appropriate and subsume whatever can be appropri-
ated and subsumed into their needs, vision, philosophy, and way of life, from 
the Western archive and contribution to human civilization. Subsuming does 
not mean replacing, and therefore inverting, what the Spaniards directly did 
and then what the French, British, and U.S. indirectly did. It means that the 
present articulation of Indigenous cosmologies in the future will coexist with 
the Euro –U.S. cosmology in their diversity. It means that now there are two 
types of options, whereas for 500 years only one was presented as diverse—
the diversity of sameness. The mirage of diversity in the struggles remains 
the same: the struggles of secular against sacred forces, and the struggles 
between the left and the right within secular political parties. But all such 
belief was within Western cosmology adopted and adapted by Creoles and 
Mestizo elites.
 Epistemically and philosophically, the process was similar and parallel 
to political processes. Amawtay Wasi is neither an adaptation of Western 
university structure nor a return to the education of the Incanate. It simply 
requires common sense to understand that for better or worse we are living 
in a world built and dominated by Western institutions, actors, and catego-
ries of thought. However, domination (and even hegemony) is not equivalent 
to the totalization of the totality. That is, domination and hegemony give 
only the impression that there is no way out. Amawtay Wasi is showing us 
that there are ways out by delinking from the entanglement and building 
an-other option. By building an-other option, we learn that the dominant or 
hegemonic is only an option that convinced us that it was not an option but 
the one and only truth. The academic structure of Amawtay Wasi was mod-
eled on the idea of “centers or nodes of knowledge/wisdom” that comes from 
the ancestry of Andean civilizations: the center or node of political knowl-
edge/wisdom, Atiy.
 In the presentation of Amawtay Wasi, in the publication Boletin ICCI-
Rimai (Publicacion del Instituto Cientifico de Culturas Indigenas), it is spec-
ified that:
The university was established to be a space of both reflection and action, 
and grew out of a project of the nationalities and peoples of Ecuador and 
of all Abya Yala (the Americas). Our university works towards the decolo-
nization of knowledge and is committed to reconstructing the concept and 
meaning of intercultural knowledge. The UIAW is an intercultural project 
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whose purpose is to serve as a foundation stone in construction of a pluri-
national state and an intercultural society. (http://www.amawtaywasi.edu.
ec/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=23&Itemid= 
34&lang=en).
What was and is the Americas in the frame of Western knowledge was and is 
Abya Yala in the frame of Indigenous knowledge. They coexist. The need to 
decolonize knowledge, mentioned above, and the need to create intercultural 
knowledge, arise from the awareness that the mirage of epistemic universal-
ity since the European Renaissance was indeed imperial knowledge, a type of 
knowledge and subjectivity (way of being) that is becoming unsustainable by 
the minute as we have been witnessing in the years 2007–2011.
 Amawtay Wasi was born in the frame of the history of Indigenous strug-
gles for liberation since the sixteenth century. Currently, Amawtay Wasi is 
anchored in and supported by (jointly and separately) the Confederation of 
Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), the Scientific Institute of 
Indigenous Cultures (ICCI), and Amawta Runakunapak Yachay (ARY). The 
decision to create a House of Wisdom, higher education based on Indige-
nous cosmology instead of Western cosmology, emerged from the awareness 
that unless they controlled their own knowledge, Indigenous peoples would 
fail in claiming Indigenous rights. It became clear that the axis upon which 
Indigenous peoples work to liberate themselves from the chain of the Creole 
and Mestizo State is their own education, not a claim that they have the right 
to be educated by the State that oppresses them. The recovery of land and 
territories, the reconstitution of Indigenous nationalities and memories, are 
unthinkable without a structure of knowledge based on Indigenous episte-
mology that supports the advocacy to obtain Western knowledge. Anchored 
in the colonial State and University, Western knowledge prevents Indigenous 
peoples from reconstituting a fractured civilization, but the knowledge at 
the service of imperial/colonial expansion is reproduced through internal 
colonialism. Amawtay Wasi is showing us that it is necessary and possible to 
delink, epistemically, politically, and subjectively. And it is showing us how 
this can be done, not as a universal model, but as one of the roads to pluriv-
ersal futures.
 The antecedents in the struggle to consolidate autonomous structure of 
education can be traced back to the 30s and 40s in Ecuador and Bolivia, but, 
more specifically, 12 November 1996 remains a key moment. That very day, 
the first meeting toward the organization of Amawtay Wasi took place at the 
office of Dr. Luis Macas, at that point holding the office of National Deputy of 
the Government of Ecuador. The process began. Committees were formed, 
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and a working project was structured during the subsequent months. Three 
workshops were held with the participation of Indigenous organizations, 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous ONGs, intellectuals, professionals, and offi-
cers of the State. By 1998, the first projects of Amawtay Wasi were laid out 
in six volumes, and it was agreed that the managers of such projects will be 
the CONAIE and the ICCI. The project was then presented to the National 
Parliament that very year. And the official process began.
ethics of education, epistemic Structure, and 
Political Orientation
We will make several disclaimers before entering the epistemic foundation 
and the system of ideas that animates and structures Amawtay Wasi.
 It is called “University.” As such, it is connected to the tradition of Euro-
pean universities at the same time delinking from them. Its foundation is 
neither Christianity (medieval and renaissance university), nor the Kantian-
Humboldtian university inaugurated during the Enlightenment; even less 
the corporate university that, in the West, subsumes the Christian and the 
Kantian-Humboldtian legacies, a story we summarized in Chapter 7. Amaw-
tay Wasi is a case of border thinking par excellence: revamping Indigenous 
cosmologies and ways of life by subsuming European contributions into 
their own models. Border thinking means that precisely—that the restitution 
of disavowed and broken knowledge had to be articulated in the idiom of the 
invaders (Spanish, French, Portuguese, English, Italian, German, as the case 
may be in the past 500 years), but no longer in their language, their episte-
mology, and their institution, even if the name is appropriated. Decoloniality 
needs border thinking. Both are necessary conditions for delinking from the 
mirage of imperial thinking and being. Amawatay Wasi is indeed a radi-
cal delinking from the history of the Renaissance/Kantian-Humboldtian/ 
Corporate University of the Western world. That delinking is expressed in 
one of the processes through which students had to go: learning to unlearn 
in order to relearn.
 What is the genealogy of Amawtay Wasi, if it is not Greco-Roman or 
coming from the Renaissance and the Enlightenment? This genealogy stems 
from the Southern Cross. As we explained in the introduction and chapter 
7, there is a correlation between the Southern Cross, Tawantinsuyu, and the 
conceptual structure of Amawtay Wasi. Like Tawantinsuyu, Amawtay Wasi 
added a center to the four parts composing the structure. In Tawantinsuyu it 
was Cuzco, the belly of the world. For Amawtay Wasi it is Kawsay (wisdom, 
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life, plenitude, estar siendo). The very foundation of the Amawtay Wasi con-
ceptual structure is a combination of the Chacana and the four elements 
of life: water, fire, air, land. At the center is life. But life is not an entity: it 
comes out of the relations between the four elements which, in their turn, 
find their distinctiveness not by their essence but by their mutual interrela-
tions. For this reason, Indigenous ontology is relational, but it radically dif-
fers from the Western claim for relational ontology. Relational ontology is a 
Western response to Western essential ontology, the ontology of Being (Hei-
degger) that encountered its critique in Levinas (the ontology of relations, 
the face to face, the dialogue). Indigenous relational ontology comes from 
their own ancestral epistemology parallel but unrelated until the arrival of 
Spanish missionaries, who brought with them the ancestral Greek epistemol-
ogy based on the essence of objects, ideas, and denotation; not of relation but 
of denotation.
 The Amawtay Wasi conceptual structure consists in layers of the same 
basic structure shown in figure 1. What changes in each case are the four 
components and the characteristics that the center acquires in relation to 
those specific components. Thus one can imagine that “on top” of the “four 
elements of life” the basic categorial structure of Amatay Wasi consists in the 
four nodes of learning.
 The overall structure thus consists in these four nodes of institutes (see 
figure 2):
Yachay: wisdom, knowledge, epistemic training
Munay: love, passion, intuition
Ruray: doing, experiencing, and building
Ushuay: potency, energy, power
 The four nodes organize ancestral knowledge of Indian, not Western, 
cosmology. Greeks and Romans have nothing to add here, or, in any case, not 
as a model or influence but as inconvenience: Amawtay Wasi has no choice 
but to define itself, and redefine indigenous ancestral knowledge, in relation 
to the Western ancestral knowledge. The reverse is not true: Europe does not 
have to respond to Indigenous knowledge to re-invent itself. Or, if it does, it 
is to dismiss any epistemology that is alien to Western epistemology. Thus, 
modeled on the Southern Cross, we have the node of political knowledge, 
or Ushay; the node of spiritual knowledge, or Munay; the node of practical 
knowledge, or Ruray; and the node of technical/technological knowledge, or 
Yachay. At the center of the four nodes, or the Center of the centers, is Kaw-
say—wisdom, life, humanity, and culture.
FIgure 1
FIgure 2
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 Now, crucial to academic and scholarly organization is the principle of 
vincularidad. This principle is vital for understanding the Indigenous rela-
tional epistemology. How to translate this term? Sometimes it appears as 
“relational,” but that translation is confusing, for “relational ontology” is 
already a concept that moves away from both ontology and dialogism and 
focuses on relational ontology as the foundation of complex structures. But 
that definition is still within Western debates. “Vincularidad” shall then be 
translated as co-relationality—connections between the four nodes and, 
above all, connections with the center upon which each and all of the nodes 
depend. The expression “vincularidad como ser,” which appears in figure 3, 
is indeed a difficult expression to translate. It means that being is constituted 
by and in vincularidad. The concept of “being” is maintained and is at the 
same time radically transformed when transplanted from Western to Indig-
enous ways of thinking and of “being.” Thus, as the figure makes clear, “vin-
cularidad como ser” (at the center) emerges from the correlations between 
“complementarity,” “reciprocity,” “correspondence,” and “proportionality.” A 
phenomenology of Being, as found in Continental philosophy, is unthink-
able in any Indigenous languages and structures of thought. Seen in this 
light, the diagram is still abstract. But when we project “vincularidad” on 
the four nodes and the respective center, it acquires all its epistemic poten-
tial. Thus each node is interrelated with the agro-ecological, and vitally and 
organizationally with the four elements of Pachamama—air, fire, land, and 
water—and, furthermore, with the four basic symbolic colors of Tawantin-
suyu—red, yellow, green, and blue. The four basic colors correspond to the 
four “suyus” of Tawantinsuyu. Qollasusyu, on the West and the Pacific, is 
blue (water); Antisuyu, in the Northeast, the jungle, is green; Chinchaysuyo, 
in the North, the desert region with strong sunlight, is yellow; and Collasuyu, 
in the Southeast, the region of argillaceous earth or land, is red.
 When it comes to the four nodes of knowledge, the interconnections cre-
ate pairing on each side of the nodes. And so we have in the node of Yachay/
Widsom/Knowledge the challenge of Interculturality that interconnects 
Yachay with Ushay. On the other hand, we have the challenge of the Cosmo-
vision that interrelates Yachay with Munnay. At its turn, Munay interrelated 
with Ruray take us to the ecological challenge: to make the habitat livable. 
In correspondence, Ruray and Ushay present the challenge of technoscience. 
Now, Ushay (and any of the four nodes) is interrelated with the nodes next 
to it; for example, Ushay interrelated with Yushay presents the challenge of 
interculturality, whereas when interrelated with Ruray, it takes us to the chal-
lenge of technoscience. Thus we enter a house of knowledge where neither 
the sense of being in one single domain nor the sense of Western holism 
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obtains. In this house, the wholes and the parts belong to one specific episte-
mology. We enter a house of wisdom whose components come from a non-
Western cosmovision, knowledge, wisdom, and way of life, but always in 
forced relation with it (which is another dimension of Indigenous relational 
epistemology that was not in place or needed before the Spanish invasion 
and, in other part of the world, before the French, British or U.S. invasion 
and intervention. That both systems have been entangled for 500 years, and 
that one dominates over the other, does not mean that Indigenous cosmolo-
gies should continue to surrender to something that is not their own. Why 
would Indigenous or any other non-Western peoples have to live as others 
want them to live? To understand the ethical dimension of this observation, 
it is suffice to remember many situations in which a Western person would 
say “I do not want to live as the communists want me to live!” Well, the 
reverse is also true. There is no reason to pretend that it is the true and the 
preferable. Furthermore, the curricular structures and the five-year program 
FIgure 3
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make sure that students also understand the relations between Ruray and 
Yashay (complementarity between knowing and doing), Ushay and Munay 
(correspondence between power and love), Proportionality between Inter-
culturality, and Reciprocity between Cosmovision and Technology.
 Let us come back to Amawtay Wasi. Each node in itself has its own 
goal, beyond the interrelation that each node has with the other nodes (e.g., 
Yushay–Ushay and Yushay–Munay). Thus the main goal of Yushay–Munay 
(Wisdom, Knowledge, Cosmovision), in complementarity, is to strengthen 
the identity (linguistic, cultural, spiritual, memory) of Nacionalidades 
y Pueblos Indigenas. Training is offered in Cultural Knowledge, History, 
Psycho-pedagogy, Health, and Intercultural Medicine. The training person-
nel of this center is composed of Uwishining, Yachaks, Shamans, Midwives, 
and Cultural Trainers.
 Ruray–Munay (to do, to experience, and to build) is the economic node. 
The goal of this node is the organization of the economic structure of indig-
enous communities and the formation of micro-organizations run by the 
families and the communities. Students are trained in agro-ecology, sustain-
able tourism, economic principles, and economic administration. This node 
is governed by a Council of Amawtas and formed by personnel from the 
communities in charge of the administration and organization of communal 
economy.
 Ushay–Yushay (Energy, Potency, Power, Interculturality) is in charge of 
education dedicated to the political strengthening of Nacionalidad y Pueblos 
Indígenas in their respective and relevant organizations. The goals are the 
advancement of plurinational societies; the conformation of cultural autono-
mies; the consolidation of territorialities; counseling to local governments; 
and the conceptualization and unfolding of Indigenous Law and Indigenous 
Legal Administration.
 Ruray–Ushay (experiencing, doing, potency, energy) is oriented toward 
the expansion of technological learning in the communities. It is related to 
the organization of the territories and the construction and building of infra-
structures, with training in architecture and engineering. It is governed by 
a Council of Amawtas formed by Indigenous builders, textile makers, gold-
smiths, and communication–technology experts.
in SUmmary, Amawtay Wasi focuses on the following basic needs for decol-
onization of knowledge and generation of decolonial knowledge. The center 
of the entire project is life and “learning to be,” a term that refers to the long 
experience in which Indigenous peoples have been treated as inferior and 
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of inferior knowledge. Amawtay Wasi has begun a long process to redress 
what was unjustly disregarded and how the people were mistreated. Thus 
decolonization of knowledge and of being goes through wisdom/knowledge 
(science); knowing to do (technology); knowing to be/ser (individual and 
the community); knowing to be/estar (service, society, community); and har-
mony and balance (with nature) to live in plenitude (buen vivir). All four 
trajectories centered on Kawsay (plenitude, life, wisdom). Decolonization of 
knowledge and of being, to which Amawtay Wasi is contributing, consists 
in delinking from Western epistemology (essential ontology and relational 
ontology) and rebuilding an Indigenous, relational ontology that puts life 
above institutions and above the myth that development and growth lead to 
freedom and happiness. 
 Figure 4 summarizes the Strategies and the four formative levels. The 
Strategies consist of Challenges (Desafios), Competences (Capacidades), and 
Approaches (Enfoques). The three of them constitute the General Proposal 
of Amawtay Wasi. The four formative levels are:
•	 Learning to think by communal doing
•	 Learning to learn
•	 Learning to unlearn in order to relearn
•	 Learning to undertake
 Amaway Wasi is today (January of 2012) well and running. It has become 
an important point of reference contributing to numerous new beginnings: 
higher education is in the hands of the people who have had until now to sub-
mit to the higher education managed by actors and institutions that denied 
them the right to think on their own. Memories are local and cannot be con-
trolled by global designs. When global designs attempt to control memories 
that are not the memories of the actors and institutions upon which global 
designs are imagined and enacted, they become imperial modes of domina-
tion; designs to induce or force people to live according to the desires and 
designs based on the memories that are not theirs. Learning to unlearn in 
order to relearn is precisely this kind of project: the project of the people who 
become epistemically and politically disobedient, who realize that knowl-
edge cannot be framed and packaged in the bags of Greece, Rome, France, 
Germany, England, and the U.S. This is of course a very important genealogy 
of thought and memories for Euro-American citizens. But not for 80% of the 
world now close to 7 billion people. Learning to unlearn is of the essence to 
build democratic, non-imperial, non-violent, non-legally delinquent futures. 
Amawtay Wasi is a small star in the universe of new beginnings.
 FIgure 4
introduction
 1. We mean here the parallel march of the—better known in the West—coloniza-
tion of South America and the first Russian colonies in Volga region and Western Siberia. 
Moscow was declared the Third Rome in the early sixteenth century, inheriting from 
the Byzantine empire a specific providential theocratic imperial consciousness, with the 
state viewed as a metaphysical principle of sacred cosmology. The sixteenth century also 
brought the ascension of Ivan IV (Ivan the Terrible) as Tsar of all Russia in 1547 and the 
succeeding colonization of territories that almost equaled Europe in their size. Hernan 
Cortés managed to control the Aztec Tlatoanate in 1520, and Francisco Pizarro did the 
same in the Andes, taking over and dismantling the Incanate. When Philip II replaced his 
father, Charles I, as King of Castile, he initiated a well-thought-out managerial project to 
organize the Spanish possessions in Indias Occidentales. In the meantime, Portugal was 
following suit in managing its Brazilian possessions.
 2. For the colonization of time and the invention of the Middle Ages, see Dagenais 
and Greer (2000). For the transformation of barbarians in space into primitives in time, 
see Walter D. Mignolo, “Coloniality at Large: Time and the Colonial Difference” In Time 
in the Making and Possible Futures. (Rio de Janeiro, Unesco—ISSC—Educam, 2000), 
237–73.
 3. For the complete cycle of learning and a summary of the political process that led 
to the foundation of Amawtay Wasi and its overall philosophy, see the appendix in this 
volume. Information on Amawtay Wasi can be found in the Internet. There is a publica-
tion by UNESCO, in Quichua, Spanish, and English, (Amawtay Wasi. Sumak Yachaypi, 
Alli Kawsaypipash Yachakuna: Aprender En La Sabiduria Y El Buen Vivir = Learning 
Wisdom and the Good Way to Live. UNESCO, Universidad Intercultural Amawtay Wasi, 
2004; Catherine Walsh, 2005).
 4. The reader not familiar with Amawtay Wasi can find a more detailed description 
in the appendix of this volume.
 5. For the relevance of the concept, in Ecuador and Bolivia, related to the state and 
the rewriting of the constitution, see Catherine Walsh (2008).
 6. Along with the general meaning of shifting the geography of reason from its es-
tablished European place to other locales, what is important in Lewis Gordon’s idea is the 
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constructive criticism of the disciplinary decadence with the claims of the disciplines at 
their closed, absolute, and deontological nature, as well as the teleological suspension of 
the disciplines as the ends in themselves (Gordon 2006: 183). As a result, the thinker who 
attempts to shift the geography of reason takes a position objectively close to the philoso-
phy of education and knowledge practiced in Amawtay Wasi, which we share. It is to see 
the issues, the crucial problems to pursue, whose solving is more important than the loy-
alty to one’s discipline, method, school, or a system of knowledge. Instead of studying an 
object from the position and with the help of the instruments of different disciplines, we 
attempt to build a dialogue between different knowledges on what is knowledge as such. 
Hence, the object in the understanding of Western philosophy disappears, giving place to 
problems discussed from various positions and the question of what kind of knowledge 
we need to make the world a more fair and just place for us all.
 7. There is one institute of nanotechnology in Monterrey, Mexico, and another one 
in Brazil, but they are ancillary of similar institutes in the U.S.
 8. Chicana intellectual and activist Gloria Anzaldúa described the borders between 
Mexico and the U.S., as “una herida abierta.” We see in this metaphor, an expression of the 
global “colonial wound” inflicted by georacial classification of regions and people through 
five hundred years of Western theological and egological politics of knowledge: Racism 
is a politics of humiliation, of wounding people by making them feel inferior, both as hu-
man beings (ontological colonial difference) and as rational beings (epistemic colonial 
difference). Geo- and body politics of knowledge emerge from the colonial wound and 
not from Aristotle, Saint Thomas Aquinas, and Descartes. See Anzaldúa 1987.
 9. See, for example, decolonial arguments in business schools and in the area of 
management in South America by Eduardo Ibarra Colado (2007), in Australia by Subhab-
rata Bobby Banerjee (2008); in the area of health, between Morocco and southern Spain 
by Isabel Jiménez-Lucena (2008).
 10. There is an obvious line connecting Paulo Freyre’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed 
(1970) and Chela Sandoval’s Methodology of the Oppressed (2000). 
Chapter 1
 11. The bibliography on the concept of coloniality is extensive by now, including: a 
summary in Anibal Quijano (2000); on coloniality of knowledge, Edgardo Lander (2000); 
on coloniality of being, Enrique Dussel (1977); and on being and geopolitics of knowl-
edge, Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2008). “Coloniality” contributed to the move from Eu-
rocentered works on the sociology of knowledge toward the geopolitics of knowledge as 
decolonization . On this, see Walter Mignolo at www.incommunicado.info/node/view/18.
 12. As far as we (Madina and Walter) carried within us the memories of being born 
and raised in Moscow (with ties with Uzbekistan and Caucasus) and Argentina (with ties 
with Northern Italy), respectively, the postcolonial academic talk in the United States 
remained somewhat—and for different reasons—outside the realms of our imperial/ 
colonial experiences and our sociohistorical formation of subjectivity. Interestingly 
enough, we found in Gloria Anzaldúa (1987) and Frantz Fanon (1952) (who are nei-
ther Eruasian nor of European descent) a guide for our thoughts and reflection of our 
subjectivities.
 13. The idea that “globalization,” as understood today, is a process that starts with 
the “discovery” of America is shared by European political theorists such as Carl Schmitt 
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who, in Schmitt 2003 [1952] makes a clear distinction between the “preglobal” and the 
“global” age. “Globalization” in this view is not a human phenomenon from time im-
memorial but a historical qualitative turn in appropriation of land, massive exploitation 
of labor, and international law that is concentrated both in the hands of European and 
capitalist imperial countries.
 14. The concept of body politics of knowledge is radically different from Michel Fou-
cault’s biopolitics. While, in Foucault, biopolitics is conceived in terms of management of 
power (and is still anchored in the modern—and imperial—conception of knowledge), 
the body politics of knowledge displaces epistemology from its Eurocentric location to 
the places (geopolitics) and racialized bodies of the colonies (men and women of color, 
gays and lesbians of color, indigenous people and Muslims, Arabic and Aymara languages 
instead of Greek and Latin, etc.). “Body politics of knowledges” refers to epistemic and 
philosophical creativities in places, bodies, languages, and memories that have been dis-
qualified as thinkers and philosophers, and in this regard, shall not be confused with the 
imperial body politics of knowledge that—in seventeenth-century political theory in Eng-
land—conceived the social structure as an analogy of the human body. “Border thinking” 
refers precisely to the articulation of the displaced appropriating the global expansion of 
Western categories of thinking and principles of knowledge. Decolonial thinking emerges 
from all of this, which does not mean that all Blacks and Indians, Muslims and Aymaras, 
women and men of color endorse it. Assimilation is the alternative to decolonial thinking 
and decolonial option. See the next chapter “Theorizing from the Borders,” for a more 
detailed elaboration of this concept.
 15. There is already a significant bibliography addressing such issues. For example, 
“Double Critique: Knowledges and Scholars at Risk in Post-Soviet Societies,” edited by 
Walter Mignolo and Madina Tlostanova, South Atlantic Quarterly, 105/3, 2006; Globaliza-
tion and the Decolonial Option, special issue of Cultural Studies (21/2–3, 2007). A recent 
volume edited by Mabel Moraña, Enrique Dussel, and Carlos A. Jáuregui, Coloniality at 
Large: Latin America and the Postcolonial Debates, which clearly shows that epistemic 
universality is no longer viable in a decolonial world. In contrast, Madina Tlostanova has 
shown the differences between South America on the one hand and Central Asia and the 
Caucasus on the other (“Imperial Discourse and Post-Utopian Peripheries: Suspended 
Indigenous Epistemologies in the Soviet Non-European Ex-Colonies” 2006).
 16. For more details about these basic and important distinctions, see the special issue 
of Cultural Studies, Globalization and the Decolonial Option, edited by Walter Mignolo in 
collaboration with Aruro Escobar, 21/2/3, March 2007.
 17. Intellectuals such as Malek Bennabi (Algeria) and Abdelkhebir Khatibi (Morocco) 
devoted their works to the problems of decolonization in the sphere of knowledge and 
being (Bennabi 2003a, 2003b and Khatibi 1983). Even if French poststructuralist think-
ers developed some of their ideas in France as a consequence of the war in Algeria, their 
problems were not the same as those of Bennabi or Khatibi, but rather problems emerging 
from the regional history of Western thought. When Robert Young suggests in White My-
thologies (1990) the links between French poststructuralism and decolonizing processes 
in Algeria and Tunisia, he does so with still another (third) set of problems at hand: the 
problems set by postcolonial agendas approximately since the mid 1980s. Thus, the geo-
politics of knowledge allows us to see three regional projects, each characterized by a set 
of specific issues and questions. From a decolonial perspective (which is the fourth project 
in this scenario, emerging from historical process in South America and the Caribbean), 
none of them can be reduced to another.
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 18. We write “capital/modernity” instead of “capitalism” because the latter is a term of 
Marxist discourse while the former belongs to decolonial discourse. We make a distinc-
tion between capitalism and the colonial matrix of power. In this particular case, “capital/
modernity” links the sphere of control of an economy with the sphere of knowledge and 
subjectivity. A distinctive feature of capital/modernity is the dispensability of human lives 
disguised under the discourses of progress, development, and modernization. Capital-
ism, instead, focuses on the economic aspects and leaves aside the “cultural” dimension 
that we translate into the control of knowledge and subjectivity in the colonial matrix of 
power.
 19. David Chioni Moore suggested that we locate the post-Soviet world within the 
postcolonial realm (Moore 2001). He is quite right to point out that postcolonial scholars 
usually do not include the ex-Socialist block into the sphere of their interests and there 
are no postcolonial studies in ex-Soviet Union or former Socialist countries. But Moore 
lumps together eastern and southeastern European countries and the USSR, which have 
had distinctly different histories and imperial and colonial discourses. It might have been 
a good idea to explore the hidden reasons of why postcolonial discourses do not exist in 
the ex–Second World. To do that, it might have been important to get better acquainted 
with the actual contemporary situation in this quite diverse area. Probably, then, he would 
not put together, in a purely rhetorical way, Algeria and Ukraine or Hungary and Philip-
pines, which have very different colonial histories. What is lacking in this article, written 
from the distinctly outsider’s perspective, not at all familiar with internal cultural, lin-
guistic, religious differences, and nuances of this locale, as well as contemporary artistic/
cultural/linguistic expressions of postcolonial, postimperial, transcultural sensibilities, is 
a strong universalizing bent in trying to use the umbrella term “postcolonial,” regardless 
of possible differences (Moore 2001).
 20. What we mean by “second-class” empire can be seen today in the cases of Georgia 
and Ukraine. President Mikhail Saakashvili denounces Russia’s imperial ambitions, but he 
himself has no quarrel with joining the Western imperial designs, even if in the capacity 
of a groveler. A similar case is Ukraine. In the South American and Caribbean countries, 
the situation is radically different, because from their independence in the nineteenth 
century, they all wanted to join France and England, and now the United States, which 
form the history of Christian and liberal capitalist empires of the West.
 21. Until the beginning of the nineteenth century, “Latin America” did not exist 
and there was no such a thing as “Latin American” countries. We refer here mainly to 
the Spanish (and indirectly to the Portuguese) colonies in the New World. The Spanish 
colonies extended to today’s California and Colorado, including Texas, New Mexico, and 
to a certain point, Louisiana and Florida. It is common, however, to repeat the mistake 
of labeling the period between 1500 and 1800 “colonial Latin America.” What we have 
are “Spanish colonies in the Indias Occidentales,” sometimes also called New World and 
America.
 22. Within the socialist modernity was an internal and external civilizing and mod-
ernizing rhetoric as well. The first was intended for the Soviet non-European colonies and 
was expressed in the reinvention of the old Lenin myth that had typically Eurocentric ori-
gins of the heroic civilizing efforts of the great Russian people in backward Central Asia. 
In the 1960–1980s, it was used to divert attention from the deteriorating living standards 
by looking for an imagined enemy—the Muslim colonies that the poor Russians presum-
ably had to feed. In the external rendering, the same mythology referred to the Third 
World countries who were the objects of the continuous Western and Soviet rivalry.
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 23. For more details available in English, see an interesting though ambivalent discus-
sion on racial politics in the USSR in Slavic Review, vol. 61, no 1, spring 2002, and Kal-
pana Sahni’s book on Russian Orientalism (Sahni 1997).
 24. We could think here also of transnational corporations in a transnational unified 
economy (capital/modernity) in which contending states are moving toward a polycen-
tric capital/modernity (or capitalism in Marxist terminology). Therefore, transnational 
corporations are not undermining the state but forcing its transformation. The European 
Union is a case in point; the emerging UNASUR (the projected union of Latin American 
countries to defend their interests in front of U.S. and the European Union) is another. 
Therefore, the argument that opposes transnational corporations to national states should 
be revised in the light of the international and competitive relations between the states 
(G8, G5). This scenario may not be clear enough if we think in terms of “capitalism,” but 
it becomes clear if we think in terms of “capital/modernity”—the emerging states are no 
longer willing to follow the dictates of U.S. or the European Union to modernize but, 
rather, follow the dictates of their own experiences and needs. It is in this new scenario 
that a global political society is emerging, calling for decolonial thinking and decolonial 
political and epistemic options.
 25. Brazil most likely will take the leadership in the constitution of UNASUR (Unión 
Suramericana), which would only resemble the European Union, with its dominating 
“heart of Europe” (in Hegel’s metaphor), “integrating” the periphery. UNASUR would 
be like a Central or Eastern European Union in confrontation with England, France, and 
Germany, as UNASUR is being created basically to avoid the U.S. (as well as other intru-
sions) into the region.
 26. Capital (from the Online Etymology Dictionary) c.1225, from L. capitalis “of the 
head,” from caput (gen. capitis) “head” (see head). A capital crime (1526) is one that af-
fects the life, or the “head.” The noun for “chief town” is first recorded 1667 (the O.E. word 
was heafodstol). The financial sense (1630) is from L.L. capitale “stock, property,” neut. of 
capitalis. Of ships, “first-rate, of the line,” attested from 1652. Capital letters (c.1391) are 
at the “head” of a sentence or word. Capitalism first recorded 1854; originally “the condi-
tion of having capital;” as a political/economic system, 1877. Capitalist is 1791, from Fr. 
capitaliste, a coinage of the Revolution and a term of reproach.
 27. The arguments asserting and enacting “de-Westernization” are already well ad-
vanced in East and Southeast Asia. See Kishore Mahbubani. The New Asian Hemisphere: 
The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East, 2008.
 28. This story told by Nebrija himself in the prologue to his grammar of Castilian lan-
guages (printed in 1492) is well known. In connection with this argument, it is analyzed 
in Walter D. Mignolo, 1995, The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality and 
Colonization, Chapter 1.
 29. A useful counterpart for the Atlantic empires is Anthony Pagden’s Lord of All the 
World: Ideologies of Empires in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500–c. 1800, 1995.
 30. A system of charges in the Spanish colonies, by means of which a group of in-
dividuals owed retributions to other groups (the colonizer) in terms of labor or other 
means.
 31. It is perhaps worthwhile to state that we limit the meaning of “imperial differ-
ences” to the formation of the modern/colonial world sustained and structured by the 
colonial matrix of power. In this regard, “imperial differences” do not apply, for example, 
to the relations between the Ottoman and the Mughal Sultanates, in the same way that 
“colonial difference” does not apply to their internal organization. By “imperial” and 
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“colonial difference,” we mean a racial (ontological and epistemic) difference that began 
to be construed by Christian theology in the sixteenth century, then extended itself, and 
transformed into secular philosophy. “Imperial difference” implies, for instance, to de-
scribe the relations between Western imperial formations and the Ottoman Sultanate (or 
today between the West and China, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other), but not 
the other way round.
Chapter 2
 32. Any dictionary would have something like this as a definition of epistemology: a 
branch of philosophy that investigates the origin, nature, methods, and limits of human 
knowledge. But, who were the philosophers who contributed to that definition; what 
were the sociohistorical conditions in which their thought unfolded; and what were the 
needs to which their thought responded? Border thinking and epistemology emerges 
from bodies and subjects that “human knowledge” cast as to be not human enough to 
have knowledge. Border thinking is always thinking in conflictive dialogue with impe-
rial epistemology, “the dominant branch of human knowledge.” Border thinking emerges 
from bodies dwelling in the border between an epistemology that was not theirs, which 
they cannot avoid, and an epistemology that was theirs, which was disqualified. Border 
thinking thinks from the awareness of disqualification.
 33. For example, John Milbank’s (1993) theological critique of the social sciences 
reverts the order of the secular and the sacred in epistemology, but the geohistorical 
location of his thought as well as the unspoken male, white, and Christian identity of 
his discourse are grounded in Greek and Latin categories of thought and articulated in 
the English language. On the other hand, when W. E. B. Du Bois asked “how can one be 
American and Black at the same time?” he established the foundation of a “double con-
sciousness” as an epistemic foundation grounded on the racial colonial difference ([1904] 
1995).
 34. “Third World nationalism” (e.g., India or Algeria) reproduced in the ex-colonies 
the model of “Imperial nationalism” (e.g., England or France), and all ended up in the 
impasse we all know about. “Internal colonialism” was the result, since the first-colonial 
nation-states, in the modern/colonial world, which emerged in the Americas at the end of 
the eighteenth and first decades of the nineteenth centuries. Bolivia now is going through 
an interesting process of border thinking and constitutional decolonization. And, we may 
see a similar experience in Iraq. “Third World nationalism” furthermore remained within 
the monotopic and exclusionary imperial logic, just in the hands of the “locals or natives.” 
Frantz Fanon, instead, opened up the possibility and the need of a double consciousness 
and border thinking of and from the experience of the damnés de la terre. His thoughts 
were far removed from national fundamentalisms.
 35. For example, Deng Zhenglai (http://cuscps.sfsu.edu/Events/deng_zhenglai.htm) 
also claims, in Development of Chinese Social Sciences in the Era of Globalization, that 
Chinese social sciences should keep the open-minded or global orientation as its strat-
egy of development and enhance the dialogue with the West. But at the same time, social 
scientists should also recognize that China is now a country of global significance and no 
longer a country secluded from the dominant/Western discourse. Therefore, globaliza-
tion is a chance for China and Chinese academe to challenge the overtowering Western 
discourse and promote the Chinese interpretation of Chinese history and experience 
n oT E S  To  c h A p T E R  2  •  243
and envision Chinese ideals and world ideals. Problematization and exploration of new 
methods and theory in Chinese social sciences should stem from Chinese history, Chi-
nese modernity, and Chinese transformation. We owe this information to Chunjie Zhang 
(Duke University). See also the robust arguments advanced by Kishore Mahbubani, 
2009.
 36. In his ironic travelog, Five Rivers of Life, contemporary Russian postmodernist 
writer Victor Yerofeyev points out: “A Russian in Europe is like a cockroach. He is run-
ning, moving his whiskers, nervously smelling. He is scandalous for Europe’s clean sur-
face. Europe can contemplate with interest the exotic insects, it would like some kind of 
poisonous tarantula or a caterpillar, ladybirds are a touching site for it, but there are no 
good cockroaches” (Yerofeyev 2000).
 37. A Turkish ironist Orhan Pamuk, in The Black Book, says: “The customer,—one of 
the shop-keepers said,—does not want to put on an overcoat that he sees every day in the 
street on the shoulders of mustached, bow-legged and emaciated compatriots. He wants 
to put on a jacket that arrived from a distant unknown country, and that is worn by new 
and beautiful people. He wants to believe that once he puts on this jacket he will trans-
form himself, he will become a different person . . . It is for this reason that they invented 
revolution in dress, shaved off the beards and even changed the alphabet . . . The custom-
ers in fact are buying not clothes, but dreams. They wish to buy a dream to be the same as 
those who wear the European dress” (Pamuk 2000).
 38. The Ottoman Sultanate and Russia had a lot in common. The Ottoman territorial 
expansion was stopped early in history because, to unite with their ethnic and cultural 
“relatives” in Central Asia, the Turks already in the sixteenth century had to (and could 
not) bypass Shiite Persia, which later on resulted in the clash of Russian and Ottoman 
interests in the Balkans. The multiethnic, multiconfessional, and multilinguistic Russian 
Empire, with its extensive principle of conquering the space, started to lose its position 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the presence of capitalist Western empires 
of modernity and had to satisfy its expansionistic appetites mainly in the East and South 
(i.e., in the locales that were drastically different in an ethnic-religious sense from the 
metropolis). Each of these empires was born in the outskirts of its religious-cultural 
oecumena, but with the passing of time, each proclaimed as its imperial mission to take 
the central place: In Russia, it was the famous Moscow as the Third Rome doctrine, ac-
cording to which the ex outskirt of Byzantine empire, which became Christian relatively 
late, claimed the role of Orthodox Christian center, and in Turkey, it was the Central 
Asian, and hence relatively remote from Muslim centers and shrines, origin of Turks, 
who became Muslim only in the tenth century and began to inhabit Anatolia even later 
but soon turned into the most powerful Muslim empire—even if for a relatively short 
period of time. The Ottoman Sultanate had to correspond to this new role, turning from 
the eclectic, in the cultural and religious sense, marginal state into the center of Islamic 
civilization. Embracing Islam, the Turks became the heirs of the ancient high Islamic cul-
ture and here, as well as in Russia, a complex religious configuration of juxtaposing itself 
to both Islam and Christianity was obviously at work. If, in the Russian Empire, it was a 
juxtaposition with Islam (an other religion) and a contrast between Orthodox and West-
ern Christianity (i.e., an internal Christian difference), then in the Ottoman Sultanate, the 
juxtaposition was done not only along the obvious division into Christians and Muslims 
but also within Islam, which was reflected in the rather negative attitude of the Sunnite 
Ottoman Sultanate to Shiites. Religious identification of both Russians and Turks at that 
time was relatively perfunctory, syncretic, and border but was presented certainly as the 
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only true religion on the basis of which the Ottoman and the Moscow imperial myths 
were slightly later created. For more details, see Goodwin (1998), Lieven (2000).
 39. At the time of writing the first version of this chapter, the FAO Summit on the 
food global crisis just ended. During the summit, it was reported that Monsanto, DuPont, 
and Syngenta, the largest companies controlling transgenic seeds and fertilizers, declared 
huge profits. The UN, IMF, and WB concurred that the crisis was human-made and could 
be fixed. It is not a paradox: It is ingrained in the rhetoric of modernity, based on progress 
and salvation of all kinds, while increasing capital accumulation and, in this case, “using” 
people risking starvation as “bodies to feed,” to increase food production, and hence the 
profits of the corresponding corporations. Look around and you will see the same seem-
ing “paradox”: a rhetoric that maintains the faith in progress and development as salva-
tion, while increasing the mechanisms of economic and political control, by maintaining 
a structure of knowledge that justifies development as the only way to freedom and hap-
piness. Any alternative to such structure of knowledge is condemned as antidemocratic. 
La Via Campesina and Food Sovereignty, the two global organizations in the sphere of 
political society working toward the decolonizing knowledge that controls and manipu-
lates the global food crisis, were not invited to this summit. It was limited to transnational 
corporations and international organizations (UN, IMF, World Bank).
Chapter 3
 40. The name “Eurasian studies” itself sounds highly ambiguous. In the Russian mind, 
it immediately evokes Eurasianism as a philosophic-cultural movement of the early twen-
tieth century, going through periodic revivals at the times of nationalist and imperial 
booms, like today. This is not what is meant by the name “Eurasian studies” in the West. 
It rather designates just a presumably objective geographic phenomenon—Eurasia. How-
ever, geography here hides a geopolitical myth. Eurasia in geography means the whole 
continent, which comprises Europe and Asia. Geography does not recognize Berlin walls 
and divisions between Protestantism and Orthodox Christianity or Latin- and Cyrillic-
based languages. Therefore the term “Eurasian studies” is meaningless in a geographic 
sense, because it would mean to study France along with Turkmenia and Spain along with 
China. What is meant by “Eurasian” here is rather a geopolitical and civilizational myth 
of not Europe and not Asia, which Russia stands for. Thus, although Russia itself stopped 
being interesting for Western area studies, its specter is still present in the very name of 
“Eurasian studies.” However, this euphemism seeks to erase Russia and replace its name 
(and former power) with a “new” geopolitics of knowledge.
 41. Several attempts have been made by Russian scholars working within the Frank-
furt school tradition in the last decade to apply postcolonial theory to post-Socialist 
discourse by turning it upside down and assigning the role of the subaltern to the ex-
Russian colonizer in the newly independent states. However, the old geopolitical mod-
els are still obvious in these constructs, as they look mainly at those colonies that have 
always claimed their closeness to Europe (the western Ukraine, the Baltic countries) in 
contrast with Russia coded as an Asiatic empire. This is a cunning rhetoric, as it attempts 
to transfer the Russian imperial guilt and responsibility to the ex-colonial others (Penzin 
2011).
 42. Even the best of the Western experts on Central Asia suffer this Orientalist bent, 
which is clearly seen in the titles of their articles, in the visual representations of the 
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people adorning the covers of their books, which stress the sensational and the exotic 
and abuse the modernity vs. tradition and civilization vs. barbarity dichotomy. See, for 
example, Sahadeo and Zanca 2007.
 43. The mardikors were and are today, in post-Soviet Central Asia, the day laborers 
with no permanent jobs. After the 1916 Turkistan massive revolts against the Czarist Em-
pire, connected among other things with the Russian attempt to force the local population 
to public front-line work, a whole subculture of mardikor insurgent songs and poems 
emerged, many of which remain only in oral form and only recently were collected and 
presented in the Uzbek Memorial of the victims of repression. The usual tactic was to 
collect the oral histories, as if for the future publication, then hide them in inaccessible 
archives and get rid of their reciters (the ozans or shamans), attempting to buy them into 
Socialism by asking them to write odes to the tractor and kolkhoz, or later, to publish the 
dastans in distorted forms, where the liberatory heroic impulse was amputated (Paksoy 
1995a, Tekuyeva 2006a).
 44. This is a question that recently caused a heated discussion among the Western 
ex-Sovietologists, who started to question the formula of divide and rule and attempted 
to prove the presumable good intentions of the Soviets in drawing the Turkistan borders 
by stating that the Bolsheviks were thinking not only about defending the intactness 
of their new empire but also about activating their nation-building and, later, gradual 
nation-dissolving theories and creating a new brand of colonialism. This is the opinion of 
Francine Hirsch (2000) among others. To anyone who has experienced the Soviet power 
from within, this rationale sounds not only simplistic and easily bought into the Soviet 
ideological clanking but also highly cynical, as it presupposes that one can somewhat ex-
cuse the USSR if one proves that it was building a new and better brand of colonialism! In 
all such reasoning invariably alienated from history and from the indigenous subjectivity, 
there is a crucial element missing—that of race.
 45. The yard of my Moscow apartment complex, as well as the majority of other Mos-
cow yards, has been cleaned over the last five years by a family of Uzbeks from Namangan. 
Both the husband and wife have university degrees. He is an engineer and she is a doctor. 
They brought three children, out of five, to clean Moscow streets as well. The children are 
segregated at a Moscow school. The family resides in a construction trailer that, as they 
explained to me, is much better than before, when they stayed in a basement infected by 
rats. The municipal authorities employ them half legally, with a $100 monthly salary, and 
no Moscow “registration,” which makes them vulnerable to any policeman in the street. 
Today, when the economic crisis hit Moscow violently, the Uzbek families are risking 
quick deportation and subsequent starvation at home.
 46. The resistance tactics of the Central Asian peoples were and are similar to those of 
the Caribbean intellectuals, who also resorted to fiction instead of forbidden historiogra-
phy or philosophy, to tell the truth and preserve the link with the past, with the ancestral 
beliefs, with their freedom-fighting legacies. It is resistance in the disguise of fiction that 
we find, for example, in the works of Alisher Ibadinov and other Central Asian writers 
of the Soviet time, most of whom perished in Stalin’s purges. Unfortunately, today, after 
the Central Asian states became independent and it is seemingly the indigenous people 
who are in power there, the same logic of repression persists. A telling case is the fate 
of Mamadali Mahmudov, a writer who, having suffered in Soviet times, received a prize 
for his resistant literary works after the gaining of independence, but then in the 1999 
was imprisoned again, this time, apparently by the new government, which promotes its 
freedom-loving and democratic image (Paksoy 2002).
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 47. Kalpana Sahni correctly points out a process of gradual popularization of racism 
and Eurocentrism in the Soviet period, linked with the erasing of the difference between 
the elite and popular culture. If, in Czarist Russia, Eurocentrism arguably was restricted 
by the aristocracy and middle class strata, in the Soviet Union, it became a commonplace 
discourse among the Soviet people (Sahni 1997: 162). Today, we can trace the remnants 
of the Brezhnev era myth interiorized by Russians and used as a justification for the colo-
nization excesses and neocolonialism. It is a myth first formulated in Lenin’s time and 
depicting the sacrifices of the “great Russian people” for the development of the backward 
nations. Soviet economists and ideologists of the 1970s revamped this myth by adding 
pseudo-scientific grounds to it. In the last decades of the Soviet rule, it was necessary to 
take attention away from the deteriorating living standards of the soon to collapse em-
pire. The economic stagnation was then presented to the Russian majority as entirely a 
fault of Central Asia, which presumably the heroic Russian people constantly dragged to 
their own higher status, risking their own well being and prosperity. This myth continues 
to live today in both Russia and Central Asia and the Caucasus zombified by the Soviet 
propaganda and still generates colonial complexes.
 48. The situation started to visibly change when I was working on the second revision 
of this chapter—the indigenous social movements in practically all former and present 
colonies of Russia/Soviet Union have begun to raise their voices due to various internal 
and external factors.
 49. See a thorough and unbiased report of the event by Shirin Akiner (2005).
 50. In the last several years, an armed resistance has been emerging in the territory of 
historic Circassia. Analysts both in Russia and abroad viewed the Nalchik bloody upris-
ing of October 2005 as Circassia’s entry into a war of liberation. The recent decision mak-
ing Sochi the place of the 2014 Winter Olympics and the large scale preparations for this 
event have stirred up the Circassian resentment globally. Circassian organizations point 
out that, by an irony of history, the 2014 Olympic Games will mark the 150th anniversary 
of the Circassians’ defeat by Russia in 1864 (Tlisova 2007). One of the possible scenarios 
is that the Olympics, if they ever happen in Sochi, might be the match that would light a 
major uprising in the Caucasus, this time centered on the Cherkess people.
 51. In Andijan, it was particularly graphic, as the incident started with the insurgents 
breaking into a local prison and forcibly freeing the prisoners (killing and wounding 
those who refused to obey) then marching them down the main road toward the National 
Security Service, where they were made to stand as a human shield as the insurgents fired 
on the building behind them. The bodies of those killed earlier in prison were thrown in 
front of the railings. See Akiner (2005) for more details.
 52. However, there were links between religion and social movements in Latin Amer-
ica in the past, for instance, in the Peruvian anticolonial movement of Aky Onkoy.
 53. This sentiment is expressed in the attempts to apply the postcolonial discourse 
to an analysis of the Russian situation of the “new subalterns” in the ex-colonies. See, for 
example, Alexei Penzin’s works on this problem (2011).
 54. Thus, in 1851 American popular writer, globetrotter, and publisher Maturin Mur-
ray Ballow (Lieutenant Maturin Murray) wrote a sensational exoticist tale The Circassian 
Slave, or the Sultan’s Favorite. A Tale of Constantinople and the Caucasus (Murray Ballou 
2006), in which he presented Circassia as a prototypal South of Europe populated by 
noble savages: “Circassia, the land of beauty and oppression, whose noble valleys produce 
such miracles of female loveliness, and whose level plains are the vivid scenes of such 
terrible struggles; where a brave, unconquerable peasantry have, for a very long period, 
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defied the combined powers of the whole of Russia, and whose daughters, though the 
children of such brave sires, are yet taught and reared from childhood to look forward to 
a life of slavery in a Turkish harem as the height of their ambition—Circassia, the land of 
bravery, beauty and romance, is one of the least known, but most interesting spots in all 
Europe” (Murray Ballou 2006: Chapter 4).
 55. Nakshbandi was born near Bukhara, where now stands his shrine and mausoleum 
to which thousands of people have been paying homage for six centuries. Nakshbandi 
Sufism was one of the main versions of Islam in this locale for a long time, predictably 
banned in Soviet years. This order was different from other Sufi orders, as it did not stress 
the ascetic life and turning from the real world to the transcendent one but rather spoke 
for the equality of both worlds, the real and the mystical, their existence in each other and 
through each other. This philosophy is marked with a special tolerance and rejection of 
orthodoxy: It regards women as equal to men and allows them into the main parts of the 
mosques along with men.
 56. There are many parallels between the non-European borderlands of Eurasia and 
other locales marked with transcultural impulses. One of them is the idea of a hybrid, 
impure ethnicity, mixed blood. It was the Russian imperial scholars that built the conve-
nient—pure in blood—classification of people living in Central Asia. In reality, they never 
existed. And, even the imperial ideologues themselves realized that. The first Turkistan 
general-governor, von Kaufman, lamented that the local population is mixed and often 
impossible to define in ethnographic terms (Abashin 2004: 49). Moreover, there was a 
specific variant of Central Asian Creoles—the “Sarts”—half Uzbek and half Tadzhic, in 
an ethnic sense and in some elements of the way of life resembling the Tadzhic but speak-
ing a Turkic language (new Uzbek) and not Farsi. And, again, as in the Caribbean or in 
Latin America, a supraidentity made these internal names unimportant for the people 
themselves, because they knew that a certain pan-Turkic identity is working for the unity 
of all Central Asian tribes. The latter was dangerous for the Russians, and Russia fought 
this threat in many ways, from the forceful change of linguistic hierarchy to a population 
census based on binary principles.
 57. Ilkhom comes from an Arabic word meaning “inspiration which God sends to 
the creators.” In 1976, a half-underground club of young artists, musicians, and poets 
called Ilkhom founded a theater studio—the first independent theater in the whole Soviet 
Union—which was to become the center of Tashkent’s alternative aesthetics. Its first per-
formance was at attempt at a transcultural link, as it combined the traditions of the Uzbek 
street theater Maskharaboz with the latest theatrical experimentation, which gradually 
resulted in the creation of specific Ilkhom theatrical principles and school of acting based 
on constant improvisation.
 58. When I was writing the second version of this chapter, Ilkhom brought to Moscow 
theater festival The Golden Mask, the two last Weil shows—the most ambitious and pro-
vocative of his projects. I was lucky to attend one of them, Ecstasy with the Pomegranate, 
a sensuous parable of yet another trickster, a Russian by origin, modernist painter Alex-
ander Nikolayev, fascinated with the Orient. He came to Uzbekistan, later became a Sufi 
and turned into Usto Mumin, always driven by an angst and attracted by a transsexual 
Bacha [boy] dancer. This performance is a virtuoso transcultural, transmedia, and global 
phenomenon, not only in its presentation but also in its creation. The androgynous bat-
cha dances were directed by a famous American dancer, writer, director, and founder of 
the modern interracial and intercultural dance group Reality, David Roussève. A talented 
young Uzbek artist, Babur Ismailov, did a fascinating work of adapting Nikolayev’s paint-
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ings for video and animation presentation during the show. An interesting Korean by 
origin composer, Artyem Kim, created a delicate, sensuous, and suggestive soundtrack of 
the Ecstasy, based on rhythmical leitmotifs repeated in various media—from traditional 
musical instruments to voice and even pebbles in a big metal pot. As a result, a border 
performance emerged, always balancing on the edge of various art forms, languages (Weil 
uses Anzaldúa’s type of bilingual repetition with variation when a phrase is first said in 
Uzbek then repeated in Russian but with a deviation), rhythms (traditional Uzbek mixing 
with Caribbean), symbols (e.g., queer semiotics interchanges with Sufi).
 59. The abundance of English-speaking universities in Central Asia is particularly 
symptomatic in relation to the Amawtay Wasi phenomenon, as it demonstrates how easily 
indigenous cosmology, knowledge, and thinking can be appropriated, neutered, and used 
as a new multicultural edition of mind colonization. A perfect example of such initiative 
from above (as opposed to Amawtay Wasi, as the indigenous people project from below) 
is the regional internationally charted University of Central Asia, cofounded in 2000 by 
the heads of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzia, and Tajikistan under the supervision of and with the 
money from “his highness” the Aga Khan, the Imam [spiritual leader] of the Shia Imami 
Ismaili Muslims since 1957 and a representative of a small expatriate Muslim top elite in 
the West (UCA 2011). The university is positioned as promoting the Central Asian Moun-
tain Societies and their cultural and economic heritage in the new world order. Yet, the 
curricula and specializations, the tuition in English, and other telling details demonstrate 
that the university is going to make Western style experts and new local elites according 
to the new old formula: ethnic-national-regional in its form, neoliberal-capitalist in its 
essence.
Chapter 4
 60. In 2002, the Slavic Review organized a discussion on the meaning of race in the 
USSR, where opinions differed from Eriz Weitz’s (2002) parallel between Nazi and Soviet 
racial politics, even if there was no clearly defined idea of race in the Soviet Union, in 
his view, and Francine Hirsch’s (2002) opposite idea of the clear Soviet definition of race 
accompanied by an incoherent and often inconsistent racial politics. In good faith, the 
American scholars tried to analyze Soviet modernity without paying much attention to 
its darker colonial side or listening to the colonized/racialized/gendered voices. In reality, 
the Soviet racial othering is not unique for any modernity/coloniality, as it is based on the 
familiar operation of divesting the (unreformable) enemy of its human nature to justify its 
annihilation. On top of that, there was always a gap between the official racial ideological 
discourses and rhetoric in the USSR and the real practices of the Janus-faced empire.
 61. The exception in this case was the Orientalistic interpretation of the homosexual 
problematic, particularly, homosexuality between grown men and young boys, especially 
in the form of the “bacha cult,” which was ostracized by the Russian empire and later 
banned by the Soviet authorities and presented as an inherent part of Central Asian law. 
It was not directly linked to Islam though. Lesbianism figured in these accusations much 
less frequently, although it also was regarded as a direct and unhealthy result of female 
seclusion and a harmful medieval or bourgeois survival.
 62. For instance, she makes a viable comparison of the Uzbekistan national gender 
project and those of Turkey, but she fails to mention that both cases represent the realm of 
n oT E S  To  c h A p T E R  5  •  249
subaltern empires and their colonies and the specific identity generated catching up with 
modernity.
 63. The majority of Kamp’s elaborations can be found in earlier books and articles 
by Uzbek gender activist M. Tokhtakhodzhayeva, published in Uzbek and in Russian 
(Tokhtakhodzhayeva 1996, 1999, 2001), with only a brief reference in Kamp’s book. 
This testifies to the asymmetry of knowledge production and distribution—as anything 
that Kamp would write will be by definition more reliable in the academic world than 
Tokhtakhodjayeva’s or Shakirova’s works, as they are assigned the role of native infor-
mants and diligent pupils of Western feminists and gender theorists. Therefore, their 
knowledge is appropriated by the West and reproduced under a sanctified Western name, 
or sometimes a name that is non-Western but still sanctified by Western education or 
tenure at a Western university. Chandra Mohanty and Jacqui Alexander address this is-
sue in their seminal Feminist Genealogies, Colonial Legacies, Democratic Futures: “Token 
inclusion of our texts without reconceptualizing the whole white, middle-class, gendered 
knowledge base effectively absorbs and silences us. This says, in effect, that our theories 
are plausible and carry explanatory weight only in relation to our specific experiences, but 
that they have no use value in relation to the rest of the world” (Alexander and Mohanty 
1997: xvii).
 64. See an interesting article on body and gender by a Tadzhik scholar Gulnora Be-
knazarova, who nevertheless clings to the outdated pattern of the traditional vs. emanci-
pated women (Beknazarova).
 65. Area studies and Western-style ethnography lie in the basis of an interesting book 
written by the northern Caucasus scholar Madina Tekuyeva, Man and Woman in Adygean 
Culture: Tradition and Modernity (2006a), where one has to read in between the lines to 
fight the methodological constructions that do not fit the described material.
 66. For example, in the Russian and early Soviet Empires, the colonizers demonstra-
tively ignored possible sexual partners from the colonized women as being below their 
status, while the colonial men who chose the Russian/Soviet modernity also preferred 
to marry Russian women, thus elevating their own status by acquiring a more desir-
able (Whiter) partner. Later, the situation reversed, in the sense that the local elites and 
the middle class started to regard the Russian women as sexually accessible and socially 
emancipated but definitely preferred to marry local women from good families who were 
educated and enlightened enough yet continued to act as the bearers of the sanctified lo-
cal tradition.
Chapter 5
 67. On Sylvia Wynter’s ideas on the subject and bibliography, see After Man, Towards 
the Human: Critical Essays on Sylvia Wynter, ed. Anthony Bogues, Kingston and Miami: 
Ian Randle Publisher, 2006.
 68. There are some exceptions, like German Catholic Carl Schmitt, for whom Catho-
lic Spanish intellectual tradition takes precedence over Protestantism, which was crucial 
for his co-national Max Weber who argued for the connection between capitalism and 
Protestant ethics. 
 69. On the distinction humanitas/anthropos, see Nishitani Osamu, “Anthropos and 
Humanitas: Two Western Concepts of ‘Human Beings’,” in Translation, Biopolitics, Co-
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lonial Difference, ed. Naoki Sakai and Jon Solomon. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University 
Press, 2006, pp. 259–74.
 70. See Constitution of Ecuador, Titulo II, Derechos; Capitulo 2, Derechos del Buen 
Vivir (http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/ecuador08.html); Constitu-
con de Bolivia, capitulo cuarto, Derecho de las naciones y pueblos indigenas originario 
campesino, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Bolivia/bolivia09.html. See also 
Annette Aurélie Desmarais, La Vía Campesina: Globalization and the Power of Peasants. 
London and Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2007.
 71. An example of how decolonial humanities are being thought out in Russia, see 
http://www.jhfc.duke.edu/globalstudies/currentpartnerships.html; http://www.jhfc.duke.
edu/globalstudies/Tlostanova_how%20can%20the%20decolonial%20project.pdf,
Chapter 6
 72. See Walter D. Mignolo, “Globalization and the Geopolitics of Knowledge: The 
Role of the Humanities in the Corporate University,” Nepantla: Views from South 4.1 
(2003): 97–119. (Chapter 7 is a modified version of this article.)
 73. See Ngugi Wa Th’iongo, Decolonizing the Mind: The Politics of Language in Afri-
can Literature (1986) and Ignacio Ramonet, “La Pensé Unique,” Le Monde Diplomatique 
(1992): 1.
 74. To make a long story short, I refer only to Lewis Gordon’s Fanon and the Crisis of 
European Man: An Essay on Philosophy and the Human Sciences (1995).
 75. About the Zapatistas’ theoretical revolution, see Walter D. Mignolo, “The Zapatis-
tas’ Theoretical Revolution: Its Historical, Ethical and Political Consequences,” Review. 
Fernand Braudel Center 25.3 (2002a): 245–75.
 76. A copy of Abraham Ortelius’s map can be found at <http:// image.sl.nsw.gov.au/
cgi-bin/ebindshow.pl?doc=crux/a127;seq=11>; this map was published for the first time 
in his atlas titled Theatrum Orbis Terrarum (1570).
 77. For a useful, Eurocentered narrative of citizens and foreigners, see Julia Kristeva, 
Strangers to Ourselves, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (1991).
 78. I am following here a less-known narrative of another conceptualization connect-
ing people to “cities”: see León-Portilla, 2003, 15–35.
 79. I explored this issue in Andean history (and in Aymara’s categories of thought) in 
“Decires fuera de lugar: sujetos dicentes, roles sociales y formas de inscripción,” Revista de 
Crítica Literaria Latinoamericana 21.41 (1995): 9–32. A decolonizing foundation of phi-
losophy leading to the epistemic and hermeneutical shift delinking Greco-Latin catego-
ries of thought reinscribed in the imperial languages of modernity could be found in the 
pioneering work of Rodolfo Kusch, an Argentinian philosopher of German descent. See 
his La negación en el pensamiento popular (1975) and El pensamiento indígena y popular 
en América (1971) in Obras Completas, Vol. II (2000), 255–546.
 80. Stories are being told of Chinese people going to the West then returning to 
China, being welcomed, and initiating companies, small and large, which in part explains 
the Chinese economic boom in the past twenty years. That is not the case for those from 
countries like Bolivia, Tanzania, or Tunisia. The various types of frontiers and citizen mo-
bility are strictly related to colonial and imperial differences and to the economic world 
structures that the colonial and imperial differences contributed to creating and main-
taining.
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 81. Arguments are often advanced that sound like a reaction to the situation in the 
U.S. rather than an analysis of racism in the modern colonial world. Poverty, in the sense 
that the term has in the modern colonial and capitalist world and racism are two sides of 
the same coin: The Industrial Revolution would not have been possible without the Colo-
nial Revolution in the sixteenth century.
 82. As with any key category of thought, the decolonial shift needs to be articulated 
within the conceptual package of Western epistemology (i.e., Greek and Latin translated 
into modern imperial languages—Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, French, German, and 
English) and to work out the displacement, the fracture, the colonial or imperial differ-
ences rearticulated from the perspective of coloniality. As Ali Shariati would say, why shall 
we study the Q’uran with the instrument and principles of the social sciences and the hu-
manities and not reflect on the social sciences and the humanities from the instruments 
and epistemic principles we find in the Q’uran? (See Alí Shariati, On the Sociology of Islam 
[1979], 44–45.) Something similar happens with pacha-sophy, looking at the Greek philo-
sophical legacy from the categories we find in the Aymara language.
Chapter 7
 83. On October 20, 2010, a meeting was held in Canada to consider the possibility of 
a common higher-education framework, similar to the European Plan Bologna (http://
chronicle.com/article/A-Common-Higher-Education/125062/). In February 2011, the 
government of the U.S. appointed a National Commission on the Humanities, http://
www.dukenews.duke.edu/2011/02/rhbhumanities.html.
 84. See Natalia Vinelli’s interview with Felipe Quispe (2002). Quispe, also known as 
El Mallku, is a Bolivian indigenous activist and leader. Now in his ﬁfties, he is finishing a 
PhD in history at the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés.
 85. To make a long story short, each time that I write “coloniality,” just think about 
the other side, the darker and obscure side of “modernity.” And remember that there is 
not and cannot be modernity without coloniality. The reason why “coloniality” sounds 
odd and remains invisible is that the histories of modernity have been told from the per-
spective of modernity itself! As is often said, it is difficult to understand and feel poverty 
while standing in the marina in Marseilles, looking at the sun set in the Mediterranean. Of 
course, you can “conceive” of colonialism and “know” that there are poor people around. 
But, that is a different story.
 86. As far as the history of science is concerned, Mexico provides a good example to 
be contrasted with that of India; see Prakash 2000; see also Gortari 1979. As for the “origi-
nal” scientiﬁc revolution, that is, the metropolitan one that gets exported to and imported 
into the colonies, see Jardine 1999.
 87. See Tünnermann Bernheim 2001. On “coloniality of knowledge,” see Lander 
2000.
 88. For a critical and historical overview of the modern (that is, postindependence) 
university in Chile, see Thayer 1996. For a historical and critical historical overview, see 
the classic Readings 1996. Both books generated interesting debates. The one on Thayer’s 
book was published in Nepantla 1 (Quijano 2000): 229–82. The debate on Readings’s 
book was published in Smith 1996. See also Sousa Santos [1987] 1998, on “the idea of the 
university,” and Hinkelammert 2002. For an analysis of the United States and Japan, see 
Miyoshi 2000.
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 89. For the peculiarities of the U.S. university during the Cold War, see Chomsky et 
al. 1997. For the crisis of the university in Latin America during the post–Cold War years, 
see North American Congress on Latin America 2000.
 90. For more information about the structure and goals of the Universidad Intercul-
tural, see Macas 2000, Macas and Lozano 2000, and “Universidad Intercultural” 2002.
 91. See also Multinational Monitor 2002. The special issue of the Boletín ICCI-RIMAI 
from which the quotation is drawn is devoted entirely to the Universidad Intercultural 
and provides ample information related to the issues I bring up here.
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